14O1 — In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation (Dkt. 591-49, S.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-02992)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 591-49 · 2025-10-17 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

DX 14.O.1
FILED 
PROVISIONALLY 
UNDER SEAL WITH 
REDACTIONS 
PURSUANT TO 
STIPULATED 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
IN RE BANK OF AMERICA  
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
Case No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
 
EXPERT REPORT OF J. DANIEL KREIS 
 
March 4, 2025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
I. 
ASSIGNMENT ................................................................................................................... 1 
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................................................................... 1 
III. 
FACTS AND DATA CONSIDERED................................................................................. 4 
IV. 
HOURLY RATE ................................................................................................................. 4 
V. 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS .............................................................................................. 4 
VI. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 5 
A. 
The EDD Debit Card Program .................................................................................... 5 
B. 
Overview of the Bank’s Claims Operation ................................................................. 6 
C. 
The Bank’s Use of the Claim Fraud Filter .................................................................. 9 
VII. STATEMENT AND EXPLANATION OF OPINIONS ................................................. 10 
A. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a  
debit card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has 
conducted an adequate investigation of that claim that includes the review of all 
available relevant records. ......................................................................................... 10 
B. 
The Bank’s
 and related training materials for claims analysts provide  
sensible procedures for EFTA/Reg E compliance that are consistent with well-
established industry standards for investigating unauthorized transaction claims. ... 13 
C. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant 
departure from the Bank’s
 ............................................................................ 28 
D. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to  
industry standards. ..................................................................................................... 31 
E. 
The Bank could have adopted strategies other than CFF Indicator 1 to deal with  
any operational challenges related to EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized  
ATM withdrawals, including prioritizing investigation of higher-value claims and 
hiring or contracting additional claims analysts. ....................................................... 35 
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F. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD cardholders 
was contrary to industry standards. ........................................................................... 36 
G. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards.................... 38 
H. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny claims, 
rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts,
 
 was contrary to industry standards. .................... 43 
I. 
The claim denial letter that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims  
were denied, or whose prior permanent credit was rescinded, by CFF Indicator 1  
was contrary to industry standards. ........................................................................... 50 
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I. 
ASSIGNMENT 
1. 
I have been retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel in In re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3-21-md-02992-GPC-MSB, to provide expert 
opinions on the following topics related to cardholders who received unemployment and other 
benefits payments from the California Employment Development Department (“EDD”) on 
prepaid debit cards (“EDD debit cards”) issued by Bank of America (the “Bank”) during the 
period March 2020 through June 8, 2021: 
a. 
Whether the Bank’s policies and practices for investigating and 
decisioning unauthorized transaction claims (“claims”) made by EDD debit cardholders (“EDD 
cardholders”) were consistent with financial industry standards for investigating and decisioning 
claims. 
b. 
Whether the Bank’s policy and practice of using its Claim Fraud Filter to 
rescind permanent credits was consistent with financial industry standards for investigating and 
decisioning claims. 
c. 
Whether the Bank’s policy and practice of using its Claim Fraud Filter to 
freeze EDD cardholder accounts was consistent with financial industry standards for freezing 
cards and accounts. 
d. 
Whether there were other available strategies that the Bank reasonably 
could have used to deal with claims submitted by EDD cardholders. 
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS 
2. 
I am the principal of First Camden Consulting, a limited liability company based 
in Maryland that I founded in 2019. Through First Camden Consulting, I provide consulting, 
project management, training, and related services to consumer-facing financial institutions, 
particularly as relates to designing, implementing, and improving policies, practices, and systems 
for detecting and investigating suspicious transactions and fraud involving consumer electronic 
payments, especially payments involving credit cards and debit cards. 
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3. 
I have 42 years of experience in the field of consumer electronic payments. 
During my career, I have designed, implemented, developed, managed, and consulted on 
consumer payment systems and operations for major financial institutions, businesses, and U.S. 
government agencies, with a focus on consumer fraud analytics and operations. Since 1996, I 
have been retained to consult on these topics by over 100 financial institutions, businesses, and 
government agencies in 17 countries. I have significant experience and expertise in industry 
standard policies, practices, and procedures for detecting fraudulent transactions and for 
investigating and resolving consumer claims of unauthorized transactions, both under the 
Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regulation E (“EFTA/Reg E”) framework applicable to debit 
cards, and the similar Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z (“TILA/Reg Z”) framework 
applicable to credit cards. 
4. 
A sampling of my experience includes the following engagements: 
a. 
From June 1982 to August 1989, I held several positions at First Omni 
Bank (now M&T Bank), a regional bank that led in the development of automated teller machine 
(“ATM”) networks and risk management technologies. I had several job titles and roles, 
including Group Vice President of Risk Operations, which required managing a staff of 
approximately 150 full-time equivalent employees and overseeing the bank’s fraud investigations 
related to deposit accounts, including under EFTA/Reg E.  
b. 
From August 1989 to October 1995, I was the Regional Director at FICO, 
a leading developer of fraud management tools for financial institutions globally. In that role, I 
managed FICO’s Mid-Atlantic and Mexican markets, working with FICO’s financial institution 
customers, including major banks, in the development and execution of their consumer fraud 
analytics and fraud management strategies. This included working with a top-three (by assets) 
U.S. bank1 in the development and implementation of an early version of the Falcon fraud 
 
1 The name of the bank is not disclosed here because, as is common in the industry, the 
consulting engagement was subject to a non-disclosure agreement. 
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model, which is a widely used tool in the financial industry for fraud management, including for 
detecting suspicious and potentially fraudulent or illegal transactions. 
c. 
From October 1996 to January 2021, I was the Director of Portfolio 
Management at First Annapolis Consulting (now part of Accenture). In that role, I managed a 
team that consulted with over 100 financial institutions with a focus on consumer payments risk 
and operations management. Approximately 70% of my team’s engagements included an 
assessment of our financial institution clients’ fraud management practices. While subject to non-
disclosure agreements, a sampling of my engagements included (i) Large Regional Bank: 
designed fraud operations for new consumer credit card offering, including the policies and 
procedures for investigating cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims in compliance with 
Regulation Z; (ii) Top 3 U.S. Retailer: managed all fraud-related functions and operations for the 
retailer’s private label credit card, including operations for investigating and decisioning 
cardholders’ claims of unauthorized transactions; (iii) U.S. Financial Regulator: acted as the 
regulator’s agent for 11 months in managing the back-office operations and winding-down and 
sale of a failed bank, including management of the call center that handled customer calls 
following the simultaneous closure of more than 500,000 card accounts; (iv) Leading U.S. Bank: 
designed and implemented all fraud operations for a major new consumer credit card offering; 
(v) Top 3 U.S. Card Issuer: developed plan for card issuer’s collections call center, which had 
hundreds of agents, to implement artificial intelligence systems for improving and streamlining 
call center’s regulatory compliance and other back-office operations. 
d. 
From 2021 to 2024, I was as a co-founder and the Director of Credit and 
Operations of Percapita, a New York City-based financial technology company that provides 
banking services to historically underserved communities. In that role, I managed the design, 
implementation, and development of the policies and procedures for fraud identification, 
investigations, and recovery practices for Percapita’s debit card offering. This included managing 
the company’s policies and procedures for investigating and decisioning claims of unauthorized 
transactions in compliance with EFTA/Reg E. 
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5. 
My curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix A. I have not testified as an expert 
witness at trial or by deposition during the last four years. 
III. 
FACTS AND DATA CONSIDERED 
6. 
In preparing this report, I relied on my knowledge, training, experience, and 
expertise accumulated during my 42-year career in consumer payment systems and operations. I 
also relied on the Plaintiffs’ complaint, documents and information produced in discovery in this 
case, and documents and information that are publicly available. The specific materials I relied 
upon are cited in this report and in the list attached as Appendix B.  
7. 
My work on this matter is ongoing and I may review additional materials or 
conduct further analysis. I reserve the right to supplement, amend, and revise my opinions in this 
report, including based on additional materials made available to me.  
IV. 
HOURLY RATE 
8. 
I am being paid for my work on this case at the rate of $450 per hour, which is not 
contingent on the opinions I express or the outcome of this matter. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS2 
9. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a debit 
card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has conducted an adequate 
investigation of that claim that includes the review of all available relevant records. 
10. 
The Bank’s
and related training materials for claims analysts provide sensible procedures for compliance 
with the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E (“EFTA/Reg E”) that are consistent with 
well-established industry standards for investigating unauthorized transaction claims. 
 
