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Ten countries, no single ranking: a scorecard of pandemic relief from official sources

How ten advanced economies sized, built, delivered, policed and wound down their pandemic relief, entry by entry from audit offices, ministries, statistics offices, legislatures, the IMF and the OECD. There is no overall score: the IMF, whose tally opens the grid, says its own database is not meant for comparing countries.

Sources retrieved or checked on September 24, 2026; each source’s own date is in the list at the end.

What this is. A side-by-side comparison, assembled by Pandemic Darlings, of what official sources say about each country. It is not a ranking and adds no score. Where no official assessment was found, the cell says so.

1. Seven questions, ten countries

Each row asks one question and each column is one country. The size row comes from a single IMF table and the design row from a single OECD paper; the other rows draw on each country’s own auditors, ministries and statistics offices, so one row can mix sources of different kinds.

The table scrolls sideways; the question column stays in place.

Seven questions across ten countries, with a numbered source for each cell.
QuestionUnited StatesUnited KingdomCanadaGermanyFranceAustraliaJapanItalyNetherlandsSouth Korea
Size of the responseIMF tally to September 2021, % of 2020 GDP25.5% spending and forgone revenue; 2.4% loans, equity and guarantees.119.3% spending and forgone revenue; 16.7% loans, equity and guarantees.115.9% spending and forgone revenue; 4.0% loans, equity and guarantees.115.3% spending and forgone revenue; 27.8% loans, equity and guarantees.19.6% spending and forgone revenue; 15.2% loans, equity and guarantees.118.4% spending and forgone revenue; 1.8% loans, equity and guarantees.116.7% spending and forgone revenue; 28.3% loans, equity and guarantees.110.9% spending and forgone revenue; 35.3% loans, equity and guarantees.110.3% spending and forgone revenue; 4.3% loans, equity and guarantees.16.4% spending and forgone revenue; 10.1% loans, equity and guarantees.1
Job-retention designOECD classification, October 2020, plus scheme rulesExisting state short-time compensation, federally funded, was little used; PPP loans, forgiven if jobs and pay were kept, worked as a wage subsidy.2A new scheme (furlough, CJRS): government grants of 80% of salaries, up to £2,500 a month, for employees put on temporary leave.2, 3A new wage subsidy paying a fixed 75% of usual wages, whatever the cut in hours; Canada’s existing short-time work scheme had been little used.2Existing Kurzarbeit, opened to firms with 10% of staff on cut hours (was 30%); pays 60% of lost net pay (67% with children), raised later.2Existing activité partielle, opened by “force majeure” declaration; workers got 70% of gross pay, state-reimbursed on wages up to 4.5 times the minimum wage.2A new flat-rate wage subsidy (JobKeeper) that acted as a minimum salary; Australia had never had a short-time work scheme.2Existing Employment Adjustment Subsidy: output test eased from a 10% drop over three months to 5% over one; up to 100% subsidy for small firms.2Existing Cassa Integrazione opened to firms of any size and sector on a simple declaration; pays 80% of gross wages, capped at €998 or €1,199.2Existing short-time work replaced by a temporary wage subsidy (NOW) proportional to the fall in sales; employers keep paying 100% of wages.2Existing employment retention subsidy, eased and raised: small firms’ share of wages covered went from two-thirds to three-quarters, then up to 90% for April–June 2020.2, 4
Reach of the main schemesPPP guaranteed over 11 million loans worth more than $799bn (about $760bn later forgiven); stimulus checks paid $931bn; UI spending reached about $900bn.5, 6Furlough paid £68.9bn to 1.3 million employers for 11.7 million jobs; SEISS paid £28.1bn to 2.9 million self-employed people.7CEWS approved $100.23bn for 460,070 employers, supporting up to 5,329,720 employees (August 2020); CERB and the EI emergency benefit paid $74.8bn.8, 9Short-time pay covered 6.00 million employees at the April 2020 peak, a historic high; the BA paid €12.58bn of it in 2020.10Activité partielle covered 8.4 million employees in April 2020; state-guaranteed loans (PGE) reached €145bn for over 700,000 firms by end-2021.11, 12JobKeeper supported around 4 million employees, almost a third of pre-pandemic employment, and around one million businesses; total cost $88.8bn.13Under the COVID special measures (April 2020–March 2023), MHLW made 7,882,642 subsidy decisions worth ¥6.35 trillion.14In March–April 2020, 51% of firms used COVID short-time work for almost 40% of private-sector employees (INPS and Bank of Italy data).15NOW’s first round advanced about €7.9bn to over 139,500 employers; NOW made up over half of the 2020 support package of over €30bn.16, 17Relief grants of up to ₩1 million went to all 21 million households: ₩14.3 trillion, including ₩2.1 trillion from local governments.4
