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CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY
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JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice)
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
100 Northern Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000
Fax: +1 617 523 1231
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice)
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice)
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
1900 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000
Fax: +1 202 346 4444
Attorneys for Defendant
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO DIVISION
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS LITIGATION
Case No. 3:21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO STAY PENDING
RESOLUTION OF RULE 23(f)
PETITION
Date:
September 16, 2025
Time:
TBD
Ctrm:
2D – 2nd Floor
Judge:
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
FILED PROVISIONALLY UNDER SEAL PURSUANT
TO STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB Document 513-1 Filed 07/03/25 PageID.29679
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RELEVANT BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7
I.
Judicial Efficiency Supports Staying Proceedings Until the Ninth
Circuit Decides the Propriety of Class Certification. ...................................... 7
II.
This Case Satisfies the Nken Standard for a Stay. .......................................... 8
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 12
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO
DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc.,
2020 WL 804403 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) .............................................. 2, 9, 10
Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
2012 WL 5818300 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) ............................................. 11, 12
C.B.S. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp.,
716 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) ................................................................... 8
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall,
300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) ................................................................................ 7
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978) ........................................................................................... 12
Davis v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings,
2024 WL 489288 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024), cert. granted in part,
2025 WL 288305 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2025) ................................................................. 3
Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto Enters., LLC,
968 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 12
Durruthy v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC,
2021 WL 254194 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) ......................................................... 8
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,
2015 WL 4397175 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) ........................................................ 2
Great Am. E&S Ins. Co. v. Dye Precision, Inc.,
2024 WL 4529578 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2024) ....................................................... 7
Hart v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
2019 WL 7940684 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019) ................................................... 7, 8
In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig.,
268 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ......................................................................... 6
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DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY
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Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis,
605 U.S. __, 2025 WL 1583302 (2025) ............................................................... 4
Landis v. North American Co.,
299 U.S. 248 (1936) ............................................................................................. 7
Leiva-Perez v. Holder,
640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 9, 10
Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc.,
2020 WL 773253 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) ................................................ 11, 12
McFaddin v. E.A. Renfroe & Co.,
2015 WL 13774232 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2015) ...................................................... 7
Nguyen v. Marketsource, Inc.,
2018 WL 2182633 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) .................................................... 11
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ......................................................................................... 8, 9
Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods
LLC,
31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) ........................................................................ passim
Pena v. Taylor Farms Pacific, Inc.,
2015 WL 5103157 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) ................................................... 11
Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................... 8, 9, 11
Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc.,
835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) .............................................................................. 5
Salhotra v. Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc.,
2022 WL 1091799 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) ..................................................... 2
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413 (2021) ......................................................................................... 2, 3
Van v. LLR, Inc.,
61 F.4th 1053 (9th Cir. 2023) ........................................................................... 4, 5
Wang v. Abbott Lab'ys,
2022 WL 16951658 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2022) ............................................... 7, 8
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DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY
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Zinser v. Accufix Rsch. Inst., Inc.,
253 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................. 6
Other Authorities
12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3) ........................................................................................... 5
Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation
E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z),
81 Fed. Reg. 83968 (Nov. 22, 2016) .................................................................... 5
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Order, at 7. As the Court explained, when an appellate “decision will likely inform
on the proper standard to apply,” “the orderly course of justice and judicial economy”
support staying this action pending the higher court’s decision. Id. The same is true
of BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition, should the Ninth Circuit accept it.
Meanwhile, discovery in this MDL is effectively complete, and dispositive
motion deadlines were vacated (id. at 9) and have yet to be re-set. It would be
extremely inefficient and would likely cause significant prejudice to BANA to force
this case to barrel further toward a class trial or a class-wide decision on the merits
under Rule 56 when there is a substantial likelihood that the Ninth Circuit will review
whether this case can proceed on a class-wide basis in the first place. Moreover,
staying proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit’s Rule 23(f) review would cause no
harm or prejudice to Plaintiffs because, as this Court is well aware, every single class
member has already received more than full compensation for their alleged damages.
E.g., Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 8. District courts routinely stay proceedings pending a
request for Rule 23(f) review.2 This Court should do the same here, and wait to issue
a revised scheduling order until after the Ninth Circuit decides whether to accept
BANA’s petition.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification on August 29, 2024. Dkt.