2 All opinions stated in this report, including all opinions about what is consistent with or 
contrary to industry standards or contrary to industry standards, apply to the Class Period, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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11. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant departure from the 
Bank’s
12. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to industry standards. 
13. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD cardholders was contrary to 
industry standards. 
14. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards.  
15. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny claims, 
rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts, despite
 was contrary to industry standards. 
16. 
The claim denial notices that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims it 
denied, or whose permanent credits it rescinded, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud 
Filter failed to meet industry standards for providing notice of a denied claim. 
VI. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3 
A. 
The EDD Debit Card Program 
17. 
I understand that the California Employment Development Department (“EDD”) 
administers programs concerning unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and other public 
benefits (“EDD benefits”) payable to California residents. Throughout 2020-2021, I understand 
that EDD had contracted with the Bank to handle the distribution of EDD benefits through Visa-
branded prepaid debit cards, often referred to as “EDD debit cards.” My general understanding is 
that installments of each EDD benefits recipient’s EDD benefits were periodically deposited into 
 
3 This factual overview is based on my experience in the financial services industry, and my 
review of the deposition transcripts and all other documents cited herein and in Appendix B. 
 
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that recipient’s Bank of America EDD debit card account, and that the Bank issued each 
recipient an EDD debit card to access the EDD benefits in their account. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. 
Overview of the Bank’s Claims Operation 
18. 
EFTA/Reg E is a major regulatory compliance issue for banks and other 
consumer-facing financial institutions. When a debit cardholder contacts their card issuer5 to 
report an unauthorized transaction involving their debit card or associated account, this is often 
referred to in the industry as “making an unauthorized transaction claim.” When a cardholder 
makes an unauthorized transaction claim, it triggers a series of rights and obligations under 
EFTA/Reg E’s “error resolution” procedures. In general terms, if a debit cardholder reports an 
unauthorized transaction to their card issuer, the EFTA/Reg E error resolution procedures 
typically require the card issuer to open an unauthorized transaction claim, conduct an investigation 
of the transaction, and reimburse the cardholder for the amount of the transaction unless the card 
issuer’s investigation shows that the cardholder authorized or benefited from the transaction.   
19. 
The following describes the typical process in the industry by which a card issuer 
opens an unauthorized transaction claim. The process typically begins when the cardholder calls 
the card issuer’s customer service phone line and informs a customer service agent that there is a 
transaction or transactions on their debit card account that they (the cardholder) did not make. 
The customer service agent then gathers from the cardholder information sufficient to identify 
the cardholder’s account (e.g., name and card number or social security number), information 
sufficient to identify the specific transaction(s) that the cardholder is disputing, and the reason(s) 
that the cardholder is disputing the transaction(s) (e.g., the cardholder states they didn’t make the 
 
4 See Chestnut Tr. 31:13-23; 50:15-21.  
5 In the case of the EDD debit card, the card issuer was Bank of America. 
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transaction). This is the industry-standard information that is needed to open a claim.6 Once this 
information is gathered, it is industry standard for the card issuer (typically through the customer 
service agent) to open a claim, and for the card issuer’s system to assign that claim a unique claim 
number. My understanding is that the above process, which is typical in the industry,
20. 
Once a claim is opened, EFTA/Reg E’s error resolution procedures then generally 
require that the card issuer adequately investigate the claim. To ensure EFTA/Reg E compliance, 
it is a standard practice in the banking and financial services industry for debit card issuers to 
have a department of trained personnel who are dedicated to investigating claims (“claims 
analysts”). In general terms, it is industry standard for a claims analyst to investigate claims by 
reviewing relevant records that might contain information corroborating or disproving the 
cardholder’s claim that they (the cardholder) did not authorize the transaction at issue. After 
reviewing such records, the claims analyst will “decision” the claim, which means deciding 
whether to “pay” the claim (i.e., reimburse the cardholder for the unauthorized transaction by 
issuing a permanent credit in the amount of the unauthorized transaction to the cardholder’s 
account) or to “deny” the claim. After the claim is decisioned and any necessary post-decision 
processes are completed, the claim is typically “closed” in the card issuers’ system. It is widely 
recognized in the industry that, under EFTA/Reg E’s error resolution procedures, a card issuer 
cannot deny a claim unless its claims investigation uncovers evidence the cardholder authorized 
or benefitted from the transaction. I understand that at Bank of America, 
 
 
6 There is additional information that can be useful to the claims investigation that card issuers 
typically have their call center agents gather during this same phone call. Examples include the 
 
 
 
 But 
this additional information is not part of the industry-standard information needed to open a 
claim, which is limited to information sufficient to identify the cardholder account, the 
transactions being disputed, and the reason why. 
7 See Daniels Tr. 78:6-89:25. 
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8 and that 
 had in 
place policies—namely, the Bank’s
—that if followed would have resulted in the Bank’s 
claims analysts conducting investigations that are generally consistent with the industry standard 
process described above.  
21. 
Because debit card issuers have a great variety of records and information that are 
potentially relevant to claims, it is also industry standard practice for card issuers to have detailed 
written policies about what records and information their claims analysts need to review when 
conducting a claims investigation. I understand that, during 2020-2021, the Bank’s written policy 
for how to conduct investigations of unauthorized transaction claims submitted by its debit 
cardholders, including EDD cardholders, was the Bank’s 
 As is standard in the industry, 
the Bank’s
 The overarching purpose of the 
 and similar documents used by 
other financial institutions is to ensure that claims analysts are consistently following the same 
investigation procedures to comply with the EFTA/Reg E error resolution procedures.9 My 
understanding is that, before September 28, 2020, 
 
 
 
8 See Daniels Tr. 133:5-8, 135:9-20; BANA_EDD_MDL-00012738. 
9 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00003890 (Sept. 24, 2020 training) (
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C. 
The Bank’s Use of the Claim Fraud Filter  
22. 
 
 
 
11 
23. 
 
 
 
.12  
24. 
 
 
 
 
 
.13 
25. 
Because I understand that Plaintiffs’ claims focus on EDD cardholders whose 
claims were denied, whose permanent credits were rescinded, and/or whose accounts were 
frozen based solely on Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter, this report focuses on Indicator 1. 
My understanding is that CFF Indicator 1 is a
 
 
 
10
11 See Daniels Tr. 21:6-23, 39:16-40:8, 42:3-8, 52:21-53:9, 209:20-24, 234:13-21; Martin Tr. 
124:20-125:17, 162:1-25, 173:7-23. 177:6-178:12. 
12 See Daniels Tr. 233:3-9, 234:24-235:11, 284:15-20; Martin Tr. 173:24-174:16, 175:6-14, 
178:13-23, 179:13-180:1. 
13 See Martin Tr. 159:15-18, 179:13-180:6, 192:24-193:10, 223:18-224:16. 
14 See ¶¶58-59. 
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10 
 
