Job retention schemes during the COVID-19 lockdown and beyond

Summary

An OECD brief titled Job retention schemes during the COVID-19 lockdown and beyond, updated 12 October 2020. It states that by May 2020 job retention schemes supported about 50 million jobs across the OECD, about ten times as many as during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. The brief describes short-time work and wage subsidy schemes, with country descriptions for France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, including the Paycheck Protection Program and the Employee Retention Tax Credit. It recommends gradually increasing firms' contribution to the cost of hours not worked, time-limited support, closer alignment with unemployment benefits, and support for job search and training. The paper was prepared as a background document for Chapter 1 of the OECD Employment Outlook 2020.

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Job retention schemes during the
COVID-19 lockdown and beyond

Updated 12 October 2020

Job retention (JR) schemes have been one of the main policy tools used by
a number of OECD countries to contain the employment and social fallout of
the COVID-19 crisis. By May 2020, JR schemes supported about 50 million
jobs across the OECD, about ten times as many as during the global financial
crisis of 2008-09. By reducing labour costs, JR schemes have prevented a
surge in unemployment, while they have mitigated financial hardship and
buttressed aggregate demand by supporting the incomes of workers on
reduced working time. Looking forward, governments need to be vigilant to
ensure that JR schemes are not downscaled too quickly, and allow viable
jobs to be destroyed, or too slowly, and become an obstacle to the economic
recovery. When the health and economic situation improves, JR support
needs to be better targeted to jobs that are viable but at risk of being
terminated and place a greater focus on supporting workers at risk of
becoming unemployed rather than their jobs.

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Job retention (JR) schemes have been one of the main policy tools in many OECD countries to contain
the employment and social fallout of the COVID-19 crisis. By May 2020, JR schemes supported about
50 million jobs across the OECD, about ten times as many as during the global financial crisis. JR schemes
seek to preserve jobs at firms experiencing a temporary reduction in business activity by alleviating firms’
labour costs while supporting the incomes of workers whose hours are reduced. They can take the form
of short-time work (STW) schemes that directly subsidise hours not worked, such as the German
Kurzarbeit or the French Activité partielle. They can also take the form of wage subsidy (WS) schemes
that subsidise hours worked but can also be used to top up the earnings of workers on reduced hours,
such as the Dutch Emergency Bridging Measure (Noodmatregel Overbrugging Werkgelegenheid, NOW)
or the JobKeeper Payment in Australia. A crucial aspect of all JR schemes is that employees keep their
contracts with the employer even if their work is suspended.
In the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, the overriding concern for governments has been to help firms
and workers deal with the sudden and unpredictable decline if not full shut-down in business activity
resulting from the government-imposed restrictions to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus. To
maximise take up, many governments have modified existing JR schemes or introduced new ones. These
schemes provide the necessary liquidity to firms to hold on to their workers, including their talent and
experience, and allows them to ramp up operations quickly once economic activity recovers, without having
to go through the process of hiring and training new workers. However, as countries move out of the strict
confinement phase, policy makers have to strike the right balance between ensuring adequate support for
jobs that are temporarily unviable and limiting the extent to which subsidies reach jobs that would be
preserved anyway or that are unviable in the long term.
The objective of this Brief is to discuss the main features of JR schemes deployed by countries during the
COVID-19 lockdown, and how they should be adjusted as restrictions to economic activities are gradually
being withdrawn to continue to protect viable jobs without hindering the reallocation of employment towards
expanding firms and sectors.

Key findings
During the early stage of the COVID-19 crisis, countries have acted decisively to save jobs by scaling
up existing job retention schemes or introducing new ones. Across the OECD, they supported
over 50 million jobs, ten times as many as during the global financial crisis of 2008-09. In most countries,
these schemes allow firms to adjust working hours at zero costs, greatly reducing the number of jobs
at risk of termination as a result of liquidity constraints and preventing a surge in unemployment.
Moreover, JR schemes tend to provide stronger support than unemployment benefits to workers who
are temporarily not working, mitigating financial hardship for many workers and supporting aggregate
demand.
Going forward, job retention schemes need to adjust their focus to targeting jobs that are likely to be
viable in the short- to medium-term and may also need to be differentiated between sectors whose
activity remains legally curtailed and those where activity is resuming. Governments have a number of
levers that they can use to adapt support as they start re-opening their economic sectors:
 Gradually increase firms’ contribution to the costs of hours not worked as the health and
economic situation improves. This strengthens incentives to use subsidies for jobs that are
viable after the crisis and to increase working hours as soon as possible. In wage subsidy
schemes, employer contributions may be set to ensure a minimum level of income.
 Job retention support should be time-limited, but limits should not be set in stone. Time-limits
reduce the risk of supporting jobs that are no longer viable even in the longer term. However,

