RESPONSE in Opposition as to Amanda Christian filed by USA re 722 MOTION to Vacate,… — USA v. Thomas et al (Dkt. 765)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS · Doc. 765 · 2023-11-14 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The United States' response in opposition to the defendant's motion to vacate, set aside or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed November 14, 2023 as Document 765 in United States v. Amanda Christian, Criminal Action No. 1:20-CR-296-9-JPB-CMS, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It asks the court to deny the motion at Doc. 722 without a hearing and to recommend denying a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The background states that a second superseding indictment returned August 10, 2021 charged five conspiracy counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, two bank fraud counts under § 1344, five wire fraud counts under § 1343 and two counts under § 1014. It states that she pleaded guilty on March 23, 2022 to one conspiracy count, stipulated to a loss between $1,500,000 and $3,500,000, and was sentenced to 41 months' imprisonment.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
AMANDA CHRISTIAN  
Criminal Action No. 
1:20-CR-296-9-JPB-CMS 
United States’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to  
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct her Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
The United States of America, by Ryan K. Buchanan, United States 
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, and Tal C. Chaiken and Samir 
Kaushal, Assistant United States Attorneys, respectfully files this Response in 
Opposition to Defendant Amanda Christian’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 
Correct her Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 722.)  Christian’s claims are 
based on conclusory allegations that are affirmatively contradicted by the record 
and that regardless do not warrant relief.  The Court should deny Christian’s 
Motion in its entirety without an evidentiary hearing. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
A. Factual Background. 
Christian participated in a scheme that co-defendant Darrell Thomas 
orchestrated to obtain fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans.  
(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), ¶¶ 99–100.)  As part of the scheme, 
Christian fraudulently obtained a $760,207 PPP loan for her own business, 
Advertising and Then Some Inc. (“ATS”).  (Id. ¶¶ 108–109.)  She also conspired 
with Darrell Thomas and others to obtain an $830,417 fraudulent PPP loan for 
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Transportation Management Services Inc. (“Transportation Management”) and a 
$787,160 fraudulent PPP loan for Mickies Auto and Tires LLC (“Mickies”).  (Id. 
¶¶ 100–101, 103–104, 111–113.)   
B. 
Christian’s Criminal Indictment and Guilty Plea. 
A Grand Jury sitting in the Northern District of Georgia returned a first 
superseding indictment on July 13, 2021, charging Christian and 13 others (Doc. 
135) and a second superseding indictment on August 10, 2021 charging Christian 
and 14 others (Doc. 290).  The second superseding indictment charged Christian 
with five counts of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and/or wire fraud (18 
U.S.C. § 1349), two counts of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), five counts of wire 
fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), and two counts of making false statements to a financial 
institution (18 U.S.C. § 1014).  (Doc. 290 at 25–29, 40–44, 47–50, 56–61, 63–64.)  
Christian was released on an unsecured bond.  (Doc. 214.)  She retained Gabe 
Banks (“Defense Counsel”) to represent her.  (Doc. 347.)   
On January 13, 2022, Defense Counsel and attorneys for several co-
defendants filed a joint motion to continue the pretrial deadlines, stating that 
they “have received the government’s initial discovery production” and need 
more time to review it.  (Doc. 411.)  The Court thereafter continued the pretrial 
deadlines.  (Doc. 414.)  On March 4, 2022, after being notified that Christian 
wanted to enter a guilty plea, the Court set a change of plea hearing for March 
24, 2022 and later reset it to March 23, 2022.  (Mar. 4, 2022 docket entry; Mar. 7, 
2022 docket entry.) 
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On March 23, 2022, Christian pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud.  (Doc. 447; Doc. 447-1.)  At the change of plea hearing, 
Christian was sworn and confirmed under oath that she signed and understood 
the terms of her Plea Agreement, including (1) that she was pleading guilty 
because she is in fact guilty and (2) that the stipulated loss amount is between 
$1,500,000 and $3,500,000.  (Doc. 759 at 3:19, 4:10–5:5, 9:7–14:17.)1  Christian also 
acknowledged her understanding of the elements of the offense to which she 
pleaded guilty and admitted that she “agreed to try to accomplish a common 
and unlawful plan to commit wire fraud,” that she “knew the unlawful purpose 
of the plan and willfully joined in it,” and that she “acted with the intent to 
defraud.” (Id. at 15:21–17:11, 21:19–22:19.)   
Before formally entering her guilty plea, Christian confirmed that she fully 
understood the proceeding, had a sufficient opportunity to discuss the case with 
her attorney, and was satisfied with her attorney’s representation: 
The Court: Is there anything that we’ve talked about today that you do 
not feel that you fully understand? 
Christian: 
No, sir. 
The Court: Have you had a sufficient opportunity to talk about your case 
with your attorney and have your attorney answer any 
questions that you have before entering your plea? 
Christian: 
Yes, sir. 
The Court: Are you satisfied with the representation that your attorney 
has provided to you? 
 