 
(often referred to in 
Bank documents as an “
 claim).15 I understand that EDD debit cards had a four-digit 
PIN. 
26. 
In the banking and financial services industry, a card transaction is commonly 
referred to as “PIN-enabled” or “pinned” if completing the transaction requires entry of the 
personal identification number (“PIN”) associated with the card. The terms “PIN-enabled” and 
“pinned” are synonymous in this context. 
VII. 
STATEMENT AND EXPLANATION OF OPINIONS 
A. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a 
debit card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has 
conducted an adequate investigation of that claim that includes the review of 
all available relevant records. 
27. 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act protects individual consumers who engage in, 
or whose cards or accounts are used to engage in, various kinds of electronic transactions, 
including debit card transactions at ATMs and POS terminals. EFTA is implemented by 
Regulation E, commonly referred to in the industry as “Reg E.” EFTA/Reg E provide a number 
of requirements that debit card issuers must follow when a cardholder makes an unauthorized 
transaction claim. 
28. 
It is widely recognized in the banking and financial services industry that, to deny 
an unauthorized transaction claim under EFTA/Reg E, the financial institution must conduct an 
 
15 See BANA_EDD_MDL-00592328 (describing Indicator 1 as
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090640, 90643 (same); BANA_EDD_MDL-
00100649 (describing Indicator 1 as 
 Letson Tr. 92:19-23 
(agreeing that Indicator 1 
 
id. 93:6-94:5 (Indicator 1 applied to 
any “
 Martin Tr. 125:25-126:8, 
127:8-10 (similar); Daniels Tr. 285:22-286:12; 289:11-12 (similar). 
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adequate investigation that includes the review of all available relevant records and must 
conclude based on that adequate investigation that the cardholder authorized the transaction. This 
industry standard practice is reflected in Bank of America’s
 
.16  
29. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is industry standard when 
investigating an unauthorized transaction claim to review relevant records of both the card issuer 
(in this case, Bank of America) and third-party service providers that the card issuer can easily 
access.
 
 
 
 
 
.17 
30. 
The above industry standard practices are reflected in the Bank’s
 
 
16 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00559693
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00001312 (
 
 
17 See BANA_EDD_MDL-00100507, -100514, -100516-17, -100520, -100528 (Bank training 
materials detailing numerous “
 
; Daniels Tr. 159:24-160:11, 163:1-3 
 
); Martin Tr. 184:10 (calling Visa PAS 
 
 for EDD debit cards). 
18
 BANA_EDD_MDL-
00003890 (
(same); BANA_EDD_MDL-00100637 (
 
 
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0 All these statements are consistent with industry standards. 
 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00006487 (Apr. 2020 training)21 
 
(same); BANA_EDD_MDL-00004542 (
) (same); see also Daniels Tr. 120:16-
19 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006847 (
); BANA_EDD_MDL-00003888 (Sept. 
2020 training); BANA_EDD_MDL-00100636 (
). 
20 BANA_EDD_MDL-00004536 
 
21
 See 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00003888 (Sept. 2020); BANA_EDD_MDL-00100636 (Oct. 2020). 
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B. 
The Bank’s 
 provide 
sensible procedures for EFTA/Reg E compliance that are consistent with 
well-established industry standards for investigating unauthorized 
transaction claims. 
31. 
The Bank’s 
2 This is all industry standard. 
32. 
The Bank’s 
33. 
The claim type of a particular disputed transaction is determined by the kind of 
transaction that is being disputed and the reason why. A few basic facts are usually sufficient to 
establish the claim type. Such facts include whether the transaction at issue involves a debit card 
or credit card; whether the transaction was “card present” (i.e., whether it required using the 
physical card, as would be the case with an ATM withdrawal or purchase through a POS 
terminal) or “card not present” (e.g., an online purchase); and whether the customer is alleging 
the transaction was unauthorized (commonly referred to as a “fraud claim”) or that the merchant 
simply charged them the wrong amount (commonly referred to as a “billing dispute” or “non-
fraud claim”).  
34. 
This report focuses on the Bank’s
because this is the only complete copy of the 
that I understand the Bank has produced in 
this litigation. BANA_EDD_MDL-00559693
24 That
 
22 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006484
); BANA_EDD_MDL-00003890 (
 
); BANA_EDD_MDL-00100637 (
); BANA_EDD_MDL-
00004542 
). 
23 See BANA_EDD_MDL-00559693
 
24 I assume that any other versions of the
 in effect in during or near the Class Period are 
generally consistent with the
 version, as relates to the two relevant claim types 
 
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14 
 (id. at -559893-98), 
;25 and (2) “
 (id. at -559898-901), 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
identified in this paragraph. This assumption is informed by a
BANA_EDD_MDL-00559979, as 
well as by excerpts of other versions of the 
produced by the Bank, which appear to be 
generally consistent with the
 version. See BANA_EDD_MDL-00001312 (19-
page excerpt with effective date of 
); BANA_EDD_MDL-00718756 (15-
page excerpt of undated version). 
25 Daniels Tr. 152:1-25, 287:19-288:12. 
26 
 (BANA_EDD_MDL-00559911-14), which I understand would apply to 
reconsideration of EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals that were denied 
by the Bank’s CFF, and the claim type 
(id. at -559914-18), which I understand would apply to 
 denied by Indicator 1 of the 
CFF. My analysis does not focus on either of these claim types, however, because “reconsideration” 
investigations—i.e., when a financial institution re-investigates a denied claim at the 
cardholder’s request—are widely deemed in the industry not to be required by EFTA/Reg E, but 
to be a voluntary customer service measure. 
 
27 See, e.g., Schwartz Tr. 128:24-132:2 (explaining that 
 
Holt Tr. 112:16-113:6. 
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35. 
The
for those two claim types are generally 
consistent with what I would expect to see, and in my opinion are generally consistent with 
industry standards. For example, the claim type 
.” Id. at -559893-94.
Id. at -559898-99. Bank training materials and deposition testimony 
 
28 
36. 
Below, I provide my understanding of each of the
29 For each 
, I provide some 
illustrations of the kinds of information the 
could reveal that would be helpful 
to determining whether the cardholder authorized or benefited from the transaction, and therefore 
helpful to correctly decisioning a claim. 
 
28
29
See BANA_EDD_MDL-00559898-99. Of these,
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(1)
– I understand this to refer to the
(2) 
30 
For disputed ATM withdrawals, other important information that is industry standard to review 
would have been located in
31 Such information could be critical to correctly decision a 
claim, as it could reveal activity consistent with criminal activity, such as
 
30 See also Daniels Tr. 90:1-91:5 
 
 
31 BANA_EDD_MDL-00100656. 
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.32 
(3) 
 – The Bank describes this
nformation. 
(4)
 – It is industry standard 
to review
Such information 
that is highlighted in Bank training materials, and this is industry standard to review, includes the 
following: 
• 
 For example, if the 
account history shows that a nondisputed ATM withdrawal was made in California only 20 
minutes before a disputed ATM withdrawal was made in New York, that would indicate that it 
 
32 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00100546 (Bank training materials) 
; id. at -100555 
33 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006502 
); BANA_EDD_MDL-00100657
 
 
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was impossible for the cardholder to personally complete both card-present transactions, and that 
there are therefore multiple copies of the card (at least one of which is very likely counterfeit). 
This would be key information indicating that the disputed ATM withdrawal was very likely 
unauthorized. 
• 
– It is industry standard to review
It is widely recognized in the industry that 
transactions that 
 indicate an increased 
risk that those transactions may be fraudulent. Conversely, transactions that 
indicate an increased likelihood that the transactions were authorized. 
For example, if a cardholder disputes a $100 ATM withdrawal but the analysis of 
 this would increase the likelihood that the cardholder may have made the 
disputed ATM withdrawal but forgot that they did so.34 
• 
 Visa 
and other major card networks use
 Review of this 
information helps to establish 
 and is industry standard to review. For 
example, if a card has previously only been used to make transactions 
that 
would indicate a significant
that would increase the likelihood 
that the disputed transaction was not authorized. 
 