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time-limits should not be set in stone as they may need to adjust according to the health and
economic situation.
 Align short-time work and unemployment benefits more closely by lowering short-time benefits
in countries where they are considerably more generous than unemployment benefits. This can
strengthen incentives for workers to resume normal working hours or look for another job,
particularly among workers in jobs whose survival is uncertain.
 Provide support for job search and career guidance. The mobility of workers from subsidised to
unsubsidised jobs can be promoted by encouraging or requiring workers on JR schemes to
register with the public employment services and benefit from their support (e.g. job-search
assistance, career guidance and training).
 Promote training while on reduced working hours . Training can help workers improve the
viability of their current job, including by making telework more effective, or improve the prospect
of finding a new one. Combining training with part-time or irregular work schedules is easier
when training courses are targeted at individuals rather than groups, delivered in a flexible
manner through online teaching tools and their duration is relatively short.

1. Governments have invested massively in job retention schemes to stem job
losses

In response to the COVID-19 crisis, most OECD countries took active measures to scale up existing
short-time work (STW) schemes, introduce new ones or create temporary wage subsidies to preserve jobs
and support incomes.

Most countries have used new or existing short-time work schemes to retain jobs

STW schemes provide subsidies to firms to cover all or part of the cost of hours not worked, protecting
workers’ income and mitigating costs for firms. Their main purpose is to provide support for firms facing a
temporary decline in demand to retain jobs that have become unprofitable in the short-term but that are
likely to remain viable in the medium-term. The design of STW schemes varies considerably across
countries as countries take different approaches to ensure cost-effectiveness (Hijzen and Venn, 2011[1]).
See Box 1 for a description of STW schemes in selected OECD countries.

Box 1. Job retention schemes in the first months of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany, Italy, Japan
and the United States
France
France allows firms to invoke the health crisis as “force majeure” to use its Activité Partielle. Firms can
apply for the scheme retroactively for up to 30 days since the first reduction in hours. Applications are
deemed accepted if they do not receive a response within 2 days (down from the usual 15 days). The
maximum duration of the scheme has been extended from 6 to 12 months. All employees with a
contract (whether permanent or not) are eligible and receive 70% of their gross wage from the employer.
During the COVID-19 crisis, most employers do not bear any cost for hours not worked, as the state
reimburses what they pay to employees up to a cap of 4.5 times the hourly minimum wage.

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Germany
Germany simplified access to Kurzarbeit. Since March 2020, firms can request support if 10% of their
workforce are affected by cuts in working hours, compared to 30% before. Employers initially continue
to pay their employees any actual hours worked plus 60% of their net earnings losses because of
reduced hours (67% for employees with children). The public employment service reimburses
employers for these payments as well as for 100% of social-insurance contributions for the lost work
hours (compared to a 50% reimbursement of social-insurance contributions during the global financial
crisis of 2008-09). The subsidy is normally also available to workers on temporary contracts and
apprentices and it was extended to agency workers at the start of the crisis. In April, the government
increased the statutory replacement rates for lost earnings to 70% from the fourth month and 80% from
the seventh month onwards (and respectively to 77% and 87% for employees with children). In addition,
restrictions on taking another job while on STW have been lifted. Workers are allowed to cumulate
additional earnings and STW benefits as long as total income does not exceed previous earnings. In
some sectors, unions and employers agreed on higher replacement rates of up to 90%.

