Reply Brief 10-15-2025

Date: 2025-10-16

Summary

Plaintiff's Reply Brief on Vacature, filed October 16, 2025 as Document 57 by pro se plaintiff Joshua Abrams in Abrams v. Division of Unemployment Insurance, et al, Case No. 1:24-cv-03390-RMR, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The reply answers the State Defendants' response to the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). It argues the dismissal misapplied abstention, exhaustion and immunity doctrines in light of Williams v. Reed, that state remedies are futile for his due process, First Amendment, ADA and Section 504 claims, and that the Court mooted his motions (e.g., ECF Nos. 35, 37, 41, 44, 49, 55) without merits review. It asks for vacatur of judgment, acceptance of the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 53), or leave to file a third amended complaint, and lists two exhibits on conferral.

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Case No. 1:24-cv-03390-RMR Document 57 filed 10/16/25 USDC Colorado pg 1
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The United States District Court District of Colorado FILED
901 19th St, Denver, CO 80294 | (303) 844-3433 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DENVER, COLORADO
Plaintiff: Joshua Abrams 8:04 am, Oct 16, 2025
JEFFREY P. COLWELL, CLERK
v.
Defendant(s): Division of Unemployment Insurance, et al
▲COURT USE ONLY▲

Joshua Abrams, Pro Se | abramslive@gmail.com |720-910-4829 Case Number:
P.O. Box 761 Loveland CO 80539 1:24-cv-03390
Division: Courtroom
Plaintiff’s Reply Brief on Vacature

Plaintiff Joshua Abrams, submits this Reply to the State Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s

Motion to Amend Judgment. Defendants’ opposition relies on procedural technicalities,

mischaracterizations of controlling precedent, and a selective reading of the record that ignores

Plaintiff’s prior efforts to supplement and amend the complaint, as well as the Court’s errors in

mooting those filings without merits review. Vacatur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

is warranted due to clear legal errors. Particularly the misapplication of abstention and

exhaustion doctrines in light of Williams v. Reed, 142 S. Ct. 1234 (2025), and manifest injustice

from the Court’s months of silence, improper mooting of motions (including for leave to

supplement, status conferences, and counsel), and failure to engage with systemic federal claims

that have no viable state remedy.

Defendants’ insistence on state exhaustion or remand is futile, as Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 53) and proposed third version center on federal constitutional and statutory

violations (e.g., due process deprivations, First Amendment retaliation, ADA/§504

discrimination) that are exclusively federal in nature and untethered from mere administrative

benefits disputes. The Court’s dismissal overlooked these realities, dismissing most claims
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without prejudice while ignoring Plaintiff’s timely motions to cure defects and incorporate

intervening law. As a pro se litigant facing indigency and access barriers Plaintiff is entitled to

liberal construction under Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991), and denial of vacatur

would perpetuate irreparable harm, including eviction risk and health deterioration from

Defendants’ inaccessible processes. Plaintiff has been denied access to the case jacket, with

clerks referring him to PACER which has fees which the court ignored despite existence of a fee

waiver restricting access and proper references to all ECF number combined with mooted

motions for appointment of council and then to highlight procedural and technical errors as

worthy against the plaintiff when the defendant has multiple attorneys and paralegals at their

disposal reflect an uneven and obstructive ability for the plaintiff to engage considering his

disability and indigent status unfairly burdens compliance with their own created obstructions.

1. Certificate of Conferral and Procedural Compliance

Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a), Plaintiff emailed Defendants’ counsel on October 13,

2025, to confer in good faith regarding vacatur, amendment, and resolution of disputed issues

(Exhibit A, attached hereto). Defendants responded on October 15, 2025, declining consent,

asserting Williams v. Reed is distinguishable, and refusing to engage substantively on curing

alleged deficiencies or resolving merits disputes (Exhibit B, attached hereto). Defendants

mischaracterized Plaintiff’s conferral as seeking “legal advice,” despite the email’s clear focus on

narrowing issues as required by the local rule. This non-engagement exemplifies Defendants’

pattern of bad-faith obstruction evident throughout the case. Defendants reference Plaintiff’s

initial failure to confer as if it were deliberate or critical to the case’s resolution, when in reality it

represents an attempt to abuse process by exploiting minor procedural oversights that mirror

their ongoing patterns of non-compliance with law by leveraging deficiencies from a pro se and

disabled party to obstruct justice and evade substantive engagement on unconstitutional
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practices, serving no legitimate purpose. Any prior conferral lapse was minor, excusable for a

pro se litigant denied counsel, and now fully and immediately cured upon notice.

