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The United States District Court District of Colorado
901 19th St, Denver, CO 80294 | (303) 844-3433
Plaintiff: Joshua Abrams
v.
Defendant(s): Division of Unemployment Insurance, et al
▲COURT USE ONLY▲
Joshua Abrams, Pro Se | abramslive@gmail.com |720-910-4829
P.O. Box 761 Loveland CO 80539
Case Number:
1:24-cv-03390
Division: Courtroom
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY
Plaintiff Joshua Abrams respectfully submits this Notice to advise the Court of controlling legal
authority issued subsequent to the parties’ briefing, which is directly relevant to the Court's
September 2, 2025 Dismissal Order and pending Rule 59(e) motion.
Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(f), Plaintiff respectfully provides notice of the following legal
authority issued subsequent to the parties' briefing:
Williams v. Reed, 604 U.S. ___ , 142 S. Ct. 1234 (2025).
This authority is pertinent to the issue of administrative exhaustion and federal jurisdiction raised
in the Court's Dismissal Order (ECF No. 50), particularly in light of Exhibit B to Plaintiff's
Supplemental Notice Against Dismissal and in Support of Emergency Injunctions (filed on or
around August 28, 2025), which documents the agency's cancellation of Plaintiff's appeal.
A copy of the Williams v. Reed opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
A copy of the referenced Exhibit B (the CDLE Notice of Reconsideration dated March 31, 2023)
is attached hereto as Exhibit B for the Court's convenience.
Respectfully submitted,
FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DENVER, COLORADO
JEFFREY P. COLWELL, CLERK
10:27 am, Dec 18, 2025
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________________________________________
Date: 12-17-2025 | ❑Petitioner/Plaintiff
Joshua Abrams, Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & AUTHENTICITY
I certify the filings are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge done in good faith and
under acknowledgement of perjury. & That on 12-17-2025 a true and accurate copy of this filing
were served on Defendants by: E-filed, lauren.davison@coag.gov & Stephen.woolsey@coag.gov
____
_ ____________
_ __
_ __________
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(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2024
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WILLIAMS ET AL. v. REED, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF
WORKFORCE
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
No. 23–191. Argued October 7, 2024—Decided February 21, 2025
Petitioners are unemployed workers who contend that the Alabama De-
partment of Labor unlawfully delayed processing their state unem-
ployment benefits claims. They sued the Alabama Secretary of Labor
in state court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, raising due process and federal
statutory arguments and seeking a court order requiring the Depart-
ment to process their claims more quickly. The Secretary moved to
dismiss on several grounds, including that the state trial court lacked
jurisdiction because the claimants had not satisfied the relevant stat-
ute’s strict administrative-exhaustion requirement. See Ala. Code
§25–4–95. The state trial court granted the Secretary’s motion and
dismissed the complaint, leaving the claimants in a catch-22—unable
to sue to obtain an order expediting the administrative process because
they had not yet completed the process allegedly being delayed. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed on failure-to-exhaust grounds, con-
cluding that §1983 did not preempt the State’s administrative-exhaus-
tion requirement.
Held: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require-
ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging
delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those
§1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Pp. 5–10.
(a) “[A] state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise
subject to suit under §1983 is preempted, even where the federal civil
rights litigation takes place in state court.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S.
131, 139.
Thus, in Howlett v. Rose, this Court held that §1983
preempted a Florida rule extending the State’s sovereign immunity
from §1983 suits “to municipalities, counties, and school districts” be-
cause it in effect afforded immunity from certain §1983 claims. 496
U. S. 356, 366. And in Haywood v. Drown, the Court held that a New
Exhibit A
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WILLIAMS v. REED
Syllabus
York statute designed to shield correction officers from damages
claims by prisoners was preempted by §1983. 556 U. S. 729. Pp. 5–6.
(b) Under Alabama’s exhaustion requirement, state courts cannot
review claims of unlawful delays under §1983 unless and until the
claimants first complete the administrative process and receive a final
decision on their claims. Such a requirement operates to immunize
state officials from a narrow class of claims brought under §1983. Un-
der this Court’s precedents, Alabama cannot apply such an immunity
rule. P. 7.
(c) According to the Secretary, the jurisdictional nature of Alabama’s
exhaustion provision distinguishes it from the state rules at issue in
Haywood and Howlett. But this Court’s precedents have not treated
the jurisdictional label of state rules as dispositive when state rules
functionally immunize defendants from a class of §1983 claims in state
court. In Haywood, for example, the Court stated that the jurisdic-
tional status of New York’s rule did not insulate it from preemption.
556 U. S., at 739–742.
Next, the Secretary suggests that any delays in the state adminis-
trative process can be cured by claimants’ seeking a writ of mandamus
from the state courts to compel the Department to act more quickly. It
is not evident, however, that mandamus is available to the claimants
here. In any event, the Secretary’s argument is simply another way of
saying that the claimant must go through the state process before su-
ing under §1983 to challenge any delays in that process. Just as Ala-
bama may not force plaintiffs to complete the state administrative pro-
cess before plaintiffs may sue under §1983 to challenge allegedly
unlawful delays, the State may not force plaintiffs to seek mandamus
before bringing those claims. Pp. 8–10.