34
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00100669 (
 
) (same). 
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19 
• 
, and it is an important component of comparing 
disputed transactions with 
 For example, if 
shows that a card has only been previously used to make transactions 
 
 that is a 
significant increase in 
and consistent with unauthorized use, increasing the likelihood that the disputed ATM 
withdrawals were not authorized. 
(5)
 – This is a standard piece of 
information to analyze when investigating a fraud ATM claim. For example, if a cardholder 
reports 
this would increase the 
likelihood that the disputed ATM withdrawal was not authorized.35  
(6) 
– It is 
industry standard when investigating ATM fraud claims to review 
for multiple reasons. The first is 
If 
there are significant differences in
 thus 
increasing the likelihood that the transaction was unauthorized.
an also 
reveal additional helpful information, such as
 
35 See also Daniels Tr. 155:23-156:21. 
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20 
 which would be indicative of fraud and increase the likelihood 
that the cardholder did not authorize the disputed ATM withdrawal.36 
(
 As 
discussed above
Bank training documents indicate that 
 all of which would be 
important, industry standard information to review when investigating a fraud ATM claim.37 
(8) “
would be important information. For example,
this would increase the likelihood that the cardholder 
 
(9)
38 – If a cardholder
 it is industry standard to review
 If this revealed, for example, that the cardholder
 
36 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00100663 (
BANA_EDD_MDL-
37 See BANA_EDD_MDL-00100507, -100514, -100516-17, -100520
BANA_EDD_MDL-00003924; Daniels Tr. 153:24-154:7, 154:15-16, 156:1-10, 158:8-11, 
159:24-160:11, 163:1
38 The corresponding
BANA_EDD_MDL-00559899, which I understand to mean that 
 
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21 
 
 and would increase the likelihood that the cardholder did not make or 
authorize the disputed ATM withdrawal. 
(10)
9 – The Bank 
describes this 
 as involving review of 
,” in order to 
40 
Bank training materials list 
uch information could tend to support or disprove a theory that 
disputed transactions are the result of an “account takeover,” which is an industry term that refers 
to a third party having unlawfully gained control of the cardholder’s account, including by 
 
39 The corresponding
,” BANA_EDD_MDL-00559898, which I 
understand to mean that
40 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006504. 
41 BANA_EDD_MDL-00100621, -100623. 
42
929-35
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00090640 
 
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22 
(11) 
 A common practice in the 
industry is to review
. As stated in Bank training materials, 
the information in 
”43 
(12) “
 – It is a common practice to review the
during a fraud claim investigation, especially if 
other evidence indicates suspicion of account takeover activity. As stated in Bank training 
materials, review of 
44 
(13) “
– It is 
a common practice to review 
, including a 
 For example, if the cardholder 
 and therefore increase the likelihood the cardholder did 
not make or authorize the disputed ATM withdrawals. 
37. 
As the Bank’s training materials correctly emphasize, each of these
could reveal information that is not just relevant but potentially outcome-dispositive: “
 
 
43 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006500. 
44 BANA_EDD_MDL-00006492. 
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23 
 For example, take the sixth 
 
listed above 
”). If 
.46 On the other hand, if
this would be important 
information that would increase the likelihood that the cardholder had made or authorized the 
disputed ATM withdrawal. 
38. 
In addition to the
47 According to a designated 
 
45 BANA_EDD_MDL-00004542 (emphasis in original); Daniels Tr. 141:14-142:15. 
46 See also Martin Tr. 73:17-23.  
47 BANA_EDD_MDL-00559895-97, -559901. The same is true of 
 
 See id. at -559906, -559910, -
559914, -559918, -559922, -559925. 
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24 
representative of the Bank, this means that
48 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00559897, -559901 
39. 
 
48 Daniels Tr. 138:14-140:4; cf. BANA_EDD_MDL-00559896-97, -559900-01
49 Accord Martin Tr. 147:5-16 
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25 
51 
 as set 
forth in the following excerpt from a Bank training document: 
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00004556 (Mar. 2021 training)52 
40. 
The Bank’s training materials provide a useful example of how the Bank’s stated 
might play out in a real-life investigation. The Bank’s 
example, reproduced below, illustrates the importance of following the industry-standard 
 
50 See, e.g., Martin Tr. 147:5-16
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00090640 
 
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00003929-
35 
51
 is well-known and long-standing problem in the debit and credit card industry, 
. Accord Martin Tr. 49:21-53:14, 65:21-66:6 
 
 Letson Tr. 156:14-157:5, 165:1-12 (similar); 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00057505
 id. at -
52 The same information appears in other training materials. See BANA_EDD_MDL-00100669 
 
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26 
practice of giving each claim an individualized investigation in which all pertinent records and 
details are review by a trained claims analyst in order to make a fully informed and evidence-
based decision about whether the Bank has sufficient information to conclude that a cardholder 
authorized the transaction, and thus sufficient information to deny the claim. 
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27 
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00003927-28 (
53 
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28 
41. 
In the above example
 
What this illustrates is the importance 
of each piece of relevant information in reaching a correct claim decision, including
 
C. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant 
departure from the Bank’s
42. 
As stated above, my understanding from reviewing Bank documents and 
deposition testimony listed in Appendix B is that the Bank 
 
 
  
43. 
My understanding from reviewing Bank documents and deposition testimony 
listed in Appendix B is
 my knowledge,
 
53 See also BANA_EDD_MDL-00004577-78
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29 
My understanding is informed by, and appears to be 
consistent with, the Bank’s designated representatives’ deposition testimony.54  
44. 
If my understanding is correct that CFF Indicator 1 
 and that the Bank used 
 
as summarized and discussed above at paragraph 36 and note 28. To be clear, my 
understanding, which is supported by the Bank’s deposition testimony,55 is that the Bank 
 
 
 
 
45. 
This opinion is informed and supported by
 
54 See, e.g., Letson Tr. 92:19-23, 93:6-12
 Daniels Tr. 
289:11-12, 290:12-15 
; Martin Tr. 125:22-
126:8, 127:8-10, 173:20-23, 177:25-178:7 
55 See, e.g., Fox Tr. 93:22-94:13.  
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30 
56 All of these considerations are part of the applicable 
summarized and discussed above at paragraph 36, and all of these 
considerations would be industry-standard information to review when investigating a claim of 
an unauthorized ATM withdrawal. As stated above at paragraph 35, losses from transaction 
fraud are borne by the Bank under EFTA. In my opinion, the Bank implemented the CFF to 
protect itself from these losses.57
58
46. 
As stated above,
59 
all of which is industry standard. 
his too was a significant departure from the Bank’s
and contrary to industry standards. 
 
 
 
56 Martin Tr. 128:20-21, 129:16-132:15. 
57 With the CFF, the Bank chose the “most aggressive” approach for automatically denying 
unauthorized-transaction claims. Letson Tr. 239:3-243:5 
58 See Holt Tr. 183:21-184:4 
59 Daniels Tr. 90:1-16, 91:6-2. 
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31 
D. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to 
industry standards. 
47. 
For largely the same reasons explained above, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 
to deny all EDD cardholder claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry 
standards for multiple independent reasons. 
48. 
One reason that the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD cardholder 
claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry standards is that it resulted in 
the denial of claims without the Bank conducting an industry-standard investigation of relevant 
records available to the Bank,
49. 
 