1 Page references in transcripts are to the PageID numbers generated by 
the CM/ECF system, not to the page numbers designated on the transcripts.   
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Christian: 
Yes, sir. 
(Doc. 759 at 26:21–27:8.) 
As part of the Plea Agreement, Christian also affirmed, among other 
things, that she understood “the elements of each charge that the Government 
would have to prove to convict [her] at trial,” that she “carefully reviewed every 
part of [the Plea Agreement] with [her] attorney,” that she understood and 
voluntarily agreed to the Plea Agreement’s terms, and that she was satisfied with 
her attorney’s representation.  (Doc. 447-1 at 18.)     
C. 
Christian’s Sentencing. 
Christian’s sentencing was set for September 13, 2022.  After the Probation 
Office issued the initial PSR, Defense Counsel submitted objections to facts in the 
PSR and to the PSR’s inclusion of a three-level upward adjustment for an 
aggravating role in the offense.  (PSR at 40.)  The Probation Officer maintained its 
position as to the role adjustment in the final PSR.  (Id. ¶ 123.)   
One week before Christian’s sentencing hearing, Defense Counsel filed a 
sentencing memorandum.  (Doc. 563.)  In the sentencing memorandum, Defense 
Counsel withdrew the objections to the PSR and asked the Court to grant a 3-
level downward variance and impose a sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment.  
(Id. at 2–3.)  Defense Counsel argued at length that the Section 3553(a) factors 
demonstrate that a sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment is appropriate.  (Id. at 
4–11.)  Defense Counsel also attached records related to Christian’s criminal 
history (arguing that she had been erroneously assigned one criminal history 
point) and community service, and several character letters in support of 
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Christian.  (Docs. 563-1 through 563-7.)  After hearing arguments from the parties 
at sentencing, the Court sentenced Christian to 41 months’ imprisonment, which 
represented a one-level downward variance from the low-end of her Guidelines 
range.  (Doc. 760 at 35:18–36:2, 42:17–20.)   
Legal Standards 
 