1(A). Formal Certification of Conferral

Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a), Plaintiff emailed opposing counsel on October 13, 2025,

to confer in good faith regarding the Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend Judgment and potential leave

to file a Third Amended Complaint (Exhibit A, attached hereto). Defendants responded on

October 15, 2025, declining to consent to vacatur or amendment, asserting Williams v. Reed is

distinguishable, and stating the case remains closed (Exhibit B, attached hereto). Defendants

offered no substantive response to Plaintiff’s questions about resolving disputed issues or curing

alleged deficiencies.

2. Defendants' Waivers Due to Non-Response

Defendants’ original Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33) similarly ignored and failed to rebut

Plaintiff’s claims of systemic and constitutional violations, including widespread due process

deprivations, First Amendment retaliation, and ADA/§504 failures, instead relying solely on

inapplicable Eleventh Amendment immunity and exhaustion arguments that have since been

proven illusory (e.g., no actionable notices or viable appeals routes existed, rendering any

exhaustion window long expired and state proceedings mere dead ends that would obstruct

federal justice and evade constitutional accountability). Defendants completely unrebutted all

claims of systemic and ongoing harms, failing to address or raise proper defenses to these core

allegations, leaving them uncontested. By failing to refute or engage with these arguments,

Defendants have waived them under the same logic they hypocritically invoke against Plaintiff

asserting that non-response constitutes concession or waiver (D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(e); see also

Plaintiff’s original Reply Brief and Response to Defendant Motion to Dismiss where

Defendants’ omissions operated as admissions. This is particularly inconsistent and shifting, as
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Defendants claim Plaintiff waived certain claims by allegedly failing to address minor counts in

reply briefs, when in reality, their own failure to raise proper defenses meant there was nothing

substantive to reply to, demonstrating bad-faith mischaracterizations that deny the record, rewrite

reality, and seek to distract the Court from Plaintiff’s main duties to remedy systemic injustices,

where amendment was timely motioned to cure any perceived defects.

3. Futility of State Remedies and Improper Venue Arguments

Defendants' insistence upon exhaustion of state remedies or remand to state court is plainly

futile, as such proceedings are wholly inadequate to vindicate Plaintiff's federal constitutional

claims including violations of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and discriminatory

practices under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Actwhich fall squarely within the exclusive purview of federal jurisdiction. See

Williams v. Reed, 142 S. Ct. 1234, 1245-47 (2025) (precluding abstention or exhaustion where

state administrative processes erect illusory barriers to federal review); Patsy v. Board of Regents

of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (holding that exhaustion of state remedies is not

required for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Deferral to state fora in these

circumstances would impermissibly permit deficient and opaque state mechanisms to circumvent

federal scrutiny, thereby perpetuating systemic harms and impeding the administration of justice

in contravention of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. Sprint

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (emphasizing the narrow application of

Younger abstention and the primacy of federal courts in adjudicating federal rights).

4. The Court’s Dismissal Misapplied Abstention, Exhaustion, and Immunity Doctrines

Defendants contend Williams v. Reed is not an “intervening change” in law, asserting Plaintiff

could have raised it earlier and that it is not applicable to this federal suit. This misreads both the

timeline and Reed’s scope, constituting clear error warranting vacatur.
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5. Error in the Timeline and Handling of Motions to Incorporate Reed

Reed, decided February 21, 2025, post-dates Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1,

December 6, 2024) and Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7, February 7, 2025). Plaintiff drafted his

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36, late April/early May 2025) around

the time of Reed’s issuance but was unaware of it during initial preparation. More critically,

Plaintiff attempted to incorporate Reed and cure defects through subsequent filings, including the

Motion for Leave to Supplement Complaint around ~June/July 2025, which sought to add new

evidence (e.g., ReliaCard coercion, out-of-state wage exclusion, appeal cancellations) and

address systemic issues where during that time Plaintiff would have been able to have done

proper research and noted and incorporated those changes. The existing pending motion to

amend moots any concessions of failure to reference Reed earlier, as court rules and standards