SpeedPPP opened April 3, 2020, and its first $349bn was obligated by April 16; by June 12 lenders had made 4.6 million loans worth $512bn.18Announced March 20, 2020; furlough claims opened April 20, ahead of HMRC’s end-April plan. The NAO found both schemes delivered “quickly and ahead of schedule”.3CERB applications opened online April 6, 2020, and over 6 million CERB and EI claims arrived by April 19; most checks came after payment.19The Bundestag passed the eased rules unanimously on March 13, 2020; the BA says notifications and approvals were then processed within a few days.20, 10Short-time work requests counted as approved after 2 days without reply (normally 15); over three-quarters of PGE lending went out March–June 2020.2, 12Announced March 30, 2020, “later than job retention schemes in comparable countries”, then “implemented with speed” using Single Touch Payroll technology.13No official assessment of payment speed found.Self-employed claims opened April 1, 2020; almost 60% of 5.1 million arrived within four days. OECD: some new CIG users struggled to get prompt support.21, 2UWV prepared to take applications from Monday, April 6, 2020, paying 80% of the expected subsidy up front and fixing the final amount later.22, 23Relief checks went out to all households from May 2020, cash first to 2.8 million lowest-income households; the OECD called the response “swift and sizeable”.4, 24
Integrity findingsSBA’s inspector general: over $200bn (17%) of PPP and EIDL went to potentially fraudulent actors after SBA “weakened or removed” controls. GAO: UI fraud 11–15%.25, 26NAO reports HMRC’s estimate of £4.5bn error and fraud (4.6% of cost) in furlough and SEISS, and found the evidence behind it weak in places.7Auditor General: $4.6bn paid to ineligible individuals; at least $27.4bn of payments to individuals and employers should be investigated further (unverified, not proven fraud).9The BA’s own view: tips on possible misuse were a minimal share of cases. The Bundesrechnungshof audited its handling of suspected misuse in October 2022.10, 27Senate budget report, citing the tax administration: 24,820 irregular solidarity-fund requests, worth €30m, identified by the end of 2020.28ANAO found the ATO’s administration effective and fit to protect payment integrity; the ATO’s own gap analysis puts incorrect, unrecovered payments at 2.4% ($2.18bn).13Board of Audit (August 2022): checks for duplicate payments were not properly run; over ¥161.33m in subsidies was paid twice or improperly received.29INPS: of 5.18 million applicants for the €600–1,000 self-employed payments, 18% were rejected; almost 1.5 million applications were duplicate or redundant.21The Court of Audit concluded in May 2023 that the labor ministry, with UWV and municipalities, carried out the NOW wage subsidy and Tozo well.30Labor ministry’s own 2022 targeted probe: 25 employers took ₩1.047bn of retention subsidy fraudulently; 11 were prosecuted. No audit-office figure found.31
Official view of the effectCBO estimated in September 2020 that the spring 2020 relief laws would lift real GDP 4.7% in 2020 and 3.1% in 2021.32NAO: the schemes “achieved their primary objective of preventing millions of job losses”; unemployment peaked just over 5%, half the OBR’s July 2020 forecast.7Auditor General: the audited programs “prevented a rise in poverty”; Statistics Canada data put 2020 poverty at 11.6% without them, against 6.4% observed.9IMF staff paper: without Kurzarbeit’s expansion, unemployment would have risen a further 3 points at the trough; consumption could have fallen 2–3 times as much.33INSEE: private paid hours fell 9.4% in 2020, 80% of that drop taken as short-time work hours; private salaried employment fell only 1.7%.34Independent evaluation: JobKeeper “preserved between roughly 300,000 and 800,000 jobs”, about 2½ to 6% of pre-pandemic employment.13Cabinet Office estimate: the special measures kept April–June 2020 unemployment about 3 points lower, against 0.5–1.0 points after the Lehman shock.35Bank of Italy preliminary estimate (November 2020): wider CIG, liquidity support and the layoff ban prevented about 600,000 dismissals in 2020.36CPB: without the 2020 package GDP would have fallen about 0.6 points more; 65,000–180,000 people kept jobs, at a cost to economic dynamism.17OECD (2022): retention subsidies and cash transfers “helped save jobs”; it cites an estimate that the first transfer cut 2020 poverty by about 12 points.24
Wind-down and recoveryPPP took applications until May 2021; pandemic UI expired September 6, 2021. By April 2024 states had recovered $3.7bn of $55.2bn identified UI overpayments.5Both schemes closed at the end of September 2021. HMRC forecast recovering about £1.1bn by 2023-24, and £2.0bn to £5.1bn staying unrecovered.7CEWS’s last claim period ended October 23, 2021. By March 31, 2024, 57.2% of CEBA loans had been repaid, 25.3% forgiven and 17.3% remained outstanding.8, 37On February 18, 2022, the Bundestag extended the special short-time work rules to June 30, 2022, and the maximum duration from 24 to 28 months.38By January 31, 2023, €50.7bn of €143.82bn in PGE loans had been repaid and €1.83bn called on the guarantee; losses should not exceed €3.6bn.39JobKeeper ran until March 28, 2021, after a three-month review changed eligibility and rates. The ATO stopped $206m of claims and recovered $202m.13The special measures ended March 31, 2023. By March 2026 MHLW had canceled ¥115.3bn of decisions for improper receipt and recovered about ¥89.6bn.14, 40The March 2021 Sostegni decree: layoff ban and fee-free ordinary CIG to June 30, 2021; other COVID wage schemes to December 31, 2021.41NOW 1 settlement: 71% of settled employers had to repay part of their advance (€2.3bn); 29% received €455m more; for 26% it fell to zero.16Relief coupons had to be spent by August 31, 2020, or became a donation to the state; a 2022 fraud probe ordered ₩6.01bn repaid with penalties.4, 31