To prevail on a Section 2255 claim based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must show that “(1) h[er] counsel’s performance was 
deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced h[er] defense.”  Martin v. 
United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  There is a “strong presumption” that a defense 
attorney’s conduct falls within “the range of reasonable professional assistance” 
and an attorney’s performance “is deficient only if it falls below the wide range 
of competence demanded of lawyers in criminal cases.”  Osley v. United States, 
751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014).  Prejudice requires showing a reasonable 
probability that, but for the defense attorney’s deficient performance, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  Martin, 949 F.3d at 667.   
A court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the defendant’s 
“allegations are patently frivolous, based upon unsupported generalizations, or 
affirmatively contradicted by the record.”  Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 
F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
see also Osley, 751 F.3d at 1229 (affirming denial of Section 2255 motion without 
an evidentiary hearing because “a district court is not required to hold a hearing 
when the petitioner’s claims are clearly contradicted by the record or are patently 
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frivolous”); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (providing that a court should hold a hearing 
“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that 
the prisoner is entitled to no relief”).  Rather, courts must hold a hearing only if 
the defendant alleges reasonably specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, 
would entitle her to relief.  See, e.g., Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216; Ochoa v. 
United States, 45 F.4th 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2022).    
I. 
Defense Counsel Did Not Perform Deficiently as to Discovery Because 
the United States Provided all Discovery to Defense Counsel.  
Christian alleges that Defense Counsel was ineffective “because he failed 
to file a motion of discovery to obtain evidence used to indict the defendant.”  
(Doc. 722 at 6.)  She is mistaken.  Defense Counsel did not file a motion for 
discovery because the United States provided discovery to Defense Counsel.  (See Aug. 
6, 2021 Ltr., attached as Ex. A; Doc. 411 at 2 (“Counsel for the Defendants have 
received the government’s initial discovery production, which is voluminous (in 
excess of 50GB and approximately 200,000 digital files) and have been reviewing 
such voluminous discovery.”).)2  It was not ineffective for Defense Counsel not to 
file a motion to obtain discovery that he already had.   
 
2 The Supreme Court has explained that “a guilty plea represents a break 
in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.  When a 
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty 
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to 
the entry of the guilty plea.”  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  To the 
extent Christian challenges anything other than the voluntariness of her guilty 
plea, she has waived that claim through entry of her plea.  See, e.g., Wilson v. 
United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims based on “pre-plea issues”).  
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 To the extent Christian suggests that Defense Counsel did not adequately 
review the discovery with her before she entered her plea, the record 
affirmatively shows otherwise.  Before entering her guilty plea, Christian 
confirmed that she “had a sufficient opportunity to talk about [her] case with 
[her] attorney and have [her] attorney answer any questions” and was “satisfied 
with the representation that [her] attorney ha[d] provided to [her].”  (Doc. 759 at 
26:24–27:5.)  Where a defendant makes statements under oath during her plea 
colloquy that contradict her later allegations, those sworn statements “are 
afforded great weight,” Martin, 949 F.3d at 670, and the defendant “bears a heavy 
burden to show h[er] statements were false.”  Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  Christian has not met her “heavy 
burden” of showing that her statements at the plea hearing were false.  See, e.g., 
Ilonzo v. United States, No. 1:12-CR-276-SCJ-JKL, 2019 WL 4722466, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
June 20, 2019) (denying ineffective assistance claim based on alleged failure to 
review discovery where the defendant “stated at her plea hearing that she ‘had 
sufficient time to think about and discuss this matter fully’ with her attorney and 
that she [w]as satisfied with the job that her attorney had done in representing 
her"), R&R adopted by 2019 WL 4689044 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2019).  
Christian likewise has not sufficiently alleged any prejudice.  She makes 
the conclusory assertion that reviewing the discovery (assuming she did not) 
“would have allowed her to make an informed plea and possibl[y] led her to go 
to trial.”  (Doc. 722 at 7.)  She does not, however, identify any discovery that she 
 