.60 In my 
experience, even a small financial institution has the ability to reach out to regulators to approve 
the future implementation of automated systems. I have worked with the startup FinTech 
company “Upstart,” that sought and received a No-Action Letter from the CFBP regarding the 
implementation of an automated process. Based on my experience, in my opinion, the Bank’s 
failure to do so for the CFF indicates that the Bank itself believed that its regulators would not 
have approved the Bank’s implementation of the CFF. I also understand that in 2022, the Bank 
entered into a consent order with its regulators regarding its implementation of the CFF, which 
saw the Bank being fined $225 million, supporting my opinion that the Bank’s failure to reach 
 
60 Letson Tr. 26:5-22.  
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32 
out to regulators is because it believed that its regulators would not have approved use of the 
CFF.61  
50. 
Another reason that the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD 
cardholder claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry standards is that it 
resulted in the denial of claims without any claim-specific reason to believe the cardholder 
authorized or benefited from the transaction, which is the only industry-standard reason for 
denying a claim. The fact that a claim involves an ATM withdrawal is not an industry-standard 
reason to conclude that the cardholder authorized or benefited from the ATM withdrawal; if it 
were, debit card issuers would not have claim types applicable to investigating fraud ATM 
claims, and would instead simply deny all ATM claims as a matter of course without conducting 
any investigation. But that is not what occurs in the industry. Instead, it is industry standard 
among debit card issuers to conduct an adequate investigation of fraud ATM claims.  
51. 
The Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD cardholder claims that 
included an ATM withdrawal was also contrary to industry standards for at least three reasons 
specific to the EDD debit card and the EDD debit card program.  
(1)  
 
62 
 
 
.63 
 
.64 Given this 
 
61 https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/federal-regulators-fine-bank-of-
america-225-million-over-botched-disbursement-of-state-unemployment-benefits-at-height-of-
pandemic/ 
62 See Chestnut Tr. 190:14-17. 
63 See note 50. 
64 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00228914 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00297295 (
 
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33 
known vulnerability of EDD debit cards,
 
 it would have been industry standard for 
the Bank to look both for evidence that the card had been skimmed and for signs of counterfeit 
card fraud when investigating EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals
(2)  It is also my understanding that the Bank
which could provide critical information to correctly 
decision claims.65 When a card issuer has intelligence about significant criminal activity 
impacting a particular product, it is industry standard for the card issuer to inform claims analysts 
about that known threat to enable the claims analysts to leverage that intelligence to detect 
similar fraud and correctly decision claims.
(3)  Given the size of the EDD debit card program 
 
 see ¶17) and the amount of benefits on those cards, 
one would expect that incoming claims would contain some mix of fraudulent claims and 
legitimate claims. For example, I understand that the Bank had concerns before and during the 
Class Period about fraudulent claims being submitted by criminals who had used stolen identities 
 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00455617 
 
65 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00100663
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34 
to be approved for EDD benefits and EDD debit cards, had used those cards to make transactions, 
and who had submitted fraudulent unauthorized transaction claims in an attempt to receive 
provisional or permanent credit on those claims, thereby doubling their ill-gotten gains. (I’ll refer 
to these as “fraudulent claims”). On the other hand, during the same period, I also understand 
that 
 
66 The industry-standard way of ferreting 
out fraudulent claims from legitimate claims is to conduct an adequate investigation of each 
claim (which can be supplemented by claims and non-claims personnel conducting separate and 
ongoing investigations of suspected organized criminal activity, fraud rings, and the like). The 
Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all claims that include an ATM withdrawal was contrary 
to industry standards because it made no attempt to differentiate the fraudulent claims from the 
legitimate claims, but instead summarily denied all claims that included an ATM withdrawal. 
 
 
66 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00455617 
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00218256 
 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00450517 
ANA_EDD_MDL-
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35 
E. 
The Bank could have adopted strategies other than CFF Indicator 1 to deal 
with any operational challenges related to EDD cardholder claims of 
unauthorized ATM withdrawals, including prioritizing investigation of 
higher-value claims and hiring or contracting additional claims analysts. 
52. 
While I understand that the Bank’s prepaid claims operation faced elevated claims 
volume and other operational challenges during the Class Period, it is contrary to industry 
standards to deal with such operational challenges by summarily denying claims without 
conducting an adequate investigation. Banks and other financial institutions subject to 
EFTA/Reg E sometimes face unusual circumstances that may cause a spike in claims volume or 
concerns about fraudulent claims, and industry standard methods have developed for dealing 
with those challenges. 
53. 
Industry standard strategies for dealing with a spike in claims volume include: 
a. 
Prioritizing investigation of higher-dollar-value claims. Increasing the 
dollar value threshold would have alleviated some of the burden the Bank faced in investigating 
claims and would have provided an opportunity to triage the Bank’s exposure to fraud by 
ensuring it was focused on the most significant claims. Additionally, in my experience, low-
dollar-value claims are the least likely to be fraudulent, as fraudsters typically are trying to 
extract maximum value in each fraudulent transaction. This
 
.67  
b. 
Notably, this strategy would also ensure that legitimate EDD cardholders 
were timely receiving their funds in their time of extreme need during the height of the 
pandemic. 
c. 
Increasing the monetary threshold at which low-dollar-value claims are 
auto-paid without conducting an investigation thereby decreasing the number of claims that need 
to be investigated. 
d. 
Increasing the number of full-time-equivalent claims analysts, including 
through the use of large staffing companies such as Accenture, as necessary to timely process 
 
67 See Schwartz Tr. 48:21-49:12. 
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36 
claims and ensure that no claims are denied without first receiving an adequate investigation. I 
have direct experience working with Accenture and using its large scale professional staffing 
services. It is my opinion that Bank of America could have hired sufficient numbers of highly 
trained claims analysts in the relevant time from this or another highly specialized global 
professional services company. I have personally managed an engagement with Accenture, 
where it provided human resources to support the development of enhanced customer service 
operations for a leading US lender. Accenture alone operates with approximately 774,000 people 
serving clients in over 120 countries.68 
54. 
While there are costs to implementing these industry standard strategies, that is a 
standard cost of doing business. Additionally, the Bank has long been a highly profitable 
financial institution, it being the second largest bank in the United States, and had ample 
resources to bear the costs of implementing these strategies. For example, I understand that in 
April 2021, the Bank announced a $25 billion common stock repurchase plan “to return to 
shareholders excess capital that is not needed to … deliver for customers and communities.”69 A 
small fraction of that “excess capital” would have been sufficient to hire or contract for the 
additional claims analysts required to investigate all EDD cardholder claims, including those that 
were summarily denied by the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1.  
F. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD 
cardholders was contrary to industry standards.  
55. 
As stated above, my understanding is that the Bank also used CFF Indicator 1 as 
the sole basis for automatically rescinding permanent credits that it had paid to EDD cardholders 
between April 1, 2020 and September 28, 2020.70 In other words, 
 
 
68 https://newsroom.accenture.com/fact-sheet 
69 Bank of America Announces $25 Billion Common Stock Repurchase Plan, Bank of America 
Newsroom (April 15, 2021), https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/content/newsroom/press-
releases/2021/04/bank-of-america-announces--25-billion-common-stock-repurchase-pl.html. 
70 Martin Tr. 179:13-180:1, 320:24-321:12. 
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37 
the Bank developed and began implementing CFF Indicator 1, it used that “filter” to 
automatically take back permanent credits that the Bank had issued to EDD cardholders on any 
claim that included an ATM withdrawal, despite having previously resolved that claim in the 
cardholder’s favor. 
56. 
I also understand that when the Bank issued permanent credits to EDD 
cardholders between April 1, 2020 and September 28, 2020, it sent a notice to the affected EDD 
cardholders informing them that the credit the Bank was issuing them was “permanent.”71 This is 
an industry standard practice. Consistent with its ordinary meaning, the word “permanent” is 
commonly used in the industry in this context to convey that the claim process has been 
conclusively resolved in the cardholder’s favor.72 
57. 
Rescinding permanent credit is a rare event. I am aware of it occurring only in 
circumstances that, at minimum, involve the discovery of new information, ideally new 
information not previously available to the financial institution, that clearly establishes the 
cardholder authorized or benefited from the transaction. For example, it would be consistent with 
industry standards, in my opinion, for a debit card issuer to rescind permanent credit if, after 
issuing the permanent credit, the card issuer received a communication from the cardholder 
stating that they now remember having made the disputed transaction. This would be consistent 
with industry standards because this would be new information not previously available to the 
card issuer and that conclusively establishes that the cardholder made the transaction. On the 
other hand, it generally would be contrary to industry standards, in my opinion, for a card issuer 
to rescind permanent credit based on information that was known to the card issuer at the time it 
investigated and decided to pay the claim. 
 