387 So. 3d 138, reversed and remanded.
KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined as to Part II.
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_________________
_________________
1
Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 23–191
NANCY WILLIAMS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
GREG REED, SECRETARY, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ALABAMA
[February 21, 2025]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Several unemployed workers in Alabama applied for
unemployment benefits from the State. In their view, the
Alabama Department of Labor has unlawfully delayed the
processing of their benefits claims. So the claimants sued
the Alabama Secretary of Labor in state court under 42
U. S. C. §1983, raising due process and federal statutory
arguments and seeking a court order requiring the
Department to process their claims more quickly. The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the claimants could not
sue under §1983 to challenge delays in the administrative
process until the claimants completed that process. But
that ruling created a catch-22:
Because the claimants
cannot sue until they complete the administrative process,
they can never sue under §1983 to obtain an order
expediting the administrative process.
This Court’s
precedents do not permit States to immunize state officials
from §1983 suits in that way. See Haywood v. Drown, 556
U. S. 729 (2009); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356 (1990). On
that narrow ground, we reverse.
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WILLIAMS v. REED
Opinion of the Court
I
A
The State of Alabama grants monetary benefits to
unemployed claimants who meet certain eligibility criteria.
See Ala. Code §25–4–90 et seq. (2016); Ala. Admin. Code,
ch. 480–4–3 (Supp. 2019).
To obtain unemployment
benefits, a claimant first must apply to the Alabama
Department of Labor “in accordance with such general
rules as the secretary may prescribe.” Ala. Code §25–4–90.1
After receiving an application, the Department, through an
examiner designated by the Secretary, must “promptly”
make a “determination” on the claim. §25–4–91(a). The
Department also must “promptly” notify the claimant of the
determination, generally by mailing a notice to his or her
last known address.
§25–4–91(c)(1).
The relevant
statutory provisions do not define “promptly.”
A
claimant
who
wants
to
appeal
an
adverse
determination must, within 7 days of the delivery of the
notice or 15 days of the mailing of the notice, seek review
by an appeals tribunal.
§25–4–91(d).
That tribunal
consists of a Department employee who is appointed by the
Secretary.
§25–4–92(a). The tribunal must “hear and
decide disputed claims and other due process cases” related
to benefits claims. Ibid. And the tribunal must “promptly”
hold a hearing. Ala. Admin. Code Rule 480–1–4–.09(2).
The tribunal must then decide the appeal “within 30 days”
of the hearing. Ala. Admin. Code Rule 480–1–4–.11(1).
A claimant who loses before the appeals tribunal may
seek discretionary review before the Department’s Board of
Appeals, which is composed of three members appointed by
the Governor. Ala. Code §25–2–12. A claimant must seek
——————
1 During this litigation, Alabama changed the name of its Department
of Labor to the Department of Workforce, and Greg Reed, Alabama’s first
Secretary of Workforce, was substituted as the respondent. See 2024
Ala. Acts no. 2024–115. Like the parties’ briefing, we refer to the
Secretary and the Department by their titles when this suit was filed.
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Opinion of the Court
review within 15 days from the date when the appeals
tribunal’s decision was mailed to the claimant. §25–4–
92(c). If the Board of Appeals does not grant review within
10 days of the claimant’s filing, then the decision of the
appeals tribunal becomes final. §25–4–94(b).
After the Board of Appeals denies review, fails to grant
review within the 10-day period, or grants review and
issues an adverse decision, the claimant may then
challenge the denial of benefits in Alabama state court.
§25–4–95. But not until then. The Alabama law setting
forth these procedures includes a strict exhaustion
requirement, which provides:
“No circuit court shall permit an appeal from a decision
allowing or disallowing a claim for benefits unless the
decision sought to be reviewed is that of an appeals
tribunal or of the board of appeals and unless the
person
filing
such
appeal
has
exhausted
his
administrative remedies as provided by this chapter.”
Ibid.
That statutory procedure “shall be exclusive.” §25–4–96.
On its face, the State’s exhaustion requirement prevents
claimants
from
challenging
adverse
benefits
determinations in state court, including in suits brought
under §1983, until the Board of Appeals has completed or
denied review.
B
In this case, 21 Alabama claimants applied for
unemployment
benefits.
They
contend
that
the
Department, in various ways, has unlawfully delayed the
processing of their benefits claims. For example, plaintiff
Derek Bateman alleges that he attempted to appeal his
claim to an appeals tribunal. But according to Bateman,
the Department never scheduled a hearing or otherwise
acted on his appeal, even after he attempted to follow up by
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Opinion of the Court
email and phone calls numerous times.
The 21 claimants sued the Secretary of Labor in his
official capacity in the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County, Alabama. Invoking 42 U. S. C. §1983, they
asserted among other things that the Department’s delays
in processing their benefits claims violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social
Security Act of 1935.
The claimants did not ask the court to rule that they were
entitled to unemployment benefits. Rather, they simply
asked the court to order the Department to promptly
address their benefits claims.