   
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is now aware of that would have caused her to proceed to trial rather than 
entering a guilty plea.  See, e.g., Ilonzo, 2019 WL 4722466, at *3 (denying 
ineffective assistance claim based on failing to properly investigate case, where 
the defendant “entirely fail[ed] to point to what information or evidence that trial 
counsel purportedly missed that would have made any difference in her decision 
to plead guilty rather than proceeding to trial”). 
II. 
The Record Contradicts Christian’s Claim that Defense Counsel 
“Hurriedly Implored” her to Plead Guilty.   
Christian contends that Defense Counsel was ineffective “because he 
hurriedly implored [her] to sign her plea agreement due to the fact that the 
government would not speak with [her] until after the plea agreement was 
signed.”  (Doc. 722 at 8.)  As set forth above, Christian’s allegation that she was 
rushed into pleading guilty is belied by the record of the plea hearing, in which 
she confirmed that she had sufficient time to discuss the case with her attorney.  
Moreover, Christian entered her guilty plea more than eight months after she 
was initially charged, contradicting her claim that she was rushed to plead 
guilty.  (Doc. 135; Doc. 447.)     
Christian also suggests, without explanation, that her plea colloquy 
violated Rule 11.  (Doc. 722 at 8–9.)  The thorough Rule 11 colloquy at the plea 
hearing squarely defeats Christian’s allegation.  Where, as here, “the provisions 
of [Rule 11] were scrupulously followed, the trial judge’s determination that the 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily will only be overturned on a 
finding that the district court was clearly erroneous.”  United States v. Fairchild, 
803 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir. 1986).  
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III. 
Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Not Challenging the 
Stipulated Actual Loss Amount. 
Christian claims that Defense Counsel was ineffective for not challenging 
the Court’s loss calculation at sentencing.  (Doc. 722 at 9–19.)  Specifically, she 
argues that her loss amount should have been calculated using the actual loss 
amount, not intended loss amount, involved in her offense.  (Id.)  Her argument, 
again, misunderstands both the facts and the law. 
To start, Christian stipulated to the loss amount as part of her Plea 
Agreement and at her plea hearing: 
AUSA: 
Paragraphs 12 through 15 set forth a series of guidelines 
stipulation[s]; specifically, that the base offense level is Section 
2B1.1, that a 16-level upward adjustment will apply under 
Section 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) because the amount of loss is between 
1.5 million and 3.5 million . . .  
*** 
AUSA: 
I do believe I misspoke, your Honor, the plea agreement does 
set forth that the applicable adjustment is 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). And I 
think I correctly stated the loss amount of between 1.5 and 3.5 
million, but I did reference the wrong subsection. So my 
apologies to the Court for that. 
The Court: Okay. Very well. Sounds like we’ve got it cleared up now, so 
thank you. 
Ms. Christian, with that correction does that accurately reflect 
the agreement that you believe you’ve reached with the 
government? 
Christian: 
Yes, sir. 
 
