7.A — In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation (Dkt. 591-9, S.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-02992)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 591-9 · 2025-10-17 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 
2 Case No. 1-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
  
 
 
EXPERT REPORT OF VICTOR STANGO 
April 4, 2025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Table of Contents 
 
I. 
Qualifications ...................................................................................................................... 1 
II. 
Assignment ......................................................................................................................... 2 
III. 
Summary of Opinions ......................................................................................................... 2 
IV. 
Background ......................................................................................................................... 4 
A. 
Fraud and the Claims Fraud Filter .......................................................................... 4 
B. 
Plaintiff’s Allegations and Proposed Classes ......................................................... 4 
C. 
The Remediation Plan and Associated Repayments ............................................... 6 
V. 
Summary of Mr. Regan’s Opinions and Damages Methodologies .................................... 7 
VI. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Claim Denial Class Damages Methodology Is Flawed, Overstates 
“Actual Damages,” Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, Would Award Damages to 
Unharmed Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits ...................... 11 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Claim Denial Amounts as Damages And Therefore Substantially 
Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages ............................................................... 11 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages .............................................................................................. 13 
1. 
The Economic Circumstances of Proposed Class Members and Any 
Potential Economic Impact of Claim Denials Would be Highly 
Individualized ........................................................................................... 16 
2. 
Proposed Class Members’ “Cost of the Inability to Access Funds” Would 
be Highly Individualized and are Overstated for Many Consumers Under 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology ........................................................................ 22 
C. 
Correcting Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially Reduces Estimated 
Damages ................................................................................................................ 30 
D. 
The Proposed Claim Denial Class Methodology Does Not Distinguish Between 
Harmed and Unharmed Consumers ...................................................................... 33 
E. 
The Claim Denial Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably Estimate 
BANA’s Profits ..................................................................................................... 35 
VII. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Credit Rescission Class Methodology Is Flawed, Cannot Be 
Applied Class-wide, Overstates “Actual Damages,” Would Award Damages to 
Unharmed Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits ...................... 36 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Rescinded Credit Amounts as Damages and Therefore 
Substantially Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages ......................................... 36 
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B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages .............................................................................................. 37 
C. 
Correcting for the Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially Reduces 
Estimated Damages ............................................................................................... 38 
D. 
The Proposed Credit Rescission Class Damages Methodology Does Not 
Distinguish Between Harmed and Unharmed Consumers .................................... 38 
E. 
The Credit Rescission Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably Estimate 
BANA’s Profits ..................................................................................................... 39 
VIII. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Account Freeze Class Methodology Is Flawed, Cannot Be Applied 
Class-wide, Overstates “Actual Damages,” Would Award Damages to Unharmed 
Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits ........................................ 39 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Frozen Account Balances as Damages and Therefore 
Substantially Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages ......................................... 39 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages .............................................................................................. 40 
C. 
Correcting for the Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially Reduces 
Estimated Damages ............................................................................................... 41 
D. 
The Account Freeze Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably Estimate 
BANA’s Profits ..................................................................................................... 42 
IX. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Customer Service Class Ignores 
Important Consumer Heterogeneity and Fails to Propose a Damages Methodology that 
Reliably Measures Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis ............................................ 43 
X. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed EMV Chip Class Damages Methodology Does Not Distinguish 
Harmed from Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity That 
Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for Many Consumers, and Does 
Not Reliably Estimate Profits ........................................................................................... 44 
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I. 
Qualifications 
1. 
I am a Professor of Management at the University of California, Davis. I am also a 
Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Consumer Finance Institute. Since 
receiving my Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Davis, in 1996, I have 
taught at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College, the Graduate School of Business at 
the University of Chicago, the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and the University of Tennessee. I have also been an Economist and Senior Economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and a Visiting Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
2. 
My research focus and area of expertise is consumer behavior in financial services 
markets. I have published more than 20 articles in leading academic finance and economics 
journals, including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, and the Review of 
Financial Studies. My articles have covered topics such as consumer deposit account and credit 
card usage, consumers’ costs of credit card borrowing, the incidence of credit card and deposit 
account fees, and topics related to consumer saving and borrowing behavior.  
3. 
I have received grants from the National Science Foundation, Russell Sage Foundation, 
Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, Filene Institute, 
and the FDIC in support of my research. I have presented my research at the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the National Bureau of Economic Research, the American Economic 
Association, and other venues.  
4. 
Appendix A contains my curriculum vitae. A list of materials I relied upon in forming 
my opinion in the current matter is included as Appendix B. A list of my prior testimony for the 
past four years is included as Appendix C. 
5. 
I am being compensated at $1,200 per hour. I have been assisted in this matter by staff of 
Cornerstone Research, who worked under my direction. I receive compensation from 
Cornerstone Research based on its collected billings for work its employees perform supporting 
me in this matter. Neither my compensation in this matter nor my compensation from 
Cornerstone Research is in any way contingent or based on the content of my opinion, the results 
of my analysis, or the outcome of this or any other matter. 
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II. 
Assignment 
6. 
I have been retained in this matter by Goodwin Procter LLP, counsel for Bank of 
America, N.A. (“BANA”). I have been asked to review and respond to certain opinions 
expressed by Greg J. Regan in his report submitted on March 4, 2025 (the “Regan Report”).1 
Specifically, I have been asked to respond to Mr. Regan’s damages methodologies and the 
calculations he performs to measure alleged damages for all five proposed classes. 
7. 
This report does not respond to all of the opinions in the Regan Report or any opinions in 
other reports. It only responds to those specific opinions or assumptions to which counsel has 
asked me to respond. I reserve the right to respond to additional opinions or assumptions in the 
Regan Report or other plaintiff expert reports if asked to do so by counsel in the future. I also 
reserve the right to supplement or amend my report should new data or information become 
available. 
III. 
Summary of Opinions 
8. 
Mr. Regan proposes a damages methodology for each of five proposed classes. I discuss 
each of the proposed classes in detail below. Before doing so, I offer a summary of the principal 
methodological flaws in the Regan Report. 
9. 
To start, Mr. Regan’s methodology to calculate the “principal amount of damages” 
mischaracterizes denied claims, rescinded credits, and frozen account balances as damages for 
the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes. Mr. 
Regan treats proposed class members who have lost access to funds as though they have lost the 
funds and provides no economic argument for why a dollar amount lost that was temporarily lost 
and then returned represents economic harm in the amount of the dollars to which the individual 
regained complete access. See Sections VI.A, VII.A, VIII.A, and X. 
10. 
Second, Mr. Regan’s proposed “consequential damages” methodology for the proposed 
Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes is flawed and cannot 
 
1 Expert Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, March 4, 2025, Backup Materials, and Materials listed in Appendix B 
(“Regan Report”), ¶ 5. 
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estimate economic harm on a class-wide basis. Mr. Regan’s methodology erroneously applies 
assumptions about proposed class members’ economic circumstances and behaviors that are not 
derived from class data and may be non-representative of proposed class members’ economic 
circumstances and behaviors, both individually and on average. Because Mr. Regan’s broad-
brush assumptions obscure important heterogeneity in alleged damages across proposed class 
members and overstate economic harm for many proposed class members, his proposed 
methodology cannot identify economic harm class-wide. See Sections VI.B, VII.B, VIII.B, and 
X. 
11. 
Third, correcting these two errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology substantially 
decreases his “actual damages” estimates for the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, 
Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes. I do not opine on the legal question of whether any 
damages in this matter should be trebled, but even if Mr. Regan’s damages estimates for the 
Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes could be trebled, the trebled amount would be 
substantially lower than Mr. Regan’s estimates after correcting for the errors in his “actual 
damages” methodology. See Sections VI.C, VII.C, and VIII.C. 
12. 
Fourth, Mr. Regan’s methodology to identify members of the proposed Claim Denial, 
Credit Rescission, and EMV Chip classes does not explain how to fully 
 
 
 In addition, 
for the proposed Claim Denial and EMV Chip classes, Mr. Regan fails to demonstrate that all 
claims denied by the Bank based solely on Indicator 1 would have been approved absent the use 
of Indicator 1. Further, to the extent Mr. Regan’s proposed EMV Chip class includes cardholders 
whose card was “lost, stolen, or never received” but did not report it as such or who would not 
have been protected from fraud by the presence of an EMV chip, it improperly includes 
individuals who should be excluded from the proposed class. See Sections VI.D, VII.D, and X. 
13. 
Fifth, Mr. Regan’s proposed “actual damages” methodology for the proposed Customer 
Service class fails to reliably measure economic harm on a class-wide basis because I understand 
that Mr. Minnucci has not shown either that the industry benchmark he proposes to determine the 
average excess hold time is appropriate or that the data needed to identify how many times each 
proposed class member called BANA actually exist. See Section IX. 
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14. 
Sixth, Mr. Regan’s proposed “incremental Float Revenue” calculations for the proposed 
Claim Denial, Credit Rescission and Account Freeze classes erroneously assume that consumers 
would have immediately withdrawn the full claim amount or frozen account balance if not for 
the claim denial, credit rescission, or account freeze. For the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. 
Regan also fails to account for any decrease in BANA’s float revenue that resulted from freezing 
proposed class members’ accounts. In my opinion, it would require individual inquiry to 
determine what the account balance of each proposed class member would have been absent 
BANA’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claims Fraud Filter. Therefore, Mr. Regan’s methodology 
cannot be applied on a class-wide basis. See Sections VI.E, VII.E, and VIII.C. 
IV. 
Background 
A. 
Fraud and the Claims Fraud Filter 
15. 
BANA launched the Claims Fraud Filter (“CFF”) on September 28, 2020 “
 
”2 
 
 
.3 
 
.”4 
As of June 9, 2021, BANA discontinued using the CFF to close error claims.5  
B. 
Plaintiff’s Allegations and Proposed Classes  
16. 
Plaintiffs allege “a series of unlawful policies and practices that Defendant Bank of 
America, N.A. (the ‘Bank’) implemented at the height of the Covid pandemic in 2020-2021” 
 
2 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024, with Exhibits (“Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to 
Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories”), p. 8:2–3. 
3 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:2–9. 
4 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:14–15.  
5 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:6–9. 
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related to Indicator 1 of the CFF.6 According to Plaintiffs, “[t]hose policies and practices 
deprived more than 
 Californians of access to critical unemployment insurance (‘UI’) 
and other public benefits for which they had been approved by California’s Employment 
Development Department (‘EDD’), and which the Bank had been entrusted to distribute through 
Bank-issued prepaid debit cards.”7 
17. 
Plaintiffs “seek to represent five related classes”:8  
a. Claim Denial Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders who notified the Bank that an unauthorized transaction had occurred 
on their Bank of America EDD debit card account (‘Claim’) at an automated 
teller machine (‘ATM’), and whose Claim the Bank denied or closed at any time 
from September 28, 2020 through June 8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the 
Bank’s CFF.”9 
b. Credit Rescission Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders who received permanent credit from the Bank in connection with 
their Claim, which credit the Bank rescinded at any time from September 28, 
2020 through June 8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Bank’s CFF.”10 
c. Account Freeze Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders whose EDD debit card account (‘Account’) the Bank froze at any 
time from September 28, 2020 through March 18, 2021, based solely on Indicator 
1 of the Bank’s CFF, and whose Account the Bank (i) subsequently unfroze, or 
(ii) subsequently converted from frozen to blocked status on or after March 18, 
2021, and then unblocked.”11 
d. Customer Service Class: This class consists of “[a]ll members of the Claim Denial 
Class and/or the Credit Rescission Class who telephoned the Bank’s customer 
 
6 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, August 29, 2024 (“Motion for Class Certification”), p. 1:3–5. See also Motion for Class 
Certification, p. 2:8–14. 
7 Motion for Class Certification, p. 1:6–10. 
8 Motion for Class Certification, p. 3:27. 
9 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 32. See also Motion for Class Certification, pp. 9:25–10:3. 
10 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 63. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 10:6–18. 
11 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 73. See also Motion for Class Certification, pp. 10:21–11:20. 
-
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service phone number for Bank of America EDD cardholders at any time between 
September 13, 2020 and November 21, 2020, inclusive, and whose telephone call 
was routed to the Bank’s Claims Call Center.”12 
e. EMV Chip Class: This class consists of “[a]ll members of the Claim Denial Class 
and/or the Credit Rescission Class whose EDD debit card did not include an EMV 
chip prior to June 9, 2021.”13 
C. 
The Remediation Plan and Associated Repayments 
18. 
In October 2022, BANA submitted a Remediation Plan to the Consumer Financial 
Production Bureau and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency “
 
 
”14 Under the Remediation Plan, BANA committed 
to provide “
”15 
19. 
BANA noted that the “
 
,” and that the Remediation Plan was intended to “
 
.”16 BANA clarified that 
 
,” as it was “
 
”17 Jennifer Lennon, a BANA Senior 
Vice President and Product Management and State Liaison, described the Remediation Plan as 
“
.”18  
20. 
To develop the Remediation Plan, BANA 
 
 
 