(e.g., RMR Civ. Practice Standard 7.1A prohibiting multi-issue or duplicate motions) bar

amending pending motions or filing redundant ones to avoid confusion and inefficiency. Had the

Court not waited months to moot everything, Plaintiff could have freely amended under Rule

15(a)(2)’s liberal standard. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Not specifically

referencing that single change amid a mountain of other legitimate reasons to amend does not

justify ignoring controlling law now raised. The Court improperly mooted this motion, along

with others that sought to supplement plaintiff’s complaints and opposition to dismissal (e.g.,

ECF Nos. 35, 37, 41, 44, 49, 55), without merits review, depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to

integrate Reed’s holdings.

6. Reed’s Direct Applicability to Abstention and Exhaustion

Reed is controlling and directly applicable: It bars abstention or exhaustion requirements where

state UI systems impose “procedural barriers” that deny claimants a meaningful opportunity to

challenge denials or delays, particularly through deficient notices, illusory appeals, or systemic
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failures that obstruct federal accountability. 142 S. Ct. at 1245-47. Colorado’s practicesno notices

for underpayment or cross-state wages, “funneling” appeals into irrelevant tracks (e.g.,

“withdrawal” instead of underpayment, ECF No. 53, pp. 5-7), retaliatory “integrity” holds

without process (id., pp. 8-9), and ADA failures (oral-only accommodations causing COVID

exposure, id., pp. 10-12)create the exact “catch-22” Reed condemns. Defendants’ distinction

(Reed as “narrow” to state-court delay claims) ignores its broader Supremacy Clause rationale,

which applies to federal suits challenging systemic deprivations. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457

U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (no exhaustion for §1983 claims); Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,

78 (2013) (Younger abstention narrowly limited). The Court’s reliance on exhaustion (ECF No.

50, pp. 9-13) was clear error post-Reed, as no viable state route existed for Plaintiff’s claims

(e.g., March 24, 2023 appeal cancellation without notice, ECF No. 53, p. 6).

7. Nature of Relief Sought

This clarification directly rebuts Defendants' misreading of Reed as inapplicable to suits seeking

"benefits," as none of Plaintiff’s claims demand direct payment of backpay; any reference to

such ($6,000 underpayment) is incorporated solely through the emergency injunction motion

(ECF No. 55) and serves only as evidentiary support for personal harms and broader systemic

violations, not as a standalone request for retrospective monetary relief. Plaintiff’s core claims

focus on prospective injunctive and declaratory remedies to halt ongoing constitutional

deprivations, rendering state administrative appeals irrelevant and incapable of redress.

8. Inadequacy and Futility of State Remedies

None of Plaintiff’s claims are curable through state remedies or appeals, as the applicable

windows for any such proceedings have long expired due to Defendants’ deficient notices and

illusory processes, further entrenching the obstruction Reed prohibits. Remand or exhaustion

would result in additional delays and obstruction, allowing state fora to rely on rubber-stamp
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rulings from lower administrative bodies to evade substantive engagement with federal duties,

perpetuating systemic injustices without addressing the constitutional violations at issue. This

deferral contravenes Reed’s mandate against using state mechanisms as barriers to federal

accountability, especially where, as here, the claims are inherently federal in nature and

untethered from resolvable administrative disputes.

9. Misconstrued Immunity and ADA Claims

The dismissal misconstrued immunity: Plaintiff’s claims seek prospective injunctive/declaratory

relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), with §504 damages limited to deliberate

indifference for federally funded programs (42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 waiver). Had the Court engaged

with or considered any of Plaintiff’s supplemental motions, notices, and submissions in support

of these claims (e.g., ECF Nos. 35, 37, 41, 44, 49, 55), the applicability of these carve-out

exceptions to immunity would have been evident and was fully and properly cured in the 2nd

amended complaint. Plaintiff properly argues that sovereign immunity is waived under §504

where Defendants exhibited reckless disregard and deliberate indifference, leading to severe

harm through obstruction, engineered limitations on accommodation requests, and resulting

physical, economic, and other injuriesincluding life-threatening health consequences that nearly

killed Plaintiff and caused significant lost work due to hospitalization. Defendants’ arguments

overlook this, and the curing of the carve-out for waived immunity was properly raised in the

Second Amended Complaint, submitted with the Motion to Amend Judgment.