2. Integrity figures, with what each one measures

A US 8% is an inspector general’s estimate of potentially fraudulent PPP money. A UK 11% is a government department’s own estimate of fraudulent Bounce Back loans. A Dutch 71% is the share of employers asked to hand back part of an advance that was always meant to be settled later. The panel shows only figures checked against the official document that printed them: 28 figures from 13 countries.

Who produced the figure. Own figure the program’s administrator or its ministry. Independent an audit office, inspector general, legislature, budget office or international body. Mixed an independent body working from the administrator’s own rate.

28 integrity figures from 13 countries, each with what it measures and who produced it.
Source
United StatesPaycheck Protection Program (PPP)estimated fraud (potentially fraudulent loans)8% ($64bn)of PPP funds disbursedIndependent SBA Office of Inspector General25
United StatesCOVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL, loans and advances)estimated fraud (potentially fraudulent loans and advances)33% (over $136bn)of COVID-19 EIDL funds disbursedIndependent SBA Office of Inspector General25
United StatesPandemic unemployment insurance (all programs)improper payments (error and fraud)21.52% (at least $191bn)DOL’s rate applied by the inspector general to about $888bn of pandemic UIMixed DOL Employment and Training Administration (rate); DOL Inspector General (extrapolation)42
United StatesPandemic unemployment insurance (fraud)estimated fraud11%–15% ($100bn–$135bn)of UI benefits paid, April 2020–May 2023Independent U.S. Government Accountability Office26
United StatesEconomic Impact Payments (stimulus checks)improper paymentsaround 2%EIP improper payment rate, as GAO reported in September 2020Independent U.S. Government Accountability Office6
United StatesRestaurant Revitalization Fundnet questioned costs (awards without planned eligibility checks; not a fraud finding)$6.7bn of $28.6bnawards paid without verifying eligibility as plannedIndependent SBA Office of Inspector General43
United StatesShuttered Venue Operators Granthigh-risk awards the inspector general says warrant eligibility review$1.6bn in 1,818 awards (of $14.6bn paid)awards flagged as high-risk, July 2024Independent SBA Office of Inspector General44
United KingdomCoronavirus Job Retention Scheme (furlough)error and fraud, most likely estimate5.1% (£3,498m; range 3.0%–7.8%)of £69,224m net costOwn figure HM Revenue & Customs45
United KingdomSelf-Employment Income Support Schemeerror and fraud, most likely estimate5.2% (£1,472m; range 4.2%–6.3%)of £28,066m net costOwn figure HM Revenue & Customs45
United KingdomBounce Back Loan Schemefraud, most likely estimate (highly uncertain)11% (£4.9bn)of £47bn lent; estimate as of March 31, 2021, from a sample of 1,067 loansOwn figure Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (reported by the NAO)46
United KingdomBounce Back Loan Schemeloans expected not to be repaid (credit losses plus fraud)37% (£17bn; range 31%–48%)of £47bn lent; estimate as of March 2021Own figure Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (reported by the NAO)46
United KingdomCoronavirus Business Interruption Loan Schemelender-flagged suspected fraud (not proven)£0.06bn of £25.83bn drawnas at December 31, 2025Own figure Department for Business and Trade and British Business Bank47
United KingdomEat Out to Help Outerror and fraud, most likely estimate8.5% (£71m; range 5.1%–11.8%)of £840m net costOwn figure HM Revenue & Customs45