Italy
Italy greatly extended the reach of its STW scheme (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) by allowing firms
of any size and from all sectors to apply. Firms can simply declare that they have been negatively
affected by the COVID-19 crisis without having to provide detailed evidence. They can apply within
four months of the start of the reduction in activity and the benefits can be paid retroactively from the
end of February 2020. Nevertheless, some of the intended new beneficiaries have experienced
difficulties in accessing the scheme and receiving prompt support. Employers’ participation in the cost
of the scheme has been suspended, while benefit levels for workers remain unchanged. Benefits pay
80% of gross wages and they are capped at EUR 998 for wages up to EUR 2 159 and at EUR 1 199
for wages above that level. For a worker with an average wage this translates into an effective
replacement rate of about 45% when hours are reduced to zero.

Japan
Japan expanded the coverage and eased the requirements for access to the Employment Adjustment
Subsidy. Up until the crisis, access to the Employment Adjustment Subsidy required a 10% reduction
in production for more than three months. This has been reduced to 5% over one month. Japan
increased the subsidy rates for hours not worked to a maximum of 100% for SMEs and to 75% for larger
firms. In May 2020 the government announced an increase in the maximum benefit by 80% for larger
firms (from JPY 8 330 to JPY 15 000 a day per employee). The programme has been extended to cover
non-regular workers who are not covered by employment insurance. The government further
announced a new scheme to cover workers who have remained without support because their SME
employers have not applied for the subsidy despite reducing hours. These workers will be able to apply
to the new scheme directly and will have 80% of their usual earnings covered.

United States
In the United States, 26 states (accounting for about 70% of the population) operate Short-Time
Compensation (STC) programmes. Through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, the Federal Government now funds 100% of STC payments in States with an existing
programme and 50% in States that introduce a new one. Also, STC recipients qualify for the same
weekly USD 600 increase in benefit payments that is being made to all unemployment benefit recipients
for the a period of four months. However, the use of STC remains very limited for a variety of reasons
(Figure 1), including administrative bottlenecks, lack of employer awareness, weak financial incentives
for employers (employers are liable for their part of social-security contributions for hours not worked)
and limits to the maximum reduction in working hours. To bypass such problems, the United States

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introduced several limited wage subsidies schemes such as the Paycheck Protection Programme
(PPP) and the Employee Retention Tax Credit (ERTC). PPP provides small businesses – irrespective
of their sales – with loans to pay their employees during the COVID-19 crisis, which are forgiven if
employment and compensation levels are maintained. ERTC is available for employers which have
seen a decline in sales of over 50%. For firms with less than 100 employees, the scheme provides a
refundable tax credit of 50% of the wages of all employees, whether or not they continue to work. In
larger firms, the credit is only available for the wages of workers who do not work during the crisis. The
maximum amount of the credit in total is set at a relatively low level of USD 10 000.

As the COVID-19 crisis took off, all countries took steps to ensure that the schemes could be rapidly and
widely deployed to provide support for firms and workers to deal with the consequences of
government-imposed restrictions on economic activity. Twenty-three OECD countries had a STW scheme
in place before the crisis erupted (Table 1), while eight countries introduced new schemes in response to
the crisis. All countries with pre-existing schemes rapidly adjusted them to cope with the COVID-19 crisis.1
Countries’ measures to expand existing STW schemes fall into three broad categories:
 Simplifying access and extending coverage. Twenty countries took measures to facilitate and
expedite access to STW and boost take-up among the affected firms. Several countries where
firms are required to provide an economic justification have reduced the thresholds to allow firms
to claim STW (e.g. Japan, Korea, and Poland). In others, firms can invoke the health crisis as a
“force majeure” by a simple declaration (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Italy, and Spain).
Germany and Norway lowered the minimum permissible reduction in working time to gain access
to their STW schemes. Italy, where STW was limited to large firms and certain sectors, extended
its scheme to all sectors and firms of all sizes. Countries also simplified and streamlined
procedures, with widespread use of online applications and the possibility of making claims
retroactively.
 Extending coverage to non-permanent workers. Nine countries extended eligibility beyond workers
in standard forms of employment to include temporary, temporary-agency and even certain
categories of self-employed workers. In principle, this should reduce the risk that STW schemes
reinforce labour market duality (Hijzen and Venn, 2011[1]). However, firms may have weak
incentives to hold on to workers in non-standard forms of work during periods of STW, especially
if the scheme imposes a direct cost on employers. This is of particular concern during the
COVID-19 crisis since the sectors most affected tend to rely heavily on non-standard forms of work
and highlights the importance of additional measures to support such workers in case they lose
their jobs.
 Raising generosity. Several countries have increased the generosity of STW schemes by raising
the replacement rates for workers and reducing the costs for firms. Fourteen countries increased
the effective replacement rate for hours not worked. In several countries where employers were
required to pay part of the wages or social-security contributions for the hours not worked these
costs were reduced to zero (e.g. France, Germany, Italy). In about half of all countries, this cost
was already zero before the crisis. Higher replacement rates and lower employer cost reflect the
fact that in the early stage of the crisis countries gave more weight to the need to provide support
for workers and businesses than to concerns for the possible disincentive effects of the measures
adopted.
The new STW schemes that were introduced in response to the COVID-19 crisis have also been designed
to be used easily and quickly by firms experiencing difficulties and generally cover non-standard workers