324, Class Cert. Mot. BANA opposed on October 24, 2024, arguing in part that the
Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021),
precludes class certification in this case. Dkt. 349, Class Cer. Opp., at 34-35. BANA
posited that TransUnion established that “[e]very class member must have Article III
2 See e.g., Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc., 2020 WL 804403, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020)
(staying case “in its entirety pending resolution of Plaintiff's Rule 23(f) petition, and
if the petition is granted, Plaintiff’s Ninth Circuit appeal”); Salhotra v. Simpson
Strong-Tie Co., Inc., 2022 WL 1091799, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) (staying
litigation pending ruling on Rule 23(f) petition); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM
Radio, Inc., 2015 WL 4397175, *5 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (staying case “pending
the resolution of [defendant]’s forthcoming Rule 23(f) petition to the Ninth Circuit
and possible appellate proceedings”).
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO
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standing”—i.e., a “concrete injury in fact”—“in order to recover individual
damages,” and that “Plaintiffs’ putative classes include multiple types of cardholders
with no injury,” including specific individuals that BANA identified within the class
where the evidence strongly suggested that they defrauded EDD with fraudulent
benefits claims and BANA with fraudulent unauthorized transaction disputes. Id.
(citing TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431-33). Moreover, BANA asserted that the
consumer-specific evidentiary process required to distinguish class members who
were actually injured from those who were not “defeats predominance,” and
therefore precludes certification. Id.
In response, Plaintiffs pointed the Court repeatedly to Olean, arguing that
under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, “Rule 23 does not preclude ‘certification of a
class that potentially includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class
members,’” even when faced with evidence that their class as defined includes not
just members lacking Article III injury but known criminal fraudsters. Dkt. 378,
Class Cert. Reply, at 2 (quoting Olean, 31 F.4th at 669); see also id. at 3, 15. Plaintiffs
did not dispute that these class members lack injury or standing under Article III—
they just claimed it “would not be enough to preclude certification” and is a “tiny
percentage,” anyway. Id. at 15. The Court heard argument on Plaintiffs’ motion on
January 17, 2025. Dkt. 408.
After the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, and before the Court issued its
decision, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Davis v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, specifically to
decide “[w]hether a federal court may certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any
Article III injury.” 2024 WL 489288 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024), cert. granted in part,
2025 WL 288305 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2025). BANA moved to stay class certification and
dispositive motion practice in this case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in
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argued—and the Court agreed—that they didn’t need one, because BANA had
already done it for them in connection with its regulatory settlement. Dkt. 494, Class
Cert. Order, at 57-59. The Court therefore never required Plaintiffs to prove
predominance, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). See Rule 23(f) Petition at § II.A.1.
Second, BANA argues that in adopting Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition
that “already excludes any person who . . . has previously engaged in fraudulent
Program conduct” (Dkt. 494, Class Cert. Order, at 56), the Court created “a ‘fail safe’
class that is defined to include only those individuals who were injured by the
allegedly unlawful conduct.” Olean, 31 F.4th at 669 n.14 (quoting Ruiz Torres v.
Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1138 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016)). Excluding fraudsters
from the class only once BANA identifies them gets the issue backwards, and is not
what the law requires. District courts must assess the necessity of “a class-member-
by-class-member assessment of the individualized issue” once such an individualized
issue is identified. Van, 61 F. 4th at 1069. The Court did not conduct this assessment
here. And the Court’s misunderstanding of the degree to which EFTA requires
Plaintiffs to shoulder individualized proof compounds the predominance problems.
For example, the Court concluded that class members need not show that their
accounts were “created for personal, family or household purposes”—rather than for
fraudulent or criminal purposes—because EDD accounts are “prepaid accounts.”
Dkt. 494, Class. Cert. Order, at 49-50. But as the CFPB explained when it removed
the phrase “established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” from
the regulation governing prepaid accounts (12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3)), the phrase was
“unnecessary here as it already appears in the main definition of account in [12
C.F.R.] § 1005.2(b)(1), and prepaid accounts are expressly included as a subcategory
within that broader definition.” Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 83968
(Nov. 22, 2016). Correctly interpreted, EFTA requires individualized proof by
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Plaintiffs, which destroys predominance here—a problem that cannot be avoided by
Plaintiffs’ fail-safe class definition. See Rule 23(f) Petition at § II.A.2.
