Sentencing Memorandum as to Amanda Christian filed by USA — USA v. Thomas et al. (Dkt. 565, N.D. Ga.)

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U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS · Doc. 565 · 2022-09-08 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
AMANDA CHRISTIAN  
 
Criminal Action No. 
1:20-CR-296-9-JPB 
 
United States’ Sentencing Memorandum 
The United States of America, by Ryan K. Buchanan, United States Attorney, 
and Tal C. Chaiken and Nathan P. Kitchens, Assistant United States Attorneys for 
the Northern District of Georgia, and Babasijibomi Moore, Trial Attorney for the 
United States Department of Justice, respectfully files this Sentencing 
Memorandum in advance of Defendant Amanda Christian’s sentencing, which is 
set for September 13, 2022 at 10:00 a.m.  Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.  As 
set forth below, the United States submits that a Guidelines sentence of 46 months’ 
imprisonment – at the low end of the undisputed Guidelines range – is sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 3553(a). 
A Guidelines Sentence is Appropriate Given the Section 3553(a) Factors. 
1. 
The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense. 
Defendant’s offense was serious, motivated by personal greed during an 
unprecedented global crisis.  In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic sent stock 
markets crashing and unemployment rates skyrocketing, while nationwide 
lockdowns ground the economy to a halt.  Many American businesses – and in 
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particular, small businesses – struggled to stay afloat as consumer demand 
plummeted, creating daunting uncertainty for the businesses, their employees, 
and the families who rely on them.  Against that backdrop, Congress passed the 
Paycheck Protection Program (the “PPP”) as one of the mechanisms for providing 
relief to small businesses and their employees.  To obtain a loan, a business had to 
certify that the loan would be used to pay for payroll, lease or mortgage interest, 
or utilities, and the loan was forgivable if the business spent a certain percentage 
of the loan on payroll costs.   
Because Congress’s intent was to “provide relief to America’s small 
businesses 
expeditiously,” 
the 
PPP 
streamlined 
the 
Small 
Business 
Administration’s typical lending requirements.  Business Loan Program 
Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811-01 (Apr. 
15, 2020).  For example, the PPP “allow[ed] lenders to rely on certifications of the 
borrower in order to determine eligibility of the borrower and use of loan proceeds 
and to rely on specified documents provided by the borrower to determine 
qualifying loan amount and eligibility for loan forgiveness.”  Id.  These procedures 
were designed to quickly get much-needed funds to small businesses so they could 
keep their workers employed during an economic and public health crisis that 
threatened the viability of many small businesses and their ability to keep their 
employees on the payroll. 
Defendant sought to take advantage of the PPP’s streamlined procedures to 
line her own pockets.  Indeed, she admits that “she took advantage of an 
opportunity designed to help businesses and people across the country during the 
time of a global crisis and pandemic.”  (DE 563 at 2.)  Not only did she apply for a 
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$760,207 PPP loan for her own business, Advertising and Then Some (“ATS”) but 
she also recruited and facilitated the loans of at least two other businesses: Mickies 
Auto and Tire (“Mickies”), which received a $787,160 PPP loan, and 
Transportation Management Services Inc. (“Transportation Management”), which 
received an $830,417 PPP loan.  (PSR, ¶¶ 103-114.)  Defendant was not a small 
business owner worried about her employees and the mouths they were 
responsible for feeding.  Rather, she saw in the PPP an opportunity to get free 
money to use for personal expenses.  And though approved lenders funded the 
loans, the funds that were stolen were taxpayer funds administered by the Small 
Business Administration. 
As Defendant notes, she did not orchestrate the scheme – Darrell Thomas 
did.  But while Defendant contends that she did not fill out the fraudulent PPP 
loan applications or submit them for processing, the evidence refutes that 
characterization of her role.  Specifically, Defendant herself personally signed the 
fraudulent PPP loan application for her business, ATS, on July 23, 2020.  (See 
Exhibit 1.)  Moreover, on August 5, 2020, Mickies’ owner, Rick McDuffie, came to 
Defendant’s office to sign the Borrower Resolution form for Mickies, which was 
necessary for Mickies to obtain its $787,160 fraudulent loan.  (See Exhibit 2 at 1-3, 
13-15.)  While Defendant did not herself prepare the fraudulent loan application 
or the fabricated supporting documents, she signed – or facilitated the signing of 
– the loan-related documents, with full knowledge of the false representations they 
contained.   
Defendant’s involvement in multiple fraudulent PPP loans – and their 
timing – likewise demonstrates her knowledge of the scheme.  Transportation 
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Management received its fraudulent PPP loan on May 21, 2020.  (PSR, ¶ 104.)  More 
than two months later, Defendant electronically signed her own fraudulent PPP 
loan application and, the following month, she facilitated McDuffie’s signing of 
his fraudulent PPP loan.  Defendant’s involvement in multiple fraudulent PPP 
loans – including one for her own business – underscores her knowledge of the 
scheme and her heightened culpability relative to other participants who were 
involved in only one loan.   
Finally, while it is true that Defendant did not ultimately receive a 
substantial share of the three fraudulent PPP loans, that is because she and her co-
conspirators got caught, not because Defendant had a comparatively smaller role 
(see DE 563 at 8).  Specifically, the United States Secret Service determined that 
Defendant’s loan was fraudulent and interviewed her.  During that interview, 
Defendant provided a false story about her involvement in the fraudulent loan – 
claiming that she submitted her company information online to people she did not 
know – and returned the funds to the lender.1  (See Exhibit 3.)  And Mickies’ loan 
was frozen by the bank and returned to the lender based on suspected fraud.  (PSR, 
¶ 112.)  Finally, nearly all of Transportation Management’s fraudulent PPP loan 
proceeds were seized as part of the investigation.  (See DE 125 (ordering forfeiture 
of more than $480,000 seized from bank accounts of Transportation Management 
and its owner, Bern Benoit); DE 265 (preliminary order of forfeiture for assets 
seized from Darrell Thomas’s accounts, of which more than $250,000 is 
 