71 See, e.g., Moore_S_0000367 (Aug. 31, 2020) (Bank letter to Plaintiff who was issued 
permanent credit: “We’ve completed our investigation of this disputed transaction. The previously 
issued [provisional] credit for [claim amount] is now permanent.”); PLFF00000011 (Sept. 2, 
2020) (same). 
72
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38 
58. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 as the sole basis for rescinding 
permanent credit issued to EDD cardholders was contrary to industry standards for at least three 
independent reasons. Specifically, it was contrary to industry standards because the fact that the 
affected claims included a disputed ATM withdrawal 
1) was known to the Bank when it decided to pay the claim by issuing 
permanent credit; (2) did not involve any new information, much less new information not 
previously available to the Bank; and (3) did nothing to call into question the correctness of the 
Bank’s previous decision to pay the claim, much less clearly establish that the cardholder 
authorized or benefitted from the transaction, for all the reasons discussed above in Part VII, 
Sections D-E. 
G. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards. 
59. 
It is standard in the industry for financial institutions to monitor their customers’ 
cards and accounts for signs of fraudulent activity. At a very general level, financial institutions 
carry out this monitoring through a variety of industry-standard rules and technologies, which 
include fraud “rules” and fraud “models.” Fraud rules are instructions structured as if-then 
statements—i.e., if certain conditions are present (e.g., an attempted ATM withdrawal greater 
than or equal to $500 originating outside North America), then take a specific action (e.g., decline 
the transaction). The terms “fraud rule” and “fraud filter” are generally synonymous; both are 
structured as if-then statements.73 Fraud models are a more complex technology that are often 
developed by third parties, have long leveraged artificial intelligence and machine learning based 
on large data sets of known fraud and non-fraud payment data, and can be tailored to specific 
geographic regions and lines of business; an example is FICO’s Falcon Fraud Manager.74 Fraud 
 
73 Accord Letson Tr. 61:5-7 (a fraud filter is 
; id. 225:3-7 (similar); 
Schwartz Tr. 18:3-18:7 (fraud filter “was a series of rules that we used to process fraud claims”); 
Fox Tr. 85:12-24 
 
74 See, e.g., FICO Blog, “The Fraud Consortium: 9,000 Heads Are Better than 1” (Dec. 6, 2017), 
fico.com/blogs/fraud-consortium-9-000-heads-are-better-1; FICO Blog, “FICO Fights Prepaid 
 
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39 
models and rules are often used together. For example, fraud models typically assign individual 
transactions a “score,” which is intended to capture in numerical form the risk that the transaction 
is fraudulent, and card issuers commonly write rules where one of the conditions in the “if” part 
of the rule statement is based on that scoring (e.g., if a transaction with defined characteristics is 
scored within a particular range, then decline the transaction).75 
60. 
In my opinion, based on my understanding of CFF Indicator 1 as stated in this 
report, CFF Indicator 1 was not a fraud model, but was a fraud rule with a simple if-then 
structure that could be paraphrased as follows:
76 My understanding is that the Bank used 
CFF Indicator 1 to deny claims and freeze the associated EDD debit card accounts during the 
period September 28, 2020 to March 17, 2021,77 
 
 
Card Fraud with AI and Machine Learning” (Mar. 9, 2020), fico.com/blogs/fico-fights-prepaid-
card-fraud-ai-and-machine-learning; FICO, “Falcon Intelligence Network: A Fraud Consortium 
for Fraud-Fighting Machine Learning Innovation” (Mar. 26, 2021), fico.com/blogs/falcon-
intelligence-network-fraud-consortium-fraud-fighting-machine-learning-innovation; see 
generally FICO, “FICO® Falcon® Fraud Manager,” https://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-
falcon-fraud-manager. 
75 Accord Martin Tr. 208:3-21 
76 Accord Martin Tr. 127:1-10, 209:12-210:5
; see also id. 171:8-15, 207:21-208:8
 Letson Tr. 61:1-7, 225:3-7 (similar); Fox Tr. 85:6-85:9 
77
See id. 
78 See Martin Tr. 302:2-25; 321:19-23; BANA_EDD_MDL-00125920-21 
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40 
61. 
As a designated representative of the Bank testified (correctly in my view), fraud 
rules by their nature are
62. 
 
 
 
 Freezing a card/account is the most severe consequence with an 
enormous impact on the cardholder.  
63. 
I have never heard of a debit card issuer doing what I understand the Bank to have 
done here with respect to CFF Indicator 1—i.e., using a fraud rule as the sole basis either for 
summarily denying claims, or for summarily freezing cards/accounts. In my experience, freezing 
an account typically occurs only in limited circumstances due to reasons such as receipt of a 
court order to freeze specified cards/accounts, a request from a prepaid card sponsor (in this case, 
EDD) to freeze specified cards/accounts, or an individualized investigation conducted by a 
trained analyst that leads the card issuer to conclude with a high degree of confidence that a 
specific card/account is being used for criminal purposes.  
64. 
My understanding is that the Bank used the CFF to freeze EDD cardholder 
accounts and 
81 I also understand that the Bank continued 
following this practice of 
 
79 Martin Tr. 286:25-288:8. 
80 In the prepaid context, taking a particular action with respect to the card (e.g., suspending, 
blocking, freezing) is generally synonymous with taking that same action with respect to the 
account.
 
81 See Chestnut Tr. at 146:1-25, 157:9-14. 
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41 
2 
I understand that the Bank was also aware that many EDD cardholders who managed to reach an 
EDD call center agent were told by the agent that
 thereby subjecting EDD 
cardholders whose accounts were frozen by the CFF Indicator 1 to a
”83 
65. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 as the sole basis for summarily 
freezing EDD debit card accounts was contrary to industry standards for at least three 
independent reasons: 
a. 
For all the same reasons underlying my opinion that CFF Indicator 1 did 
not provide a reasonable basis for the Bank to conclude that the cardholder had made or 
authorized the disputed transaction and that the claim at issue was therefore fraudulent (see Part 
VII, Sections D-F), there was no reasonable basis for the Bank’s derivative conclusion that the 
account was therefore engaged in fraud and could be frozen.  
b. 
As a fraud rule or filter, CFF Indicator 1 was only predictive and therefore 
provided only a suspicion that the submission of a fraud ATM claim meant that the associated 
EDD debit card account was being used for criminal purposes. It was contrary to industry 
 
82 See Chestnut Tr. at 71:9-12, 155:17-157:14; Martin Tr. 226:17-227:18, 235:15-236:1, 272:16-
274:13; Golden Tr. 146:7-147:19, 149:10-21, 150:20-151:6, 165:18-167:17; Chestnut Tr. Ex. 36 
at 16, 18. 
83 BANA_EDD_MDL-0090722 
; see also Martin Tr. 272:16-274:13 
 
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42 
standards for the Bank to use a fraud rule or filter as the sole basis for freezing EDD debit cards 
and accounts.  
c. 
To the extent that the Bank considered CFF Indicator 1 as providing not 
just a predictive suspicion but a definitive determination that the associated EDD debit card 
account was being used for criminal purposes, that too was contrary to industry standards 
because the Bank reached such a determination based on a single criterion (Indicator 1),84 and 
without
see Part VII, Sections D-F)
d. 
(see Part VII, Section H).  
66. 
In my opinion, there were reasonably available strategies other than freezing 
accounts based solely on CFF Indicator 1 that the Bank could have adopted to help identify EDD 
debit card accounts being used for criminal purposes, and which would have significantly 
reduced the harmful impact on legitimate EDD cardholders. In addition to the alternatives to 
CFF Indicator 1 discussed above (see ¶¶51-53), the Bank could have blocked instead of freezing 
accounts, which would have permitted legitimate EDD cardholders an opportunity to 
authenticate identity directly with the Bank under the Bank’s
 