As relevant here, the
claimants sought a court order requiring the Department
to: (1) “issue an initial nonmonetary decision within the
next ten days to every plaintiff who has not yet received a
decision”; (2) “provide within ten days a hearing date for
each of the plaintiffs who [has] requested a hearing”;
(3) schedule such hearings for a date not later than 90 days
after the request for the hearing; and (4) pay every
approved claim within two days of the date of approval.
App. 42–43.
The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on several
grounds. The Secretary argued, among other things, that
the state trial court lacked jurisdiction because the
claimants had not satisfied the administrative-exhaustion
requirement in Alabama Code §25–4–95.
The court
granted the Secretary’s motion and dismissed the
complaint.
The claimants appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court.
That court affirmed on failure-to-exhaust grounds.
Johnson v. Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 144 (Ala. 2023).
The court concluded that under this Court’s precedents,
§1983 did not preempt the State’s administrative-
exhaustion requirement. Id., at 143–144.
Justice Cook dissented. He reasoned that under this
Court’s §1983 precedents, the State could not bar a suit
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Opinion of the Court
challenging the Department’s delays in making a
determination on a benefits claim. Id., at 146–150.
This Court granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ___ (2024).
II
The Secretary argues that Alabama’s exhaustion
requirement constitutes a “neutral rule of judicial
administration” and that the Alabama Supreme Court
permissibly applied that statutory rule to bar the
claimants’ §1983 suit in state court. Haywood v. Drown,
556 U. S. 729, 738 (2009). The claimants respond that
Alabama may not preclude §1983 suits on failure-to-
exhaust grounds when, as here, plaintiffs challenge the
Department’s delays in processing their claims. Otherwise,
they say, Alabama’s rule would create a catch-22
preventing adjudication of, and in effect immunizing state
officials from, this narrow category of §1983 claims about
delays in the administrative process.2
In light of this Court’s precedents, we agree with the
claimants. In the unusual circumstances presented here—
where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion
requirement in effect immunizes state officials from §1983
claims challenging delays in the administrative process—
state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-
exhaust grounds.
A
This Court has long held that “a state law that
immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit
under §1983 is preempted, even where the federal civil
rights litigation takes place in state court.” Felder v. Casey,
——————
2 The claimants also contend, more broadly, that this Court’s §1983
precedents—especially Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496
(1982), and Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131 (1988)—categorically bar both
federal and state courts from applying state administrative-exhaustion
requirements to §1983 claims. We need not address that broader
argument.
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Opinion of the Court
487 U. S. 131, 139 (1988). As the Court has explained,
States possess “no authority to override” Congress’s
“decision to subject state” officials “to liability for violations
of federal rights.” Id., at 143. That principle bars any state
rule immunizing state officials from a “particular species”
of federal claims, even if the immunity rule is “cloaked in
jurisdictional garb.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at 739, 742.
In Howlett v. Rose, for example, the Court analyzed a
Florida rule extending the State’s sovereign immunity from
§1983 suits “not only to the State and its arms but also to
municipalities, counties, and school districts that might
otherwise be subject to suit under §1983.” 496 U. S. 356,
365–366 (1990). This Court held that §1983 preempted
Florida’s rule because the rule in effect afforded immunity
from certain §1983 claims. Id., at 375–378.
And in Haywood v. Drown, the Court addressed a New
York statute depriving state courts of jurisdiction over
claims by prisoners seeking damages against state
correctional officers. See 556 U. S., at 733–734. The Court
reiterated that States “lack authority to nullify a federal
right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent with
their local policies.”
Id., at 736. In violation of that
principle, New York in essence had created “an immunity
defense” for correctional officers when those officers were
sued under §1983 in state court. Id., at 736–737, n. 5, 742.
The Haywood Court held that “the unique scheme adopted
by the State of New York—a law designed to shield a
particular class of defendants (correction officers) from a
particular type of liability (damages) brought by a
particular class of plaintiffs (prisoners)”—was preempted
by §1983. Id., at 741–742.3
——————
3 In Haywood, the Court declined to address “whether Congress may
compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law,
to hear suits brought pursuant to §1983.” 556 U. S., at 739. This case
similarly does not require us to address that underlying question:
Alabama “has made this inquiry unnecessary by creating courts of
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Opinion of the Court
B
Here, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the State’s
exhaustion requirement applies to “procedural challenges
related
to
the
administration
of
unemployment-
compensation benefits in addition to substantive challenges
regarding the decision to award (or not award) those
benefits.” Johnson v. Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 143
(2023). And it concluded that the universe of “procedural
challenges” requiring exhaustion includes §1983 suits
alleging that the Department is unlawfully delaying the
processing of benefits claims.
Alabama’s exhaustion requirement operates to immunize
state officials from a narrow class of claims brought under
§1983—namely,
claims
of
unlawful
delay
in
the
administrative process.
Under Alabama’s exhaustion
requirement, state courts cannot review claims of unlawful
delays under §1983 unless and until the claimants first
complete the administrative process and receive a final
decision on their claims. In essence, Alabama has said that
to challenge delays in the administrative process under
§1983, you first have to exhaust the administrative process.
Of course, that means that you can never challenge delays
in the administrative process. That catch-22 prevents the
claimants here from obtaining a merits resolution of their
§1983 claims in state court and in effect immunizes state
officials from those kinds of §1983 suits for injunctive relief.
