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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice)
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
100 Northern Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000
Fax: +1 617 523 1231
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice)
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice)
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
1900 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000
Fax: +1 202 346 4444
Attorneys for Defendant
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO DIVISION
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS LITIGATION
Case No. 3:21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
DEFENDANT BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A.’S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY
PENDING SUPREME COURT
REVIEW
Date:
April 25, 2025
Time:
1:30 P.M.
Ctrm:
2D – 2nd Floor
Judge:
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB Document 433 Filed 02/28/25 PageID.25715 Page
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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) moved to stay proceedings pending the
Supreme Court’s decision in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis, No.
24-0304, for basic reasons of judicial economy. See Dkt. No. 415 (“Mot.”). Plaintiffs’
opposition (“Opp.,” Dkt. No. 427) misconstrues the standard for a stay, ignores all
possible outcomes in Laboratory Corp., further ignores the undisputed record
evidence of putative class members who plainly lack standing under Article III, and
instead focuses on irrelevant factual distinctions between this case and Laboratory
Corp. Plaintiffs also misstate the length and definition of the requested stay, and
severely overstate the harm associated with briefly delaying the receipt of additional
payments above and beyond the remedial and compensatory monies BANA has
already paid. For these reasons, and those in the Motion, the Court should stay
proceedings in this matter pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Laboratory Corp.
I.
Plaintiffs Ignore the Likely Impact of Laboratory Corp.
As an instant matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize and overstate the standard for
a Landis stay, arguing that BANA must demonstrate that “this case and [Laboratory
Corp.] are factually and legally similar in all material respects.” Opp. at 5–6. The
relevant question under Landis is simply whether a stay will simplify the issues
before the Court, which courts assess by considering whether “the two cases factually
and/or legally overlap.” United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bani Auto Grp. Inc., 2018 WL
5291992, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098,
1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (among the “competing interests” to be weighed in considering
a Landis stay is “the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying
or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law”) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v.
Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)).
Against this standard, the Supreme Court’s decision in Laboratory Corp. is
certain to inform on the key issue underlying Plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification—whether, and to what extent, a class can be certified if it includes
uninjured members. See Mot. at 5–8. Plaintiffs’ position that “nothing but
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speculation” suggests that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Laboratory Corp. will affect
this case (Opp. at 6) is simply untrue. The Court granted certiorari to answer a
question that will determine whether the legal standard the Ninth Circuit announced
in Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651
(9th Cir. 2022), is correct. This Court expressly based its tentative order on Olean.
So there is nothing “speculative” about the notion that Laboratory Corp. will control
here, whatever its outcome.
Plaintiffs concede that there are a “range of possible outcomes” in Laboratory
Corp. (Opp. at 6), but they say nothing about the “possible outcomes” that would
preclude certification of their class, or at least require the Court to reassess Plaintiffs’
arguments for certification against a different standard than the one the Court applied
in its tentative order.
Critically, Plaintiffs have no response at all to the fact that one way the
Supreme Court could decide the question before it is to embrace the strict
interpretation of Article III adopted by the Second and Eighth Circuits, where “no
class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing.” Denny v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Johannessohn v.
Polaris Indus. Inc., 9 F.4th 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2011) (“If members who lack the ability
to bring a suit themselves are included in a class, the court lacks jurisdiction over
their claims.”). Such a decision would preclude certification of Plaintiffs’ putative
class here, and that preclusion of a class action would obviously “simplify[ ] issues”
before the Court. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110.