84 See Martin Tr. 326:6-9 
id. 283:1-15
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43 
86  
67. 
This opinion is supported by my understanding that the Bank did precisely this 
 
and by my understanding that there were no 
particular reasons why the Bank could not have implemented this same strategy during the 
period September 28, 2020 to March 17, 2021.  
H. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny 
claims, rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts
was contrary to industry 
standards. 
68. 
Card issuers use industry standard metrics for assessing the accuracy of their 
decisioning of claims. For example, it is industry standard for card issuers to periodically review 
each of their claims analysts for key performance indicators (“KPIs”), which measure 
compliance with organization-defined performance goals. For individual claims analysts, 
industry standard KPIs include whether the analyst is complying with the issuer’s claims 
investigation procedures and policies, and the extent to which the analyst is correctly or 
incorrectly decisioning claims. To determine this, the person(s) performing the review takes a 
 
85 See Martin Tr. 30:8-33:13; 188:4-190:16, 208:14-21, 218:2-220:7, 220:17-20, 268:2-4 
(testifying that Bank’s
see also id. 36:5-7, 108:3-18, 250:2-9, 255:23-256:17 
 
86
 id. 314:25-315:11 (similar); 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00107327(
 (similar). 
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44 
random sample of claims (i.e., the industry standard is to use a software-based randomizer) that 
the analyst has decisioned within a defined recent time frame, and reviews the analyst’s 
documentation and the available evidence for each sampled claim to determine whether the 
analyst complied with the card issuer’s procedures and policies, and whether the analyst 
correctly decisioned the claim (i.e., whether the reviewer disagrees with the analyst’s ultimate 
decision to pay or deny the claim). In my experience, card issuers typically review approximately 
ten investigations/decisions per month per claims analyst (more when an analyst is new). In my 
experience, which includes working with the claims organizations of many card issuers, an 
average claims analyst has an average claims audit overturn rate of approximately 1% or less. An 
analyst who incorrectly decisions more than 10% of reviewed claims would typically be required 
to undergo remedial training (e.g., take a re-training class), and if the analyst’s error rate 
continues to be above 10%, the industry standard card issuer response would be to terminate the 
analyst or move the analyst to another role in which they do not have responsibilities for 
investigating and decisioning claims. 
69. 
Throughout the Class Period, my understanding is that the Bank
 I also understand that 
 
 
87 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00517113
BANA_EDD_MDL-00159470 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00592192 
 
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45 
88 
70. 
With respect to reconsideration of claims denied by the CFF, I understand that 
cardholders generally
(see note 26), 
 
); BANA_EDD_MDL-
00090135, -90143 
88
 BANA_EDD_MDL-00406129 
89 
(see ¶63), 
90 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00100641-44 
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46 
71. 
With respect to Bank’s use of the CFF to rescind permanent credits, my 
understanding is that the Bank 
91 
72. 
My understanding is that the Bank also 
For
understand to be 
92 
The slide also states that
93 In 
my opinion, such rates are incredibly high and virtually unheard of in the industry. Such rates 
are, in my opinion, contrary to industry standards because they are many times higher than the 
1% and 10% industry standard rates discussed above. 
 
91 BANA_EDD_MDL-00571310 
; BANA_EDD_MDL-00077224; 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00417490. 
92 EDD cardholders represent approximately
93 BANA_EDD_MDL-00572768. 
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47 
73. 
I understand that, during this litigation, the Bank produced data from the Class 
Period as set forth in the table below, which I understand shows
94 To this data provided by the 
Bank, I have added my own two columns that calculate, using basic excel formulas set forth in 
column title,
 
 
 
94 Bank’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 39 at 9:11-21. 
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48 
Chart derived from the Bank’s Data in the 
Bank’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory 42, Exhibit 13 
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49 
74. 
Assuming these data provided by the Bank are accurate, they show that the 
Again, my opinion is that 
such rates are virtually unheard of in the industry and are contrary to industry standards because 
they are many times higher than the 1% and 10% industry standard rates discussed above.  
75. 
While I understand that
95  
76. 
Additionally, I understand from a Bank interrogatory response in this litigation 
that,
Specifically, I understand that the Bank
96 
My assumption, based on my industry experience
 
95 BANA_EDD_MDL-00572767-68. 
96
at 9:11-21. 
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50 
 Second, my understanding is based on
97 
I. 
The claim denial letter that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims 
were denied, or whose prior permanent credit was rescinded, by CFF 
Indicator 1 was contrary to industry standards. 
77. 
It is widely recognized in the banking and financial services industry that, when a 
debit card issuer denies a customer’s unauthorized transaction, EFTA/Reg E requires the issuer 
to send the customer a written notice informing the customer that the claim was denied, and 
stating the reason(s) why the claim was denied. The card issuer’s reason(s) for denying a given 
claim are typically selected by the claims analyst that denied the claim, at the time that the claim 
is denied, typically from a preset menu of claim of denial reasons established by the card issuer. 
The claim denial reason selected by the claims analyst then goes into the claim denial letter that 
is sent to the cardholder. It is standard in the industry for debit card issuers to have procedures 
for automatically generating such claim denial letters once claims are denied, and that 
automatically populate the claim denial reason selected by the claims analyst into the text of the 
letter. My understanding is that this is generally consistent with
 
97 See, e.g., BANA_EDD_MDL-00510145 
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51 
98 
78. 
My understanding is that, with respect to each EDD cardholder whose claim was 
denied by operation of the CFF, or whose permanent credit was rescinded by operation of the 
CFF, the Bank
informing them that their claim had been denied. I 
understand that these letters were based on
letters that I understand the Bank sent to 
plaintiffs being proposed as representatives of the Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes 
after their claim was denied or permanent credit rescinded due to the Bank’s use of CFF 
Indicator 1.99  
 
98 See Daniels Tr. 187:14-189:5; BANA_EDD_MDL-00559895-97, -559899-901 
99 See 
 Denial/rescission letters sent to Claim Denial Plaintiffs 
Koole, McClure, Moon, Oosthuizen, Rivera, and Yuan, and Credit Rescission Plaintiffs Chong 
and Moore; Daniels Tr. 53:2-54:12, 220:12-221:11, 225:13-231:1; Martin Tr. 132:20-133:3. 
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52 
79. 
The identical content of those letters reads as set forth below. The only reason that 
this form letter provides for why the claim was closed is: “Your claim has been closed because 
we believe the account or the claim have been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity.” 
 
 
80. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s reason provided by its letters (Exs. D15-D16) is 
contrary to industry standards for at least three reasons. (1) The reason given is not one clear 
reason why the claim was denied, but two vague and unrelated alternative reasons for why the 
claim might have been denied (i.e., the account was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity, 
the claim was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity). It is contrary to industry standards, in 
my opinion, not to provide the cardholder a single and reasonably clear reason why the claim 
was actually denied (e.g., “we believe you authorized the disputed transaction”). (2) Although it 
could be consistent with industry standards to provide two reasons reason for denying the claim 
connected by an “or,” the two reasons need to be closely related conceptually (e.g., “we believe 
you made or authorized the disputed transaction”) in order to be consistent with industry 
standards. The Bank’s multiple reasons (i.e., the account was the subject of fraud or suspicious 
 
100 BANA_EDD_MDL-00012790, BANA_EDD_MDL-00411205 (Template denial/rescission 
letter and Denial/rescission letters sent to Claim Denial Plaintiffs Koole, McClure, Moon, 
Oosthuizen, Rivera, and Yuan, and Credit Rescission Plaintiffs Chong and Moore) 
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53 
activity or the claim was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity) are contrary to industry 
standards because they are not conceptually related. It is a very different concept for an account 
to be the subject of fraud or suspicious activity (which could just as easily be a reason for paying 
the claim) than for a claim to be the subject of fraud or suspicious activity (which, although 
vague, could be interpreted as indicating the Bank believes the submission of the claim itself was 
fraudulent or suspicious). (3) The Bank’s reason for denying the claim is so vague that it could 
also be a reason for paying the claim. Specifically, any cardholder who makes a legitimate 
unauthorized transaction claim made the claim because they believe, in the Bank’s words, that 
their “account … ha[s] been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity” in the form of one or 
more unauthorized transactions.101 That is why they made the claim and, unless disproved, would 
be a reason that the Bank would be required to pay the claim. In my opinion, it is contrary to 
industry standards to provide a claim denial reason that is so vague that it could also be a reason 
to pay the claim. 
 