12 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 88. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 12:2–26. 
13 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 97. 
14 Bank of America, “Unemployment Insurance Prepaid Card Program Remediation Plan,” Submitted October 6, 2022 to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and October 12, 2022 to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00102554–577 (“Remediation Plan”), p. 1. 
15 Remediation Plan, p. 2. 
16 Remediation Plan, fn 16, p. 15. 
17 Remediation Plan, p. 12. 
18 Declaration of Jennifer Lennon in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, In Re: Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024, Appendix of Exhibits to 
the Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of 
America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 24, 2024, Ex. (“DX”) 8 (“Lennon Declaration”), ¶¶ 1, 11. 
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.”19 
According to the Remediation Plan, “
 
.” 20 Nevertheless, the plan “
 
.”21 
21. 
In the Remediation Plan, 
 
 
 
.”22 The Remediation Plan also 
 
 
 
”23 I understand that 
 
 
 
.24 
 
.25 
V. 
Summary of Mr. Regan’s Opinions and Damages Methodologies 
22. 
Mr. Regan was asked to “evaluate appropriate methodologies to measure the impact on 
each Class of the Bank’s policies and practices, as alleged by Plaintiffs.”26 Mr. Regan 
specifically was retained to “provide a methodology to calculate classwide damages available to 
 
19 Remediation Plan, p. 5. 
20 Remediation Plan, p. 6. 
21 Remediation Plan, p. 6. 
22 Remediation Plan, p. 2. 
23 Remediation Plan, p. 2. 
24 Remediation Plan, pp. 11–12. 
25 Mr. Regan’s analysis includes 
. Regan Report, ¶ 35. See Regan Report, 
Schedule 1; Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of 
Interrogatories (Interrogatories 2-6, 14-15), In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, December 1, 
2023 (“Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of 
Interrogatories”), p. 8:18–21; Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s 
First Set of Interrogatories, p. 9:5–6. 
26 Regan Report, ¶ 5. 
-
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each of the… five Classes” described above in Section IV. Mr. Regan proposes damages 
methodologies to measure a combination of (1) “actual damages,” (2) statutory damages, (3) 
treble damages, and (4) disgorgement. Mr. Regan opines that these damage categories can be 
calculated on a class-wide basis.27 
23. 
For the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip 
classes, Mr. Regan defines “actual damages” as the sum of “[t]he principal amount of damages” 
and “consequential damages.”28  
24. 
Mr. Regan asserts that “the principal amount of actual damages” for the proposed Claim 
Denial, Credit Rescission and Account Freeze classes equals the total dollar amounts of denied 
claims, rescinded credit, and frozen balances respectively, thereby classifying as damages funds 
that were later repaid or released to proposed class members.29 For the proposed EMV Chip 
class, Mr. Regan asserts that principal damages equal the sum of denied claims and rescinded 
credit in the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes.30 
25. 
Mr. Regan also proposes a methodology to estimate alleged “consequential damages” for 
the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes. The 
methodology is similar for all four proposed classes. Mr. Regan opines that his methodology 
“reflects the time value of money for impacted cardholders, or comparable measure of the 
economic loss to class members resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits,” 
estimated by assessing compound interest on the principal amounts of the claims or account 
balances.31 In choosing an interest rate, Mr. Regan asserts that “the benefit of having available 
funds, such as the balance otherwise available in an EDD Cardholder account, was that the 
consumer could avoid ‘costly borrowing or missed payments.’ ”32 Mr. Regan then defines the 
 
27 Regan Report, ¶ 5. 
28 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 13, 17, 21. 
29 Regan Report, ¶¶ 38, 66, 78. 
30 Regan Report, ¶ 99. Mr. Regan clarifies he is not opining that these principal damages should be awarded twice: “an impacted 
Cardholder may have more than one claim or may belong to more than one class. This does not mean, however, that I propose the 
same damages multiple times for Cardholders who have more than one claim or are members of more than one proposed class. If 
an award is made, and depending on the nature of the award, it may be appropriate to disaggregate the damage amounts. This 
disaggregation is easily undertaken using the existing data in my analysis.” See Regan Report, ¶ 6. 
31 Regan Report, ¶¶ 46, 49. Mr. Regan also describes his methodology as measuring “economic harm” in addition to “financial 
harm.” See Regan Report, ¶¶ 44, 51. 
32 Regan Report, ¶ 43. 
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cost of borrowing as “the foundation for [his] methodology to calculate consequential 
damages.”33 He performs this calculation with two interest rates, each applied identically to 
every proposed class member: (1) 10%, which he states “is consistent with the interest rate 
applied to judgments in California,”34 and (2) 20%, which is “based on [his] review of the types 
of credit accessed by typical consumers.”35  
26. 
Mr. Regan’s methodology further attempts to estimate the cost of delayed benefit 
payments for the proposed Account Freeze class.36 Mr. Regan performs this calculation by 
assuming that cardholders whose accounts were frozen for longer than 15 days would have been 
unable to receive deposits of additional EDD funds into their accounts and would have needed to 
wait until 30 days after their account was frozen to receive their next two benefit payments, 
without establishing that any of those cardholders continued to be eligible for benefits at all 
during that time. Mr. Regan assumes that proposed class members would have needed to “access 
alternative funds” at a cost of 20% interest, again without considering whether each class 
member needed to access alternative funds at all.37 Mr. Regan applies these assumptions 
identically to all proposed Account Freeze class members.  
27. 
For the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes, Mr. Regan also estimates 
“treble damages.” He claims that “[t]reble damages under EFTA, 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e), can be 
calculated on a classwide basis by simply multiplying each class member’s actual damages by 
three.”38  
28. 
Mr. Regan’s methodology to calculate actual damages for the proposed Customer Service 
class is to provide “compensation for the value of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ lost time spent 
 
33 Regan Report, ¶ 43. 
34 Regan Report, ¶ 46. 
35 Regan Report, ¶¶ 47, 49. Mr. Regan also claims that “[t]his 20% rate is consistent with my prior experience studying 
unsecured consumer debt such as credit cards, and lower than APRs associated with alternative lending sources.” 
36 Regan Report, ¶¶ 83–84. Mr. Regan’s attempt to estimate the cost of delayed benefit payments for the proposed Account 
Freeze class comprised one component of his estimate of consequential damages under “Methodology 2” in his class certification 
report, which attempted to estimate “actual damages incurred by the Account Freeze class.” Expert Class Certification Report of 
Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, August 29, 2024, Backup Materials, and Materials listed in Appendix B (“Regan Class 
Certification Report”), ¶ 101. “Methodology 2” was distinct from “Methodology 1,” which only applied a compound interest rate 
to frozen balances, “reflect[ing] the time value of money for this population of cardholders.” Regan Class Certification Report, ¶ 
100. 
37 Regan Report, ¶¶ 83–84. 
38 Regan Report, ¶¶ 10, 14, 58, 70. 
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on hold with the Bank’s Claims call center… that was greater than the reasonable wait-on-hold 
time by industry standards.”39 Mr. Regan proposes to calculate this “compensation” by 
multiplying an “average excess hold time” by “the applicable minimum wage”—which he 
assumes to be the “then-current California minimum wage”—for all proposed Customer Service 
class members.40 
29. 
Mr. Regan claims that disgorgement of profits for the proposed Claim Denial, Credit 
Rescission, and Account Freeze classes equals the “incremental Float Revenue on the amounts 
withheld from members of the class.”41 Mr. Regan estimates those values by applying the 
applicable BANA Float Revenue rate to the total dollar amounts of denied claims, rescinded 
credit, and frozen balances respectively for the period before these amounts were reimbursed.42 
For the proposed Customer Service class, Mr. Regan claims that disgorgement of profits equals 
the Bank’s avoided costs from “understaffing [BANA’s] Claims call center.”43 For the proposed 
EMV Chip class, Mr. Regan claims that disgorgement of profits equals the Bank’s avoided costs 
from “not including EMV chips in its EDD debit cards.”44  
30. 
Mr. Regan proposes methodologies to calculate alleged statutory damages for certain 
proposed classes but does not perform any calculations to estimate the alleged statutory damages. 
As I note in Section II, I have not been assigned to respond to these opinions. 
 
39 Regan Report, ¶ 19. 
40 Regan Report, ¶¶ 91–93.  
41 Regan Report, ¶ 61. See also Regan Report, ¶¶ 72, 87. 
42 Regan Report, ¶¶ 61–62. See also Regan Report, ¶¶ 72, 87. 
43 Regan Report, ¶ 94. 
44 Regan Report, ¶ 101. 
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VI. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Claim Denial Class Damages Methodology Is Flawed, 
Overstates “Actual Damages,” Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, Would Award 
Damages to Unharmed Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Claim Denial Amounts as Damages And Therefore 
Substantially Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages 
31. 
One can calculate economic damages as the difference between actual consumer 
outcomes and consumer outcomes in a “but-for” hypothetical world absent the at-issue 
conduct.45 As an example, a consumer who had $100 taken from them in the actual world and 
never received it back and would not have had the $100 taken from them in the but-for world has 
lost funds and could be said to have suffered $100 in economic damages. 
32. 
A conceptually distinct economic damages issue arises when a consumer has not lost 
funds, but has rather lost access to funds for some period of time. For example, imagine a 
consumer who, in the actual world, had $100 taken from them and then returned some weeks or 
months later and, in the but-for world, had $100 taken and returned immediately. Such a 
consumer has lost access to funds for a period of time and could only have suffered damages 
relating to the lost access of the funds over that period of time.46 The distinction is clear: the 
consumer who has lost funds does not have $100 in the actual world but does have $100 in the 
but-for world, and the consumer who has lost access to funds has $100 in both the actual and 
but-for worlds but received it later in the actual world than in the but-for world. To treat 
customers in the two situations as similarly situated is economically illogical. 
 
45 Dunbar, Michael K., Elizabeth A. Evans, and Roman L. Weil, “Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Damages Calculations” in Litigation 
Services Handbook, The Role of the Financial Expert, Fifth Edition, ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2012), pp. 5.1–23, p. 5.1. See, e.g., Buffo, Stephen L., David P. Hoffman, and Roman L. Weil, “Serving as a Financial Expert in 
Litigation” in Litigation Services Handbook, The Role of the Financial Expert, Fifth Edition, ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), pp. 2.1–16, p. 2.5. See also, e.g., Evans, Elizabeth A., Joseph J. Galanti, and Daniel G. Lentz, 
“Developing Damages Theories and Models” in Litigation Services Handbook, The Role of the Financial Expert, Fifth Edition, 
ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), pp. 4.1–35, p. 4.29. 
46 As described in Section V above, Mr. Regan refers to these as “consequential damages.” See Regan Report, ¶ 9. I discuss 
issues with Mr. Regan’s “consequential damages” methodology for the proposed Claim Denial class in more detail in Section 
VI.B below. 
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Figure 1: Lost Funds vs. Lost Access to Funds in the Actual and But-For Worlds 
 
Note: In the context of both “Lost Funds” and “Lost Access to Funds,” the consumer may suffer 
damages associated with the time value of money. I address Mr. Regan’s methodology with 
respect to the time value of money for the proposed Claim Denial class below in Section VI.B.2. 
33. 
Despite the clarity of that distinction, Mr. Regan treats proposed class members who have 
lost access to funds as though they have permanently lost the funds. In other words, his damages 
methodology acts as if the value of their claims were never returned to them. Mr. Regan defines 
the “principal amount of actual damages” for the proposed Claim Denial class as “the amount of 
each class member’s claim(s) that the Bank denied based solely on Indicator 1 of its Claim Fraud 
Filter.”47 Those claims total 
.48 While Mr. Regan acknowledges that his estimated 
damages “may require an offset for amounts that 
 
,” he does not explain or acknowledge that 
 
, a fact shown in Mr. Regan’s Schedule 1.49 
Therefore, in actuality, proposed class members only lost access to their funds for a period of 
time, and Mr. Regan’s characterization of these principal amounts as damages makes no 
economic sense. Mr. Regan provides no economic argument for why a dollar amount that was 
temporarily lost and then returned later represents economic harm in the amount of the dollars to 
which the individual regained complete access.  
34. 
Elsewhere in his report, Mr. Regan employs the economically appropriate logic in 
distinguishing lost funds and lost access to funds. For the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. 
 