Plaintiffs claim that BANA “has not presented any evidence that any of the
class members present any indicia of fraud” such that they lack standing (Opp. at 9),
but this assertion is demonstrably false. BANA’s class certification brief cited
multiple examples of individuals identified as putative class members by Plaintiffs’
own expert who engaged in fraudulent conduct, including uncontested evidence that
these individuals themselves made the ATM transactions that they later reported to
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BANA as unauthorized. See Dkt. No. 349 at 19–23. BANA’s Motion further set forth
evidence that many more fraudsters than those explicitly highlighted in its class
certification brief are included in the proposed class. See Mot. at 3. The record
demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ putative class contains some number of fraudsters as the
most dramatic examples of individuals who lack Article III standing.1 Plaintiffs do
not dispute this. Plaintiffs’ response to BANA’s showing was not that these people
do not exist, but rather that the number of them is low enough that their inclusion in
the class does not create “any realistic possibility that individualized inquiries into
class member injury will predominate at trial.” Opp. at 8. It is theoretically possible
that the Supreme Court will decide Laboratory Corp. in a way that will let Plaintiffs
obtain class certification on this basis. But it is also possible that it won’t. See
Petitioner’s Reply to Brief in Opposition, at 2 (identifying a “divergence [] across
some circuits that frame the issue of uninjured class members through the lens of
Article III and those that view the issue of uninjured class members through the prism
of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance”) (cleaned up).
There are myriad possible outcomes in Laboratory Corp. The petitioners are
asking the Supreme Court to overrule Olean. If the Court does so, in whole or in part,
this Court would need to reassess class certification against whatever legal standard
takes its place. There is only one possible outcome that would have no effect at all
on this case. That would be a full adoption by the Supreme Court of the Olean
standard with no further explication on how it might be applied. The certiorari grant
itself is reason to suspect this is not the likeliest of all possible outcomes. The
question in Laboratory Corp. as to the permissibility of uninjured persons in a class
under Article III and Rule 23(b)(3) is a request to overturn relevant, binding Circuit
law. The Supreme Court’s answer to the question presented will not be limited to the
1 Plaintiffs’ reliance on In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., 320 F.R.D. 540 (S.D.
Cal. 2017) is misplaced. See Opp. at 8. There, the court denied the stay because there
was no evidence that there were uninjured members in the class. Morning Song, 320
F.R.D at 545. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs cannot seriously dispute that their class
includes some number of class members who lack standing.
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facts of Laboratory Corp., but will be instructive for any pending and future class
actions where the issue of uninjured class members is in dispute, including this one.
Given this, it is not mere “speculation” that Laboratory Corp. will “likely provide
this Court with substantial guidance, if not new law, that will materially impact the
Court’s decisions in this matter.” Skulevold v. SD&A Teleservices, Inc., 2020 WL
771834, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2020) (granting stay).
Indeed, proceeding with class certification now, based on the Olean standard
cited in the tentative order, when there is a significant chance that the Olean standard
will be overruled or modified, would introduce needless confusion and inefficiency
to this already complex case. If the Court issues a class certification order now, it will
trigger Plaintiffs’ obligation to provide notice to the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B). If any further class proceedings occur following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Laboratory Corp., there will likely need to be supplemental or corrective
notices that will be confusing to the class and create unnecessary work for the parties
and the Court, at a minimum. The high potential for class confusion, and the brief
duration of the requested stay, weigh in favor of postponing class certification—and
the resulting notice—until after the Supreme Court’s decision.
Plaintiffs’ long recitation of differences between the factual record here and in
Laboratory Corp. misses the point. See Opp. 7–8. Whatever factual differences exist
between this case and Laboratory Corp. are irrelevant. The single legal issue before
the Supreme Court is whether the Olean standard that the Ninth Circuit applied in
that case—and that this Court is set to apply here—is a correct interpretation of
Article III and/or Rule 23(b)(3). Should the Olean standard be overturned or
modified, this Court will be required to reconsider its tentative decision on class
certification. For this reason, Plaintiffs’ citation to Wolf v. Carpenter Hazlewood
Delgado & Bolen LLP (Opp. at 7) does not help them. There, the court declined to
issue a stay pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
because it determined that the case before it was governed by a different Ninth Circuit
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ruling than the one being challenged at the Supreme Court. See Wolf, 2021 WL
487889, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2021). As discussed above, Plaintiffs and this Court
both rely explicitly on Olean, which the Supreme Court is poised to review.