 
Executed on March 4, 2025  
 
                           
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Daniel Kreis 
101 See Daniels Tr. 84:15-21
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APPENDIX A 
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1 
 
J. Daniel Kreis 
2743 Gingerview Lane 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
jdkreis@gmail.com  443-510-8060 
 
SUMMARY 
Extensive experience driving innovation and impeccable execution in Consumer payments, Risk and 
Portfolio Management with industry leaders. Expertise includes: 
• 
Development and implementation of Fraud Risk Tools and Treatment Strategies 
• 
Managing back-office operations (Credit, Customer Service, Collections and Fraud) 
• 
Design and execution of Portfolio Governance and Financial Models 
• 
Directly managed portfolios and consulted with 100 plus lenders in 20 countries. 
 
WORK EXPEREINCE 
A history of developing new approaches to managing portfolios, using the latest tools, technologies and 
concepts working with some of the best minds in financial services. 
 
January 2021 – October 2023 
Founding Partner, Director of Lending and Shared Services – Percapita 
Founding Partner responsible for the development of Credit Products and Debit Card fraud management 
practices. 
 
April 2019 – January 2021 and October 2023 to present 
Founder – First Camden Consulting 
Launched a consultancy focused on credit portfolio management. Completed the following 
engagements: 
 
• 
Regional Credit Card Issuers – developed the Secured Credit Card graduation strategy to 
unsecured for a major regional US bank. 
• 
Fintech Issuer – assisted an emerging issuer analyze and develop mitigating strategies for 
application fraud management. 
• 
Fintech Credit Card Issuer – developed the credit underwriting and compliance policies for a 
new Credit Card program for a high wealth focused Fintech. 
• 
U.S. Retail Lender – directed the redesign of credit, collections, and compliance practices for a 
North American specialty lender. 
 
October 1996 – April 2019 
Director of Portfolio Management – First Annapolis Consulting (acquired by Accenture in 2017) 
Managed a consulting practice that focused on consumer and small business lending (primarily credit 
cards and retail finance). Key engagements include: 
 
• 
Regional Credit Card Issuers – developed several growth strategies for regional credit card 
issuers focused on Product Design, Marketing, Credit Underwriting and Account Management. 
• 
Major Canadian Financial Institution – managed the implementation of risk systems (FD/Zoot) 
and practices for a new credit card start up. 
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2 
 
• 
Retail Lending – assisted numerous leading retail lenders in the U.S., Canada, RSA, and Spain. 
• 
U.S. Fleet Card Issuer – designed the underwriting and account management practices for 3 of 
the top 4 fleet card issuers. 
• 
Interim Operations Manager – directly managed credit card operations for 5 issuers on an 
interim basis for over 50 months combined. 
 
October 1995 – October 1996 
Director of Credit – Program Management Corporation (“PMC”) 
Responsible for the consumer credit program launch, including: 
• 
Systems Design and Implementation – worked with FDR in systems parameter design and 
testing. 
• 
Backoffice Function – established all policies for back-office processing including new accounts, 
fraud investigations and collections. 
 
August 1989 – October 1995  
Regional Director (MidAtlantic) – Fair, Isaac Company (“FICO”) 
Responsible for the launch and growth of the Wilmington, DE service and sales office. Lead the 
development of a team of five that serviced many of FICO’s leading clients including – Amex, AT&T, 
Capital One, Chase, CITI, GE Capital, PNC, Macy’s, MBNA, and M&T.  Key contributions included: 
 
• 
FICO SCORE Marketing Campaign – developed and executed a marketing campaign to replace 
MDS Scores with FICO Scores (migrated 34 of 35 targeted organizations in the first year). 
• 
Major Account Relationships – coordinated the creation of onsite customer service support for 
the largest regional lenders – improving brand image. 
• 
Account Acquisition – worked with numerous lenders in the development of test-and-control 
marketing campaigns, prospect targeting and credit underwriting and credit line assignment 
strategies. 
• 
Account Management – developed collections, authorizations and fraud risk and operations 
workflows for numerous lenders. 
 
June 1982 – August 1999 
Group Vice President Risk Operations – First Omni Bank (now part of M&T Bank) 
Promoted five times from Systems Analyst to Group VP Risk Operations. Key accomplishments included: 
 
• 
Affinity Card Launch – managed the launch of the ACE Hardware affinity card. 
• 
Davox Auto-dialer – implemented the third Davox auto-dialer in existence. 
• 
Inclusive Operations – developed and hired the bank’s first blind collector and “job sharing” 
positions. 
• 
Test-and-Control Marketing – implemented numerous Prescreen marketing campaigns testing 
more than 20 concepts in 1985. 
 
EDUCATION 
University of Maryland at Baltimore County (UMBC) – MA Economics with Finance Minor 
Degree conferred – June 1982 
 
 
 
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3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF FORMER CLIENTS 
 
 
 
 
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APPENDIX B 
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APPENDIX B: MATERIALS RELIED UPON 
Production Materials 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00001312 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00004535-4580 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00004535-4580 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00005509-5545 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00006482 - 6535 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00012738-12739 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00028946-28949 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00057504-57506 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00057837-57878 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00077223-77225 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090135-90137 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090640-90647 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090695-90698 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090721-90724 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100390; BANA_EDD_MDL-00100634 -100679  
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100506-529 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100530 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100616-00100633 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100634-100679 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100741 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00104526 - 104527 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00107327-107335 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00125177-125179 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00125919-125923 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00129437-129440 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00159469-159474 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00163307-163308 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00181896 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00218256 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00225047-225048 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00225867 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00228914 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00273305-273307 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00297295 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00406128-406130 
"BANA_EDD_MDL-00411205,  
-005560, -00556122, -00556152,  
-00556324, -00558991, -00558996,  
-00559094, -00559101; PLFF00000008;  
Yuan—A-0000003, -0000004" 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00417487-417490 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00450516-450518 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 591-49     Filed 10/17/25     PageID.41897 
Page 63 of 65

BANA_EDD_MDL-00455617 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00510141-510148 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00517105-517126 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00556536-556537 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00559693-559980 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00571310 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00572766-572770 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00592192-592194 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00592324-592330 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00718756-718770 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00863943-863948 
BANA_EDDMDL-00003887 - 3911 
BANA_EDDMDL-00003912 - 3937 
BANA_EDDMDL-00570333 - 570334 
BANA_MDD_MDL-00012790 
Moore_S_0000367 
PLFF00000011 
 
Publicly available materials 
"Employment Development Department Strike Team Detailed Assessment & Recommendations" 
Order re Preliminary Injunction [Yick, N.D. Cal., Dkt. 89] 
Order re Preliminary Injunction [Yick, N.D. Cal., Dkt. 103] 
CFPB Consent Order 
Order re Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 126] 
First Amended Master Consolidated Complaint [Dkt. 136] 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class 
Certification 
Bank of America Q3-2020 Press Release 
Alan S. Kaplinsky, "CFPB issues new no-action letter to Upstart" 
"Federal Regulators Fine Bank of America $225 Million Over Botched Disbursement of State 
Unemployment Benefits at Height of Pandemic" 
Accenture Fact Sheet Fiscal 2025 - First Quarter 
 
Discovery 
BofA's Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' Fifth Set of Interrogatories 
BofA's Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' Fifth Set of Interrogatories (Exhibit 11) 
Plaintiffs' Revised Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice 
BofA's Responses and Objections to Plaintiffs' Seventh Set of Interrogatories  
Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Shane Daniels 
Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Robert Chestnut 
Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Matthew Martin 
Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Michael Letson 
Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of William Golden 
Expert Declaration of Teresa A. Pesce 
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Expert Declaration of Russell Cronan 
Expert Class Certification Report of J. Daniel Kreis 
Transcript of Ryan Schwartz 
Transcript of Anne Holt 
Transcript of William Fox 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 591-49     Filed 10/17/25     PageID.41899 
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