CanadaCanada Emergency Wage Subsidyclaim amounts denied or adjusted after audit (mostly missing documents, not proven ineligibility)5.9% ($325m)of $5.53bn in 2,515 completed audits, to March 31, 2023Own figure Canada Revenue Agency48
CanadaCanada Emergency Business Accountestimated ineligible recipientsabout 9% of recipients ($3.5bn)of about 898,000 recipients and $49.1bn in loansIndependent Office of the Auditor General of Canada37
FranceState-guaranteed loans (PGE)state guarantees called on unpaid loans (a default measure, not fraud)€1.83bn called (of €143.82bn lent)to January 31, 2023Own figure French state guarantee records, reported by the Senate finance committee39
AustraliaJobKeeper Paymentpayment gap: incorrect payments not stopped or recovered (net); all incorrect claims (gross)2.4% net ($2.18bn); 2.8% grossof payments applied for, ATO gap analysisOwn figure Australian Taxation Office (reported in the Treasury-commissioned independent evaluation)13
South KoreaEmployment Retention Subsidy (targeted investigation)fraudulent receipt found in a targeted investigation (not a population rate)₩1.047bn (25 employers; 11 prosecuted)2022 targeted investigation of employment-insurance paymentsOwn figure Ministry of Employment and Labor31
JapanEmployment Adjustment Subsidysubsidy decisions canceled for improper receipt¥115.3bn in 4,640 decisions (¥89.6bn recovered)to end of March 2026; ¥6.35 trillion was paid under the COVID special measures (April 2020–March 2023)Own figure Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare40
JapanSustainability Benefit (持続化給付金)improper receipt certified by the ministry591 cases, ¥589.58mto end of September 2021, of ¥5.5147 trillion paid in 4.23 million grantsOwn figure METI / SME Agency certification, reported by the Board of Audit49
Italy€600/€1,000 COVID-19 indemnities (self-employed)applications rejected (eligibility, not fraud)18% (956,000 of 5.183 million applicants)data to March 2021Own figure INPS21
NetherlandsNOW wage subsidy, first periodemployers asked to repay part of the advance at final settlement (by design, not fraud)71% of settled employers (90,000; €2.3bn)of about 125,000 employers with a final settlementOwn figure UWV16
NetherlandsTVL fixed-costs grantpaid out through established misuse and improper use1.7% (€128m; €12.3m recovered)of €7.5bn granted across all TVL roundsOwn figure Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate / RVO (progress report to parliament)50
New ZealandCOVID-19 Wage Subsidy Schemesubsidies paid back (mostly voluntary; not fraud findings)NZ$703m repaid voluntarily; NZ$23m recoveredas at March 5, 2021, of more than NZ$13bn paid March–December 2020Own figure Ministry of Social Development data, reported by the Auditor-General51
BrazilAuxílio Emergencial (2020)payments made improperly (audit estimate)about R$45bnTCU review update, September 2022Independent Tribunal de Contas da União52
BrazilBEm job-preservation benefit (2020)potential improper receiptabout 90,000 cases, over R$150mof R$18.2bn paid to 12.4 million workers, May–July 2020Independent Tribunal de Contas da União53
PhilippinesSocial Amelioration Program (excluding 4Ps)share of benefits received by non-poor households (targeting leakage)73% of benefits52% of poor households were not coveredIndependent World Bank54
KenyaCOVID-19 Emergency Response Fund cash transferspending whose lawfulness and effectiveness the auditor could not confirm (no ID numbers or locations); not a fraud findingKSh 400m (the full transfer)97,515 recipients, June–August 2020Independent Office of the Auditor-General (Kenya)55