As a final backstop to BANA’s arguments on judicial economy and efficiency,
Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that this case will be unaffected by Laboratory Corp.
because even “under the standard articulated by the petitioner in [Laboratory Corp.],
Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing class wide legal ‘injury.’” Opp. at 10. As
already noted, however, that is contrary to the arguments they made in urging the
Court to certify the class, and indeed contrary to the arguments Plaintiffs made three
pages earlier in the same brief, where they recognized the need for individual
inquiries into class member injuries and merely insisted those inquiries would not
predominate. Opp. at 8. Regardless, Plaintiffs’ certification motion relied on the
Olean standard, not on “the standard articulated by the petitioner” in Laboratory
Corp. See Dkt. No. 324 at 15–16; Dkt No. 378 at 2–3, 14–15, 22–24. And their
Opposition further notes that Ninth Circuit cases “such as Olean . . . remain the law
and are controlling.” Opp. at 7. The tentative order indicates that the Court is set to
apply Olean in deciding this question here, not some other standard that the Supreme
Court may adopt in Laboratory Corp. See Tentative Order at 59. Thus, the question
whether Plaintiffs have met their burden under any alternative standard has not been
briefed by either party or addressed by the Court.2
2 In any event, Plaintiffs are wrong on the law about whether or not they have met
the burden articulated by the Petitioner in Laboratory Corp. EFTA does not, as
Plaintiffs suggest (Opp. at 9–10), create statutory and constitutional claims even in
the absence of an injury. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426 (2021)
(“[T]his Court has rejected the proposition that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and
purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”) (internal quotations
omitted). Plaintiffs’ citation to Merisier v. Bank of Am., N.A. (Opp. at 10) is
particularly puzzling. The court there merely noted that certain provisions of EFTA
“that did apply to [plaintiff’s] claims” were “promptly complied with.” 688 F.3d
1203, 1210 n.10 (11th Cir. 2012). Nothing in the footnote Plaintiffs cite, or elsewhere
in the Merisier opinion, stands for the proposition that Plaintiffs can assert an injury-
in-fact under Article III based on alleged procedural violations of EFTA as to
fraudulently submitted claims.
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Given the likely effect of any outcome in Laboratory Corp. on the class
certification decision in this case, the interests of judicial economy and efficiency
weigh in favor of a brief stay.
II.
Plaintiffs Misstate the Equities of the Requested Stay.
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the requested stay would be anything other than short
and definite are belied by the facts. The Supreme Court set Laboratory Corp. for oral
argument on April 29, 2025.3 Based on the Court’s historical practices, it is nearly
certain that the Court will issue its opinion before the Term concludes at the end of
June 2025, only four months from now.4
Plaintiffs express concern about whether the stay would be extended if the
Supreme Court remands Laboratory Corp. to the Ninth Circuit. See Opp. at 11. These
concerns are overwrought. If a remand is required, it would mean the Supreme Court
has issued an opinion overturning or modifying the Olean standard on which the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Laboratory Corp. is based, and a brief delay to ensure that
the correct standard is applied is an obvious example of judicial efficiency. Plaintiffs
do not provide any reason that this Court would need to wait for the Ninth Circuit to
resolve the remanded appeal in Laboratory Corp. before applying the Supreme
Court’s instructions to this case; BANA has not asked for that at this time, and has
expressly requested a stay only pending the issuance of the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Plaintiffs’ citation to Yong v. I.N.S. (Opp. at 13, n. 4) underscores that it is BANA’s
request—not Plaintiffs’ dramatic interpretation—that the Court must assess in
deciding whether the requested stay is appropriate. There, the Ninth Circuit rejected
3 See Calendar of Oral Arguments for the Session Beginning April 21, 2025, available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgu
mentCalApril2025.pdf.
4 See e.g., Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024) (argued April 23, 2024,
decided June 21, 2024); Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 399 (2024) (argued
April 23, 2024, decided June 13, 2024); Moyle v. U.S., 603 U.S. 324 (2024) (argued
April 24, 2024, decided June 27, 2024); Trump v. U.S., 603 U.S. 593 (2024) (argued
April 25, 2024, decided July 1, 2024).