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(Doc. 759 at 10:6–10, 14:6–17; see also Doc. 447-1, ¶ 13.)  Thus, an objection to the 
loss amount at sentencing would have constituted a breach of the Plea 
Agreement and would have relieved the United States of its obligations under 
that agreement (for example, to dismiss the remaining charges against Christian, 
to recommend an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and to recommend 
a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range).  Christian cannot show any 
ineffectiveness or prejudice based on Defense Counsel’s failure to object to a 
stipulated term in her plea agreement.  See, e.g., Covington v. United States, 739 
F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 2014) (“an objection by counsel to the application of [a 
guideline stipulated in the plea agreement] would have breached the plea 
agreement” and “released the government from its obligations under the plea 
agreement,” such that the defendant could not show prejudice); Fremont v. United 
States, No. 13-CR-20519, 2016 WL 1622607, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2016) (“Counsel 
cannot be deemed deficient for failing to directly attack the . . . loss amount . . . 
contained in the plea agreement, because this would have breached the plea 
agreement, and exposed” the defendant to additional liability.).     
Christian’s Motion includes a lengthy argument that the loss amount 
under Section 2B1.1 should include only actual loss, not intended loss.  (Doc. 722 
at 10–18.)  While the United States disagrees with Christian’s legal analysis, her 
analysis is irrelevant: Christian’s loss amount was determined using only actual 
loss amount – the amount of three fraudulent PPP loans that were actually 
funded – not intended loss amount (e.g. loan amounts that were sought but not 
actually approved and/or disbursed).  (See PSR, ¶¶ 104, 107, 109–110, 112, 114, 
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115.)  Specifically, the loss was calculated based on the $830,417 loan funded for 
Transportation Management, the $760,207 loan funded for ATS, and the $787,160 
loan funded for Mickies.  (Id.) 
Christian appears to be confusing the concepts of “intended loss” and 
“credits against loss.” Under the commentary to Section 2B1.1, “intended loss” 
means “the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict” even 
if that harm would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.  USSG § 2B1.1, 
comment (n.3(A)(ii)).  “Credits against loss,” on the other hand, is a reduction in 
the loss amount for “money returned . . . by the defendant or other persons 
acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.”  
USSG § 2B1.1, comment (n.3(E)).  Christian suggests that her loss amount should 
have been reduced by amounts that were eventually returned to the lenders – 
that is, that a credit should be applied against the actual loss.  But she does not 
identify any evidence supporting that any funds were returned to lenders before 
the offense was detected.  The record shows that she cannot make that showing. 
It is undisputed in the PSR that of the $787,160 PPP loan issued to Mickies, 
all but $5,125 was “frozen, and ultimately returned to CDC Small Business 
Finance because Woodforest Bank suspected the deposit was fraudulent.”  (PSR, ¶ 112 
(emphasis added).)  Christian therefore cannot establish that Mickies’ PPP loan 
funds were returned “by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the 
defendant . . . before the offense was detected”; instead, the funds were returned 
because Mickies’ bank detected the offense and froze the funds.  The loss amount 
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associated with Transportation Management and Mickies is $1,617,577.3  Thus, 
even if Christian had properly alleged in non-conclusory fashion that she 
returned ATS’ PPP loan funds to the lender before the offense was detected, her 
Guidelines level would be the same.  USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) (establishing a 16-
level upward adjustment for a loss amount between $1,500,000 and $3,500,000).  
Thus, she cannot show any deficient performance or prejudice.     
Finally, Christian suggests in passing that her counsel should have argued 
that her loss amount should have been calculated based on her personal gain 
from the offense, which she alleges was $55,000.  (Doc. 722 at 10.)  That is not, 
however, how loss is calculated under Section 2B1.1, and Defense Counsel 
cannot have performed deficiently in failing to make a meritless objection.  See 
USSG § 2B1.1, comment (n.3(B)) (“The court shall use the gain that resulted from 
the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it 
reasonably cannot be determined.”) (emphasis added); see United States v. 
Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] lawyer’s failure to preserve a 
meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a client.”).    
IV. 
Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Not Challenging an Element 
of the Offense to Which Christian Pleaded Guilty.  
Christian claims that Defense Counsel was ineffective for “not objecting to 
the submission of ‘intent and willful’ element.”  (Doc. 722 at 19.)  Although 
 