Under this Court’s precedents, however, Alabama cannot
maintain such an immunity rule. As this Court’s cases
have repeatedly held, “a state law that immunizes
government conduct otherwise subject to suit under §1983
is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation
takes place in state court.” Felder, 487 U. S., at 139; see
——————
general jurisdiction that routinely sit to hear analogous §1983 actions.”
Ibid.
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Opinion of the Court
also Howlett, 496 U. S., at 375–378.4
C
In response, the Secretary advances two primary points.
First, the Secretary argues that the “jurisdictional nature
of Alabama’s exhaustion provision sets it apart from
procedural rules that may be more readily preempted by
§1983.” Brief for Respondent 25. In particular, according
to the Secretary, the jurisdictional status of Alabama’s
exhaustion requirement distinguishes it from the state
rules at issue in Haywood and Howlett.
States “retain substantial leeway to establish the
contours of their judicial systems” and are free to enforce
“neutral” jurisdictional rules. Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735–
736. The Secretary’s argument fails, however, because this
Court’s precedents have not treated the jurisdictional label
of state rules as dispositive when state rules functionally
immunize defendants from a class of §1983 claims in state
court. In Haywood, for example, a New York law withdrew
the state courts’ jurisdiction over a class of §1983 claims
against correctional officers. The Court stated that the
jurisdictional status of New York’s rule did not insulate the
rule from preemption.
Id., at 739–742. As the Court
——————
4 Importantly, the Court’s holding today does not mean that premature
procedural due process claims will necessarily prevail. As this Court has
stated, “a procedural due process claim is not complete when the
deprivation occurs. Rather, the claim is complete only when the State
fails to provide due process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U. S. 230, 236 (2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F. 3d
107, 116 (CA3 2000). Therefore, as counsel for the claimants rightly
acknowledged at oral argument, a plaintiff who asserts a “due process
claim without exhausting” will “usually lose” because of the requirement
that the challenged procedural deprivation must have already occurred,
except “in an unusual case” where “you’re actually challenging the
inability to exhaust.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 36.
Here, the claimants allege that the State’s delays in completing the
administrative process violated their due process and statutory rights.
We take no position on the merits of those claims.
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explained, New York’s law operated as “an immunity
statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb.” Id., at 742. To treat
the jurisdictional label as dispositive would allow the
Supremacy Clause to be “evaded.” Ibid.; see also Howlett,
496 U. S., at 383.
Second, the Secretary suggests that the claimants could
seek a writ of mandamus from the state courts to compel
the Department to act more quickly. For that reason, the
Secretary says that any delays in the state administrative
process can be cured within the state judicial system.
To begin with, it is not evident that mandamus is
available to the claimants here. The Secretary cites a lone
decades-old case from an Alabama intermediate appellate
court suggesting in dicta that mandamus would be
“appropriate” in a case where a state agency intentionally
delayed its decision on a couple’s application to become
adoptive parents.
Vance v. Montgomery Cty. Dept. of
Human Resources, 693 So. 2d 493, 495 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997).
If mandamus relief were available in these
unemployment benefits cases, one would have expected the
Alabama Supreme Court to say so in its opinion here. Yet
the court did not say or suggest that mandamus relief would
be available.
In any event, the Secretary’s argument based on the
supposed availability of mandamus is simply another way
of saying that the claimant must go through the process
provided by the State before suing under §1983 to challenge
delays in the state process. To be sure, the availability of
mandamus relief in state court might be relevant to the
merits of a due process or federal statutory claim
challenging delays in the state process.
But just as
Alabama may not force plaintiffs to complete the state
administrative process before plaintiffs may sue under
§1983 to challenge allegedly unlawful delays, Alabama may
not force plaintiffs to seek mandamus before bringing those
§1983 claims. Otherwise, by the time the plaintiffs could
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Opinion of the Court
sue for injunctive relief under §1983, their claims would be
moot.
For its part, the dissent largely discusses issues that we
do not address in this opinion. In Part II–C–2, when the
dissent eventually turns to the merits of our legal analysis,
the dissent argues that Haywood’s reasoning about
immunity rules applies only where a “focus on statutory
purpose” reveals that a state rule reflects “‘policy
disagreement’” with federal law. Post, at 11 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.) (quoting Haywood, 556 U. S., at 737–738). We
respectfully disagree with the dissent’s reading of
Haywood. That decision did not endorse a freewheeling
inquiry into whether a state rule’s “purpose” or “policy”
(however assessed) is at odds with federal law. Rather, a
state rule runs afoul of Haywood if it operates as an
“immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb” by wholly
barring a “particular species” of §1983 suits in state court.
Id., at 739, 742.
The dissent also suggests that the claimants forfeited
their argument based on Haywood and Howlett in the
Alabama Supreme Court.
In that court, however, the
claimants clearly raised the argument that under §1983 the
State could not apply an administrative-exhaustion
requirement to their claims challenging delays in the
administrative process.
Reply Brief for Appellant in
Johnson v. Washington, No. SC–2022–0897 (Ala. Sup. Ct.),
pp. 16–17.