47 Regan Report, ¶ 38. 
48 Regan Report, ¶ 39. 
49 Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
Revised Exhibit 1 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 2 and 6. See also Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
Actual World
But-For World
Difference
Lost Funds
-$100
-$100 + $100 = $0
-$100
Lost Access to Funds
-$100 + $100 = $0
-$100 + $100 = $0
$0
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Regan purports to estimate harm from the “Cost of Delayed Benefit Payments.”50 His damages 
calculation does not include delayed benefit payments as “principal amount[s] of actual 
damages” for the proposed Account Freeze class.51 Excluding delayed benefits from principal 
damages is consistent with the view of damages in Figure 1 above, recognizing that each 
proposed Account Freeze class member later received those benefits.52 Mr. Regan fails to 
explain the inconsistency that delayed benefit payments are properly excluded from his 
“principal amount of actual damages” while frozen account balances (and denied claim amounts) 
are erroneously included.  
35. 
In my opinion, Mr. Regan’s “principal amount of actual damages” is a misnomer because 
there are no economic damages arising from the principal amounts of the denied claims that later 
were fully returned. Given that claim denial amounts have been returned, the only potential 
damages from any delay in paying those claims would be damages associated with the loss of 
access to those funds, which I address in the next section.  
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages 
36. 
In his “consequential damages” calculations, Mr. Regan attempts to approximate the 
economic harm from lost access to funds.53 Mr. Regan opines that the appropriate methodology 
reflects “the time value of money for impacted cardholders, or comparable measure of the 
economic loss to class members resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits.”54 He 
 
50 Regan Report, Section IV.B.2.b. As described above in Section V, Mr. Regan analyzes the “cost of Delayed Benefits” as a 
component of “consequential damages,” which is distinct from his calculation of “the principal amount of actual damages.” 
51 Mr. Regan’s calculation does attempt to value damages from lost access to funds. I discuss his methodology below in Section 
VIII.B. 
52 Regan Report, ¶¶ 83–84. 
53 Regan Report, ¶ 9. 
54 Regan Report, ¶ 46. In his class certification report, Mr. Regan also opined that “consequential damages” should include 
certain fees he claims proposed class members would likely have incurred. See Regan Class Certification Report, ¶ 8. In his 
March 4th report, Mr. Regan merely claims that “[t]his methodology to calculate consequential damages is conservative because 
it excludes other obvious financial harms experienced by EDD Cardholders attributable to the Bank’s denial of their claims. For 
instance, due to the unexpected unavailability of their funds, EDD cardholders would likely have incurred late or overdraft fees.” 
Regan Report, ¶ 9. I reserve the right to supplement my opinions with respect to additional forms of “consequential damages” if 
asserted by Mr. Regan or Plaintiffs.  
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estimates consequential damages by assessing compound interest on the principal amounts of the 
claims over time.55 
37. 
Mr. Regan proffers two interest rates for those calculations. One is a 10% rate, which he 
claims “is consistent with the interest rate applied to judgments in California.”56 I offer no legal 
opinion on whether 10% or any other statutory rate is appropriate in this matter, although I do 
employ that rate for illustrative purposes in some calculations below.  
38. 
Mr. Regan also proffers a second interest rate of 20% that, he suggests, “include[s] the 
cost of increased borrowing, reduced consumption, or the inability to pay down existing debt 
such as credit card debt. This is because impacted cardholders would have needed to mitigate the 
unexpected inability to access their funds otherwise available in their Bank-controlled EDD 
accounts.”57 Mr. Regan opines that he “determined the second interest rate based on [his] review 
of the types of credit accessed by typical consumers.”58 
39. 
As a methodological matter, Mr. Regan does not explain why he equates the “time value 
of money” with a borrowing cost, in this case a hypothetical credit card interest rate that he 
assumes proposed class members might face regardless of whether they held a credit card and 
without evidence that they would borrow 100% of the denied claim amount.59 The time value of 
money is a well-established concept in economics and finance, capturing the financial concept 
that “a dollar in hand today is worth more than a dollar promised at some time in the future.”60 
Studies note that a risk-free interest rate can be an appropriate benchmark for the time value of 
money.61  
40. 
The time value of money would apply to consumers whether or not they held credit cards, 
whether they faced credit card interest rates of 0% or 20%, whether or not they might fund 
 
55 Regan Report, ¶ 44. 
56 Regan Report, ¶ 46. 
57 Regan Report, ¶ 46. 
58 Regan Report, ¶ 47. 
59 Regan Report, ¶¶ 46, 49. 
60 Ross, Stephen A., Randolph W. Westerfield, and Bradford D. Jordan, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, Sixth Edition 
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2003), p. 129. 
61 Espinoza, R. David, “Separating Project Risk From the Time Value of Money: A Step Toward Integration of Risk 
Management and Valuation of Infrastructure Investments,” International Journal of Project Management 32, no. 6, 2014, pp. 
1056–1072, p. 1056 (“The time value of money is represented by the risk-free rate and compensates investors for parking their 
money in a secure investment that yields a known amount over a period of time.”). 
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unanticipated expenses from savings, whether or not they would reduce consumption facing a 
financial shortfall, and so on. Market credit card interest rates such as the ones employed by Mr. 
Regan would, on the other hand, reflect lenders’ time value of money, as well as possible premia 
for default risk, inflation, and other factors unrelated to the time value of money for proposed 
class members.62 
41. 
Mr. Regan’s methodology includes additional flaws beyond the conceptual problem of 
equating any single borrowing cost to the time value of money. In justifying the 20% interest rate 
that he applies to all proposed class members, Mr. Regan fails to analyze the types of credit 
accessed specifically by the proposed class or any individual proposed class member during the 
proposed class period. Rather, his methodology erroneously applies assumptions about proposed 
class members’ economic circumstances and behaviors that are not derived from class data and 
may be non-representative of proposed class members’ economic circumstances and behaviors, 
both individually and on average.63  
42. 
As I describe below, proposed class members’ individual circumstances would generate 
diversity in whether or not proposed class members accessed substitute funds by borrowing on 
credit cards due to the Bank’s alleged misconduct, and Mr. Regan’s methodology would 
overstate economic harm for proposed class members who could have accessed substitute funds 
without borrowing. Further, Mr. Regan’s assumed 20% interest rate also obscures heterogeneity 
in economic harm and overstates economic harm for many proposed class members because 
many consumers who did borrow could have faced lower interest rates than those assumed in 
Mr. Regan’s methodology.  
 
62 DeFusco, Richard A., et al., “The Time Value of Money” in Quantitative Investment Analysis, Fourth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2020), pp. 1–43, p. 38 (“An interest rate can be viewed as the sum of the real risk-free interest rate and a set 
of premiums that compensate lenders for risk: an inflation premium, a default risk premium, a liquidity premium, and a maturity 
premium.”). 
63 Regan attempts to justify his use of average values for various inputs by claiming that 
 
 See Regan Report, ¶ 57. 
 
.” 
See Remediation Plan, p. 12. 
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43. 
Because Mr. Regan’s broad-brush assumptions obscure important heterogeneity in 
alleged damages across proposed class members and overstate economic harm for many 
proposed class members, his proposed methodology cannot identify economic harm class-wide. 
1. 
The Economic Circumstances of Proposed Class Members and Any 
Potential Economic Impact of Claim Denials Would be Highly 
Individualized 
44. 
Mr. Regan’s assertions regarding proposed class members’ likely economic 
circumstances, which frame his economic assumptions underlying his “consequential damages” 
methodology, obscure what would be considerable heterogeneity in the proposed class on each 
dimension he discusses. That heterogeneity would exist in terms of consumer wages, available 
savings consumers could have accessed during their claim denial, and claim denial amounts 
relative to those figures. 
45. 
First, in discussing proposed class members’ likely economic circumstances, Mr. Regan 
opines that “consumers who lost their jobs during the pandemic and received unemployment 
insurance tended to earn less than the median wage.”64 Mr. Regan does not document that the 
characteristics of proposed Claim Denial class members would match the characteristics of 
consumers more broadly who “lost their jobs during the pandemic and received unemployment 
insurance,” in terms of whether they would have “tended to earn less than the median wage.”65  
46. 
To the contrary, proposed class members who received EDD benefits in California likely 
would have come from different places in the wage distribution and included both unemployed 
and underemployed consumers.66 For example, proposed class member 
 had 
 payroll deposits of 
 into his EDD account through the end of the class period.67 
 
64 Regan Report, ¶ 42. 
65 Regan Report, ¶ 42. 
66 Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public 
Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/. See 
also “Eligibility Requirements,” State of California Employment Development Department, https://edd.ca.gov/ui_eligibility/, 
accessed October 21, 2024 (“When applying for unemployment benefits, you must … [b]e totally or partially unemployed.”). 
BANA’s expert Justin McCrary opines that “increased unemployment, and the introduction of PUA, led to greater UI coverage 
amongst unemployed and underemployed workers. … As a result of these programs, the UI recipient population incorporated 
new types of individuals (such as business owners) who could have increased financial resources compared to the typical benefit 
recipients.” See Expert Report of Professor Justin McCrary, Ph.D., April 4, 2025 (“McCrary Report”), ¶¶ 28–29. 
67 BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814; Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
-
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By contrast, proposed class member 
 largely had 
 payroll deposits of 
 
into his EDD account through the end of the class period.68 Beyond that class-specific evidence, 
people who submitted unemployment claims to the EDD during the proposed class period 
spanned 20 distinct industry sectors, ranging from construction to finance and insurance.69 
Evidence from the Federal Reserve of New York’s Consumer Expectations Survey (“SCE”) 
indicates that 42% of respondents who indicated that they were “[n]ot working, but would like to 
work” or “[t]emporarily laid off” during September 2020–June 2021 were categorized as earning 
household incomes of greater than $50,000 a year at the time.70 Some millionaires collected 
unemployment benefits in 2020.71 
47. 
Evidence from the class illustrates this heterogeneity. Some proposed class members 
were full-time students working part-time, while others were business owners. For example, 
prior to receiving unemployment benefits, Azuri Moon was “
 
”72 By contrast, 
Stephanie Moore 
.73 Still 
 
68 BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814; Regan Report, Schedule 1. Luis Perez had an initial payroll deposit of 
 on 
 
 and a payroll deposit of 
. BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814. 
69 See “California Unemployment Industry & Demographics Data Dashboard,” State of California Employment Development 
Department, September 2024, https://edd.ca.gov/siteassets/files/newsroom/facts-and-stats/excel/ada-county-and-statewide-
demographics--industry-data-9-21-24.xlsx. 
70 See “Center for Microeconomic Data: Survey of Consumer Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2020–2023, 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/sce#/. Of the 281 respondents to the survey during this period who indicated they 
were “[n]ot working, but would like to work” or “[t]emporarily laid off,” 119 respondents reported household incomes of greater 
than $50,000 at some point in the period. Responses are weighted by the Federal Reserve to reflect differences between the 
survey sample and the general population. 
71 Brian Faler, “Unemployment Assistance to Millionaires Soared During Pandemic,” Politico, November 22, 2022, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/22/unemployment-assistance-millionaires-covid-pandemic-2020-00070446. 
72 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re 
Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental 
Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 6:24–26. 
73 Plaintiff Stephanie Moore’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024, p. 6:24–27. 
-
-
-
-
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other class members were 
, while others were 
 
.74  
48. 
Second, proposed class members would not uniformly have been “less likely to have 
available savings,”75 as asserted by Mr. Regan. Rather, each would have had varying levels of 
savings based on their individual circumstances. One study by the Federal Reserve finds 
considerable variation across households in the amount they have saved in “liquid savings,” or 
readily accessible cash to use for unanticipated expenses: roughly 60% of households have one 
month of recurring expenses saved, 40% have three months, and other households have nine or 
twelve months’ worth of savings.76 The Federal Reserve study notes that “quasi-liquid” savings 
balances may be greater.77 Another study observes that households’ median weekly checking 
account balance varies substantially.78 Based on his analysis of data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (“SIPP”), Dr. McCrary finds that “over half of the sample (56%) had 
positive net liquid household wealth prior to receiving UI, meaning most households who 
received UI had some form of savings they could use to fund, or partially fund, a temporary 
delay of UI funds.”79 
49. 
Beyond this heterogeneity, studies find that during the proposed class period many 
consumers’ liquid assets increased substantively: “Household asset holdings and overall wealth 
 
74 Alex Yuan worked as a 
 before he began receiving unemployment benefits. 
See Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re 
Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental 
Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 6:24–28. Candace Koole was 
. See Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank 
of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 
2024 (“Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories”), pp. 6:25–26, 20:16–17. Vanessa Rivera worked as a 
. See Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera Objections 
and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to 
Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 9:3–6. 
75 Regan Report, ¶ 42. 
76 Neil Bhutta, and Lisa Dettling, “Money in the Bank? Assessing Families’ Liquid Savings using the Survey of Consumer 
Finances,” FEDS Notes, November 19, 2018, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-families-liquid-
savings-using-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20181119.html (“Bhutta and Dettling (2018)”). 
77 Bhutta and Dettling (2018). “Quasi-liquid” savings are savings that “can be accessed if needed, but there may be limitations, 
penalties, or taxes that have to be paid.” Examples of “quasi-liquid” accounts include “account-type retirement plans (401k or 
IRA), certificates of deposit or savings bonds, or cash-value life insurance accounts.” Bhutta and Dettling (2018). 
78 Fiona Greig, Erica Deadman, and Tanya Sonthalia, “Household Cash Balance Pulse: Family Edition,” JPMorgan Chase 
Institute, November 2021, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-creation/household-cash-
balance-pulse-families (“Greig, Deadman, and Sonthalia (2021)”). 
79 McCrary Report, ¶ 102. 
■ 
-
• 
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expanded rapidly in the two years following the onset of the pandemic recession.”80 Overall, 
household savings rates increased substantially during the class period.81 Other household 
expenses fell for many households as mortgage, credit card, auto, and student loan lenders 
engaged in forbearance—temporarily delaying some monthly expenses.82 Data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey indicate that many respondent households at the end 
of January 2021 who received Unemployment Insurance benefits used their COVID-19 stimulus 
payment to primarily pay off debt (61%) or primarily increase their savings (16%), consistent 
with the idea that these households were covering their living expenses with other sources of 
income.83 Dr. McCrary explains that Federal government supplements to UI benefits represented 
an increase of between 67% and 1,500% and that proposed class members may have received 
thousands of additional dollars in the form of other Federal stimulus payments.84 For lower-
income consumers, these pandemic-era unemployment benefits and other stimulus payments 
may have increased unemployed consumers’ income relative to their pre-unemployment wages, 
 
