Unemployment Amend Judgement 09-2025

Date: 2025-09-02

Summary

A pro se plaintiff's motion to amend judgment in Joshua Abrams v. Division of Unemployment Insurance, et al., Case No. 1:24-cv-03390-RMR, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, filed September 22, 2025 as Document 54. The motion asks the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to vacate its September 2, 2025 judgment, arguing clear legal error in applying Younger abstention and citing Williams v. Reed (2025) and Patsy v. Bd. of Regents. The plaintiff withdraws punitive and monetary claims, seeking only prospective injunctive and declaratory relief with § 504 damages limited to deliberate indifference, and objects to the dismissal of Claims 4-8 as abandoned. It requests leave to file a co-filed Second Amended Complaint, reinstatement of an Amended Emergency Injunction and expedited discovery into vendor contracts and ReliaCard steering practices.

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Case No. 1:24-cv-03390-RMR Document 54 filed 09/22/25 USDC Colorado pg 1
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The United States District Court District of Colorado
FILED
901 19th St, Denver, CO 80294 | (303) 844-3433
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff: Joshua Abrams DENVER, COLORADO
8:27 am, Sep 22, 2025
v. JEFFREY P. COLWELL, CLERK

Defendant(s): Division of Unemployment Insurance, et al
▲COURT USE ONLY▲

Joshua Abrams, Pro Se | abramslive@gmail.com |720-910-4829Case Number:
P.O. Box 761 Loveland CO 80539 1:24-cv-03390
Division: Courtroom
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgement

Plaintiff moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to vacate the Court’s September 2,

2025 judgment, which rests on clear legal errors and inflicts manifest injustice. The judgment

misapplies abstention and exhaustion doctrines, disregards controlling Supreme Court precedent

in Williams v. Reed, 2025, which bars deferral to deficient state unemployment-insurance

remedies, moots pending motions without merits review, misconstrues relief as

sovereign-immunity barred, and dismisses curable ADA/§504 claims. Plaintiff withdraws

punitive and inapplicable monetary claims, seeking only prospective injunctive and declaratory

relief, with §504 economic damages limited to deliberate indifference. The co-filed Second

Amended Complaint and Amended Emergency Injunction cure all named defects. Vacatur,

amendment, and reinstatement of preliminary-injunction proceedings are required to address

ongoing constitutional harms.
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I. Legal Standard

Rule 59(e) authorizes altering or amending a judgment to correct clear legal error, prevent

manifest injustice, or address new evidence or intervening law. (Phelps v. Hamilton,1997). Clear

error includes misapprehension of controlling law or facts, specifically Williams v. Reed 2025.

Manifest injustice occurs when a pro se litigant is denied a meaningful opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies or present evidence, (Servants of Paraclete v. Does 2000), or when

dismissal even without prejudice perpetuates systemic constitutional violations by deferring to

state processes that lack jurisdiction or capacity to remedy federal claims, (Williams v. Reed

2025). Rule 15(a)(2) mandates freely granting leave to amend absent futility, with heightened

deference for pro se plaintiffs. (Hall v. Bellmon 1991). The Court’s misapplication of abstention,

premature mooting of pending motions, and deferral to a constitutionally deficient state system

demand vacatur to prevent ongoing harm.

II. Controlling Supreme Court Precedent Makes Abstention and Exhaustion Inapplicable

A. Williams v. Reed (2025) Mandates Federal Jurisdiction.

In Williams v. Reed, 2025, the Supreme Court held as a now clearly established that states

cannot shield systemic due-process violations in unemployment-insurance (UI) administration

from federal review by constructing procedural barriers that deny claimants a meaningful

opportunity to contest core disputes, such as underpayments or delays. Where agency notices fail

to address the actual issues for appeal, no “ongoing state proceeding” exists under Younger v.

Harris 1971, and federal jurisdiction is proper. Williams unequivocally rejects state schemes that

obstruct or delay federal accountability.