The dissent further says that our opinion may have
“ripple effects.” Post, at 12. But as we have emphasized,
our opinion today is narrow; it resolves this dispute but is
careful not to go beyond this Court’s existing precedents.
See n. 2, supra.
*
*
*
The Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the State’s
administrative-exhaustion requirement for unemployment
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benefits claims to in effect immunize the Alabama
Secretary of Labor from §1983 due process suits alleging
that the Department has unlawfully delayed in processing
benefits claims. By affording immunity from those claims,
the Alabama ruling contravenes this Court’s §1983
precedents.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Alabama Supreme Court and remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025)
1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 23–191
NANCY WILLIAMS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
GREG REED, SECRETARY, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ALABAMA
[February 21, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE
GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join as to Part II, dissent-
ing.
Alabama law requires claimants seeking unemployment
benefits to exhaust their administrative remedies before su-
ing over those benefits in state court.
Petitioners, the
claimants here, failed to complete that process before they
sued under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court accordingly held that it lacked juris-
diction over the suit. That holding was plainly permissible.
As a matter of first principles, States have unfettered dis-
cretion over whether to provide a forum for §1983 claims in
their courts.
And, Alabama’s exhaustion rule does not
transgress the limitations that our precedents have recog-
nized. The Court concludes otherwise by endorsing an as-
applied theory of futility that is both forfeited and merit-
less, moving our jurisprudence even further off course. I
respectfully dissent.
I
This case is straightforward under first principles. Our
federal system gives States “plenary authority to decide
whether their local courts will have subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over federal causes of action.” Haywood v. Drown, 556
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WILLIAMS v. REED
THOMAS, J., dissenting
U. S. 729, 743 (2009) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Consti-
tution allows States to hear federal claims in their courts,
but it does “not impose a duty on state courts to do so.” Id.,
at 747. Thus, “[o]nce a State exercises its sovereign prerog-
ative to deprive its courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over
a federal cause of action, it is the end of the matter as far
as the Constitution is concerned.” Id., at 749.
The only potential constraint that the Constitution places
on a State’s jurisdictional discretion is the possibility that a
federal statute may preempt state law. The Supremacy
Clause makes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
the supreme Law of the Land.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly,
“[f]ederal law must prevail when Congress validly enacts a
statute that expressly supersedes state law, or when the
state law conflicts with a federal statute.” Haywood, 556
U. S., at 764 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
This preemption rule raises the “difficult question” whether
Congress can “require state courts to entertain a federal
cause of action.” Ibid., n. 8.
We need not answer that question here because §1983
does not raise any preemption issue. By its text, the provi-
sion does not “command” States to provide a forum for
§1983 plaintiffs. Id., at 765. Instead, it merely “addresses
who may sue and be sued for violations of federal law.”
Ibid.; see §1983 (deeming “liable” state officials who deny
“any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof . . . any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws”). Nor does Ala-
bama’s exhaustion bar, which regulates state-court litiga-
tion, create any implicit conflict with §1983. Plaintiffs who
do not exhaust state remedies are always free to bring their
claims in a federal forum. Id., at 766; see also Felder v. Ca-
sey, 487 U. S 131, 160 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Every [§1983] plaintiff has the option of proceeding in fed-
eral court, and the [state] statute has not the slightest effect
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on that right”). Preemption analysis requires nothing fur-
ther.
This Court’s precedents err to the extent they recognize a
broader form of conflict preemption for “state-court proce-
dural rules that are perceived to ‘burde[n] the exercise of
the federal right’ in state court.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at
766 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Felder, 487 U. S., at
141). This form of conflict preemption targets state-law
rules that constitute an obstacle to the “goals” embodied in
federal law. Id., at 138. But, only federal law itself can
support preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Extra-
textual speculation about Congress’s purposes cannot. See
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 603–604 (2009) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in judgment).
Our precedents also err in establishing the requirement
at issue here—that state jurisdictional rules be “neutral,”
even in the absence of a directly conflicting federal law. See
infra, at 5. The Supremacy Clause does not of its own force
“constrai[n] the States’ authority to define the subject-
matter jurisdiction of their own courts.” Haywood, 556
U. S., at 750 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Rather, in making
the Constitution and federal law supreme, “it provides only
a rule of decision that the state court must follow if it adju-
dicates the claim.” Id., at 751. I would therefore disregard
our further limitation as “demonstrably erroneous.” See
Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 717–718 (2019)
(THOMAS, J., concurring).*
——————
*Petitioners’ suit implicates other precedents that may not withstand
scrutiny. I doubt that petitioners have a true due process interest in
“mere Government benefits and entitlements.” Axon Enterprise, Inc. v.
FTC, 598 U. S. 175, 201, n. 3 (2023) (THOMAS, J., concurring). Tellingly,
the Court’s original expansion of the Due Process Clause into this context
came without meaningful legal analysis. The Court simply highlighted
the social importance of “entitlements,” which had come to make up
“[m]uch of the existing wealth in this country,” and which only the poor
had been theretofore unable to effectively enforce. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254, 262, and n. 8 (1970) (citing C. Reich, Individual Rights and
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Taken together, this case should begin and end with Ala-
bama’s plenary authority to decide which federal matters
its state courts will have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear.