80 Hamza Abdelrahman, Luiz E. Oliveira, and Adam Hale Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall of Pandemic Excess Wealth,” FRBSF 
Economic Letter 2024-06, February 26, 2024, https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/el2024-06.pdf. 
81 “Personal Saving Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=FhxV#, accessed September 27, 2024. 
82 Rajashri Chakrabarti, et al., “Who Received Forbearance Relief?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street 
Economics, August 2, 2021, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/08/who-received-forbearance-relief 
(“Forbearance on debt repayment was a key provision of the CARES Act, legislation intended to combat the widespread 
economic losses stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. This pause on required payments for federally guaranteed mortgages 
and student loans has provided temporary relief to those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and servicers of nonfederal loans 
often provided forbearances or other relief on request as well. … Across all markets, households that lost income and thus faced 
financial hardship were more likely to receive forbearance relief than other households.”); Daniel Sexton, “An In-Depth Look at 
Mortgage Forbearance Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, February 22, 2021, 
https://www.atlantafed.org/blogs/macroblog/2021/02/22/in-depth-look-at-mortgage-forbearance-data (“Looking at the ZIP code-
level map makes it plain that lower-income areas of most major cities have estimated [mortgage] forbearance rates substantially 
greater than rates in higher-income areas.”); “The Consumer Credit Card Market,” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
September 2021, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-credit-card-market-report_2021.pdf (“CFPB 
(2021)”) (“Large numbers of consumers benefitted from issuers’ relief programs in 2020. Bureau data indicate that 
approximately 25 million consumer credit card accounts entered relief programs in 2020… Payment-deferral programs were the 
major driver of the robust increase in relief, though fee reversals and waivers or interest rate reductions were also more common 
in 2020… The scale of this relief and the speed with which it was deployed therefore likely represented substantial benefits to the 
consumers who received it, allowing them to redeploy their limited and, likely in many cases, interrupted or diminished flow of 
income and other incoming funds towards other urgent needs… accounts held by consumers with lower scores received payment 
deferrals at the highest rates of any credit score tier – nearly one-in-six subprime and deep subprime accounts received a payment 
deferral, compared to roughly one in-ten among near-prime, one-in-twenty among prime, and just one-in-one-hundred among 
superprime accounts.”). 
83 See “Household Pulse Survey Public Use File: January 20 – February 1, 2021,” U.S. Census Bureau, 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/datasets/hhp/2021/wk23/HPS_Week23_PUF_CSV.zip, accessed October 7, 
2024. Of the 26,025,891 respondents to the Census Bureau who indicated they received Unemployment Insurance benefits, 
15,791,884 respondents mostly used their payment to pay down debt, and 4,211,705 respondents mostly used their payment to 
increase savings. Responses are weighted by the Census Bureau to reflect differences between the survey sample and the general 
population. 
84 McCrary Report, ¶¶ 28–34. 
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potentially leading to increased savings among this population.85 All of these factors suggest that 
savings would have varied for individuals in the proposed class.  
50. 
Evidence of this is found in literature cited by Mr. Regan. For example, he claims that 
“the Federal Reserve’s data indicat[e] that lower income consumers increased credit card 
spending following the onset of the pandemic.”86 However, that study clarifies that this effect did 
not begin until “the second quarter of 2021,” and excess savings continued to increase until 
August 2021.87 Prior to March 2021, the Federal Reserve study states that savings increased: 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, consumers reduced their spending due to 
mobility restrictions, while at the same time their income increased with the help 
of government stimulus checks and debt forgiveness on obligations such as rent 
and student loans.  
As a result, consumers in all income cohorts accumulated excess savings in their 
bank accounts relative to their pre-pandemic levels.88 
51. 
In fact, Plaintiffs themselves exhibit varying levels of access to liquid funds based on 
their own personal and household savings. For example, around the time he submitted a claim, 
Azuri Moon had “
.”89 Other plaintiffs had more liquid funds 
available.90 For example, Roland Oosthuizen had 
 
 
 
 
85 Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public 
Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/. 
86 Regan Report, ¶ 47. 
87 Joanna Stavins, “Credit Card Spending and Borrowing Since the Start of the Covid-19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, October 19, 2023, https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2023/credit-card-spending-and-
borrowing-since-the-start-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.aspx (“Stavins (2023)”), pp. 2–3. 
88 Stavins (2023), p. 3. 
89 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
30:4–6. 
90 I understand that, outside of plaintiff discovery responses, BANA does not have access to data on checking accounts, savings 
accounts, or other forms of liquid funds held outside of BANA, such as those held at other financial institutions or outside of any 
financial institution. 
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.91 Michael Willrich and Alex Yuan 
.92 
Similar variation would apply to the consumers in the proposed Claim Denial class more broadly 
based on different levels of savings and need. The amount of liquid funds available to each 
proposed class member at the time of the claim denial would be highly individualized and would 
affect the likelihood of borrowing on a credit card. As a result, Mr. Regan’s claim that the “the 
applicable APR for impacted cardholders would have exceeded 20%” is flawed and 
unsupported.93 
52. 
Mr. Regan also fails to compare, or provide a methodology for comparing, liquid funds to 
claim denial amounts, which also would have varied among the proposed class members. 
Consumers’ varying levels of savings and claim amounts would generate heterogeneity in how 
claims affected their borrowing. As an example, one consumer with a $500 claim denial and 
$5,000 in their checking account could spend out of their available funds without borrowing on a 
credit card. Another with a similar $500 claim and $300 in savings might have to borrow and 
could risk missing a payment—but a third with the same $300 in savings and a $200 claim 
would not. These three consumers could have different economic harms associated with the 
denial of their claims, but one would need to know not just how their individualized claims 
varied, but how those claims compared to their individualized available liquid funds and other 
economic circumstances. Mr. Regan’s methodology neither measures such heterogeneity nor 
provides a methodology for measuring such heterogeneity, but rather assumes that all proposed 
class members needed to borrow their full claim denial amount. This applies even for a claim 
denial amount as small as $50.00 or less, which could be covered by the majority of savings 
levels documented in the literature I discuss above.94  
 
91 Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 26:1–6. 
92 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff J. Michael 
Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 33:15–16; 
Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 29:24–
25. 
93 Regan Report, ¶ 49. 
94 See Bhutta and Dettling (2018); Greig, Deadman, and Sonthalia (2021). Mr. Regan includes claim denial amounts as small as 
$2 and over 500 denied claims with amounts of $50 or less in his analysis. See Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
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53. 
All of this heterogeneity in economic circumstances is crucial to understand, as it would 
generate similar diversity in whether or not proposed class members accessed substitute funds by 
borrowing on credit cards due to the Bank’s alleged misconduct. As I show in the next section, 
diversity in how proposed class members accessed substitute funds would be substantial and 
require individual inquiry to understand. I also discuss how Mr. Regan’s assumptions would 
overstate the cost of obtaining substitute funds. 
2. 
Proposed Class Members’ “Cost of the Inability to Access Funds” 
Would be Highly Individualized and are Overstated for Many 
Consumers Under Mr. Regan’s Methodology 
54. 
Mr. Regan estimates consequential damages for the proposed Claim Denial class as the 
“cost of the inability to access funds.”95 For a given consumer, the “cost of the inability to access 
funds” depends on two factors: the source(s) of funds, and the associated interest cost of each 
source. As I describe above in Section V, Mr. Regan’s approach generalizes on both counts: it 
considers one specific source of funds (credit cards) for all proposed class members, and it 
assumes a uniform interest cost for that source of funds for all consumers. Both generalizations 
are inappropriate, and Mr. Regan fails to explain how such an approach could measure economic 
harm on a class-wide basis.  
55. 
It is well-established in the academic literature in household finance that costs of 
obtaining substitute funds are highly individualized—both because consumers borrow using 
different sources of funds and because consumers face varying interest rates for borrowing, even 
within the same broad “source” of funds such as credit cards.96 That finding also applies to costs 
associated with unanticipated expenses or liquidity, in particular.97 Mr. Regan’s assumptions fail 
to capture that heterogeneity and do not represent an applicable class-wide methodology for 
calculating “consequential damages” associated with obtaining substitute funds. 
 
95 Regan Report, Section II.B.2.a. 
96 Zinman, Jonathan, “Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies,” Annual Review of Economics 7, no. 2, 2015, pp. 
251–276, p. 260. See “Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
May 2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2021-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202205.pdf 
(“Federal Reserve (2021)”); Stavins, Joanna, “Unprepared for Financial Shocks: Emergency Savings and Credit Card Debt,” 
Contemporary Economic Policy 39, no. 1, 2021, pp. 59–82 (“Stavins (2021)”), pp. 59–60. 
97 Stavins (2021), p. 75. 
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56. 
As a starting point, consumers can fund unanticipated expenses (or analogously, fund 
expected expenses following an unanticipated drop in income) from a variety of sources other 
than credit cards. They can use available cash or other liquid assets such as money market 
account funds and personal or household savings, as discussed above. They can also borrow 
from friends/family, cut back on spending, use a bank loan or line of credit, or turn to other 
sources of short-term borrowing.98 Each of these specific sources of funds can have a different 
interest rate, and even within a category (such as loans), interest rates differ across consumers. A 
given customer may even have multiple credit cards, each with a different applicable interest 
rate.99 Mr. Regan concedes in his report that credit card rates vary across consumers.100  
57. 
Notably, the most liquid funds—checking, cash and the like—will have lower or zero 
account interest rates.101 A consumer who funds unanticipated expenses out of zero-interest 
funds would incur zero “consequential damages” associated with interest costs. 
58. 
Accepted research finds considerable diversity in how consumers would fund such 
expenses.102 Some consumers indicate they could fund unanticipated expenses entirely from 
zero-interest sources, even amounting to three or six months’ worth of total household expenses, 
meaning that their “consequential damages” would be zero.103 A 2022 survey noted that more 
than half of consumers (57%) could fund an unanticipated expense of $1,000 or more out of 
savings.104 Other consumers indicate they would use different sources of funds, or multiple 
sources in varying combinations. One study shows that in 2021, 68% of consumers state that 
 
98 Federal Reserve (2021); Stavins (2021), p. 62. 
99 Gathergood, John, et al., “How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic,” American Economic 
Review 109, no. 3, 2019, pp. 844–875, pp. 844–845. 
100 Regan Report, ¶ 49. One study finds that “many individuals actually hold cards with very different APRs.” Stango, Victor, 
and Jonathan Zinman, “Borrowing High vs. Borrowing Higher: Sources and Consequences of Dispersion in Individual 
Borrowing Costs,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 19069, 2013, pp. 1–53, p. 21. 
101 Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman, “What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their Checking and Credit Card Accounts? 
Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 99, no. 2, 2009, pp. 424–429, p. 
424 (“Many consumers pay checking account fees per month that are zero or close to zero and forgo little interest by holding 
bank account balances.”). 
102 This research is consistent with Dr. McCrary’s analysis of data for UI recipient respondents to the Federal Reserve Survey of 
Household Economics and Decisionmaking (“SHED”), which finds that “over 60% of respondents indicate they would rely on 
only checking/savings accounts or cash, borrowing from friends and family, credit card borrowing paid off in full at the next 
statement, or some combination thereof.” See McCrary Report, Section VI.B.1., ¶ 90. 
103 Bhutta and Dettling (2018). 
104 “Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2022,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2023, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202305.pdf (“Federal 
Reserve (2022)”). 
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they would meet an unanticipated $400 expense by using “cash or its equivalent”—which has a 
zero interest cost.105 Of the remainder, 14% of consumers would use credit cards.106 Another 
2017 study found that for an unanticipated $2,000 expense, consumers reported using funds from 
cash (19%), checking (38%), or savings (34%) more than reported using a credit card (18%) to 
meet those expenses.107  
59. 
Another study expands the scope beyond focusing on cash as the only ready source of 
liquidity, observing “considering cash savings alone as a source of financial resiliency leads to 
an unnecessarily pessimistic view of financial resilience and how many households are living 
paycheck-to-paycheck. For example, households that contribute to a retirement plan and have an 
established rainy-day fund may comfortably spend most of their income every month and still be 
very resilient to emergency expenses.”108 Using that framework, that study finds that 92% of 
households can cover a $400 expense, with the significant majority of those funds (87%) coming 
from cash and disposable income. The study also finds significant heterogeneity, with those 
shares varying by the amount of the expense and income level.109 In the lowest income quartile, 
approximately 72% of households can weather a $400 expense and approximately 29% can 
weather a $1,600 expense using a combination of cash, disposable income, and credit cards they 
pay off before incurring interest.110  
60. 
To give an example illustrating how this would affect the “cost of the inability to access 
funds,” suppose two proposed class members each required $900 in substitute funds, and that 
each similarly would borrow at a 21% credit card rate. A consumer who could cover the $900 
out of savings would pay a 0% interest rate. A consumer who could cover $600 would pay 
interest on only one third of the amount, for an “effective interest rate” of 7% on the expenses 
 