1
In some countries, such as Denmark, these extensions build on a tripartite agreement between the government,
trade unions and employers.

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as well. In Denmark and the United Kingdom, for example, firms can submit their application online and
claim support retroactively. While there is some variation across countries, the level of support for workers
tends to be relatively high, ranging from 100% in Denmark to 75% in Latvia. In Greece, the support is a
flat rate of 800 Euros, while in Iceland workers on reduced hours receive the standard rate for regular
unemployment benefits. All new schemes, except the one in Iceland, offer support only when hours are
reduced to zero, i.e. in the case of temporary layoffs. Such schemes might be easier to implement quickly
and less susceptible to abuse based on the misclassification of part-time workers. However, they are also
necessarily more rigid and exclude the possibility of sharing the costs of adjustment across the workforce
through broad-based working time reductions (i.e. work-sharing).

Other countries have introduced temporary wage subsidy schemes to promote job
retention

A number of – mostly English-speaking – countries have introduced ad-hoc wage subsidies (WS) that can be
used by firms for hours worked (like standard wage subsidies) as well as for hours not worked (like STW
schemes). The subsidy is reserved for firms experiencing a significant decline in revenue. Unlike STW schemes,
the size of the subsidy is typically independent of the decline in business activity (whether in the form of reduced
sales or working hours. This increases the risk that support goes to job that do not need it (deadweight), but
reduces the risk that support goes to jobs that are not viable in the long-term. Firms can typically use the subsidies
to support jobs of non-standard workers or to re-hire recently laid off workers.
Australia and New Zealand introduced a lump-sum subsidy that effectively acts as a minimum salary for
all employees. Qualifying employers must continue to pay as usual for hours worked or pay the level of
the subsidy if this is higher. In Canada and Estonia, the subsidy is a fixed proportion of usual wages (75%
and 70% respectively), regardless of the reduction in working time. In Ireland, the level of the subsidy
varies with the employee’s earnings, reaching a maximum of 85% of net normal earnings for the lowest
incomes. In Poland, employers are required to pay at least 50% of usual wages for workers whose job has
been temporarily suspended (more for smaller reductions in hours) and are partially reimbursed by the
state. The Netherlands replaced its existing STW scheme with a temporary wage subsidy whereby
employers must continue to pay employees 100% of their usual wage and receive a subsidy that is
proportional to the reduction in sales (90%) and not the reduction in working hours as in traditional STW
schemes.
There are various reasons why these countries have opted for temporary WS schemes. First, with the
exception of the Netherlands, these countries had no or limited experience with STW schemes: Australia
and Estonia never had a STW scheme; Canada, Ireland, Poland and New Zealand operated STW
schemes during the global financial crisis, but they were not widely used. Second, firms in most of these
countries typically face relatively low layoff costs and therefore might have weak incentives to participate
in STW schemes that generally involve some procedural costs and, in some cases, an explicit financial
contribution by firms. Finally, WS are arguably a more flexible form of support for firms which can manage
their hours freely without any reporting requirements. They also provide stronger incentives for firms to
keep hours worked up and to increase them quickly when conditions improve. However, the schemes also
provide incentives for firms that experience the minimum required reduction in sales to apply the subsidy to all
workers, potentially wasting valuable resources.