Alabama exercised that authority to create an exhaustion
requirement, and we should respect its decision.
II
This Court should affirm even under existing precedents.
Alabama’s exhaustion requirement does not run afoul of the
limitations that this Court has identified on a State’s au-
thority to restrict federal causes of action from proceeding
in state court. Petitioners misread our precedents in argu-
ing otherwise, and the majority’s theory likewise cannot
pass muster.
A
Although this Court has held that there are limits on a
State’s discretion in regulating state-court jurisdiction over
federal causes of action, our precedents emphasize that
state authority predominates. “The general rule ‘bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state
judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts
as it finds them.’” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 372 (1990)
(quoting H. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)). Each State thus
has “great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdic-
tion of [its] own courts.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372. This
——————
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245, 1255
(1965); C. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)). As Justice
Black recognized at the time, it “strains credulity” as a textual matter
“to say that the government’s promise of charity to an individual is prop-
erty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 397 U. S., at 275 (dis-
senting opinion). Moreover, further examination may be required as to
whether §1983 can provide petitioners a cause of action in any event. Cf.
T. Lindley, Anachronistic Readings of Section 1983, 75 Ala. L. Rev. 897,
900–901 (2024) (contending that, as originally understood, §1983 did not
provide a freestanding cause of action).
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latitude allows States to decide which federal claims their
courts can hear. Ibid.
As relevant here, our precedents establish that States
must exercise this jurisdictional latitude only through “neu-
tral” rules that do not embody any “policy disagreement”
with federal law. Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735–737. Based
on this principle, we have identified two narrow exceptions
to a State’s ordinary discretion. First, a State may not re-
fuse to hear a federal claim “solely because [it] is brought
under a federal law.” McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco
R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233–234 (1934). Second, a State may
not deprive its courts of jurisdiction over a “disfavored” fed-
eral claim, even if it simultaneously denies jurisdiction to
an “identical state claim,” where doing so would “under-
mine federal law.” Haywood, 556 U. S., at 737–739.
For good reason, no one suggests that the first exception
applies. Alabama’s exhaustion requirement by its terms
does “not discriminate against rights arising under federal
laws.” See McKnett, 292 U. S., at 234. Instead, it imposes
a generally applicable exhaustion process “for the making
of determinations with respect to claims for unemployment
compensation benefits.” Ala. Code §25–4–96 (2016). State
and federal claims regarding unemployment benefits are
equally subject to this process, including as to “procedural”
challenges like the one here. Johnson v. Washington, 387
So. 3d 138, 143 (Ala. 2023).
The second exception does not apply either. Alabama’s
exhaustion requirement is nothing like the statute in Hay-
wood that this Court viewed as “disfavor[ing]” federal law.
556 U. S., at 738. That statute deprived New York courts
of jurisdiction over “damages suits filed by prisoners
against state correction officers,” based on the State’s belief
that they were “by and large frivolous and vexatious.” Id.,
at 733 (discussing N. Y. Correc. Law Ann. §24 (West 1987)).
This Court deemed New York’s rule “effectively an immun-
ity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” which protected
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correction officers from a subset of disfavored §1983 claims
even as New York courts continued to hear most §1983 ac-
tions. 556 U. S., at 741–742. According to the Haywood
majority, that policy-driven denial could not be squared
with the supremacy of §1983’s countervailing policy. Id., at
740.
Alabama’s decision to create an exhaustion requirement
for all unemployment-benefits-related claims does not em-
body any comparable policy judgment. Rather, this require-
ment, which has existed since 1939, is an ordinary jurisdic-
tional rule reflecting the Alabama Department of Labor’s
comparative “competence over the subject matter” of unem-
ployment benefits. Howlett, 496 U. S., at 381; see 1939 Ala.
Acts no. 497, pp. 737–741. The exhaustion process serves
all the useful functions that this Court has recognized: It
allows the agency with subject-matter expertise to retain
primary responsibility over the area; it avoids unnecessary
litigation; and it creates a record in case judicial review is
necessary.
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 145
(1992). In short, Alabama’s exhaustion requirement is a
procedural step that “promotes judicial efficiency,” ibid., in
contrast to the statute in Haywood, which created a de facto
“immunity” shielding a class of claims from judicial review,
556 U. S., at 742. We have no authority to interfere with
Alabama’s choice.
B
Petitioners try to evade Alabama’s exhaustion require-
ment by arguing for a different exception. On their view,
our decisions in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S.
496 (1982), and Felder establish that States are categori-
cally precluded from imposing exhaustion requirements in
the §1983 context. But, petitioners badly misread both de-
cisions.
Patsy addressed whether federal courts can impose an ex-
haustion requirement for §1983 cases in the absence of a
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congressional directive to do so. See 457 U. S., at 501. The
Court held that they cannot, reasoning that federal courts
may create exhaustion requirements only where doing so is
consistent with congressional intent, because “Congress is
vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural
scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts.”