B. Colorado’s System Embodies the Williams Constitutional Defect
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Colorado’s unemployment-insurance (UI) system exemplifies the unconstitutional paradigm

condemned in Williams v. Reed, 2025: it systematically withholds meaningful process and then

demands judicial deference to that deficient process to evade federal scrutiny. The record

establishes: (1) no actionable notice or appealable decision in 2023 addressing underpayment or

misapplied cross-state wages; (2) no notice or opportunity to cure a clearly retaliatory “integrity

hold” imposed that year, falsely premised on Plaintiff’s noncompliance later causing harm and

delay in Plaintiff’s 2025 claim; (3) misdirection of appeals into irrelevant channels (e.g.,

“withdrawal reconsiderations” incapable of resolving underpayments), followed by rejections as

“misdirected” or “untimely” despite absent or defective notices; (4) a March 24, 2023 appeal

cancellation blocking Plaintiff’s pursuit of relief; and (5) false assurances of payments that

deterred engagement with non-existent remedies. The ICAO appeal tested only the withdrawal

issue, not the federal defects (no notice on underpayment; integrity-hold barriers). Thus, the

“right to appeal” did not provide a meaningful avenue to raise Plaintiff’s due-process claims and

is illusory under Williams’ catch-22. The ICAO ‘right to appeal’ attached only to the withdrawal

determination , not to the un-noticed underpayment and integrity-hold defects so, under Williams

(2025), a pathway that never presents the federal issue is not an ‘ongoing state proceeding’ and

cannot support Younger abstention.

C. Abstention and Exhaustion Are Inapplicable

Younger abstention is narrowly confined to exceptional circumstances, none present here. Sprint

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 2013. Moreover, Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 1982, precludes any

exhaustion requirement for §1983 claims. By design, Colorado’s system denies claimants a

viable avenue to raise federal due-process violations, making abstention erroneous and

exhaustion irrelevant. The Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint reframes these as systemic

due-process violations, materially depriving claimants of property rights. Deferral to lower
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courts or state processes is erroneous, as they lack jurisdiction to remedy these federal

constitutional defects. Williams renders abstention improper. The Court’s contrary ruling

constitutes clear legal error. Younger abstention does not apply because, as Williams (2025) and

Sprint (2013) make clear, there is no ongoing state proceeding on these facts: the necessary

notices never issued, and the supposed state channels were illusory for raising the federal

due-process and ADA claims.

D. The Court's Deferral to State Courts Is Clear Error Under Williams

The Court's holding that federal jurisdiction is barred absent appeal to the Colorado Court of

Appeals misapprehends controlling law. Williams v. Reed, clarifies that systemic UI due-process

claims lacking proper notices or meaningful appeals need not exhaust state remedies, as those

processes are constitutionally inadequate. Here, no appealable decision issued on the 2023

underpayment or retaliatory integrity hold, rendering state channels illusory. Deferral to ICAO or

the Colorado Court of Appeals cannot remedy federal violations, per Patsy v. Bd. of Regents,

457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (no §1983 exhaustion). Moreover, Plaintiff’s requested

reprocessing—framed as prospective injunctive relief—addresses any backpay through

compliance, voiding any notion that state appeals are appropriate. Such deferral would merely

shield ongoing injustice, as lower courts lack jurisdiction to enforce federal constitutional

remedies and would deplete Plaintiff’s limited resources while invoking layered immunities now

foreclosed by Williams v. Reed

III. The Court Erred by Mooting Pending Motions Without Merits Adjudication

The Court erred by deeming Plaintiff's motions to amend, supplement the record, object to

dismissal, and appoint counsel without merits adjudication, contravening Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a)(2) and Tenth Circuit authority. Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023,
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1027 (10th Cir. 1994). These filings cured identified defects by: (1) clarifying prospective relief

under Ex parte Young; (2) detailing ADA/§504 violations with deliberate-indifference evidence;

and (3) exposing systemic notice failures, misrouted appeals, and retaliatory “integrity” holds.

The Court’s refusal to consider the motion to amend—which presented new evidence of

expanding violations—and its denial of a requested status conference to accommodate Plaintiff’s

disability further compounded the harm. This procedural shortcut denied Plaintiff, a pro se

litigant, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, constituting a due-process violation within this

federal proceeding.

B. Pro Se Limitations and Counsel Appointment

As a pro se, disabled, and indigent litigant without access to PACER or resources for formal

exhibit compilation, Plaintiff cannot provide exhaustive pin cites or labeled exhibits at this

stage—a level of precision unreasonably demanded of unrepresented parties facing systemic

barriers. The Court's mooting of Plaintiff's counsel-appointment motion exacerbated this,

denying tools to streamline evidence presentation and overburdening both Plaintiff (compelled to

litigate alone amid health/financial constraints) and the Court (forced to parse unpolished

filings). Appointing counsel would facilitate precise record development while easing judicial

review, accelerating merits adjudication, and averting further manifest injustice.