10. Court-Imposed Access Barriers & Unequal Litigative Resources

The Court's handling of this case has compounded manifest injustice through systemic access

barriers that unfairly disadvantage Plaintiff as a pro se, indigent, and disabled litigant. Despite

the existence of a fee waiver under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Plaintiff was denied access to the case
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jacket (docket sheet), with clerks referring him to direct payment for copies or PACER a service

that imposes fees the waiver was intended to exempt severely restricting his ability to make

proper references to ECF numbers and fully engage with the record with Plaintiff experiencing

destitution even small fees are unaffordable thus blocking access. This obstruction, combined

with the Court's mooting of Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel without merits review,

has left Plaintiff unable to navigate procedural complexities on equal footing with Defendants,

who benefit from multiple attorneys and paralegals at their disposal. The courts or the defendants

highlighting of minor procedural or technical errors against Plaintiff, such as initial conferral

lapses while ignoring these imbalances reflects an uneven playing field that unfairly burdens

compliance, particularly given Plaintiff's disabilities and indigency, which exacerbate his

inability to overcome court-created obstructions. Such disparities constitute manifest injustice

under Rule 59(e), warranting vacatur to ensure equitable access to justice. Servants of Paraclete

v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing procedural barriers as grounds for

relief); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring leniency).

11. Combined Motions Do Not Warrant Denial Under Pro Se Leniency Standards

Defendants' invocation of Judge Rodriguez's Uniform Civil Practice Standard 7.1A(a)(5) to bar

Plaintiff's combined motion (vacatur and amendment) elevates local form over federal substance,

ignoring that such standards are flexible guidelines, not rigid bars, especially for pro se litigants

where combined filings promote efficiency without prejudice. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 1.1(d)

(local rules construed to secure just, speedy determination); United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.3d

1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2018) (district courts abuse discretion by rigidly applying local rules to

dismiss pro se claims without considering leniency). Here, the combination logically flows from

Rule 59(e)'s purpose to reopen for amendment post-error causing no confusion or harm, unlike

cases where multiplicity overwhelms dockets. Denying relief on this ground would violate pro se
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protections, as Plaintiff lacked counsel to parse standards amid denied docket access. Hall v.

Bellmon, (1991) (technical non-compliance excused where justice served).

12. Plaintiff addresses the remaining points raised in Defendants' Response to the Motion to

Amend Judgment (ECF No. 56) below, demonstrating that their procedural and substantive

objections lack merit and further underscore the need for vacatur to prevent manifest injustice.

13. Reed's Omission is Excusable Due to Timing and Pro Se Constraints

Defendants' hindsight claim that Reed could have been raised in ECF Nos. 36 (opposition, late

April/May 2025), 48 (supplemental response), and 49 (motion to supplement) disregards the

decision's recency and Plaintiff's pro se limitations. ECF 36 was drafted contemporaneously with

Reed's issuance (February 21, 2025), when awareness required immediate legal monitoring

unavailable to an indigent litigant without free research tools or counsel. See Swoboda v.

Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 289 (10th Cir. 1993) (excusing pro se delays where access to law is

limited). ECF 48 and 49 focused on evidentiary supplements (e.g., new harms), not legal

updates; mandating exhaustive precedent integration in every filing imposes a standard

unattainable for unrepresented parties. Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.

1994) (pro se not held to counsel's knowledge). This does not preclude Rule 59(e) relief, as

"intervening" includes law not feasibly raised due to circumstances. Comm. of Blind Vendors v.

Dist. of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

14. Reed Controls Federal Claims for Systemic Reforms Beyond Mere Delays

Defendants erroneously cabin Reed to state-court delay challenges, but its holding that state

exhaustion cannot bar §1983 claims for UI due process violations extends to federal suits seeking

benefits entitlement or broad injunctions against systemic deprivations, as the Supremacy Clause

preempts any procedural shield obstructing federal rights enforcement. 142 S. Ct. at 1246; see

Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (state notice rules preempted for §1983 claims in
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federal court, as they "burden the exercise of the federal right"). Plaintiff's claims for

reprocessing and reforms are not retrospective "benefits" demands but prospective fixes to

ongoing barriers, akin to Reed's condemnation of processes that "deny claimants a viable

avenue" for federal review directly applicable here to prevent evasion of programmatic

accountability. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (Ex

parte Young suits for systemic injunctions viable in federal court despite state remedies).