105 Federal Reserve (2021). 
106 Mr. Regan opines that consumers “may have turned to other alternative sources such as… payday lenders,” with “APRs 
substantially in excess of 20%,” but in a study by the Federal Reserve 1% of consumers reported turning to such options for an 
unanticipated expense. Regan Report, fn 59; Federal Reserve (2022). Those data contradict Mr. Regan’s claim that such sources 
of funds are “alternative lending sources.” Regan Report, ¶ 49. 
107 Stavins (2021), p. 62. 
108 Chris Wheat, Erica Deadman, and Daniel M. Sullivan, “How Vulnerable Are Americans to Unexpected Expenses?” 
JPMorgan Chase Institute, July 30, 2024, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/how-vulnerable-are-americans-to-unexpected-expenses (“Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024)”). 
109 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
110 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
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covered. Other values would of course generate different effective interest rates—even among 
consumers who carried credit cards with identical contract APRs. Heterogeneity in those contract 
APRs would further individualize proposed class members’ “cost of the inability to access 
funds.” Mr. Regan does not account for any of these factors and instead applies a blanket 20% 
cost of funds for every individual in the proposed class.111 
61. 
Evidence from the class is consistent with such heterogeneity in costs associated with 
obtaining substitute funds. Some class members obtained funds from 
 
. For example, Lindsay McClure 
 
.112 Similarly, Vanessa Rivera 
.113 
Azuri Moon 
.114 Other class members 
 
. For example, Roland Oosthuizen 
 
 
.115 Michael 
Willrich and Alex Yuan 
.116 Candace Koole 
 
.117 
62. 
Alternatively, some proposed class members 
. For example, Michael 
Willrich 
 
 
111 Regan Report, ¶ 49. 
112 Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 29:12–16. 
113 Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
37:2–4. 
114 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
30:25. 
115 Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 26:2–6. 
116 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 33:15–16; Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set 
of Interrogatories, p. 29:24–25. 
117 Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
32:18–22. 
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.118 Mr. Regan’s methodology does not 
measure the impact of cutting back on such expenses. 
63. 
Even for households that do use credit cards to fund expenses, one study notes credit card 
interest costs could be below the 20% figure assumed by Mr. Regan, because consumers can 
repay their debt quickly enough to avoid interest charges before falling out of the card’s “grace 
period” for repayment: “households can access a portion of their future disposable income by 
tapping any available credit on their open and current credit cards. If the household has enough 
disposable income to pay the amount back within one month, then this short-term use of credit 
does not incur any interest charges.”119 Research shows that during the proposed class period, 
fewer than half of credit card accounts “revolved” or incurred interest charges, while the 
remainder did not incur interest charges.120 One study notes that in the two lowest income 
brackets it surveyed in 2021, fewer than half of households had credit card balances that incurred 
interest charges.121  
64. 
Evidence from the proposed class indicates that many proposed class members could 
have been situated similarly to consumers in such studies. If a claim was denied and 
subsequently paid within a single credit card billing period, the cardholder may not have incurred 
any interest on the claim denial amount. A review of claim data shows that 
claims in the 
proposed Claim Denial class, 
 of the total, had a claim denial period of less than 
.122 
Mr. Regan does not consider this, as his methodology assumes prospective class members would 
have incurred credit card interest on some portion of their denied claims even when there was 
only a single day between when the claim was denied and paid out to the consumer. This is not a 
hypothetical, as several claims in his analysis have a 1-day delay over which Mr. Regan assesses 
damages. For example: 
 
118 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 33:13–15. 
119 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
120 “Credit Cards: Pandemic Assistance Likely Helped Reduce Balances, and Credit Terms Varied among Demographic 
Groups,” United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, September 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105269.pdf. 
121 Federal Reserve (2022). 
122 See Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
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a. 
 
.  
b. 
 
 
c. 
 
 
d. 
 
 
e. 
 
 
f. 
 
 
g.  
 
 
65. 
Mr. Regan assumes the above cardholders incurred “consequential damages” on their 
claims.123 Based on my review, 
 
.124 Mr. Regan’s assumptions about “consequential 
damages” experienced by proposed class members are inconsistent with the stated experiences of 
their representatives. 
66. 
All of this diversity in available savings, claim amounts, and access to credit cards and 
other sources of funds would generate considerable variation in costs “resulting from [proposed 
class members’] inability to access their UI benefits.”125 A consumer who funded unanticipated 
claim denial expenses out of their own checking account or household savings would have zero 
 
123 Regan Report, Schedule 1.  
124 See, e.g., Plaintiff Kuang Ting Chong’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024; Plaintiff Candace 
Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff Lindsay 
McClure’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff Roland 
Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff Vanessa 
Rivera’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff J. Michael 
Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories; Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories. 
125 Regan Report, ¶ 9. 
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costs “resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits.” A consumer who funded 70% of 
expenses out of zero-interest funds and borrowed the remainder from a family member might 
have higher costs, albeit lower than in Mr. Regan’s methodology. A consumer whose income 
was supplemented by other forms of public assistance could have lower or zero costs. Some 
consumers may have obtained alternative funds using credit cards but not incurred interest 
charges to do so because they paid their bills in full or they were still in their grace periods when 
they regained access to their funds (i.e., before their credit card payments became due). 
Understanding which consumers actually incurred interest, and at the 20% rate assumed by Mr. 
Regan, would require individual inquiry given all of the variation that would exist in available 
savings, other liquid assets, claim amounts, and costs of debt from various sources. 
67. 
Mr. Regan opines that his methodology is “similar” to “
 
.”126 However, his 
assertion does not bear on the issues I discuss here. BANA’s Remediation Plan was 
 
 
.127 As described in the 
plan, the “
 
.”128 The plan also acknowledges that
 
 
 
129 The plan recognizes that 
 
 
 
.”130 And the plan specifically allows 
 
 
 
126 Regan Report, ¶ 57. 
127 Remediation Plan, p. 12; Lennon Declaration, ¶ 11. 
128 Remediation Plan, p. 12.
 
 
 See Remediation Plan, p. 5. 
129 Remediation Plan, p. 7. 
130 Remediation Plan, pp. 7–8. 
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”131 Mr. Regan’s methodology does not capture these individualized components of each 
cardholder’s experience. To measure economic harm to members of the proposed class, 
individualized inquiry is necessary. 
68. 
Furthermore, Mr. Regan’s methodology does not just obscure variation in costs “to class 
members resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits,” it also overstates such costs 
(if any) for many proposed class members.132 It will necessarily overstate costs for consumers 
who do not borrow at all or who do not borrow at rates as high as those assumed by Mr. Regan. 
It will overstate costs for proposed class members who cover substitute expenses out of zero-
interest funds such as personal or household savings. It will overstate costs for consumers who 
cut back on certain non-essential expenses. It will overstate costs for proposed class members 
who can obtain funds from friends and family. It will overstate costs for consumers who can 
repay credit card debt before incurring an interest charge. And so on. 
69. 
Additionally, data from the remediation process indicate that few affected consumers 
claimed additional harm beyond their direct compensation payments.133 The Remediation Plan 
 
 
.”134 As of October 21, 2024, 
 
.135 
 
 
 
, 
 
131 Remediation Plan, p. 8. 
132 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 46. 
133 Regan Report, ¶ 57 (“[
 
 
”)). 
134 Remediation Plan, p. 8. 
135 Lennon Declaration, ¶¶ 14–15.  
-
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.136 
70. 
Mr. Regan acknowledges aspects of this heterogeneity in his report, then fails to 
incorporate it into his calculations.137 For example, he acknowledges that credit card APRs differ 
across consumers yet applies a 20% APR identically to all proposed class members.138 As such, 
Mr. Regan, by his own admission, does not capture the “costs of the inability to access funds” for 
proposed class members. In my opinion, individualized inquiry would be necessary to measure 
actual economic harms to consumers, given the demonstrated heterogeneity discussed in this 
section.  
C. 
Correcting Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially Reduces 
Estimated Damages  
71. 
In Sections VI.A–B, I describe a number of errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology 
related to his inclusion of refunded claim denial amounts as “damages,” and his use of a 20% 
interest rate to measure the “economic loss to class members resulting from their inability to 
access their UI benefits.”139 In this section, I demonstrate that correcting these errors in Mr. 
Regan’s damages methodology substantially reduces estimated damages. 
72. 
As I described in Section VI.A, Mr. Regan’s damages methodology fails to accurately 
define actual damages as the difference between what happened in the actual world and what 
happened in the but-for world. As a result, Mr. Regan’s damages methodology mischaracterizes 
completely refunded claim denial amounts as damages. I correct for this error by excluding claim 
denial amounts, what Mr. Regan terms the “principal amount of actual damages,” from his 
damages estimation.140 As I described in Section VI.B, Mr. Regan has not shown that the 20% 
 
136 Lennon Declaration, ¶ 16. I understand this process is ongoing and reserve the right to update my analysis if new data 
become available. 
137 See, e.g., Regan Report, fn 59. Regan lists alternatives to credit card borrowing, though he only discusses more expensive 
alternatives to credit card borrowing. He does not acknowledge the less expensive alternatives described in the literature and the 
documentary record of this matter I discuss herein. 
138 Regan Report, ¶¶ 48–50.  
139 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 46, 47, 49. 
140 Regan Report, ¶ 38. 
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interest rate based on increased credit card utilization used in his “consequential damages” 
analysis applies to all or even most of the proposed class members. 
73. 
 Figure 2 below shows that correcting these two errors substantially decreases Mr. 
Regan’s “actual damages” estimates for the proposed Claim Denial class relative to the $
 
 he calculates using a 20% interest rate.141 For illustrative purposes, I recalculate Mr. 
Regan’s damages estimates using both the 10% rate he claims “is consistent with the interest rate 
applied to judgments in California” 142 and a risk-free rate representing the time value of 
money.143 As I mention in Section VI.B, I offer no legal opinion on whether 10% or any other 
statutory rate is appropriate in this matter. Excluding Mr. Regan’s “principal amount of actual 
damages” results in recalculated class-wide damages of $8.1 million using a 10% California 
statutory rate and $0.7 million using the risk-free rate. Even if alleged damages for the proposed 
Claim Denial class were to be trebled, recalculated aggregate damages would be $24.3 million 
using a 10% rate and $2.0 million using the risk-free rate, substantially lower than Mr. Regan’s 
estimates. 
74. 
 Figure 2 also recalculates total damages across the Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and 
Account Freeze classes after netting out direct compensation payments that BANA made 
pursuant to the Remediation Plan.144 Mr. Regan acknowledges that his damages estimates 
“require an offset for amounts that [BANA] has paid or presently expects to pay pursuant to the 
Remediation Plan.”145 I compute these figures by first recalculating damages across the Claim 
Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze classes and aggregating these damages at the 
cardholder level. See Sections VII and VIII for details on the recalculated estimated damages for 
the proposed Credit Rescission and Account Freeze classes. I then subtract Remediation Plan 
payments for corresponding cardholders, with the restriction that if the payments received by a 
 
141 Regan Report, ¶ 50. 
142 Regan Report, ¶ 46. 
143 I measure the risk-free rate as the market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 3-month constant maturity. This is an accepted 
choice for the risk-free rate. See Sarno, Lucio, and Daniel L. Thornton, “The Dynamic Relationship between the Federal Funds 
Rate and the Treasury Bill Rate: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Banking and Finance 27, no. 6, 2003, pp. 1079–1110, 
pp. 1079–1080. 
144 Remediation Plan payments reflected in Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to 
Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories, Revised Exhibit 4 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 14 and 15 (Direct Comp) 
 
.  
145 Regan Report, fn 60. 
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cardholder under the Remediation Plan are greater than that cardholder’s consequential damages, 
damages are set to 
 (i.e., damages cannot be negative). Netting out Remediation Plan payments 
results in recalculated aggregate damages of 
 using a 10% rate and 
 
using the risk-free rate. For over 
 of proposed class members, there are no remaining 
damages after accounting for Remediation Plan payments. Even if Claim Denial and Credit 
Rescission damages were to be trebled first, recalculated aggregate damages would be 
 
, respectively, after netting out Remediation Plan payments. 
 
Figure 2: Recalculated Regan Report Damages ($ million) by Proposed Class with 
Offsetting Remediation Plan Payments 
 
Source: Regan Report, Schedule 1; Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to 
Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories, Revised Exhibit 4 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 14 and 15 (Direct 
Comp); FRED 
 
Note: The risk-free rate is determined by the market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 3-month constant maturity, 
quoted at a daily frequency. If a rate is not available for a given day, the previous rate is used. Remediation Plan 
payments are calculated by summing the "
," "
," and "
" variables in Revised 
Exhibit 4. Offsetting Remediation Plan Payments are calculated as the minimum of Remediation Plan payments and 
total Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze damages for each cardholder. I understand that trebling 
may also be performed after netting out Remediation Plan payments instead of before. I am not able to identify 
which Remediation Plan payments correspond to Mr. Regan’s alleged damages in each proposed class, but I can 
calculate a range based on different assumptions. If Remediation Plan payments were netted out before trebling, 
aggregate treble damages for all three proposed classes would be 
 using 10% and 
 
using the risk-free rate. According to Regan Report Schedule 1, there are 
 in the proposed Credit 
Rescission class that may not have been paid. These claims have a total principal amount of 
. I reserve 
the right to update my analysis if new data become available reflecting that all or some of those 
 have 
been paid. 
 