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a stay pending the resolution of a different appeal before it. See 208 F. 3d 1116, 1118
(9th Cir. 2000). Because the district court had stayed proceedings pending the
“resolution of the [related] appeal,” the Ninth Circuit found that the stay was too
indefinite, as it was not tied to the issuance of an opinion and would remain in effect
through a potential appeal of the related action to the Supreme Court and any
subsequent remand proceedings. Id. at 1119. By contrast, BANA does not seek a stay
pending the “resolution” of Laboratory Corp.’s appeal, but only pending the issuance
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case (see Mot. at 1, 10), which is almost
certain to happen within four months.
Plaintiffs also complain about “further delay injected into the proceedings”
(Opp. at 11–12), but fail to reconcile their own contribution to the delay so far via
repeated requests to extend discovery and time to prepare their motion for class
certification. For example, at Plaintiffs’ request, BANA agreed to two joint motions
to extend the deadline for Plaintiffs to file their motion for class certification,
extending their deadline for a total of approximately eight months, from January to
August 2024 (twice the amount of the time of the requested stay). See Dkt. Nos. 197,
274. And the second joint motion was agreed to only after Plaintiffs unilaterally
sought and obtained a second extension of their deadline to file their motion for class
certification over BANA’s strenuous objections. See Dkt. Nos. 226, 229. Plaintiffs
further ignore that they sought the multi-district consolidation that has caused this
case to move slowly from inception, again, over BANA’s objection. See In re Bank
of Am. Cali. Unemployment Benefits Litig., MDL No. 2992, Dkt. No. 54 (J.P.M.L.
June 4, 2021). The fact that Plaintiffs have made choices that have had the result of
prolonging the path of this case towards trial is no reason not to grant the brief
requested stay in the interest of judicial economy here.
Further, Plaintiffs fail to address BANA’s argument that there is no clear
prejudice from delaying additional relief here given that, as defined, the class consists
of people who have already been reimbursed for their unauthorized transaction
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claims and who have already received additional compensation in a manner
approved by two different federal regulators. Mot. at 9. Instead, Plaintiffs make
empty references to the “economic vulnerabilities” of the class and the apparent
“urgency” of these claims (Opp. at 12–13), without acknowledging that what is being
“delayed” here is limited to Plaintiffs’ claimed entitlement to treble and punitive
damages, not remedial measures. See Mot. at 9; see also Vasquez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2008 WL 2518734, at *1 (E.D. Wash. June 20, 2008) (noting that “statutory treble
damages are essentially punitive damages”); Morris v. Parke, 573 F. Supp. 1324,
1326 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (“Of the numerous functions commonly attributed to punitive
damages, the two most frequently named are punishment and deterrence,” not
remediation or compensation.) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs cannot seriously
claim that a delay in effectuating a punitive remedy against BANA by four months
will “cause enormous hardship to [putative] class members” (Opp. at 13), who have
already been made whole. Indeed, none of their cited cases support such a
proposition.5
5 In Behar v. Northrup Grumman Corp. (Opp. at 12), the relief requested went beyond
money damages, and related to the release of toxic chemicals near class members’
homes. See 2024 WL 5275027, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2024) (harm to defendant is
outweighed by “the need for class members to receive clear and prompt notice of the
relevant environmental issues raised in this action”) (emphasis added). In D.C. ex re.
Garter v. County of San Diego (Opp. at 11), the court was concerned about the impact
of a delay on the ability to provide notice to class members exposed to the defendants’
allegedly illegal conduct over the span of twenty years. See 2017 WL 1365693, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017). By contrast, the conduct here occurred only a few years
ago, and over the span of only nine months, and any risk of any present contact
information growing stale is significantly lower given the short nature of the stay
requested. And in Plaintiffs’ remaining cases, the courts denied the stays as contrary
to judicial efficiency and economy, not solely due to prejudice suffered by non-
movants from delayed money damages. See Dowkin v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu,
2014 WL 4904952, at *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 30, 2014) (denying stay where the relevant
appeal “[did] not present any . . . legal issues that will control the result of the instant
case); Campbell v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2008 WL 2345035, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. June 5, 2008) (denying stay of class notice based on potential consolidation
because “consolidation is a purely ministerial act” and “would not affect the scope
of the class that had already been certified.”). As described supra, the judicial
efficiency and economy interests in this case weigh heavily in favor of granting the
stay.