3 While the PSR does not describe the circumstances of the return of ATS’s 
PPP loan funds to the lender, an evidentiary hearing would show that ATS did 
not voluntarily return those funds before the offense was detected.  As explained 
here, however, Christian’s Guidelines range would be the same even if ATS had 
voluntarily returned its PPP loan funds.     
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Christian’s claim is unclear, her discussion appears to focus on the requirement 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 – the object of the conspiracy she pleaded guilty to – that 
the defendant have an intent to defraud.  (Doc. 722 at 19–22.) 
“Pleading guilty necessarily admits the commission of the crime,” so a 
defendant is not free at sentencing to challenge an element of an offense she 
pleaded guilty to.  Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992).  
Here, when pleading guilty, Christian admitted that she acted with the intent to 
defraud: 
The Court: Do you admit that you acted with the intent to defraud? 
Christian: 
Yes, sir. 
(Doc. 759 at 22:12–14.)  And as discussed above (at 3–4), Christian stated that she 
had a sufficient opportunity to talk about her case with Defense Counsel before 
entering her guilty plea.  Finally, at sentencing, Christian admitted that “when 
[she] realized that . . . [she] was involved in a fraudulent scheme . . . [she went] 
through with it anyway.”  (Doc. 760 at 17:21–24.)  Christian has not identified 
any ineffectiveness or prejudice related to this issue.    
V. 
Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Withdrawing His Objection to 
a Role Enhancement. 
Christian claims that Defense Counsel was ineffective for withdrawing his 
objection to the PSR’s conclusion that Christian should receive a three-level 
upward adjustment for her role in the offense.  (Doc. 722 at 23.)  However, she 
cannot show deficient performance or prejudice based on the failure to make a 
meritless objection.  See Winfield, 960 F.2d at 974. 
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Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the recruitment of participants is 
sufficient to support an aggravating role enhancement.  See United States v. 
Vasquez, 486 F. App’x 830, 835 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have held many times that 
a defendant’s recruitment of co-conspirators supports a § 3B1.1 enhancement.”); 
United States v. Cunningham, 537 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. 2013) (upholding 
three-level upward adjustment where the defendant’s only managerial act was 
recruiting others to join scheme); United States v. Ducuara De Saiz, 511 F. App’x 
892, 897 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming three-level aggravating role enhancement 
based solely on defendant’s role in “finding and recruiting couriers to transport 
drugs”);  United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming application of aggravating role enhancement based solely on evidence 
that defendant recruited others).  Moreover, supervising another participant is 
likewise sufficient to warrant a role enhancement.  See United states v. Sosa, 777 
F.3d 1279, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding three-level adjustment because 
“[e]ven if [the defendant] was a supervisor or manager only of [one other 
participant], that single underling is enough to qualify [the defendant] as a 
manager or supervisor under the Guidelines”); United States v. Stroman, 661 F. 
App’x 600, 603 (11th Cir. 2016) (upholding three-level upward adjustment and 
rejecting the defendant’s argument that she simply followed the mastermind’s 
instructions because the evidence showed that the defendant “specifically 
directed other codefendants in the tax fraud conspiracy”). 
Here, Christian’s own brief alleges facts sufficient to support her 
aggravating role enhancement.  First, she admits that she “refer[red]” another co-
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conspirator, Rick McDuffie, into the scheme.  (Doc. 722 at 23; see also PSR, ¶ 101.)  
Her recruitment of McDuffie, regardless of the label she gives it, warrants an 
aggravating role adjustment.  Second, while she claims that she “did not hold 
any sort of sphere of influence over McDuffie,” she later asserts that “she 
informed . . . McDuffie to not move forward with his loan,” essentially arguing 
that she did provide McDuffie instructions as to the Mickies’ loan.  (Doc. 722 at 
23–24.)  In addition, the undisputed facts in the PSR establish that “Christian 
directed McDuffie” in connection with Mickies’ loan .  (PSR, ¶ 113.)   
Because the undisputed facts in the PSR, and Christian’s own current 
allegations, support the application of a three-level aggravating role adjustment, 
Christian cannot show that her counsel performed deficiently in withdrawing the 
objection to the role enhancement.  For the same reasons, she cannot show that 
an objection would have resulted in a lower Guidelines range and accordingly 
cannot show any prejudice.   
VI. 
Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective in his Sentencing Argument. 
Christian argues that Defense Counsel was ineffective “for failure to argue 
3553(a) factors ‘the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendant with similar conduct.’”  (Doc. 722 at 25.) Christian’s argument is 
factually and legally incorrect.4 
 
4 Christian also contends that Defense Counsel “failed to object to the 
government’s sentencing recommendation on or before the day of sentencing.”  
(Doc. 722 at 25.)  She is mistaken.  Defense Counsel argued for a three-level 
downward variance in both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 
hearing.  (Doc. 760 at 7:14–17.)  The record contradicts Christian’s allegation. 
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Christian cites cases in which defendants received downward variances or 
lower sentences than her, apparently suggesting that her counsel should have 
cited those cases at the sentencing hearing in arguing for the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.  Christian does not discuss any of the 
circumstances in those cases or explain why her sentence created unwarranted 
sentencing disparities with any of these individuals.  See United States v. Azmat, 
805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here can be no ‘unwarranted’ sentencing 
disparities among codefendants who are not similarly situated.”) 
 