Showing 28 of 28 figures from 13 of 13 countries.

Why no composite. These figures measure different things: estimated fraud, error and fraud together, improper payments, questioned costs, rejected applications, repaid advances and called guarantees. Some are a program grading its own work; others come from an auditor’s own sampling. Setting HMRC’s 5.1% for the furlough scheme45 beside GAO’s 11%–15% for US unemployment insurance26 would put a department’s error-and-fraud estimate and an auditor’s fraud-only estimate on one axis.

3. What the comparison can and cannot show

The IMF says its database of pandemic measures “is not meant for classifying the measures for fiscal reporting, nor for comparison across economies as responses vary depending on country-specific circumstances.”1 The same caution applies to every row above.

Sources on one row are not of one kind. In the integrity row, the US, UK, Canadian, Australian, Japanese and Dutch entries draw on audit offices or inspectors general; the German, Italian and South Korean entries are the administering agencies’ own; France’s comes from a Senate report citing the tax administration. In the effect row the estimates come from a budget office (US), audit offices (UK, Canada), a statistics office (France), government economists (Japan, Netherlands), a central bank’s preliminary note (Italy), an independent evaluation (Australia), an IMF staff working paper (Germany) and the OECD (South Korea).

Method. Cells paraphrase their sources in English and keep each source’s own precision and currency; sources in French, German, Italian, Dutch, Japanese, Korean and Portuguese are listed under their original titles. Where we have a copy of a document, its name links to our copy, which links on to the publisher; otherwise it links to the publisher’s page.