10%
Risk-Free Rate
Proposed Class
Damages
Treble 
Damages
Damages
Treble 
Damages
Claim Denial
Credit Rescission
Account Freeze
Total Damages
Offsetting Remediation Plan Payments
Total Damages with Offsetting Remediation Plan Payments
Percentage of Cardholders Where Remediation Plan 
Payments Completely Offset Damages
I 
-
-
-
-
• -
• • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
- -
• • 
• -
• • 
• -
• • 
1111 -
1111 
1111 
-
-
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D. 
The Proposed Claim Denial Class Methodology Does Not Distinguish 
Between Harmed and Unharmed Consumers 
75. 
Mr. Regan describes the proposed Claim Denial class as consisting of all EDD 
cardholders who made a fraud claim which BANA “closed or denied at any time between 
September 28, 2020 and June 8, 2021” based on its use of Indicator 1 of the fraud filter.146 He 
acknowledges that certain individuals (“Excluded Cardholders”) are excluded from the proposed 
class, 
.147 However, Mr. 
Regan’s methodology to identify members of the proposed Claim Denial class does not explain 
how to fully 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76. 
For example, according to the Remediation Plan, 
 
 
148 and BANA’s 
responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories 
 
 
.149 BANA’s Remediation Plan explains that 
 
 and to 
 
 
146 Regan Report, ¶ 32. Plaintiffs cite this definition to define the proposed Claim Denial class in their motion for class 
certification. See Motion for Class Certification, p. 9:25–28. 
147 Regan Report, ¶ 32 (“Excluded from the class is any person whom the Bank has determined, pursuant to its Remediation Plan 
under the CFPB Consent Order, ‘(i) has been disqualified by the state from Program eligibility; (ii) has previously engaged in 
fraudulent Program conduct, such as submission of fraudulent claims or other abuses of the claims process; or (iii) has had their 
card frozen due to legal order processes, as a result of Internal/Vendor fraud investigations, or by Global Financial Crimes 
Compliance’ (collectively, ‘Excluded Cardholders’).”) 
148 Remediation Plan, p. 4. 
149 Bank of America’s Second Set of Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Seventh Set of Interrogatories (Interrogs. 39 
& 42), In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, April 23, 2024, 8:18–10:18.  
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.”150 Identifying any 
 
 would require individual inquiry, and Mr. Regan cannot assume that each of these 
auto-paid claims would have been paid in a but-for world in which they were reviewed in the 
manner proposed by Plaintiffs’ other experts.151 
77. 
Based on the opinions of BANA’s expert Carl Pry and testimony from BANA’s witness 
William Martin, I understand 
 
. 
Mr. Pry states that “
 
 
.”152 William Martin, 
BANA’s Senior Vice President of Fraud Operations and a Prepaid Fraud Operations Executive, 
testified that, 
 
 
.153 However, Mr. 
Martin noted that “
 
.”154 As with the proposed class 
member claims that were 
, Mr. Regan cannot assume that each of these claims paid 
after a manual review would have been paid in a but-for world in which they were reviewed in 
the manner proposed by Plaintiffs’ other experts. 
78. 
Furthermore, Mr. Regan fails to demonstrate that all claims denied by the Bank based 
solely on Indicator 1 would have been approved absent the use of Indicator 1, meaning that the 
Bank’s use of Indicator 1 may not have represented a change in how those claims were treated. 
 
150 Remediation Plan, fn 16. 
151 I understand that BANA’s expert Carl Pry has opined that “
 
 
” See Expert 
Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry, April 4, 2025 (“Pry Report”), ¶ 50. 
152 Pry Report, ¶ 51. 
153 Declaration of William Martin in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, In Re: Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024 (DX 7, “Martin 
Declaration”), ¶ 12. I understand this process is ongoing and reserve the right to update my analysis if new data become 
available. 
154 Martin Declaration, ¶ 14. 
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As with the fraudsters described above, these proposed class members would have had their 
claims denied in both the actual and the but-for worlds. For example, plaintiff Jennifer Meza 
 
.155 If transactions such as Plaintiff Meza’s would also have not been paid under an 
alternative investigation process, their treatment under Indicator 1 would not represent economic 
harm as a result of the Bank’s alleged misconduct. Identifying how any denied claim would have 
been treated under a different investigation process would require individual inquiry, and Mr. 
Regan does not address this issue. 
79. 
By ignoring these factors, Mr. Regan’s methodology for identifying proposed class 
members does not clearly distinguish individuals who were harmed by the Bank’s alleged 
misconduct from those who were unharmed, rendering it an unreliable methodology for isolating 
the harm from the alleged misconduct on a class-wide basis.  
E. 
The Claim Denial Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably Estimate 
BANA’s Profits 
80. 
Mr. Regan defines 
 
” and opines that “
 
 
156 He uses “the Bank’s records to 
 
.”157 
81. 
Mr. Regan’s proposed “incremental Float Revenue” calculation erroneously assumes that 
 
 At most, 
 
 
 
155 Deposition of Jennifer Meza, April 30, 2024, p. 294:20–25. 
156 Regan Report, ¶ 61 (“The Bank referred to 
 
 The Bank generated 
 
”). 
157 Regan Report, ¶ 62. 
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.158 However, as shown by data in Schedule 1 of the 
Regan Report, 
 
.159 In my opinion, it would require individual inquiry to determine what the account 
balance of each proposed class member would have been absent BANA’s use of Indicator 1 of 
the Claims Fraud Filter. Therefore, Mr. Regan’s methodology cannot be applied on a class-wide 
basis. Even on an individual level, Mr. Regan’s methodology would require some basis for 
making assumptions about each individual’s likely behavior that could only be obtained from 
those individuals, not from any information available to BANA.  
VII. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Credit Rescission Class Methodology Is Flawed, Cannot Be 
Applied Class-wide, Overstates “Actual Damages,” Would Award Damages to 
Unharmed Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits  
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Rescinded Credit Amounts as Damages and Therefore 
Substantially Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages 
82. 
As with the proposed Claim Denial class, Mr. Regan treats proposed Credit Rescission 
class members who have lost access to funds as though they have lost the funds. The critiques of 
his methodology for calculating the alleged “principal amount of actual damages” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.A apply equally here. 
83. 
Mr. Regan defines the “principal amount of actual damages” for the proposed Credit 
Rescission class as “the amount of the class members’ claim credit that the Bank rescinded based 
solely on Indicator 1 of its Claim Fraud Filter.”160 That credit totals 
161 While Mr. 
Regan acknowledges that his estimated damages “
 
,” he does not explain that 
 
158 According to the cardholder agreement, funds were credited back on to the cardholder’s EDD account if BANA determined 
that a transaction was unauthorized. See “California Employment Development Department Debit Card Account Agreement,” 
Bank of America, March 1, 2018, p. 9 (“We will determine whether an error occurred within 10 business days after we hear from 
you—and will correct any error promptly. If we need more time, however, we may take up to 45 days to investigate your 
complaint or question. If we decide to do this, we will credit your Account within 10 business days for the amount you think is in 
error, so that you will have the money during the time it takes us to complete our investigation.”). 
159 See Regan Report, Schedule 1.  
160 Regan Report, ¶ 66. 
161 Regan Report, ¶ 67. 
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BANA has already paid almost 
 back to consumers.162 Therefore, in 
actuality, 
. Mr. 
Regan’s characterization of these principal amounts as damages makes no economic sense, and 
Mr. Regan provides no economic argument for why a dollar amount that was temporarily lost 
and then returned later represents economic harm in the amount of the dollars to which the 
individual regained complete access.  
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages 
84. 
For the proposed Credit Rescission class, Mr. Regan applies a “consequential damages” 
methodology similar to that for the proposed Claim Denial class.163 Accordingly, the critiques of 
his methodology for calculating alleged “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial 
class described in Section VI.B apply equally here. First, proposed class members’ individual 
circumstances would generate diversity in whether or not proposed class members accessed 
substitute funds by borrowing on credit cards due to the Bank’s alleged misconduct, and Mr. 
Regan’s methodology would overstate economic harm for proposed class members who could 
have accessed substitute funds without borrowing. Second, Mr. Regan’s assumed 20% interest 
rate also obscures heterogeneity in economic harm and overstates economic harm for many 
proposed class members because many consumers who did borrow could have faced lower 
interest rates than those assumed in Mr. Regan’s methodology. Mr. Regan does not engage with 
any of these issues and fails to provide a methodology that can reliably measure damages on a 
class-wide basis.  
 
162 Regan Report, fn 60. Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First 
Set of Interrogatories, Revised Exhibit 1 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 2 and 6. See also Regan Report, Schedule 1. According 
to Regan Report Schedule 1, there are 126 claims in the proposed Credit Rescission class that may not have been paid. These 
claims have a total principal amount of $0.2 million. 
163 Regan Report, ¶ 69 (“For the same reasons as the Claim Denial class members, the members of the Credit Rescission class 
would have incurred additional damages beyond the principal amounts themselves resulting from the inability to access their UI 
funds. Accordingly, I have applied the same methodology as described in § II.B.2.a) to calculate the cost of the inability to access 
impacted funds for the Credit Rescission class.”). 
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C. 
Correcting for the Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially 
Reduces Estimated Damages 
85. 
In Sections VII.A–B, I explain that the errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology for 
the proposed Claim Denial class described in Sections VI.A–B also extend to his damages 
methodology for the proposed Credit Rescission class. These errors are related to his inclusion of 
refunded rescinded credit amounts as “damages,” and his use of a 20% interest rate to measure 
the “economic loss to class members resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits.”164 
In this section, I demonstrate that correcting these errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology 
substantially reduces estimated damages.  
86. 
As shown in Figure 2 above, applying these two corrections substantially decreases Mr. 
Regan’s “actual damages” estimates for the proposed Credit Rescission class relative to the 
 he calculates using a 20% interest rate.165 Excluding Mr. Regan’s “principal 
amount of actual damages” results in recalculated class-wide damages of 
 using a 
10% California statutory rate and 
 using the risk-free rate. Even if damages for the 
proposed Claim Denial class were to be trebled, recalculated aggregate damages would be 
 
 using a 10% rate and 
 using the risk-free rate, substantially lower than Mr. 
Regan’s estimates. 
D. 
The Proposed Credit Rescission Class Damages Methodology Does Not 
Distinguish Between Harmed and Unharmed Consumers 
87. 
Mr. Regan describes the proposed Credit Rescission class as consisting of “[a]ll Bank of 
America EDD cardholders who received permanent credit from the Bank in connection with 
their Claim, which credit the Bank rescinded at any time from September 28, 2020 through June 
8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Bank’s CFF.”166 As with the proposed Claims Denial 
class, Mr. Regan’s methodology to identify members of the proposed Credit Rescission class 
 
164 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 13, 46, 47, 49, 69. 
165 Regan Report, ¶ 69. 
166 Regan Report, ¶ 4. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 10:6–18. 
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does not explain how to exclude 
 that were paid under BANA’s 
Remediation Plan. See Section VI.D. 
E. 
The Credit Rescission Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably 
Estimate BANA’s Profits 
88. 
Mr. Regan applies the same methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement of 
profits” for the proposed Claim Denial class to the proposed Credit Rescission class.167 
Accordingly, the critiques of his methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.E apply equally here. 
VIII. Mr. Regan’s Proposed Account Freeze Class Methodology Is Flawed, Cannot Be 
Applied Class-wide, Overstates “Actual Damages,” Would Award Damages to 
Unharmed Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate BANA’s Profits 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of Actual Damages” Calculation 
Mischaracterizes Frozen Account Balances as Damages and Therefore 
Substantially Overstates Plaintiffs’ Alleged Damages 
89. 
As with the proposed Claim Denial class, Mr. Regan treats proposed Account Freeze 
class members who have lost access to funds as though they have lost the funds. The critiques of 
his methodology for calculating the alleged “principal amount of actual damages” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.A apply equally here. 
90. 
 