The defendant in United States v. Crowther received a downward variance, 
but the fact that another defendant received a downward variance does not mean 
that Christian’s sentence created unwarranted sentencing disparities.  See United 
States v. Crowther, No. 2:20-cr-114-JES-MRM, Doc. 179 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2021).5  
The United States has not been able to find the “Gilroy” case referenced without 
citation in Christian’s Motion.  And Charmaine Redding, who was likewise 
sentenced as part of Darrell Thomas’s fraudulent scheme, did not receive any 
downward variance.  Unlike Christian, Charmaine Redding was accountable for 
only one fraudulent PPP loan and did not receive an aggravating role 
enhancement.  Christian’s higher sentence reflected her higher level of 
culpability and did not create unwarranted sentencing disparities.     
 
5 Christian’s citation to Crowther mistakenly suggests that it was an 
Eleventh Circuit decision.  It was not.  The sentence was imposed in the Middle 
District of Florida, and the propriety of the downward variance was not at issue 
on appeal.  See United States v. Crowther, No. 21-12255, 2023 WL 3813509 (11th 
Cir. June 5, 2023).   
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 765     Filed 11/14/23     Page 16 of 19

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   Christian also asserts that if Defense Counsel had argued for sentencing 
based on the actual loss amount, her Guidelines range would have been lower.  
(Doc. 722 at 25–26.)  As explained above, however, her Guidelines range was in 
fact based on the actual loss amount, and she agreed to that loss amount in her 
Plea Agreement and at her guilty plea hearing.  Defense Counsel was not 
ineffective for not objecting to the loss amount that Christian had stipulated to as 
part of her Plea Agreement.  See Connor v. United States, No. 1:14-CR-217-WSD-
AJB, 2017 WL 10299579, at *7–8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2017) (where the defendant 
agreed to a loss amount as part of her plea agreement, the defendant could not 
show ineffective assistance of counsel because “any objection in contradiction to 
the agreed on loss amount . . . would have failed”); Buxton v. United States, No. 
1:09-CR-500-CAP-LTW, 2011 WL 13176723, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2011) 
(rejecting as meritless a defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to a career offender enhancement because the defendant had agreed in 
his plea agreement that he qualified as a career offender).  Christian also has not 
provided any evidence to show how Defense Counsel could have proven a lower 
loss amount, and therefore cannot show any prejudice.     
Finally, Christian appears to suggest, without explanation, that she would 
receive a dramatically lower sentence if she were sentenced today.  (Doc. 722 at 
27.)  She cites two cases in which courts granted compassionate release to 
defendants who had already served lengthy sentences but would have faced 
much lower Guidelines ranges if sentenced today.  (Doc. 722 at 27); United States 
v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 274, 286 (4th Cir. 2020)(affirming grant of compassionate 
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release to defendants who had already served between 17 and 25 years in prison, 
where their “sentences would be dramatically shorter – in most cases, by 30 years 
– than the ones they received” based on statutory and Guidelines changes); 
United States v. Elzey, No. JKB-09-0288, 2022 WL 316717, at *1–4 (D. Md. 2022) 
(granting compassionate release to a defendant who had served 151 months of a 
sentence of 262 months, where the defendant’s Guidelines range at sentencing 
was 262–327 months, but at the time of the Motion, would have been 121–151 
months based on changes in the Guidelines).  Christian’s case is nothing like the 
cases she cites and her argument is a non-sequitur.       
Conclusion 
 
For these reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court 
deny Christian’s Motion in its entirety without an evidentiary hearing.  In 
addition, the Court should recommend that a certificate of appealability be 
denied because Christian has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 
(2000) (holding that to satisfy Section 2253(c), “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate 
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 
constitutional claims debatable or wrong”).   
 
 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 765     Filed 11/14/23     Page 18 of 19

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Dated: November 14, 2023 
RYAN K. BUCHANAN 
United States Attorney 
TAL C. CHAIKEN 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 273949 
Tal.Chaiken@usdoj.gov 
SAMIR KAUSHAL 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 935285 
Samir.Kaushal@usdoj.gov 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 765     Filed 11/14/23     Page 19 of 19

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