Id., at 501–502, 516. That analysis has no relevance to the
question here: whether States have authority “to establish
the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.” Howlett,
496 U. S., at 372.
Felder too is inapposite. That decision held that §1983
preempted a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that effec-
tively altered the scope of §1983 liability on the merits. See
487 U. S., at 153. That is, the statute subjected state-court
plaintiffs to a dismissal with prejudice if they did not first
submit their claims against the State or its officers to the
government for an advance merits determination. Id., at
136–137, and n. 2; see Haywood, 556 U. S., at 773–774,
n. 11 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Failure to exhaust under
that statute operated as a state-created merits defense to
§1983 liability. But, the impermissibility of such a merits
defense says nothing about a State’s discretion to create
true jurisdictional rules, which speak only to the judiciary’s
“‘power’” to “‘proceed at all.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)).
Felder would remain inapposite even if it had involved a
purportedly jurisdictional rule compelling dismissal with-
out prejudice. In that event, the Wisconsin statute would
simply have raised the problem that this Court later con-
fronted in Haywood, where the State singled out a “disfa-
vored” category of claims for second-class treatment. 556
U. S., at 738. The notice-of-claim statute in Felder existed
to “further the State’s interest in minimizing liability and
the expenses associated with it.” 487 U. S., at 143. And,
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although Felder noted that the statute “impose[d] an ex-
haustion requirement,” it treated that fact as one of multi-
ple “interrelated” factors that caused the Wisconsin statute
to “burden” §1983 claimants. Id., at 141, 146. The exhaus-
tion requirement was not an independently fatal problem,
so Felder’s language on exhaustion should not be overread.
See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821) (“[G]en-
eral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in con-
nection with the case in which those expressions are used.
If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the
very point is presented for decision”).
C
The majority rules for petitioners on narrower grounds,
but its holding is equally unpersuasive. The majority does
not dispute that, as a general matter, Alabama is entitled
to apply its exhaustion requirement to §1983 claims. See
ante, at 5, n. 2. It instead holds that, under Haywood, Ala-
bama’s discretion cannot extend to the specific claims here,
which challenge delays in the exhaustion process itself.
Ante, at 5. On the majority’s view, maintaining the exhaus-
tion requirement for such claims would mean that petition-
ers will never be able to advance to state court, leaving the
State essentially “immun[e]” from challenges to its exhaus-
tion process. Ante, at 7. This theory of futility is both for-
feited and meritless.
1
“[T]his Court has almost unfailingly refused to consider
any federal-law challenge to a state-court decision unless
the federal claim ‘was either addressed by or properly pre-
sented to the state court that rendered the decision we have
been asked to review.’” Howell v. Mississippi, 543 U. S.
440, 443 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Adams v. Robertson,
520 U. S. 83, 86 (1997) (per curiam)). In fact, the Court’s
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historical practice has generally been to treat this preser-
vation requirement as jurisdictional, although our more re-
cent cases have expressed uncertainty on this issue. How-
ell, 543 U. S., at 445–446. In view of petitioners’
preservation obligation, we should reject as forfeited their
newfound theory of futility, which was neither presented
nor addressed below.
Until seeking certiorari, petitioners litigated this case as
a facial challenge, arguing solely that §1983 “categorically”
preempted States from applying exhaustion requirements
in the §1983 context. Reply Brief for Appellant in Johnson
v. Washington, No. SC–2022–0897 (Ala. Sup. Ct.), p. 16.
The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly understood that
this facial challenge was petitioners’ “only” argument for
federal preemption. 387 So. 3d, at 143–144. Petitioners be-
latedly contend that they also raised a futility-based argu-
ment, but the briefing they cite merely addressed how the
futility of waiting for exhaustion affected the proper timing
of their facial challenge. See Reply Brief 24, n. 3 (citing Re-
ply Brief for Appellant in No. SC–2022–0897, at 16–17).
Because petitioners raised only a facial challenge below,
they cannot press an as-applied challenge here. “[F]acial”
and “as-applied” claims are distinct and must be individu-
ally preserved. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460,
473, n. 3 (2010); see also, e.g., Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603
U. S. 707, 723 (2024) (“NetChoice chose to litigate these
cases as facial challenges, and that decision comes at a
cost”). So, petitioners cannot now argue that Alabama’s ex-
haustion requirement is impermissible in the specific cir-
cumstance where exhaustion would be futile.
There is no reason to treat this case as the “very rare ex-
ceptio[n]” in which petitioners’ forfeiture might be over-
looked. Adams, 520 U. S., at 86 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The majority, which ignores that petitioners
needed to raise their as-applied objection specifically, cer-
tainly provides no justification. See ante, at 10. Instead,
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its analysis only highlights why we should not decide peti-
tioners’ as-applied challenge in the first instance.
The majority’s futility theory depends on the assumption
that petitioners will never have their day in court if we
leave Alabama’s exhaustion requirement intact. See ante,
at 7. But, petitioners’ failure to raise their as-applied claim
below means that we have no way of knowing whether this
assumption is true. It may be the case that the exhaustion
requirement here contains an implicit futility exception.
Cf. Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So. 3d 925, 929 (Ala. 2010)
(identifying futility as a “recognized exceptio[n]” to the
“exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine” gener-
ally). Or, it may be the case that petitioners may obtain
mandamus relief, as the dissent below suggested and the
State underscored. See 387 So. 3d, at 146 (Cook, J., dissent-
ing); Tr. of Oral Arg. 54–56. As a federal court assessing
petitioners’ objection in the first instance, we have no way
to assess the viability of these or any other mechanisms.