Third, BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition seeks review of the Court’s determination
that “many mini-trials will not overwhelm the proceedings,” because the necessary
fact-intensive analysis will come from BANA’s own records. Dkt. 494 Class Cert.
Order, at 60. Even though BANA has some records, other critical information about
individual class members’ claims will come from either the cardholders themselves
or EDD, not BANA. See Dkt. 494, Class Cert. Order, at 60 (recognizing that EDD
has information regarding cardholders’ entitlement to benefits). Moreover, even if
the whole universe of relevant materials came from BANA’s records, the class-
member-by-class-member review of those records is still exactly the type of
individualized inquiry that defeats predominance. The Court further held that these
mini-trials were irrelevant by holding that Plaintiffs only needed to satisfy Rule 23
when it comes to their “prima facie case.” Dkt. 494, Class Cert. Order, at 51-52.
BANA seeks appellate review of this determination, which is “directly at odds with
the way the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Rule 23(b)(3). The important inquiry is not
whether common issues predominate with respect to plaintiff’s prima facie case, but
rather will common issues predominate in the entire litigation.” In re Wells Fargo
Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 268 F.R.D. 604, 612 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Zinser v. Accufix Rsch. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Simply
because the plaintiff may be able to establish the prima facie case using some form
of common proof does not mean that defendant is limited to common proof when
asserting relevant defenses.” Id. The common issues here pale in comparison to
individual ones regarding Plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages. See also Rule 23(f)
Petition at § II.B.
Class discovery in the MDL is effectively complete. Fact discovery concluded
earlier this year, and expert discovery concluded on June 11, 2025. In connection
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with the Laboratory Corp. stay, the Court vacated the existing deadlines for
dispositive motions, which have yet to be re-set. Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 9. The Court
has scheduled a Case Management Conference for July 17, 2025. Dkt. 509.
ARGUMENT
I.
Judicial Efficiency Supports Staying Proceedings Until the Ninth Circuit
Decides the Propriety of Class Certification.
Some courts in this circuit evaluate stay requests pursuant to the “power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants,” as guided by
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). See, e.g., Great Am. E&S
Ins. Co. v. Dye Precision, Inc., 2024 WL 4529578 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2024);
Wang v. Abbott Lab'ys, 2022 WL 16951658 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2022); Hart v.
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 2019 WL 7940684, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019)
(collecting cases); McFaddin v. E.A. Renfroe & Co., 2015 WL 13774232, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 1, 2015). These courts have reasoned that “the Landis test applies where,
as here, a party seeks only to stay the court’s proceedings, rather than the effect of a
judgment.” Hart, 2019 WL 7940684, at *4. The Landis factors include “(1) ‘the
possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay,’ (2) ‘the hardship or
inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward,’ and (3) ‘the
orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of
issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.’”
Dye Precision, Inc., 2024 WL 4529578, at *3 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d
265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). These factors all point in favor of a stay:
First, there is no “meaningful harm from a stay of this action.” Id. at *4. As
explained infra at 11, and as this Court is well aware, Plaintiffs’ class is defined to
include only those people who have already been paid. See Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at
8. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate hardship. Id. (finding no hardship to Plaintiffs
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because allegedly “injured class members have received direct compensation, and if
sought and approved, consequential damages”). Moreover, any injury Plaintiffs may
suffer from a short delay can be remedied through prejudgment interest on any
monetary damages.
Second, the “hardship” and “inequity” that will result without a stay is patent;
in fact, “both parties could suffer harm if proceedings are not stayed. Depending on
the ruling of the Ninth Circuit on appeal,” “both parties could be required to engage
in duplicative and unnecessary . . . motions practice.” Hart, 2019 WL 7940684, at
*5. As this Court previously found, such hardship and inefficiency supports a stay.
Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 8-9 (citing cases, and finding that “it would be an
unnecessary waste of resources to continue [to] litigate the class action issues,”
including dispositive motion practice, during appellate review of “an issue that will
impact the legal analysis on Rule 23(b)(3)”).