15. Amendments Present New Evidence Under Rule 59(e)'s Flexible Standard

Defendants' characterization of the amendments as mere recycling of prior arguments disregards

the genuinely new evidence that emerged subsequent to their Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33),

qualifying for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)'s standard for "newly discovered" material not

reasonably available earlier. See Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th

Cir. 2005) (encompassing factual developments post-filing that could not have been fully

presented before); Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 (10th Cir. 1996)

(evidence is "new" if not reasonably discoverable at the time due to evolving circumstances).

Here, critical details on PII mishandling and ReliaCard coercion arose from Plaintiff's 2025

unemployment claim interactions, post-dating Defendants' response and revealing conclusive

evidence of vendor steering, improper handling of sensitive data, and inadequate training of call

center employees issues not fully manifest or documentable until these later developments in mid

to late 2025. This evidence includes newly submitted transcripts of call interactions

demonstrating mishandling and steering tactics, which were unavailable during initial drafting

and support entirely new counts (e.g., association-in-fact enterprises under RICO-like theories)

that integrate controlling law like Williams v. Reed for systemic procedural barriers. While

partially alluded to in earlier notices and supplements (e.g., ECF Nos. 35, 37, 41, 44, 49, 55),

those filings were improperly mooted without review (ECF No. 50, p. 19), preserving their
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novelty for vacatur purposes. Denying amendment on this basis would overlook Rule 59(e)'s

remedial function to incorporate such post-filing evolutions, preventing injustice where, as here,

the evidence directly bolsters claims of ongoing violations not resolvable anywhere else.

16. Mooting of Supplements Viable; Specific Claims Not Futile

The mooting of ECF 49 was erroneous, as the claims are viable: For ADA/§504, "access to

benefits" does not negate violations where processes are ineffective and discriminatory, causing

harms like COVID exposure actionable under deliberate indifference (28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7);

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999)). RICO targets personal-capacity acts

in enterprises (e.g., vendor kickbacks), not barred by immunity (Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31

(1991)). CCPA is withdrawn in amendments (ECF No. 53 omits) or inapplicable; CGIA notice is

preempted for federal claims (Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 144 (1988)). These cures merit

review under Rule 15's liberal policy (Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962)).

17. Pro Se Leniency Applies to Procedural Lapses Caused by Systemic Barriers

Defendants' citation to Hall v. Bellmon and Garrett v. Selby for strict rule compliance misapplies

those cases, which affirm leniency for pro se lapses from barriers like indigency or disability.

Here, violations stem from denied docket access and mooted counsel motion, warranting waiver

to avoid injustice (Andrew v. Heaton, 2004).

18. Amendments Seek Prospective Relief;(Addressing Abandoned Claims)

Defendants' futility claim that amendments are retrospective (e.g., 2023 reprocessing as back

benefits) overlooks that relief is incidental to prospective reforms, permissible under Ex parte

Young (209 U.S. at 159-60; Milliken v. Bradley, (1977). Amendments cure or withdraw

abandoned claims (e.g., Claims 4-8 refined/omitted in ECF No. 53), reviving curable ones

post-dismissal without prejudice (Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.2012). Non-response was due to

Defendants' inadequate challenges, shifting no burden (Foman, 371 U.S. at 181-82).
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19. Ancillary Relief Ripe Upon Vacatur

Defendants' ripeness objection to discovery and injunction assumes closure, but vacatur reopens

the case, making targeted discovery (e.g., vendor contracts) essential under Rule 26(b)(1)

(Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, (1978)). The injunction is ripe for ongoing harms (Winter v.

NRDC, (2008); Ashcroft v. Mattis,(1977)).