1 The United States has not sought an enhancement under USSG Section 3C1.1 
because Defendant’s statement to the United States Secret Service, though 
materially false, did not significantly obstruct or impede the investigation or 
prosecution of her offense.  
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attributable to payments made from Transportation Management to Darrell 
Thomas).)  Thus, it was diligence by others in promptly detecting ATS’s, Mickies’, 
and Transportation Management’s fraudulent PPP loans – not Defendant’s role in 
the offense – that caused her to receive a small share of the fraudulent funds for 
which she is held accountable.    
2. 
Defendant’s History and Characteristics. 
It is evident from the character letters that Defendant attached to her 
Sentencing Memorandum (DE 563 at Ex. G) that she has the support of her family, 
friends, and community.  (See DE 525 at 12-13 and at Exs. B-E.)  The PSR also 
reflects that Defendant had a difficult childhood.  While these are certainly matters 
for the Court’s consideration, the Circuit has cautioned that a defendant’s history 
and characteristics “cannot be considered in isolation and without regard to the 
criminal conduct for which the defendant has been convicted and the 
characteristics it reveals.”  Howard, 28 F.4th at 218-20 (reversing sentence of 
probation where the district court considered the history and characteristics of the 
defendant as a “single-minded focus to the detriment of all other factors”).  
Defendant’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility likewise do not require a 
downward variance, as the Eleventh Circuit has recognized genuine remorse and 
low likelihood of reoffending as factors that “are usually present in most white-
collar cases resulting in a guilty plea.”  United States v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1308 
(11th Cir. 2014).  When considered in conjunction with the other Section 3553(a) 
factors – in particular, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need to 
provide just punishment and afford adequate deterrence, and the need to avoid 
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unwarranted sentencing disparities – Defendant’s history and characteristics do 
not support a non-Guidelines sentence. 
3. 
The Need for Adequate Deterrence. 
A sentence within the Guidelines range is necessary to afford adequate 
deterrence and to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the 
law, and provide just punishment for the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  
The Eleventh Circuit has identified general deterrence as “an important goal 
of sentencing in a white-collar crime prosecution.”  United States v. Kuhlman, 711 
F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Howard, 28 F.4th at 209 (“General 
deterrence is more apt, not less apt, in white collar crime cases.”); United States v. 
Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he threat of spending time on 
probation simply does not, and cannot, provide the same level of deterrence as can 
the threat of incarceration in a federal penitentiary for a meaningful period of 
time.”); United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1158 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing 
that general deterrence is one of the “‘key purposes of sentencing’”) (citation 
omitted).   
A below-Guidelines sentence would do little to dissuade Defendant or 
others from committing a similar crime in the future.  To the contrary, a lenient 
sentence would encourage would-be white-collar offenders to view a short prison 
sentence as part of the cost of doing business.  Nor would a lenient sentence reflect 
the seriousness of fraudulently obtaining for personal gain more than $2.3 million 
intended for struggling small businesses and their employees in the midst of a 
global crisis.  Hayes, 762 F.3d at 1308 (collecting cases where the Eleventh Circuit 
has “set aside sentences of little to no imprisonment” in white collar cases “because 
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they do not constitute just punishment for the offense, do not promote respect for 
the law, and will not do much to deter similar activity by others”); see also United 
States v. Shah, 476 F. Supp. 3d 619, 623 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2020) (noting the 
seriousness of an offense that involved “bilk[ing] the government out of . . . funds 
that were earmarked to pay for the medical expenses of vulnerable and needy 
individuals”). 
As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, deterrence is especially important 
in the context of crimes, like Defendant’s crime in this case, that “may easily go 
undetected and unpunished.”  See McQueen, 727 F.3d at 1158-59 (reversing the 
district court’s lenient sentence because it “sap[ped] the goal of general 
deterrence”); see also United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that because tax evasion offenses are infrequently prosecuted, 
“[w]ithout a real possibility of imprisonment, there would be little incentive for a 
wavering would-be evader to choose the straight-and-narrow over the wayward 
path); United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Considerations 
of (general) deterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either 
are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, since both attributes go to 
increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to 
deter it.”). 
A recent analysis found that approximately 12.3% of the PPP loans granted 
to small businesses, totaling $64.2 billion, have at least one indicator of potential 
fraud.  See John M. Griffin et al., Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud? (Aug. 5, 
2022), available online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3906395 (last visited Aug. 15, 
2022).  And because of the sheer number of PPP loans as well as the streamlined 
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documentation necessary to obtain them, the United States is unlikely to detect 
and/or to prosecute most individuals who obtained fraudulent PPP loans.  The 
need for general deterrence is therefore significant in this case.  Simply put, a 
below-Guidelines sentence would signal to others considering engaging in white-
collar crime that there is a significant benefit to be gained and little to be lost by 
committing the offense.  A below-Guidelines sentence would undermine, rather 
than promote, Section 3553(a)’s purposes.     
4. 
The Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement. 
“In deciding a sentence, district courts should consider the policies behind 
the applicable guidelines provision.”  United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1291 
(11th Cir. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (directing district courts to consider 
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements).  For fraud-related offenses, the 
Sentencing Commission has explained that “along with other relevant factors 
under the guidelines, loss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and 
the defendant’s relative culpability and is a principal factor in determining the 
offense level under [U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1].”  U.S.S.G. § 2B.1.1, cmt. backg’d. 
The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement supports imposing a 
Guidelines sentence in this case, where Defendant’s Guidelines are based almost 
entirely on the amount of loss attributable to his offense.        
5. 
Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities. 
A below-Guidelines sentence would create unwarranted sentencing 
disparities between Defendant and other co-conspirators who played the most 
similar role – namely, Denesseria Slaton and Charles Petty, who were both 
sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, the low-end of their respective Guidelines 
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ranges.  See DE 427 (Petty); United States v. Denesseria Slaton, 1:21-cr-179, DE 30 
(Aug. 30, 2022) (Slaton).  There are some notable differences between Defendant, 
Petty, and Slaton, but none weighs in favor of a downward variance for Defendant.  
Petty and Slaton both had prior fraud convictions, but their Guidelines ranges 
accounted for their criminal histories.  Petty, however, was held accountable for 
only one fraudulent loan, while Slaton provided substantial assistance to the 
United States, which is why Petty’s and Slaton’s Guidelines ranges were the same 
as Defendant’s despite their higher criminal history categories.  Moreover, 
Defendant’s conduct is different than Slaton’s and Petty’s in that she obtained a 
loan for her own business while they did not.   
Meanwhile, Defendant’s conduct is unlike the conduct of the individual 
businessowners – some of whom received downward variances – because of her 
role as a recruiter and because of her involvement in multiple loans.      
6. 
The Need to Provide Restitution.   
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that a large restitution 
award warrants a shorter custodial sentence.  See Crisp, 454 F.3d at 1291 
(explaining that shortening a defendant’s sentence “in order to increase the time 
for the defendant to earn money to pay restitution” would turn the Sentencing 
Commission’s policy on its head because it would mean that the more loss a 
defendant inflicts, the shorter their sentence).  While Defendant’s restitution 
obligation is significant, the need to provide restitution does not outweigh Section 
3553(a)’s other considerations and does not warrant a substantial downward 
variance.                
 
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Conclusion 
 
 
For these reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the Court 
deny Defendant’s request for a downward variance and impose a sentence at the 
low end of the applicable Guidelines range. 
 
 
Dated: September 8, 2022. 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
RYAN K. BUCHANAN 
United States Attorney 
 
 
TAL C. CHAIKEN 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 273949 
 
NATHAN P. KITCHENS 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 263930 
 
600 U.S. Courthouse 
75 Ted Turner Drive SW 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
404-581-6000; Fax: 404-581-6181 
 
SIJI MOORE 
  Trial Attorney, Fraud Section 
  U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 565     Filed 09/08/22     Page 10 of 11

 
 
Certificate of Service 
The United States Attorney’s Office served this document today by filing it 
using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which automatically notifies the parties 
and counsel of record. 
 
September 8, 2022 
 
 
 
TAL C. CHAIKEN 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
 
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