The majority’s attempts to disregard this uncertainty are
unpersuasive. The majority concludes that the uncertainty
should count against the State, and expresses doubt about
the availability of mandamus based on the Alabama Su-
preme Court’s failure to address that form of relief. Ante,
at 9. But, that court had no reason to opine on the alterna-
tive pathways available to petitioners, given that petition-
ers failed to raise an as-applied challenge. We should not
reward petitioners for their own mistake. Likewise, the
majority’s assertion that mandamus would be irrelevant
even if it were available is puzzling. Ante, at 9–10. If peti-
tioners can secure completion of the exhaustion process
through mandamus, then by definition they will not be in a
“catch-22” that “prevents [them] from obtaining a merits
resolution of their §1983 claims in state court.” Ante, at 7.
2
In any event, petitioners’ as-applied challenge fails on the
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merits. Unlike the New York statute in Haywood, Ala-
bama’s exhaustion requirement is not “‘an immunity stat-
ute cloaked in jurisdictional garb.’” Contra, ante, at 9 (quot-
ing Haywood, 556 U. S., at 742).
Properly understood, Haywood directs our focus to the
challenged statute’s purpose. The Court there viewed the
New York statute as an immunity statute because it was
“designed to shield” correction officers from damages claims
brought by prisoners, “[b]ased on the belief ” that these
claims tended to be “frivolous and vexatious.” Id., at 741–
742. In other words, States cannot implicitly reject the su-
premacy of federal law by basing a jurisdictional limita-
tion—even one that also applies to state claims—on “policy
disagreement” with federal law. Id., at 737–738.
A focus on statutory purpose makes clear that Alabama’s
exhaustion requirement raises no Haywood problem.
There is no credible argument that Alabama adopted its ex-
haustion requirement in order to defeat challenges to the
exhaustion process itself. Alabama created its exhaustion
scheme in 1939, decades before the understanding that
public benefits give rise to a due process interest emerged.
See supra, at 3–4, n. And, the Alabama exhaustion process
is by all accounts an ordinary exhaustion requirement com-
mon among public-benefits schemes, which in the mine-run
case serves to facilitate the adjudication of benefits deter-
minations on the merits. There is no reason to think that
Alabama intended to cause mischief in the rare context of a
§1983 challenge to its procedures.
At most, this case presents a circumstance in which Ala-
bama’s “neutral jurisdictional rule” has the effect of defeat-
ing a federal claim. See Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735. But,
again, our precedents disallow a State’s jurisdictional rule
only if it is in fact not “neutral”—that is, if it is “based on a
policy disagreement,” and so is intended to “shut the court-
house door to federal claims that it considers at odds with
its local policy.” Id., at 737–738, 740.
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The majority’s contrary conclusion misunderstands Hay-
wood. Ignoring that decision’s purpose-focused language,
the majority asserts that it disallows any state rule that
“operates as an ‘immunity statute’ . . . by wholly barring a
‘particular species’ of §1983 suits in state court.” Ante, at
10 (quoting 556 U. S., at 739, 742). But, in context, that
quoted language only reinforces the majority’s error. Those
lines in Haywood reiterate that what mattered there was
New York’s illicit purpose: A State may not “dee[m]” “a par-
ticular species of suits . . . inappropriate for its trial courts.”
Id., at 739–740. Nor may a State effectively create an “im-
munity statute” “[b]ased on the belief that [certain claims]
are frivolous and vexatious.” Id., at 742. Nothing in Hay-
wood suggests that a state rule could be impermissible just
because it has the incidental effect of disallowing certain
federal claims.
The majority also does not grapple with the possible rip-
ple effects of its reading of Haywood. It professes only that
its opinion is “narrow” and does nothing more than “re-
solv[e] this dispute.” Ante, at 10. But, the majority’s pro-
testations do not make it so.
A constraint based on incidental effects is notably more
amorphous than our prior focus on statutory purpose. After
all, to the extent the Supremacy Clause bars States from
enacting nominally jurisdictional rules that “registe[r their]
dissent” from federal policy, States may craft their laws
with an eye toward avoiding conflict. Haywood, 556 U. S.,
at 737–738. But, the same is not true for incidental effects.
No statute can be perfectly drafted to anticipate every ap-
plication that ultimately arises, so it is inevitable that ex-
haustion requirements will occasionally slow or defeat
claims that we might think, as a policy matter, ought to go
forward. That happenstance is not a reason for suspicion,
just as we do not malign the many federal statutes with
similarly categorical exhaustion requirements. See, e.g.,
Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 733–734 (2001) (applying
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the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement
even where the exhaustion process could not provide the
prisoner’s requested relief ). Here too, the Court should not
encroach on Alabama’s “latitude to establish the structure
and jurisdiction of [its] own courts.” Howlett, 496 U. S., at
372.
III
The Court’s decision is irreconcilable with both first prin-
ciples and precedent. I respectfully dissent.
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Exhibit B
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