IV. Requested Relief Is Now Prospective and Falls Squarely Within Ex parte Young

Plaintiff acknowledges that certain theories in the initial pleadings required refinement. The

Second Amended Complaint cures those defects by eliminating personal-liability damages

theories and narrowing relief to prospective, programmatic remedies. Plaintiff seeks no

retroactive monetary award from the state treasury. The requested relief is limited to: (1)

reprocessing of the 2023 claim with constitutionally adequate notice, a meaningful hearing, and
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ADA accommodations; (2) targeted reforms (a viable underpayment route, reasonable appeal

windows, non-retaliatory integrity protocols, and secure PII practices); and (3) declaratory relief.

This is quintessential Ex parte Young (1908) relief, not barred by Edelman v. Jordan (1974) even

if compliance incidentally results in backpay through lawful reprocessing. To the extent damages

are pursued, they are confined to §504 economic losses upon proof of deliberate indifference,

consistent with sovereign-immunity limits. As clarified, the claims are legally viable and

squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction.

B. Incidental Backpay Is Permissible; Younger Abstention Is Inapplicable

The Court's characterization of requested relief as retroactive backpay is clear error. Under Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), prospective reprocessing of the 2023 claim—with due process

and ADA accommodations—may incidentally yield backpay as a compliance byproduct, not a

barred treasury award (Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Milliken v. Bradley, 433

U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (incidental costs allowed)). Younger abstention does not apply, as

Williams v. Reed, 603 U.S. ___ (2025), confirms no “ongoing state proceeding” exists where

notices and appeals are systemically defective. Programmatic reforms remedy ongoing violations

without interfering with state duties.

V. ADA/§504 and Due-Process Claims Are Plausibly Pleaded

The Second Amended Complaint plausibly pleads ADA Title II and §504 violations: Plaintiff

disclosed a disability, requested accommodations (human-assisted communication over

nonfunctional portals), and faced agency directives requiring oral requests without an interactive

process or coordinator outreach. Plaintiff disclosed disability in writing in March 2023 and again

In June 2023, Plaintiff specifically disclosed his disability to Defendants, which should have

triggered an interactive process under the ADA, allowing him to request reasonable
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accommodations such as human-facilitated callbacks or written agent responses in lieu of

nonfunctional web portals. Due to the opaque and obstructive frankly discriminatory nature of

CDLE's procedures that chill and block such requests, Plaintiff was unable to submit a direct

request via phone; even if he had, Defendants admissions directly claim they refused to process

written accommodations, insisting on undocumented and unknown phone requests requirements,

a requirement Plaintiff only discovered in this civil action and only after both his 2023 and 2025

claims had been irreparably delayed and wrongfully processed.

Defendants provided no interactive process or ADA-coordinator outreach and instead directed

Plaintiff to “call during business hours,” which effectively denied access to accommodations and

forced unsafe in-person visits. Defendants have since admitted that accommodations are

available only by phone with a live representative—a route that is neither disclosed during calls

nor explained on CDLE’s public-facing ADA page—thereby concealing and chilling the

accommodation process to prioritize call-center operations over compliance. Given Plaintiff’s

autism and ODD, a written, coordinator-managed process was a reasonable accommodation; the

absence of such a process materially impaired his ability to participate and to seek redress.

Resulting harms which forced in-person visits out of desperation amid health risks, illness, and

lost wages establish discrimination, failure to accommodate, and deliberate indifference.

Tennessee v. Lane, 2004. Dismissing these claims even without prejudice without assessing

curability, despite curative supplements, was error. Rule 15(a)(2) mandates granting leave to

amend, particularly for pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon 1991. Under Mathews v. Eldridge 1976,

Plaintiff’s substantial interest in timely subsistence benefits, the high risk of erroneous

deprivation from defective notices and misrouted appeals, and the minimal burden of requested

safeguards (clear notices, functional appeal routes) compel relief. Colorado’s systemic failures
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violate the Social Security Act’s “when due” mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1). The Court’s

abstention ruling evaded these merits;

VI. Supplemental Evidence and Qualified Immunity Support Merits Review and Discovery

A. Overlooked Evidence Requires Consideration

Plaintiff’s supplemental filings, ignored by the Court, include: (1) proof of excluded out-of-state

wages without basis; (2) misrouted or canceled appeals, including a March 24, 2023

cancellation; (3) a recorded March 15, 2025 call and transcript evidencing coercive ReliaCard

steering and false “incompatible bank” claims contingent processing his claim unless he accepts;

and (4) multiple public reports and audit-confirmed systemic mismanagement. These

substantiate due-process and ADA/§504 violations and support civil RICO allegations (invoking

18 U.S.C. § 666 as policy evidence, not a private action). Failing to address this evidence was

prejudicial error, warranting expedited discovery into vendor contracts, fee structures, and

steering incentives.