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Table 1. Countries have adjusted existing job retention schemes or adopted new ones
Pre-existing Increased Increased Increased New short-time New wage
short-time work access and benefit access for work scheme subsidy scheme
scheme coverage generosity workers in
non-standard
jobs
Australia  
Austria   
Belgium   
Canada   
Chile*    
Czech Republic   
Denmark   
Estonia  
Finland    
France    
Germany    
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland*   
Italy   
Japan    
Korea    
Latvia     
Lithuania      
Luxembourg      
Netherlands*      
New Zealand      
Norway      
Poland      
Portugal      
Slovak Republic      
Slovenia      
Spain      
Sweden      
Switzerland      
Turkey      
United Kingdom      
United States      

Note: Ireland and the Netherlands: the existing STW scheme was replaced by a temporary wage subsidy scheme. Chile: Income support is
financed out of the individual savings accounts for unemployment insurance of workers, unless there are no remaining funds.

The use of job retention schemes was unprecedented and widespread

Companies made massive use of job retention (JR) schemes to cut hours, or put their workers “on
furlough”. About 60 million workers across the OECD have been included in the initial requests by
companies for support by job retention schemes. In May 2020, companies’ requests for support from job
retention schemes amounted to 66% of dependent employees in New Zealand, over 50% in France,
over 40% in Italy and Switzerland, around 30% in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Portugal (Figure 1). The
actual use of these schemes is considerably lower than the initial requests in some countries,
corresponding to about 50 million across the OECD. This is still about ten times as much as during the

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global financial crisis of 2008-09 (Hijzen and Venn, 2011[1]). In Germany, for example, actual take-up was
19% in May 2020 compared with 4% at the peak during the global financial crisis, and in France actual
take-up was 33% compared with just 1% during the global financial crisis (Figure 2).

Across the OECD, job retention schemes supported over 50 million
jobs, ten times as many as during the global financial crisis.

Figure 1. Applications for participation in job retention schemes have been massive in some
countries
Share of dependent employees

Approved applications Actual use

%
70

0
NZL FRA CHE ITA AUT PRT GBR DEU LUX NLD AUS BEL IRL CZE ESP CAN SWE DNK NOR FIN LVA USA

Note: Take-up rates are calculated as a percentage of dependent employees in 2019 Q4. Data refer to end May except for Luxembourg and
Switzerland (end April). Australia, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand operate wage subsidy schemes, which are not conditional
on the reduction in working hours. United States: data refer to participation in short-time compensation schemes.
Source: National sources.

The use of JR schemes was widespread in all sectors and across all types of firms, as the government-
imposed restrictions to business activity affected many firms across almost all sectors. (Figure 2). By
contrast, during the global financial crisis 80% of the actual use of JR support in France and Germany was
concentrated in manufacturing, even though manufacturing accounted for no more than 20% of
employment at the time. This reflects the disproportionate impact of the global financial crisis on that sector
as well as the greater incentives for labour hoarding in skill-intensive industries.

The use of job retention schemes during the COVID-19 crisis has been
unprecedented. In Germany, take-up of short-time work was 19% in
May 2020 compared with 4% at the peak of the global financial crisis
and 33% in France compared with just 1% during the crisis.

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Figure 2. Take-up in France and Germany during COVID-19 and the global financial crisis
Share of dependent employees

COVID-19 crisis Global financial crisis

A. Take-up rate in France B. Take-up rate in Germany

COVID-19 crisis COVID-19 crisis

Global financial crisis Global financial crisis

0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
% of employees % of employees

C. Take-up by industry in France D. Take-up by industry in Germany

Manufacturiing Manufacturiing

Construction Construction

Trade Trade

Business-related services Business-related services

Other sectors Other sectors

0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
% of total employees in STW % of total employees in STW

Note: Panel A and B: Take-up rates refer to actual use and are calculated as a percentage of dependent employees. Panel C and D: Take-up
by industry refer to actual use and are calculated as a share of total employees in short-time work. Data refer to May 2020 and to the second
quarter of 2009.
Source: Bundesagentür für Arbeit and for May 2020: IFO Institute, www.ifo.de/en/node/55800; DARES, quarterly data and for 2020: Enquête
Activité et conditions d’emploi de la main d’œuvre – COVID, DARES, https://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/.

