Final Report and Recommendation as to Amanda Christian — USA v. Thomas et al. (Dkt. 1115, N.D. Ga.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS · Doc. 1115 · 2024-08-29 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
AMANDA CHRISTIAN, 
: 
MOTION TO VACATE 
 
Movant, 
: 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 
 
: 
 
v. 
: 
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 
 
: 
1:20-CR-00296-JPB-CMS-9 
 
: 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
: 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 
 
Respondent. 
: 
1:23-CV-04122-JPB-CMS 
 
ORDER AND FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
Movant Amanda Christian, confined at Federal Prisoner Camp Alderson in 
Alderson, West Virginia, filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  (Doc. 722).  Respondent filed a response.  (Doc. 765). 
For the reasons stated below, it is ORDERED that Movant’s motion for 
hearing (Doc. 769) be DENIED and Movant’s motion to grant her motion to vacate 
(Doc. 805) be DENIED as unnecessary, and it is RECOMMENDED that the 
instant motion to vacate (Doc. 722) be DENIED. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2022, Movant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud (Count 34), in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and she was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment.  
(Doc. 569).  Movant did not file a direct appeal. 
In 2023, Movant filed the instant § 2255 motion.  (Doc. 722).  In her motion, 
Movant raises the following claims: 
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Movant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel 
(1) 
failed to file a motion for discovery to obtain evidence used to 
indict Movant; 
(2) 
hurriedly advised Movant to sign her plea agreement; 
(3) 
failed to challenge the loss calculation and intended loss 
amount; 
(4) 
failed to object to the “intent and willful” element; 
(5) 
withdrew his objection to the role enhancement; and 
(6) 
failed to argue the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records and conduct. 
(Id. at 4–5). 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a prisoner must 
meet a two-part test established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
First, he must show that “counsel’s performance was deficient.”  Khan v. United 
States, 928 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2019).  Counsel’s performance is deficient 
only if it falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 
fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance, and, therefore, counsel’s 
performance is deficient only if it falls below the wide range of competence 
demanded of lawyers in criminal cases.”  Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 
1222 (11th Cir. 2014).  Second, a prisoner must show that he suffered prejudice as 
a result of counsel’s deficient performance.  Id.  To establish prejudice, a prisoner 
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must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A court need not address both prongs if a prisoner makes 
an insufficient showing on one.  Id. 
A. 
Claim 1 
“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if 
done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”  Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 
175, 183 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to 
the extent it is voluntary and intelligent.”  (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Nevertheless, “a plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked merely because the 
defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal.”  Id. at 186. 
The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not 
require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not 
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision.  A 
defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he 
discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus 
misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties 
attached to alternative courses of action. 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). 
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In Claim 1, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel failed to file a motion for discovery to obtain evidence used to indict 
Movant.  (Doc. 722 at 6–7).  She contends that counsel’s failure to obtain discovery 
prevented Movant from making a knowing and voluntary plea.  (Id. at 6).  However, 
Movant’s assertion is flatly contradicted by the record.  In particular, on January 13, 
2022, counsel joined a motion to continue the pretrial motion deadline and pretrial 
conference that stated, “Counsel for the Defendants have received the government’s 
initial discovery production, which is voluminous (in excess of 50GB and 
approximately 200,000 digital files) and have been reviewing such voluminous 
discovery.  Such discovery includes multiple email accounts, bank accounts, loan 
files, and recorded interviews, among other matters.”  (Doc. 411 at 2).  In addition, 
on August 6, 2021, the Government sent a letter to counsel stating: 
Discovery in the above-referenced criminal action has been 
uploaded to the drive that you provided.  The discovery includes 
Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan files, 
financial records, recorded interviews, email records, evidence from 
seized devices, IP records, search warrants and seizure warrants and 
returns, criminal history records, and other materials. 
(Doc. 765-1 at 1). 
Because the record shows that counsel did obtain discovery, Movant has 
shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice, and counsel was consequently 
not ineffective.  See Khan, 928 F.3d at 1272; see also Taylor v. Holt, No. 1:17-CV-
2331-TWT, 2018 WL 3640607, at *7 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2018) (observing that 
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“counsel plainly cannot be deficient for failing to raise an issue that he did, in fact 
raise”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-2331-TWT, 2018 WL 
3632436 (N.D. Ga. July 31, 2018).  Thus, Movant is not entitled to relief as to this 
claim. 
B. 
Claim 2 
In Claim 2, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel hurriedly advised Movant to sign her plea agreement.  (Doc. 722 at 
8–9).  She contends that counsel “implored” Movant to sign the plea agreement 
because the Government refused to speak with her until she did so.  (Id. at 8). 
However, Movant has not shown that counsel was ineffective.  At her plea 
hearing, Movant confirmed under oath that she had sufficient to time to review her 
case with her attorney.  (Doc. 759 at 26–27 (“THE COURT: Have you had a 
sufficient opportunity to talk about your case with your attorney and have your 
attorney answer any questions that you have before entering your plea?  THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”)).  “Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 
presumption of verity.”  Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).  Because 
Movant “made statements under oath at a plea colloquy, [s]he bears a heavy burden 
to show [her] statements were false.”  Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 
1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Movant has failed 
to meet her burden here, as her assertions to the contrary in her § 2255 motion are 
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insufficient to rebut the presumption of verity accorded to her statements made 
during her plea colloquy.  See id. (“The district court is entitled to discredit a 
defendant’s newly-minted story about being threatened when that story is supported 
only by the defendant’s conclusory statements.”).  In addition, Movant did not plead 
guilty until more than eight months after she was initially indicted.  (See Docs. 135, 
447).1  To the extent Movant argues that her plea colloquy violated Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11, the Court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, and this 
claim is squarely contradicted by the record.  (See generally Doc. 759).  Accordingly, 
Movant has not shown prejudice, and counsel was not ineffective.  See Khan, 928 
F.3d at 1272.  Thus, Movant is not entitled to relief as to this claim. 
C. 
Claim 3 
In Claim 3, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel failed to challenge the loss calculation and intended loss amount.  
(Doc. 722 at 9–19).  According to Movant, counsel never contested the loss amount.  
(Id. at 10). 
However, the parties stipulated to the loss amount.  According to the plea 
agreement, “The Government agrees to recommend and the Defendant agrees 
 