Sources

  1. 1Fiscal Monitor: Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic (Table 1), International Monetary Fund, October 2021 (measures to September 27, 2021). Original at imf.org.
  2. 2Job retention schemes during the COVID-19 lockdown and beyond (updated 12 October 2020), OECD, October 12, 2020. Original at oecd.org.
  3. 3Implementing employment support schemes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (HC 862), National Audit Office (UK), October 23, 2020. Original at nao.org.uk.
  4. 4OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2020, OECD, August 2020. Original at oecd.org.
  5. 5COVID-19 Relief: SBA and DOL Should Improve Processes to Identify and Recover Overpayments (GAO-25-106199), U.S. Government Accountability Office, November 2024. Original at gao.gov.
  6. 6Stimulus Checks: Direct Payments to Individuals during the COVID-19 Pandemic (GAO-22-106044), U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2022. Original at gao.gov.
  7. 7Delivery of employment support schemes in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (HC 656), National Audit Office (UK), October 13, 2022. Original at nao.org.uk.
  8. 8Claims to date — Canada emergency wage subsidy (CEWS), Canada Revenue Agency, data to September 3, 2023. Original at canada.ca.
  9. 9Report 10—Specific COVID-19 Benefits, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, December 6, 2022. Original at canada.ca.
  10. 10Geschäftsbericht 2020 (annual report), Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2021. Original at arbeitsagentur.de.
  11. 11Bilan économique 2020 – Hauts-de-France: contexte national, INSEE, July 8, 2021. Original at insee.fr.
  12. 12Analyse des prêts garantis par l’État à la fin 2021 (Trésor-Éco n° 303), Direction générale du Trésor (Ministry of the Economy and Finance), March 3, 2022. Original at tresor.economie.gouv.fr.
  13. 13Independent Evaluation of the JobKeeper Payment: Final Report (presented to the Treasury by Nigel Ray), Australian Government, the Treasury, September 28, 2023. Original at treasury.gov.au.
  14. 14雇用調整助成金（新型コロナウイルス感染症の影響に伴う特例） — Employment Adjustment Subsidy, COVID-19 special measures, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan), figures to March 31, 2023. Original at mhlw.go.jp.
  15. 15Le imprese e i lavoratori in cassa integrazione Covid nei mesi di marzo e aprile (Nota Covid-19, INPS and Banca d’Italia), Banca d’Italia, July 29, 2020. Original at bancaditalia.it.
  16. 16UWV publiceert register definitieve tegemoetkomingen eerste periode NOW, UWV (Employee Insurance Agency), undated. Original at uwv.nl.
  17. 17Economische analyse steunpakket 2020, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, September 28, 2021. Original at cpb.nl.
  18. 18COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts (GAO-20-625), U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2020. Original at gao.gov.
  19. 19Report 6—Canada Emergency Response Benefit, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, March 25, 2021.
  20. 20Bundestag stimmt für Änderungen beim Kurzarbeitergeld, Deutscher Bundestag, March 13, 2020. Original at bundestag.de.
  21. 21INPS paper on the COVID-19 €600/€1,000 indemnities, INPS, Coordinamento Generale Statistico Attuariale, data to March 2021. Original at inps.it.
  22. 22Uitvoering NOW ‘belangrijke opdracht’ voor UWV, UWV (Employee Insurance Agency), undated. Original at uwv.nl.
  23. 23Opnieuw steun aan duizenden werkgevers en zelfstandigen, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (rijksoverheid.nl), December 3, 2020. Original at rijksoverheid.nl.
  24. 24OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2022, OECD, September 2022. Original at oecd.org.
  25. 25COVID-19 Pandemic EIDL and PPP Loan Fraud Landscape (Report 23-09), SBA Office of Inspector General, June 27, 2023. Original at sba.gov.
  26. 26Unemployment Insurance: Estimated Amount of Fraud during Pandemic Likely Between $100 Billion and $135 Billion (GAO-23-106696), U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2023. Original at gao.gov.
  27. 27Konjunkturelles Kurzarbeitergeld in der COVID-19-Pandemie – Teil 2: Vorgehen der Bundesagentur für Arbeit bei Verdacht auf Leistungsmissbrauch, Bundesrechnungshof, October 4, 2022. Original at bundesrechnungshof.de.
  28. 28Projet de loi de finances pour 2022 : Gestion des finances publiques (rapport général n° 163 (2021-2022), tome III, annexe 15), Sénat, commission des finances, November 18, 2021. Original at senat.fr.
  29. 29雇用調整助成金等及び休業支援金等の支給に関する事後確認の実施について (FY2021 audit report; opinion to the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare), Board of Audit of Japan, August 4, 2022. Original at report.jbaudit.go.jp.