The unprecedented use of JR schemes has helped contain the employment and social fallout of the
COVID-19 crisis and avoid massive layoffs (OECD, 2020[2]). Concerns over the potential negative effects
of JR schemes, which arise in ordinary times, were initially of secondary importance. In particular, the risk
of devoting public resources to support jobs that employers would have retained anyway was limited
because restrictions in business activity during confinement heavily reduced sales and hence financial
resources in many firms across almost all sectors. In ordinary times, JR schemes can also impede the
reallocation of workers to more productive firms. But this risk was also limited during the lockdown period,
given the hiring freeze and the pervasive impact of government-imposed restrictions and
physical-distancing measures on all firms, independently of their pre-crisis performance.

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2. Job retention schemes in the confinement phase of the COVID-19 crisis

This section provides more detailed insights on the way JR schemes operated during the early stage of
the COVID-19 crisis, with a particular emphasis on their generosity for firms and workers and the extent to
which they target firms with financial difficulties and workers with low earnings. JR schemes played a
significant role in reducing labour costs and hence the number of jobs at risk of being terminated as a result
of acute liquidity problems in firms. By preserving jobs, they helped to protect valuable firm-specific human
capital that is contained in the job matches between employers and employees. By supporting the incomes
of workers whose hours were temporarily reduced, they also prevented financial hardship and supported
aggregate demand.

Job retention schemes helped to reduce labour costs and preserve jobs

STW schemes typically allow reducing working time at zero costs for firms, with potentially significant
consequences for the number of jobs at risk of termination. WS schemes typically allow for larger
reductions in labour costs than STW schemes, but this comes at a greater fiscal costs or weaker income
protection for workers. Due to the greater targeting of STW subsidies to firms likely to experience financial
difficulties, they are likely to be more effective in savings jobs than WS schemes.

Most job retention schemes allow working time to be reduced at zero costs for firms

During the early stage of the COVID-19 crisis, most countries set to zero the cost of contractual hours
which are actually not worked, allowing firms to adjust labour costs in line with the decline in working time
(Figure 3). This tends to hold in countries with STW schemes as well as those with WS schemes. However,
in some countries, employers have continued to bear some of the cost of idle workers. In Denmark and
the Netherlands, employers are required to contribute respectively 35% and 10% of regular labour costs
to ensure no change in income for workers. The schemes in Estonia, Japan, Portugal and Poland do not
fully protect worker’s income, but still require employers to pay part of the income of workers on zero hours,
i.e. who are temporarily not working. However, even in these countries JR schemes allowed for significant
adjustments of labour costs during the crisis.

WS schemes tend to be more generous to employers than STW schemes when some
business activity remains possible

When working time is not reduced to zero, WS schemes are more generous to employers than STW
schemes (Panel B of Figure 3). While STW schemes relieve employers of the cost for hours not worked,
they do not change the cost of hours worked. By contrast, WS schemes are designed to reduce the cost
of hours worked as well. For example, in the case of a worker on the average wage experiencing a 30%
reduction in hours worked, labour costs fall by the same proportion in most STW countries, but they decline
by 70% in Australia and New Zealand and 100% in Canada. In the Netherlands, employers also receive a
subsidy that they can use for hours worked, but in contrast to other countries with WS schemes, the size
of the subsidy is proportional to the decrease in revenue, similar in spirit to STW schemes. In this sense,
the Dutch scheme can be seen as a hybrid case.2

2
The Slovak Republic also modified its existing STW schemes complementing it with a wage subsidy to firms
experiencing a decline in activity whose amount varies with the magnitude of the reduction in sales.

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In most countries, job retention schemes allow firms to reduce working
hours at zero costs, preserving jobs and preventing a surge in
unemployment.