1 Movant argues that she did not have eight months to review the plea 
agreement.  (Doc. 769 at 2).  Ultimately, however, as noted above, Movant stated 
at her plea colloquy that she had sufficient time to review her case with counsel.  
(Doc. 759 at 26–27). 
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that: . . . The Defendant receive the 16-level upward adjustment pursuant to Section 
2B1.1(b)(1)(I) because the loss amount is more than $1,500,000 and less than 
$3,500,000.”  (Doc. 447-1 at 4–5).  Movant confirmed this provision at her plea 
hearing.  (Doc. 759 at 10, 14).  Had counsel contested the loss amount, this would 
have constituted a breach of the plea agreement.  Counsel’s failure to object to a 
stipulated term did not constitute deficient performance.  See Fremont v. United 
States, No. 13-CR-20519, 2016 WL 1622607, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2016) 
(“Counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to directly attack the $2,500,000 
loss amount and $1,358,156.76 restitution amount contained in the plea agreement, 
because this would have breached the plea agreement, and exposed the Movant to 
the additional eighteen counts charged in the indictment that carried sentences of 
five (Count (2)), ten (Count (3)), and twenty (Counts (4) through (20)) years’ 
imprisonment.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 13-20519-CR, 2016 
WL 1573649 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2016); Krecht v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 2d 
1268, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (concluding that “counsel’s decision not to object to 
the guidelines sentence . . . in a way that would breach the plea agreement was 
strategically reasonable and did not constitute deficient performance”); (Doc. 447-
1 at 1 (agreeing to plead guilty to Count 34); id. at 4 (“The United States Attorney 
for the Northern District of Georgia agrees not to bring further criminal charges 
against the Defendant related to the charges to which she is pleading guilty.”); Doc. 
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290 (charging Movant in Counts 9–11, 13, 20–22, 25–26, 32–35, 38, and 41)).  Thus, 
counsel was not ineffective.  See Khan, 928 F.3d at 1272.  Accordingly, Movant is 
not entitled to relief on this claim. 
D. 
Claim 4 
In Claim 4, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel failed to object to the “intent and willful” element.  (Doc. 722 at 20–
22).  She contends that she “lacked the knowledge and intent to participate in a 
fraudulent scheme.”  (Id. at 19). 
However, Movant admitted during her plea colloquy that she “acted with the 
intent to defraud.”  (Doc. 759 at 22).  “Pleading guilty necessarily admits the 
commission of the crime,” and a defendant may not challenge at sentencing an 
element of the offense to which he pleaded guilty.  Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 
996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504 (2016) 
(“Elements are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition—the things the 
prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction. . . .  [A]t a plea hearing, they are 
what the defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty.”  (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  As noted previously, Movant’s statements made 
under oath are presumed to be true.  Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.  Movant has not 
shown that her statements made at her plea colloquy were false.  See id.; Winthrop-
Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217.  Thus, Movant has not shown prejudice, and counsel was 
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not ineffective.  See Khan, 928 F.3d at 1272.  As a result, Movant is not entitled to 
relief on this claim. 
E. 
Claim 5 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s offense level is increased by 
three levels when “the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer 
or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was 
otherwise extensive.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (2021).  “Section 3B1.1 requires the 
exercise of some authority in the organization, the exertion of some degree of 
control, influence, or leadership.”  United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1198 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “To qualify for the increase, a 
defendant need only manage or supervise one other participant in the criminal 
activity.”  United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015).  The Eleventh 
Circuit has “held many times that a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators 
supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement.”  United States v. Vasquez, 486 F. App’x 830, 835 
(11th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 
In Claim 5, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel withdrew his objection to the role enhancement.  (Doc. 722 at 23–25).  