 
168 
 
.169 Mr. Regan does not explain that proposed class members 
have already 
.170 Therefore, in actuality, proposed 
class members only lost access to their funds for a period of time. Mr. Regan’s characterization 
 
167 Regan Report, ¶ 72. 
168 Regan Report, ¶ 78. 
169 Regan Report, ¶ 79. 
170 Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
Revised Exhibit 1 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 2 and 6. See also Regan Report, Schedule 1.  
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of these principal amounts as damages makes no economic sense, and Mr. Regan provides no 
economic argument for why a dollar amount that was temporarily lost and then returned later 
represents economic harm in the amount of the dollars to which the individual regained complete 
access.  
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Consequential Damages Interest Rate Calculations Are 
Methodologically Flawed, Cannot Be Applied Class-wide, and Overstate 
Economic Damages 
91. 
For the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. Regan applies a “consequential damages” 
methodology similar to that for the proposed Claim Denial class.171 Accordingly, the critiques of 
his methodology for calculating alleged “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial 
class described in Section VI.B apply equally here. First, proposed class members’ individual 
circumstances would generate diversity in whether or not proposed class members accessed 
substitute funds by borrowing on credit cards due to the Bank’s alleged misconduct, and Mr. 
Regan’s methodology would overstate economic harm for proposed class members who could 
have accessed substitute funds without borrowing. Second, Mr. Regan’s assumed 20% interest 
rate also obscures heterogeneity in economic harm and overstates economic harm for many 
proposed class members because many consumers who did borrow could have faced lower 
interest rates than those assumed in Mr. Regan’s methodology. Mr. Regan does not engage with 
any of these issues and fails to provide a methodology that can reliably measure damages on a 
class-wide basis.  
92. 
Beyond those issues, for the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. Regan also estimates the 
“Cost of Delayed Benefit Payments.”172 He opines that “[i]f a cardholder’s account 
 
 
”173 Instead, according to Mr. Regan, 
 
 
171 Regan Report, ¶ 80 (“For the same reasons as the Claim Denial class members (see § II.B), the members of the Account 
Freeze class would likely have incurred additional damages beyond the principal amounts themselves resulting from their 
inability to access their UI funds. Accordingly, to measure the Account Freeze class’s consequential damages, I have also applied 
a compound interest rate to the balance of frozen funds that reflects the time value of money for this population of cardholders. 
This is the same methodology described in § [II.B.2.a)] above.”). 
172 Regan Report, Section IV.B.2.b. 
173 Regan Report, ¶ 83. 
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.”174 
Mr. Regan asserts that he can calculate 
 as a 
function of “
 
”175 as well as the 20% APR he assumes 
based on his estimate of the “cost of the inability to access funds,”176 but he does not have the 
necessary data to do so. 
93. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Regan’s assumed 20% interest rate obscures heterogeneity in 
economic harm and overstates economic harm for many proposed class members because many 
consumers who did borrow could have faced lower interest rates than those assumed in Mr. 
Regan’s methodology, as described in my critique of his methodology for calculating alleged 
“consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial class in Section VI.C. 
94. 
Beyond that, Mr. Regan’s methodology for this class does not explain how to determine 
the “length of the delayed receipt” for any proposed class member. Mr. Regan “illustrate[s]” his 
calculation with a “
,” which includes 
 
.177 Mr. Regan is silent on how he plans to 
calculate, on a class-wide basis, 
 
. In 
my opinion, making such a determination would require individual inquiry, and Mr. Regan could 
not perform this calculation on a class-wide basis. 
C. 
Correcting for the Errors in Mr. Regan’s Methodology Substantially 
Reduces Estimated Damages 
95. 
In Sections VIII.A–B, I explain that the errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology for 
the proposed Claim Denial class described in Sections VI.A–B also extend to his damages 
methodology for the proposed Account Freeze class. These errors are related to his inclusion of 
 
174 Regan Report, ¶ 83. 
175 Regan Report, ¶ 84. 
176 Regan Report, fn 119, ¶¶ 40, 49. 
177 Regan Report, fn 140, ¶ 106. Mr. Regan’s delayed benefit payment calculation also implicitly assumes that the proposed 
class member remained eligible for benefits for 30 days after their account was frozen, although he does not acknowledge or 
support this assumption.  
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unfrozen account balances as “damages,” and his use of a 20% interest rate to measure the 
“economic loss to class members resulting from their inability to access their UI benefits.”178 In 
this section, I demonstrate that correcting these errors in Mr. Regan’s damages methodology 
substantially reduces estimated damages.  
96. 
As shown in Figure 2 above, applying these two corrections substantially decreases Mr. 
Regan’s “actual damages” estimates for the proposed Account Freeze class relative to the 
 
 he calculates using a 20% interest rate.179 Excluding Mr. Regan’s “principal amount of 
actual damages” results in recalculated class-wide damages of 
 using a 10% 
California statutory rate and 
 using the risk-free rate.  
D. 
The Account Freeze Disgorgement Methodology Does Not Reliably Estimate 
BANA’s Profits 
97. 
Mr. Regan applies the same methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement of 
profits” for the proposed Claim Denial class to the proposed Account Freeze class.180 
Accordingly, the critiques of his methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.E apply equally here. 
98. 
For the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. Regan also fails to account for any decrease 
in 
. He 
opines that “[i]f a cardholder’s account 
 
.”181 Instead, 
according to Mr. Regan, 
.182 
 
. Mr. Regan does not account for this decrease in 
float revenue in his disgorgement methodology for the proposed Account Freeze class. 
 
178 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 17, 46, 47, 49, 80. 
179 Regan Report, ¶ 85. 
180 Regan Report, ¶ 87.  
181 Regan Report, ¶ 83. 
182 Regan Report, ¶ 83. 
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IX. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Customer Service Class 
Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity and Fails to Propose a Damages 
Methodology that Reliably Measures Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis  
99. 
Mr. Regan’s proposed “actual damages” methodology for the proposed Customer Service 
class involves multiplying the alleged average excess hold time of “approximately 
 
per call” (based on analysis by Plaintiffs’ call center expert Mr. Jay Minnucci) by the number of 
times each proposed class member called BANA (for which Mr. Regan assumes data exist, also 
based on the opinion of Mr. Minnucci) and the “then-current California minimum wage.”183 This 
methodology fails to reliably measure economic harm on a class-wide basis because I understand 
that Mr. Minnucci has not shown either that the industry benchmark he proposes to determine the 
average excess hold time is appropriate or that the data needed to identify how many times each 
proposed class member called BANA actually exist. 
100. 
I understand that BANA’s expert Mr. Hindle has opined that “Mr. Minnucci has not 
shown that his industry benchmark properly reflects the [Average Speed to Answer] experienced 
by other call centers comparable to Bank of America’s Claims call center during the Proposed 
Class Period.”184 To the extent that Mr. Minnucci’s industry benchmark is inappropriate, the 
average excess hold time of “approximately 
 per call” that he determines and that Mr. 
Regan relies upon fails to reliably measure economic harm on a class-wide basis. 
101. 
I further understand from counsel and Mr. Hindle that BANA did not retain records of 
which cardholders are associated with which calls during the class period.185 This means that Mr. 
Regan also cannot identify the number of times each proposed class member called BANA. 
102. 
Mr. Regan’s proposed “actual damages” methodology for the proposed Customer Service 
class assumes that one could value proposed Customer Service class members’ “lost time” using 
“the then-current California minimum wage” applied identically to all proposed class 
members.186 Such an assumption does not constitute a reliable methodology for measuring 
economic harm either on a class-wide basis or for any individual members. Not only would the 
 
183 Regan Report, ¶¶ 92–93. 
184 Expert Declaration of Stephen Hindle, October 24, 2024 (“Hindle Declaration”), ¶ 20. 
185 Hindle Declaration, ¶ 18. 
186 Regan Report, ¶ 93. 
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value of alleged “lost time” vary among individuals in the proposed class, it is not apparent that 
“the then-current California minimum wage” is a valid measure for any of them, since that would 
require evidence that they could or would have earned that wage but-for the alleged excess hold 
time.187  
X. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed EMV Chip Class Damages Methodology Does Not 
Distinguish Harmed from Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer 
Heterogeneity That Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for 
Many Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate Profits 
103. 
Mr. Regan’s “actual damages” methodology for the proposed EMV Chip class is 
identical to his methodology for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes with 
an extended period for “consequential damages.”188 First, to identify members of the proposed 
EMV Chip Class, Mr. Regan was “asked to assume that the EMV Chip class consists of all 
members of the Claim Denial class and all members of the Credit Rescission class.”189 Next, Mr. 
Regan estimates “actual damages” for the proposed EMV Chip Class as the sum of “[t]he 
principal amount of damages” and “[c]onsequential damages,”190 and he defines “[t]he principal 
amount of damages” the exact same way as he does for the proposed Claim Denial class: “the 
amount of the class member’s claim that the Bank denied based solely on Indicator 1 of its Claim 
Fraud Filter.”191 Finally, as with the proposed Credit Rescission class, Mr. Regan claims that 
 
187 See Section VI.A. 
188 Mr. Regan estimates “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes for the period 
“from the application of the CFF … to the paid date.” See Regan Report, ¶¶ 45, 68. Mr. Regan estimates “consequential 
damages” for the proposed EMV Chip class for the period “from the date the Bank opened the claim until the date the Bank 
finally reimbursed the class member for the value of the claim.” See Regan Report, ¶ 99. 
189 Regan Report, ¶ 98. 
190 Regan Report, ¶ 99. 
191 Regan Report, ¶¶ 21, 99. Mr. Regan says that he has “been asked to assume that EMV chips would have prevented the 
unauthorized ATM withdrawals that were the subject of Claim Denial and Credit Rescission class members’ claims that triggered 
the Bank’s CFF Indicator 1.” See Regan Report, ¶ 97. I am not opining on whether this assumption is accurate. However, to the 
extent this assumption is inaccurate, the methodology Mr. Regan describes in Section VI of his report would not measure harm 
attributable to the alleged misconduct. Furthermore, even though Mr. Regan only assumes that the unauthorized ATM 
withdrawals would have been prevented by EMV chips, he also includes amounts from unauthorized point-of-sale transactions in 
his “principal amount of damages” for the proposed EMV Chip class. Mr. Regan does not explain how these unauthorized point-
of-sale transactions are relevant to the alleged misconduct. 
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“[c]onsequential damages can be calculated using the same two [sic] methodology described 
above with respect to the Claim Denial class.”192 
104. 
Therefore, Mr. Regan’s methodology for the proposed EMV Chip class is subject to the 
same critiques described above in Sections VI and VII. 
105. 
In addition, Mr. Regan’s proposed EMV Chip class, consisting of “all members of the 
Claim Denial class and all members of the Credit Rescission class,” may improperly include 
individuals who were not harmed.193 He notes that the proposed “EMV Chip class definition 
may be modified to exclude EDD cardholders who reported at the time of submitting their 
unauthorized-transaction claim that their card was lost, stolen, or never received.”194 Indeed, he 
claims that “such individuals can be identified from [BANA’s] records and excluded from [his] 
damages calculations,” with those exclusions having “no impact” on his proposed damages 
methodology.195 However, he fails to mention EDD cardholders whose card was “lost, stolen, or 
never received” but did not report it as such. These cardholders would not be easily identified 
and excluded. I understand that BANA’s expert Pamela Joseph has opined that EMV chips 
would also not have prevented other types of fraudulent transactions, including (but not limited 
to) “
.”196 To the extent Mr. Regan’s proposed EMV 
Chip Class consists of cardholders whose cards were lost, stolen, or never received but failed to 
report it or who would not have been protected from fraud by the presence of an EMV chip, it 
improperly includes individuals who should be excluded from the proposed class.  
 
 
 
 
192 Regan Report, ¶ 99. 
193 Regan Report, ¶ 98. 
194 Regan Report, fn 11. 
195 Regan Report, fn 11. 
196 Declaration of Pamela Joseph, October 24, 2024, ¶¶ 15, 87. 
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Executed this 4th day of April, 2025 
 
 
 
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Page 1 
Appendix A 
Professor Victor Stango 
Graduate School of Management 
University of California, Davis 
Davis, California 95616 
Email: vstango@ucdavis.edu 
Phone: (530) 752-3535 
Web: https://gsm.ucdavis.edu/profile/victor-stango  
 
 
FIELDS 
 
Household finance, behavioral economics, banking. 
 
CURRENT AND PAST FULL-TIME POSITIONS 
 
Professor, UC Davis Graduate School of Management, Davis California USA 
August 2017-present 
 
Associate Professor, UC Davis Graduate School of Management, Davis 
California USA August 2008-July 2016 
 
Associate Professor, Tuck School of Business, Hanover New Hampshire USA 
August 2004-July 2008 
 
Economist/Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Illinois 
USA August 2001- July 2004 
 
Assistant Professor, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Tennessee USA August 
1996- July 2001 
 
JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS 
 
1. “We are all behavioral, more or less: A taxonomy of consumer decision making” 
(with Jon Zinman), The Review of Economic Studies 90:3, May 2023: 1470–1498. 
 
2. “Borrowing High vs. Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shopping Behavior in 
the US Credit Card Market” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 29:4, 
2016: 979-1006. 
 
3. “Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of 
Overdraft Fees” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 27:4, 2014: 990-
1030. 
 
4. “Celebrity Endorsements, Reputation Risk and Firm Value: Evidence from the Tiger 
Woods Scandal” (with Chris Knittel). Management Science 60(1), 2014: 21-37. 
  
5. “Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation and Credit Market Outcomes: Evidence from 
Truth in Lending Reform” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 24(2), 
2011: 506-534. 
 
6. “Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets” (with Chris Knittel), Journal of Banking 
and Finance 35(10), October 2011: 2627- 2636. 
 
7. “Some New Evidence on Competition in Payday Lending Markets,” Contemporary 
Economic Policy, March 2011.  
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Page 2 
 
8. “Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance” (with Jon Zinman), Journal of 
Finance 64(6), December 2009: 2807-2849. 
 
9. “How Does Incompatibility Affect Prices? Evidence from ATMs” (with Chris 
Knittel), Journal of Industrial Economics LVII (3), September 2009: 557-582. 
 
10. “What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their Checking and Credit Card Accounts? 
Explicit, Implicit and Avoidable Costs” (with Jon Zinman), American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings 99 (2), May 2009: 424-429. 
 
11. “Incompatibility, Product Attributes and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from ATMs” 
(with Chris Knittel), BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 8(1) (Advances), 
2008. 
 
12. “The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball” (with 
Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino), Journal of Law and Economics XLVII(2), October 
2004: 543-568. 
 
13. “Ask Prices, Offers and Time-to-Sale in an Online Exchange” (with Amy Farmer), 
Economic Inquiry 42(1), January 2004: 14-28. 
 