Figure 3. JR schemes allow reducing working time at zero cost in most countries
Labour costs as percentage of usual full-time labour costs during the confinement phase of the COVID-19 crisis
A. 100% reduction of working time

Average wage 67% of average wage

%
45

0
BEL FRA DEU ITA ESP CHE GBR PRT JPN DNK USA CAN AUS NZL EST POL NLD
(N/A)
Short-time work schemes Wage subsidy schemes Hybrid
scheme
B. 30% reduction of working time

Average wage 67% of average wage
%
80

0
BEL FRA DEU ITA ESP CHE PRT USA JPN DNK GBR CAN EST NZL AUS POL NLD
(N/A) (N/A)
Short-time work schemes Wage subsidy schemes Hybrid
scheme

N/A: Not applicable as the assumed reduction in working time does not fall in the permissible range of the programme.
Note: Short-time work schemes only subsidise hours not worked, while wage subsidy schemes can also subsidies hours worked. Netherlands:
the scheme pays a WS, which is proportional to the decrease in revenue, similar in spirit to a STW scheme. Australia and New Zealand: subsidy
consists of a lump-sum payment that is independent of the reduction in working time. Denmark and the United Kingdom: schemes only allow for
temporary layoffs (100% reductions in working time). United States: the reduction in working time is limited by federal law between 10% and
60%. Japan: the reduction in labour cost is computed using the subsidy for larger firms.
Source: OECD calculations on based on national sources.

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
12 

By alleviating labour costs for firms, JR schemes significantly reduced the number of jobs at
risk of termination

Simulations based on firm-level data for 14 European countries suggest that JR schemes significantly
reduced the number of jobs at risk of termination as a result of liquidity problems in firms during the
COVID-19 crisis (see Box 2). By reducing labour costs, JR schemes prevented acute liquidity problems in
many firms despite the sharp decline in sales. This helped ensure that workers were not laid off from their
jobs or that firms did not go bankrupt. Moreover, the simulations suggest that STW schemes are likely to
be more cost-effective than WS schemes. For a given fiscal cost, government support provided through
STW schemes achieves a larger reduction in the number of jobs at risk of termination than that provided
through WS schemes. The reason for this is that STW subsidies are proportional to the decline in business
activity as measured by hours not worked and that firms with larger reductions in business activity are
more likely to experience liquidity issues that prevent firms from paying wages to their workers, while the
size of WS is independent of the decline in business activity (except in the Netherlands). Consequently,
such schemes are more likely to support jobs that would have been preserved even in the absence of
government support since firms with smaller reductions in business activity are less likely to experience
acute liquidity problems.3

Job retention schemes helped to support the incomes of workers on reduced working
hours

Workers on JR support typically are much better off than workers on full-time unemployment insurance
benefits, even in the case of a complete stoppage. JR support tends to be more strongly targeted to
low-wage workers, particularly in countries where spending on JR schemes is more limited. Consequently,
JR not only helped to prevent job losses, but also prevented financial hardship and supported aggregate
consumption by supporting the earnings of workers on reduced working time and particularly those with a
low spending capacity.

Job retention schemes offer stronger support than unemployment benefits to workers who
are temporarily not working

JR schemes ensure a higher level of support to furloughed workers (i.e. temporarily on zero hours) than
unemployment benefits (UB) in most countries (Figure 4). The difference in earnings between STW and UB
recipients is even larger for workers who continue to work part-time and receive full pay for hours worked.
The relatively high replacement rates offered by JR schemes have likely made the schemes attractive to
workers and have helped protect workers’ living standards and support aggregate demand. The largest
differences with UB can be found in countries with temporary JR schemes such as Denmark and the
Netherlands, which offer full income protection to workers as well as countries with means-tested UB such
as Australia, New Zealand. In other countries, often with pre-existing schemes for STW the difference
between STW and UB tends to be smaller. For example, in Italy and Spain, the two systems provide similar
levels of protection.

Job retention schemes provide strong income support to workers on
reduced working hours, mitigating financial hardship for many workers
and supporting aggregate demand. Income support provided through

3
However, since STW schemes provide stronger support for firms with more serious liquidity problems, they also run
a higher risk of supporting jobs that are less likely to survive in the longer term.