B. Qualified Immunity Does Not Bar Individual-Capacity Claims

Individual-capacity claims survive, as officials violated clearly established rights to timely notice

and meaningful hearings under Williams v. Reed 2025, Goldberg v. Kelly 1970, and Mathews,

424 U.S. at 333. Pleaded facts ,defective notices, misrouted appeals, and retaliatory holds all

preclude pleading-stage dismissal. Qualified immunity is inapplicable to official-capacity

prospective relief. Ex parte Young 1908. Pleaded facts, as supplemented and cured in the Second

Amended Complaint, show Defendants Barela and Fitzgerald's personal involvement in

formulating/enforcing defective policies. The Court’s vagueness finding disregarded specific

factual allegations, the liberal construction owed to pro se pleadings, and—most critically—the

supplemental filings the Court improperly mooted rather than reviewed on the merits, many of
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which directly addressed the perceived gaps. Qualified immunity is likewise unavailable:

Williams (2025), Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) clearly establish UI

claimants’ rights to timely, adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Dismissing with prejudice was clear error and incompatible with Williams v. Reed (2025), which

forbids using procedural obstacles to immunize officials from federal accountability. The Second

Amended Complaint alleges personal participation by Barela and Fitzgerald policy directives

authorizing integrity holds without adequate notice and approval of appeal funnels that foreclose

wage challenges actions that violate clearly established rights to timely notice and a meaningful

hearing. See Williams (2025); Goldberg (1970); Mathews (1976). Qualified immunity does not

apply at the pleading stage on these facts and, in any event, does not apply to official-capacity

Young relief.

VII. "Abandoned" Claims Were Not Waived

The Court’s dismissal of Claims 4–8 as “abandoned” for Plaintiff’s failure to reiterate arguments

in his motion-to-dismiss response effects an improper forfeiture and manifest injustice. As a pro

se litigant, Plaintiff preserved these claims in the Amended Complaint and multiple supplements

, which expressly addressed the defenses raised (e.g., exhaustion, immunity) even if not

replicated verbatim under each count. Liberal construction mandates merits consideration of such

filings, not waiver for lack of point-by-point duplication. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110

(10th Cir. 1991); cf. C1.G v. Siegfried, 38 F.4th 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing true

abandonment from incomplete briefing where the record otherwise preserves the

claim).Defendants failed to carry their burden of showing waiver, as their motion recycled

exhaustion and abstention theories now foreclosed by Williams v. Reed, which bars such

doctrines from immunizing systemic UI due-process failures. Plaintiff’s supplements squarely

joined these issues, obviating any need for redundant count-by-count responses. The Court’s
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contrary ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion, particularly where Defendants never rebutted

the systemic allegations (e.g., non-notice, misrouted appeals, retaliatory holds, ADA barriers),

thereby forfeiting any merits defense. The Second Amended Complaint cures any deficiencies

In conclusion The September 2, 2025 judgment perpetuates systemic UI violations by

misapplying abstention, immunity, and qualified immunity, while mooting curative filings and

deeming claims abandoned. Intervening Williams v. Reed demands federal review. Vacatur

corrects these clear errors, averts manifest injustice, grants leave for the co-filed Second

Amended Complaint focusing prospective relief and limited §504 damages.

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Vacate the September 2, 2025 judgment due to clear legal errors and manifest injustice;

2. Grant leave to file the co-filed Second Amended Complaint, which cures all identified defects;

3. Reinstate and decide Plaintiff’s co-filed Amended Emergency Injunction on the merits, with a

prompt hearing;

4. Order limited, expedited discovery into vendor contracts, fee structures, and ReliaCard steering

practices to substantiate systemic violations; and

5. Issue any further relief necessary to ensure constitutionally adequate reprocessing of Plaintiff’s

2023 claim and access to functional appeal routes during this litigation.

________________________________________

Date: 09-19-2025 | ❑Petitioner/Plaintiff

Joshua Abrams, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & AUTHENTICITY

I certify the filings are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge done in good faith and
under acknowledgement of perjury. & That on 09-19-2025 a true and accurate copy of this filing
were served on Defendants by: E-filed, lauren.davison@coag.gov & Stephen.woolsey@coag.gov

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Unemployment Amend Judgement 09-2025

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