Third, courts are persuaded that the orderly administration of justice weighs in
favor of granting a stay where “a stay [would] simplify the issues.” Wang, 2022 WL
16951658 at *6. It “does not make sense for this Court to expend its time and energy”
deciding dispositive and Daubert motions only for the Ninth Circuit to hold that class
certification is inappropriate. Durruthy v. Charter Commc'ns, LLC, 2021 WL
254194, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (quoting C.B.S. Emps. Fed. Credit Union v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 310 (W.D. Tenn. 1989));
see also Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 8-9 (granting stay of dispositive motions).
II.
This Case Satisfies the Nken Standard for a Stay.
Some courts in this Circuit have evaluated motions for a stay of proceedings
pending a Rule 23(f) appeal using the four factors set out in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418 (2009). There is “substantial overlap” between the two standards and the
outcome is often “the same under either standard.” Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc.,
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383 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 2019). This is such a case: a stay is warranted
under the Nken standard as well.
Under that standard, the court considers four factors in deciding whether to
grant a stay pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.” Romero, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1073 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434); see Alvarez,
2020 WL 804403 at *1 (granting motion to stay case in its entirety pending resolution
of the plaintiff’s Rule 23(f) petition). All four factors weigh in favor of staying this
case in this Court while the Ninth Circuit decides BANA’s Rule 23(f) Petition, and
any subsequent appeal if permitted.
First, BANA’s appeal is likely to succeed on the merits. In order “to justify a
stay, [parties] need not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that they will win
on the merits.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Instead,
parties need only show that they have a “substantial case for relief on the merits,”
meaning a case that raises “serious legal questions” or has a “fair prospect” of
success. Id. at 967-68. BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition easily satisfies this standard. The
Court’s class certification order misconstrued Olean by failing to require Plaintiffs
to propose a method of separating the uninjured from the injured pre-judgment that
would not require thousands of mini-trials, as Rule 23 predominance requires. See
Rule 23(f) Petition at § II.A.1. It also used Plaintiffs’ class definition, which excluded
certain class members determined by BANA to have previously engaged in
fraudulent conduct, but failed to address the relevant question of how Plaintiffs and
the Court would ensure that everyone who engaged in such conduct or was uninjured
would be excluded without individualized inquiries, resulting in a fail-safe class.
These errors were compounded by the Court’s misinterpretation of the degree to
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which EFTA requires Plaintiffs to shoulder individualized proof. See id. at § II.A.2.
Finally, the class certification order’s conclusion that mini-trials will not overwhelm
the proceedings because the evidence for the mini-trials will come from BANA’s
own records is both wrong (other, critical evidence will come from the cardholders
themselves and EDD) and irrelevant (the mini-trials will happen regardless of the
source of the evidence to be presented). See id. at § II.B. These are all “serious legal
questions” that have a “fair prospect” of success on appeal. Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at
967-68.
Second, BANA will be irreparably harmed without a stay, as it faces the risk
of having to litigate this case on a classwide basis while the Ninth Circuit is deciding
whether this case should proceed as a class action at all. Courts in this district have
found that “[t]he costs of pretrial litigation may amount to an irreparable harm . . .
when the costs would impose serious burdens that an appeal would avoid.” Alvarez,
2020 WL 804403 at *2. Indeed, this Court concluded the same when it granted
BANA’s request to stay the matter pending the Supreme Court’s consideration of
Laboratory Corp. See Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 8-9 (granting stay, and finding that
engaging in “unnecessary ‘motion practice, planning and preparing for trial’” would
be an “unnecessary waste of resources” while class action issues remained
undecided). It would be a monumental waste of time and resources for BANA to
defend this case as a class action, only to have to alter its strategy and defend
hundreds of individual suits should the Ninth Circuit grant the Rule 23(f) petition and
ultimately overturn the class certification order. See id.; Alvarez, 2020 WL 804403
at *2-3 (granting motion to stay where risk of having to retry an individual case as a
class action sufficiently established irreparable harm). “It is more efficient for both
parties to know the Ninth Circuit's decision before proceeding.” Alvarez, 2020 WL
804403 at *2. Because “further dispositive motion practice and trial preparation
would prove both costly and premature in the event of remand,” BANA faces
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irreparable harm if this stay is not granted. Pena v. Taylor Farms Pacific, Inc., 2015
WL 5103157, *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (granting motion to stay); see also Dkt.
448, Stay Order, at 8-9.