However, Movant has failed to show that she is entitled to relief.  Movant’s own 
statements in her § 2255 motion support her § 3B1.1 enhancement.  She states that 
she “refer[red]” another coconspirator to the scheme and “informed” him not to 
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move forward with his loan.  (Id. at 23–24).  By her own description, Movant both 
recruited and exercised control over another participant in the scheme, which is 
sufficient to support the application of the three-level aggravating role enhancement.  
See Gupta, 463 F.3d at 1198; Sosa, 777 F.3d at 1301; Vasquez, 486 F. App’x at 835.  
As a result, counsel did not act deficiently in failing to persist in making an 
unmeritorious objection.  Pinkney v. Sec’y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2017) (“[A]n attorney will not be held to have performed deficiently for failing to 
perform a futile act, one that would not have gotten his client any relief.”).  Thus, 
counsel was not ineffective.  See Khan, 928 F.3d at 1272.  Accordingly, Movant is 
not entitled to relief on this claim. 
F. 
Claim 6 
In Claim 6, Movant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when counsel failed to argue the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records and conduct.  (Doc. 722 at 25–
27). 
Movant has not shown that counsel was ineffective.  Although Movant points 
to numerous cases in arguing that there have been several cases where defendants 
have received downward variances, Movant does not explain at all how her situation 
is similar to these cases.  See United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 
2015) (explaining that “there can be no ‘unwarranted’ sentencing disparities among 
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codefendants who are not similarly situated”); (Doc. 722 at 26).  As a result, Movant 
has failed to meet her burden in showing that she was prejudiced by any 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  See Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 
1222 (11th Cir. 2017) (reiterating that “a § 2255 movant bears the burden to prove 
the claims in his § 2255 motion” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Consequently, 
counsel was not ineffective, and Movant is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
Finally, Movant has filed several motions.  First, Movant filed a motion for 
hearing.  (Doc. 769).  However, because Movant is not entitled to relief on any of 
her claims, Movant’s motion for hearing (Doc. 769) is DENIED.  With respect to 
Movant’s motion to grant her motion to vacate (Doc. 805), this motion is 
unnecessary, as the Court can rule on her § 2255 motion without an additional 
motion.2  Accordingly, Movant’s motion to grant her motion to vacate (Doc. 805) is 
DENIED as unnecessary. 
III. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, “[t]he 
district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 
order adverse to the applicant. . . .  If the court issues a certificate, the court must 
 
2 To the extent Movant argues that the motion should be granted due to the 
Government’s “untimeliness of response” to the motion for disclosure, (Doc. 805 
at 2; see Doc. 779), the motion for disclosure was not filed by or adopted by Movant. 
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state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(2).”  Section 2253(c)(2) states that a certificate of appealability may issue 
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”  A substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right 
“includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, 
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural 
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional 
claim . . . a certificate of appealability should issue only when the 
prisoner shows both that jurists of reason would find it debatable 
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 
district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 n.3 (2009) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
It is RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be DENIED 
because resolution of the issues presented is not debatable.  If the District Judge 
adopts this recommendation and denies a certificate of appealability, Movant is 
advised that she “may not appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court 
of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.”  28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255, 
Rule 11(a). 
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Movant’s motion for
hearing (Doc. 769) be DENIED and Movant’s motion to grant her motion to vacate 
(Doc. 805) be DENIED as unnecessary, and it is RECOMMENDED that the 
instant motion to vacate (Doc. 722) be DENIED. 
The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the referral to the undersigned. SO 
ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 29th day of August, 2024. 
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