  30. 30Resultaten verantwoordingsonderzoek 2022 Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Algemene Rekenkamer (Netherlands Court of Audit), May 17, 2023. Original at rekenkamer.nl.
  31. 312022년 고용보험 부정수급 기획조사 결과 (results of the 2022 targeted employment-insurance fraud investigation), Ministry of Employment and Labor (Korea), December 14, 2022. Original at moel.go.kr.
  32. 32The Effects of Pandemic-Related Legislation on Output, Congressional Budget Office, September 2020. Original at cbo.gov.
  33. 33The Effectiveness of Job-Retention Schemes: COVID-19 Evidence From the German States (IMF Working Paper WP/21/242; authors’ views), International Monetary Fund, October 2021. Original at imf.org.
  34. 34Le dispositif d’activité partielle a amorti l’impact économique de la crise sanitaire (Catherine Renne), INSEE, June 29, 2021. Original at insee.fr.
  35. 35日本経済2020－2021, 第2章第3節 雇用確保に向けた取組と課題, Cabinet Office (Japan), 2020–2021 edition. Original at www5.cao.go.jp.
  36. 36Alcune stime preliminari degli effetti delle misure di sostegno sul mercato del lavoro (Nota Covid-19), Banca d’Italia, November 19, 2020. Original at bancaditalia.it.
  37. 37Report 8—Canada Emergency Business Account, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, December 2, 2024. Original at canada.ca.
  38. 38Bundestag beschließt Sonderregelung zum Kurzarbeitergeld, Deutscher Bundestag, February 18, 2022. Original at bundestag.de.
  39. 39Prêts garantis par l’État : mieux comprendre les risques pour le budget de l’État (rapport d’information n° 706 (2022-2023), Jérôme Bascher), Sénat, commission des finances, June 7, 2023. Original at senat.fr.
  40. 40雇用調整助成金 不正受給 — Employment Adjustment Subsidy: improper receipt, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan), figures to the end of March 2026. Original at mhlw.go.jp.
  41. 41DL Sostegni, interventi più rapidi per una platea più ampia, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, March 29, 2021. Original at mef.gov.it.
  42. 42Testimony of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor, on pandemic unemployment insurance (February 8, 2023), U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, February 8, 2023. Original at oig.dol.gov.
  43. 43SBA’s Restaurant Revitalization Fund Program Award Practices (Report 24-09), SBA Office of Inspector General, March 26, 2024. Original at oversight.gov.
  44. 44Improvements Needed in SBA’s Shuttered Venue Operators Grant Post-Award Review Process (Report 24-21), SBA Office of Inspector General, July 10, 2024. Original at oversight.gov.
  45. 45Error and fraud in the COVID-19 schemes: methodology and approach (an update for 2023), HM Revenue & Customs, July 17, 2023. Original at gov.uk.
  46. 46The Bounce Back Loan Scheme: an update (HC 861), National Audit Office (UK), December 3, 2021. Original at nao.org.uk.
  47. 47COVID-19 loan guarantee schemes repayment data: December 2025, Department for Business and Trade and British Business Bank, May 12, 2026 (data to December 31, 2025). Original at gov.uk.
  48. 48Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS) – Post-payment audits – Status Update – March 2023, Canada Revenue Agency, data to March 31, 2023. Original at canada.ca.
  49. 49持続化給付金事業の実施状況等について (FY2020 audit report, part 4, item 6), Board of Audit of Japan, fiscal 2020 audit report. Original at report.jbaudit.go.jp.
  50. 50Voortgangsrapportage van de Tegemoetkoming Vaste Lasten (TVL), Tweede Kamer document 2022D04872, Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat / RVO (to the House of Representatives), early 2022. Original at tweedekamer.nl.
  51. 51Management of the Wage Subsidy Scheme (B.29[21a]), Office of the Auditor-General (New Zealand), May 2021. Original at ao.parliament.nz.
  52. 52TCU atualiza balanço da fiscalização do Auxílio Emergencial, Tribunal de Contas da União (Brazil), September 14, 2022. Original at portal.tcu.gov.br.
  53. 53Relatório de Fiscalizações em Políticas e Programas de Governo 2020 (área 6), Tribunal de Contas da União (Brazil), 2020 edition. Original at sites.tcu.gov.br.
  54. 54COVID-19 and Social Assistance in the Philippines: Lessons for Future Resilience (Yoonyoung Cho and Doug Johnson), World Bank, March 2022. Original at documents1.worldbank.org.
  55. 55Special Audit Report of the Auditor-General on Utilization of COVID-19 Funds by National Government Entities for the Period 13 March – 31 July 2020, Office of the Auditor-General (Kenya), April 2021. Original at oagkenya.go.ke.
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