14. “The Economics of Standards Wars,” Review of Network Economics 3(1), March 
2004:1-19. 
 
15. “Price Ceilings, Focal Points, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards” 
(with Chris Knittel), American Economic Review 93(5), December 2003: 1703-1729. 
 
16. “Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market,” Journal of 
Law and Economics XLVI (2), October 2003: 427-452. 
 
17. “Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: Evidence from the Credit Card Market,” 
Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4), December 2002: 475-492. 
 
18. “Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 82(3), August 2000: 499-508. 
 
19. “Environmental Regulation as an Entry Barrier for Small Manufacturing 
Establishments: A Longitudinal Examination,” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 40, 2000: 56-75. (with Tom Dean and Robert Brown). 
 
20. “Ranking Graduate Programs by Graduate Publications,” Economic Inquiry 38(2), 
April 2000, 358-367. (with Jeffery T. Collins and Richard G. Cox). 
 
21. “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Composition of Consumer Debt,” National 
Tax Journal LII (4), December 1999, 717-739. 
 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
  
22. “Debit or Credit: How People Choose to Pay” (with Jon Zinman), Research 
Monograph, Filene Institute, November 2008. 
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Page 3 
 
23. “The Economics and Strategy of Standards and Standardization” (with Shane 
Greenstein), in Scott Shane (ed.), Handbook of Technology and Innovation 
Management: Blackwell, Oxford, UK 2008. 
 
24. “Outsource or Die,” Research Monograph, Filene Institute, August 2007. 
 
25. “Credit Cards,” (with Julian Wright), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: 
MacMillan, Hampshire, UK, 2007. 
 
26. Standards and Public Policy (ed., with Shane Greenstein), Cambridge Press, 2006. 
 
27. “Outsourcing, Firm Size and Product Complexity,” (with Yukako Ono), Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 1st Quarter 2005: 2-11. 
 
28. “Emerging Payment Standards and Public Policy,” (with Tom Ciesielski and Carrie 
Jankowski), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Report, 2004. 
 
29. “The Economics of Standards: Public Policy and Market Performance” (with Carrie 
Jankowski), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Fed Letter, August 2004. 
 
EDUCATION 
UC Davis (1996), Ph.D. in Economics. 
University of Pennsylvania (1991), B.A. in Economics and Political Science. 
 
GRANTS AND AWARDS 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (MRRC) Grant “Behavioral Factors and Long-
Run Financial Well-Being,” 2016-2017. 
Pension Research Council/TIAA Institute Grant “Behavioral Factors and Long-Run 
Financial Well-Being,” 2016-2017. 
Russell Sage Foundation Grant “Behavioral Biases in Household Financial Decision-
making,” 2011-2012. 
Finalist, UCD GSM Professor of the Year, 2010. 
National Science Foundation Grant “Information Technology, Outsourcing and 
Productivity,” 2008-2010. 
 
NET Institute Research Grant, Summer 2004, Summer 2006. 
 
Filene Institute Research Grant “Outsource or Die,” 2006-2007. 
 
Filene Institute Research Grant “Payment Choices,” 2006-2008. 
 
FDIC Research Grant, 2006. 
Allen H. Keally Teaching Award, University of Tennessee, 1999-2000. 
Club 6 (High Teaching Evaluations), Haas School, UC Berkeley, 1998. 
Finalist, Allen H. Keally Teaching Award, University of Tennessee, 1997-98. 
 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS 
Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Consumer Finance Institute, 
2018-present; Associate Editor, International Journal of Industrial Organization (2004-
present); Consulting Economist, Chicago Fed (2007-10); Research Economist, NBER 
(2009-2011); Visiting Senior Economist, New York Fed (2004); Adjunct Professor, 
Chicago GSB (2001-2003); Visiting Professor, Haas School (1998). 
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Page 1 
Appendix B 
Documents Considered List 
I incorporate by reference the materials listed in Appendix B of the Expert Report of Victor 
Stango dated October 24, 2024. 
Academic Articles 
• 
Cotton, Christopher D., Vaishali Garga, and Justin Rohan, “Consumption 
Heterogeneity by Occupation: Understanding the Impact of Occupation on Personal 
Consumption During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Working Papers, no. 20–16, 2020 
• 
Espinoza, R. David, “Separating Project Risk From the Time Value of Money: A Step 
Toward Integration of Risk Management and Valuation of Infrastructure 
Investments,” International Journal of Project Management 32, no. 6, 2014, pp. 
1056–1072 
• 
Gathergood, John, et al., “How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-
Matching Heuristic,” American Economic Review 109, no. 3, 2019, pp. 844–875 
• 
Sarno, Lucio, and Daniel L. Thornton, “The Dynamic Relationship between the 
Federal Funds Rate and the Treasury Bill Rate: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal 
of Banking and Finance 27, no. 6, 2003, pp. 1079–1110 
• 
Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman, “Borrowing High vs. Borrowing Higher: 
Sources and Consequences of Dispersion in Individual Borrowing Costs,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 19069, 2013, pp. 1–53 
• 
Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman, “What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their 
Checking and Credit Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs,” 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 99, no. 2, 2009, pp. 424–429 
• 
Stavins, Joanna, “Unprepared for Financial Shocks: Emergency Savings and Credit 
Card Debt,” Contemporary Economic Policy 39, no. 1, 2021, pp. 59–82 
• 
Zinman, Jonathan, “Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies,” Annual 
Review of Economics 7, no. 2, 2015, pp. 251–276 
Books and Book Chapters 
• 
Buffo, Stephen L., David P. Hoffman, and Roman L. Weil, “Serving as a Financial 
Expert in Litigation” in Litigation Services Handbook, The Role of the Financial 
Expert, Fifth Edition, ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2012), pp. 2.1–16 
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Page 2 
• 
DeFusco, Richard A., et al., “The Time Value of Money” in Quantitative Investment 
Analysis, Fourth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2020), pp. 1–43 
• 
Dunbar, Michael K., Elizabeth A. Evans, and Roman L. Weil, “Ex Ante Versus Ex 
Post Damages Calculations” in Litigation Services Handbook, The Role of the 
Financial Expert, Fifth Edition, ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2012), pp. 5.1–23 
• 
Evans, Elizabeth A., Joseph J. Galanti, and Daniel G. Lentz, “Developing Damages 
Theories and Models” in Litigation Services Handbook, The Role of the Financial 
Expert, Fifth Edition, ed. Roman L. Weil et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2012), pp. 4.1–35 
• 
Ross, Stephen A., Randolph W. Westerfield, and Bradford D. Jordan, Fundamentals 
of Corporate Finance, Sixth Edition (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2003) 
Bates Stamped Documents 
• 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814 
• 
Bank of America, “Unemployment Insurance Prepaid Card Program Remediation 
Plan,” Submitted October 6, 2022 to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
and October 12, 2022 to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00102554–577 
Data 
• 
“California Unemployment Industry & Demographics Data Dashboard,” State of 
California Employment Development Department, September 2024, 
https://edd.ca.gov/siteassets/files/newsroom/facts-and-stats/excel/ada-county-and-
statewide-demographics--industry-data-9-21-24.xlsx 
• 
“Center for Microeconomic Data: Survey of Consumer Expectations,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 2020–2023, 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/sce#/ 
• 
“Household Pulse Survey Public Use File: January 20 – February 1, 2021,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/demo/datasets/hhp/2021/wk23/HPS_Week23_PUF_CSV.zip, accessed 
October 7, 2024 
Depositions 
• 
Deposition of Jennifer Meza, April 30, 2024 
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Page 3 
Declarations 
• 
Declaration of Jennifer Lennon in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024 
• 
Declaration of William Martin in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024 
• 
Appendix of Exhibits to the Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 24, 2024 
• 
Declaration of Pamela Joseph, October 24, 2024 
• 
Expert Declaration of Stephen Hindle, October 24, 2024  
Expert Reports 
• 
Expert Class Certification Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, August 29, 
2024, Backup Materials, and Materials listed in Appendix B  
• 
Expert Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, March 4, 2025, Backup Materials, 
and Materials listed in Appendix B  
• 
Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry, April 4, 2025 
• 
Expert Report of Professor Justin McCrary, Ph.D., April 4, 2025 
Legal Documents 
• 
Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, 
January 2, 2024, with Exhibits 
• 
Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to 
Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories (Interrogatories 2-6, 14-15), In Re Bank of 
America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, December 1, 2023, with 
Exhibits 
• 
Bank of America’s Second Set of Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s 
Seventh Set of Interrogatories (Interrogs. 39 & 42), In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, April 23, 2024 
• 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, August 29, 
2024 
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Page 4 
• 
Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, 
N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment 
Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, 
N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment 
Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Janette Mouck’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories and Admissions, In Re Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, July 19, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Juanita Isles’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, 
N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Request for 
Documents, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, 
April 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Kuang Ting Chong’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Miguel Salazar’s Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First 
Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Request for Documents, In Re 
Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 16, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Russell Matson’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories and Admissions, In Re Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, July 17, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Stephanie Moore’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
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Page 5 
• 
Plaintiff Tina Pomeroy’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions and Request for 
Documents, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, 
May 4, 2024 
• 
Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
• 
Tentative Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re Bank of 
America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation 
Online Public Press Articles and Other Web Content 
• 
“Credit Cards: Pandemic Assistance Likely Helped Reduce Balances, and Credit 
Terms Varied among Demographic Groups,” United States Government 
Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, September 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105269.pdf 
• 
“Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021,” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 2022, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2021-report-economic-well-being-
us-households-202205.pdf 
• 
“Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2022,” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 2023, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-report-economic-well-being-
us-households-202305.pdf 
• 
“Eligibility Requirements,” State of California Employment Development 
Department, https://edd.ca.gov/ui_eligibility/, accessed October 21, 2024  
• 
“Personal Consumption Expenditures by State, 2020,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
October 8, 2021, https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/personal-consumption-
expenditures-state-2020 
• 
“Personal Saving Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=FhxV#, accessed September 27, 2024 
• 
“The Consumer Credit Card Market,” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
September 2021, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-
credit-card-market-report_2021.pdf 
• 
Brian Faler, “Unemployment Assistance to Millionaires Soared During Pandemic,” 
Politico, November 22, 2022, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/22/unemployment-assistance-millionaires-
covid-pandemic-2020-00070446 
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Page 6 
• 
Chris Wheat, Erica Deadman, and Daniel M. Sullivan, “How Vulnerable Are 
Americans to Unexpected Expenses?” JPMorgan Chase Institute, July 30, 2024, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/how-vulnerable-are-americans-to-unexpected-expenses 
• 
Daniel Sexton, “An In-Depth Look at Mortgage Forbearance Data,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, February 22, 2021, 
https://www.atlantafed.org/blogs/macroblog/2021/02/22/in-depth-look-at-mortgage-
forbearance-data 
• 
Diana Farrell, et al., “Policy Brief: The Unemployment Benefit Boost: Trends in 
Spending and Saving When the $600 Supplement Ended,” JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Institute, October 2020, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-
co/institute/pdf/Institute-UI-Benefits-Boost-Policy-Brief_ADA.pdf 
• 
Fiona Greig, Erica Deadman, and Tanya Sonthalia, “Household Cash Balance Pulse: 
Family Edition,” JPMorgan Chase Institute, November 2021, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/household-cash-balance-pulse-families 
• 
Hamza Abdelrahman, Luiz E. Oliveira, and Adam Hale Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall 
of Pandemic Excess Wealth,” FRBSF Economic Letter 2024-06, February 26, 2024, 
https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/el2024-06.pdf 
• 
Joanna Stavins, “Credit Card Spending and Borrowing Since the Start of the Covid-
19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, October 19, 2023, 
https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2023/credit-card-
spending-and-borrowing-since-the-start-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.aspx 
• 
Neil Bhutta, and Lisa Dettling, “Money in the Bank? Assessing Families’ Liquid 
Savings using the Survey of Consumer Finances,” FEDS Notes, November 19, 2018, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-families-liquid-
savings-using-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20181119.html 
• 
Rajashri Chakrabarti, et al., “Who Received Forbearance Relief?” Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, August 2, 2021, 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/08/who-received-forbearance-
relief 
• 
Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits 
in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, 
https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/ 
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Page 7 
Publicly Available Documents 
• 
“California Employment Development Department Debit Card Account Agreement,” 
Bank of America, March 1, 2018 
Note: In addition to the documents on this list, I considered all documents cited in my 
report to form my opinions. 
 
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Appendix C 
List of cases in which Victor Stango testified  
as an expert by trial or by deposition in the past four years 
 
Ramirez v. Bank of America, N.A., United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, Case No.: 4:22-cv-00859-YGR. Deposition, March 20, 2025. 
 
Charles Daniel Bickerstaff, as executor of the estate of Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., on behalf of himself 
and all persons similarly situated, v. SunTrust Bank, State Court of Georgia, Fulton County. 
Case No. 10-ev-010485-H. Deposition, November 28, 2023 
 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Progrexion Marketing Inc., et al., United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. Deposition, December 14, 2021 
 
Moss v BMO Harris Bank, N.A. et al., United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York. Case No. 2:13-cv-05438. Deposition, December 10, 2021 
 
Kristen Schertzer, et al. v. Bank of America et al., United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California. Case No. 3:19-cv-00264-JM-MSB. Deposition, November 20, 2021 
 
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