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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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Finally, Plaintiffs contend that BANA has failed to show it would face
sufficient hardship if the stay is denied. See Opp. at 13–14. But the Court’s discretion
under Landis is not guided by the establishment of some threshold of harm alone, but
rather in part by demonstration that the balance of equities tilts in the movant’s favor.
See Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (analyzing the “balance of hardships between the
parties”); see also Wolf v. Lyft, Inc., 2015 WL 4455965, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 20,
2015) (granting stay despite finding that factor of “hardship or inequity” to moving
party did not weigh in favor of the stay under Landis). Further, BANA is only
required make out a “clear case of hardship or inequity” where “there is even a fair
possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to some one else.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d
at 1110 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). Plaintiffs have not shown that a delay in
receiving their claimed treble damages constitutes prejudice, so on balance, the
equities favor a stay.
In any event, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that the burden of
proceeding with motion practice and trial preparation in this scenario is sufficient to
justify a stay. See e.g., Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 2020 WL 804841, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 2020) (granting stay where movant faced possibility of “unnecessarily
expending resources engaging in motion practice and planning and preparing for trial
based on the wrong standard”) (internal quotations omitted); In re Taco Bell Wage
and Hour Actions, 2011 WL 3846727, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2011) (same). In the
next four months before the Supreme Court issues its opinion in Laboratory Corp.,
the applicable case schedule requires the parties to complete expert discovery (by
April 25, 2025), and file all dispositive and pretrial motions (by May 28, 2025). Dkt.
417. It makes no sense for either party to invest significant resources in these
workflows without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s views on the key issue of
whether Plaintiffs’ class can even be certified as defined.
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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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Plaintiffs do not sufficiently rebut BANA’s arguments that the balance of
equities between the parties tips in its favor, and that, together with the interests of
judicial efficiency and economy, warrants the requested stay.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set out in its Motion, BANA
respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion and stay all proceedings in this
action, including the entering of an order on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification,
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Laboratory Corp.6 BANA or the parties
jointly will alert the Court within seven (7) days of the opinion’s issuance, so that the
Court can set a status conference.
Dated: February 28, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
By: s/ James W. McGarry_________________
JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice)
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
100 Northern Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000
Fax: +1 617 523 1231
THOMAS M. HEFFERON (pro hac vice)
THefferon@goodwinlaw.com
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice)
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice)
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com
6 BANA maintains that the current expert discovery deadlines should be stayed to
prevent costly and potentially unnecessary work that may need to be revised in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision. At a minimum, the Court should stay or extend all
deadlines in the matter other than the expert deadlines, including the current pretrial
motion deadline, because the Court’s application of the forthcoming decision in
Laboratory Corp. will necessarily impact arguments and evidence that may be
presented at summary judgment. See Poe v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2023 WL
4695898, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (“district courts generally do not grant
summary judgment on the merits of a class action until the class has been properly
certified and notified”) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, it makes little sense for
the parties to move for summary judgment before the standard governing certification
is announced less than a month after the current May 28, 2025 pre-trial motion
deadline. Plaintiffs cannot seriously argue that the putative class members—each of
whom has already been more than fully compensated for any alleged harm—would
be unfairly prejudiced by such a brief extension.
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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB
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GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
1900 N St. NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: +1 202 346 4000
Fax: +1 202 346 4444
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100)
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500
Fax: +1 617 346 4444
VALERIE A. HAGGANS (pro hac vice)
VHaggans@goodwinlaw.com
LINDSAY E. HOYLE (pro hac vice)
LHoyle@goodwinlaw.com
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018
Tel: +1 212 813-8800
Fax: +1 212 355-3333
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice)
YChan@jonesday.com
JONES DAY
100 High Street
Boston, MA 02110
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939
Fax: +1 617 449 6999
JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433)
jbrown@myersnave.com
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 278405)
mnazareth@myersnave.com
MEYERS NAVE
600 B Street, Suite 1650
San Diego, CA 92101
Attorneys for Defendant
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
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DEFENDANT’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO STAY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by
using the CM/ECF system on February 28, 2025. I further certify that all participants
in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
Executed:
February 28, 2025
s/ James W. McGarry
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