Third, as this Court previously found, issuance of a stay will not harm
Plaintiffs. Since Plaintiffs seek only monetary damages on behalf of the class which
was defined to include only those people who have already been reimbursed for their
unauthorized transaction claims, and who have already received additional
consequential harm payments pursuant to BANA’s regulatory remediation plan, any
harm from delaying that potential recovery does not justify denying the stay. Dkt.
448, Stay Order, at 8. A stay would delay only Plaintiffs’ attempts to treble those
damages they have already been paid. Dkt. 415-1, Stay Mot. Mem., at 9. As Courts
routinely hold, that is not a sufficient basis to deny a stay. See Dkt. 448, Stay Order,
at 8; Ludlow v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 773253, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
2020) (“Mere delay in receiving damages is an insufficient basis to deny a stay.”);
see also Nguyen v. Marketsource, Inc., 2018 WL 2182633, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 11,
2018) (plaintiff “will . . . not be unduly prejudiced or harmed by a delay in receiving
monetary relief”). In fact, a stay has the potential to benefit Plaintiffs by preventing
unnecessary confusion in the event the class certification order is reversed. Absent a
stay, notice will go out to class members across the state of California. If that class is
later decertified, confusion will abound and Plaintiffs will be confronted with a class
they have communicated with but no longer represent. See Brown v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5818300, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (finding “that the
balance of hardships tips sharply toward a stay in this action” where class
certification notice will go out to 22,000 class members who may require a curative
notice if the Ninth Circuit reverses).
Fourth, the public’s “interest in efficient use of judicial resources” justifies a
stay here. Romero, 383 F. Supp 3d at 1077. Staying this case pending appeal would
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“ensure the proper resolution of the important issues raised in this case by preventing
potentially wasteful work on the part of the court and the parties while the Ninth
Circuit considers the serious legal question raised by Defendant's Rule 23(f)
petition.” Brown, 2012 WL 5818300, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
e.g., Ludlow, 2020 WL 773253, at *3. Indeed, the Court has already decided that
staying this case for the purpose of potential appellate clarity on the predominance
standard served “the orderly course of justice and judicial economy.” Dkt. 448, Stay
Order, at 7. Those reasons are just as compelling now. The Court should stay this
action pending resolution of BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition and, if the petition is
granted, the appeal. Indeed, discovery is effectively complete and there are no
dispositive motion or pretrial deadlines that would need to be vacated if the stay is
granted. Judicial economy is plainly served by delaying the imposition of new
deadlines while the Ninth Circuit decides whether to review this case. Given that
class certification orders are “inherently tentative” and subject to amendment or
reconsideration “at any time” before judgment, it likewise makes little sense for the
litigation to continue under a class certification order that this Court may very well
need to reconsider or revise under a new legal standard after BANA’s 23(f) petition
is decided. See Davidson v. O'Reilly Auto Enters., LLC, 968 F.3d 955, 964 n.7 (9th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.11 (1978)).
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, BANA respectfully requests that the Court grant this
motion and stay all proceedings in this action, including class notice and dispositive
motion practice, pending the resolution of BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition and, if the
petition is granted, BANA’s appeal.
Dated: July 3, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ James W. McGarry__________________
JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice)
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CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES ISO
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JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
100 Northern Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000
Fax: +1 617 523 1231
THOMAS M. HEFFERON (pro hac vice)
THefferon@goodwinlaw.com
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice)
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice)
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
1900 N St. NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: +1 202 346 4000
Fax: +1 202 346 4444
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100)
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500
Fax: +1 617 346 4444
VALERIE A. HAGGANS (pro hac vice)
VHaggans@goodwinlaw.com
LINDSAY E. HOYLE (pro hac vice)
LHoyle@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
Tel: +1 212 813-8800
Fax: +1 212 355-3333
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice)
YChan@jonesday.com
JONES DAY
100 High Street
Boston, MA 02110
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939
Fax: +1 617 449 6999
JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433)
jbrown@myersnave.com
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 278405)
mnazareth@myersnave.com
MEYERS NAVE
600 B Street, Suite 1650
San Diego, CA 92101
Attorneys for Defendant
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by
using the CM/ECF system on July 3, 2025. I further certify that all participants in
the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
Executed:
July 3, 2025
s/ James W. McGarry
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB Document 513-1 Filed 07/03/25 PageID.29697
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