20. Irreparable Harm from Further Delays Via Appellate Proceedings

Requiring Plaintiff to pursue time-consuming appeals would inflict extreme and irreparable

harm, particularly as an unrepresented, indigent, and disabled litigant, while perpetuating the

systemic unconstitutional harms alleged without ever affording a merits review or engagement

with Defendants' improperly raised defenses. Federal courts have a duty to act promptly in

constitutional due process cases involving public benefits, where delays risk erroneous

deprivations leading to poverty, eviction, and health crises, to Plaintiff and thousands of other

claimants experiencing the same systemic injustices cause harms that cannot be adequately

remedied post hoc. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that termination of

welfare benefits without pre-deprivation process causes irreparable injury, as "the stakes are

simply too high" for recipients dependent on subsistence); California Dep't of Human Resources

Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1971) (requiring prompt payment of unemployment benefits

"when due" under the Social Security Act to avoid irreparable harm from delays in essential aid);

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (mandating prompt

post-deprivation hearings in due process cases to minimize harm from erroneous decisions).

Here, the ongoing denial of due process in Colorado's UI system through deficient notices,

illusory appeals, and retaliatory holds has already caused Plaintiff severe economic and health

harms (e.g., COVID exposure from inaccessible accommodations, ECF No. 53, pp. 10-12), and

appellate delays would exacerbate these, adding years of uncertainty without resolution.
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This harm is magnified for pro se indigent litigants like Plaintiff, who face further denials and

restrictions in acquiring necessary transcripts and copies for appeals, despite fee waivers under

28 U.S.C. § 1915 barriers that violate the fundamental right of access to the courts. Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (requiring meaningful access to courts for constitutional claims,

including for indigents challenging governmental deprivations); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977) (states must provide tools for indigent litigants to pursue legal claims

effectively). Forcing appeals without merits review below would likely result in rubber-stamping

of the dismissal, evading substantive engagement with systemic injustices and allowing

Defendants' inadequate defenses (e.g., unaddressed systemic claims in ECF No. 33) to persist

unchecked contrary to pro se leniency standards that mandate liberal construction and avoidance

of undue burdens. Hall v. Bellmon, (1991) (courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally and

not dismiss on technical grounds without opportunity to cure). Vacatur under Rule 59(e) is thus

essential to correct these errors expeditiously, preventing irreparable harm and fulfilling the

court's duty to ensure prompt justice in constitutional cases. Servants of Paraclete v. Does, (10th

Cir. 2000) (manifest injustice includes procedural flaws causing undue hardship).

Conclusion

Vacatur is imperative to rectify the Court's clear errors and prevent manifest injustice, as required

by Rule 59(e). Controlling precedents demand federal jurisdiction over these systemic UI

violations: Williams v. Reed, preempts state exhaustion rules that create a "catch-22" by

immunizing officials from §1983 due process claims for administrative delays, directly

applicable here where Colorado's deficient notices and illusory appeals obstruct accountability;

Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, confirms no exhaustion for §1983 claims; Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs,

limits Younger abstention narrowly, precluding deferral to inadequate state processes; Ex parte

Young, authorizes prospective injunctive relief against ongoing violations; and 42 U.S.C. §
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2000d-7 waives immunity for §504 claims involving deliberate indifference in federally funded

programs. Plaintiff's inability to submit multiple motions to amend barred by Standard 7.1A

against duplicates and multi-issue filings to avoid confusion does not forfeit the right to cure,

which was fully achieved through the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 15(a)(2)'s

mandate to freely grant leave when justice requires, especially for pro se litigants. Denying

vacatur would reward Defendants' obstruction, force unnecessary appeals exacerbating

irreparable harms like eviction and health risks for this indigent pro se plaintiff, and evade merits

review of unchallenged systemic injustices contravening the court's duty to ensure prompt justice

and equitable access. Plaintiff requests: (1) vacatur of judgment; (2) Acceptance of Plaintiff’s

2nd amended complaint ,or (3) leave to file a 3rd Amended Complaint to cure any deficiencies

Exhibits:

Ex. A: Plaintiff’s Conferral Email

Ex. B: Defendants’ Response

_____________________________________

Date: 10-15-2025 | ❑Petitioner/Plaintiff

Joshua Abrams, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & AUTHENTICITY

I certify the filings are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge done in good faith and
under acknowledgement of perjury. & That on 10-15-2025 a true and accurate copy of this filing
were served on Defendants by: E-filed, lauren.davison@coag.gov & Stephen.woolsey@coag.gov

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Reply Brief 10-15-2025

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