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
 13

job retention schemes tends to be stronger than regular
unemployment benefits.

Figure 4. Replacement rates in job retention schemes tend to be higher than in unemployment
benefit systems
% of gross wage (at the average wage for a 100% reduction in working time) during the confinement phase of the
COVID-19 crisis

Job retention scheme Unemployment benefit

% gross wage

100

0
ITA ESP FIN BEL JPN DEU* PRT FRA GBR CHE DNK AUS NZL POL EST CAN NLD
Wage subsidy schemes Hybrid
scheme

*Germany: Net replacement rates for single worker without children.
Note: Short-time work schemes only subsidise hours not worked, while wage subsidy schemes can also subsidies hours worked. Unemployment
benefit rates refer to the situation two months of unemployment not including social assistance or housing benefits. Netherlands: The scheme
pays a WS, which is proportional to the decrease in revenue, similar in spirit to a STW scheme.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD tax-benefit model and national sources.

Less generous JR schemes tend to be more strongly targeted to low wage workers

In some countries, JR schemes offer more support to workers on low earnings (Panel A of Figure 5). In
five countries, the replacement rate for low-wage workers at 67% of average wage is at least 10 percentage
points higher than that for average-wage workers. These differences are larger in countries with lower
replacement rates at the average wage. This suggests that in countries which spend less on JR schemes,
a stronger targeting at low-wage workers is necessary to prevent low-income families from running into
financial difficulties. The targeting of JR support to low-wage workers is driven by the presence of caps on
benefits in countries with STW (e.g. Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom). In the WS schemes of Australia
and New Zealand, differences in effective replacement rates across wage levels stem from the fact that
the subsidy is a lump-sum independent of usual earnings.4

4
In Australia, the JobKeeper subsidy provides a level of income to the very low-paid, which can be higher than what
they normally get from work (40% of average wages).

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
14 

Generous income support, particularly for low-wage families, has prevented financial
hardship and supported aggregate consumption during the confinement phase

Generous income support to workers on reduced working hours helps to support disposable income,
preventing financial hardship in particular among low-income families. Moreover, by preserving
employment, JR schemes also contribute to household welfare by strengthening job and income security.
By supporting household incomes and reducing income volatility, JR schemes are likely to have played an
important role in supporting aggregate consumption and alleviating the risk of the supply shock
transforming itself in a demand crisis (Read et al., 2020[3])). Finally, by helping to stagger jobless claims,
they have relieved pressures on public employment and social services (and “flattened the unemployment
curve”).

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
 15

Figure 5. Gross replacement rates of job retention schemes tend to higher for low-wage workers
Gross earnings as a percentage of previous earnings during the confinement phase of the COVID-19 crisis
A. 100% reduction of working time

Average wage 67% of average wage

100

0
ITA ESP BEL DEU* JPN PRT FRA GBR CHE DNK USA AUS NZL POL EST CAN NLD
(N/A)
Short-time work schemes Wage subsidy schemes Hybrid
scheme
B. 30% reduction of working time

Average wage 67% of average wage
%
160

140

120

100

0
PRT ITA BEL DEU* JPN FRA ESP CHE USA GBR DNK AUS NZL EST POL CAN NLD
(N/A) (N/A)
Short-time work schemes Wage subsidy schemes Hybrid
scheme

N/A: Not applicable as the assumed reduction in working time does not fall in the permissible range of the programme.
*Germany: Net replacement rate for a worker with no child.
Note: Short-time work schemes only subsidise hours not worked, while wage subsidy schemes can also subsidies hours worked. Netherlands:
the scheme pays a WS, which however is proportional to the decrease in revenue, similar in spirit to a STW scheme. Spain: For a worker with
no child. Australia and New Zealand: subsidy consists of a lump-sum payment that is independent of the reduction in working time. United States:
The reduction in working is limited by federal law between 10% and 60%. Denmark and United Kingdom: only temporary layoffs, i.e. 100%
reductions in working time, are allowed in the JR scheme.
Source: National sources.

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
16 

Box 2. The effects STW and WS schemes on jobs at risk in liquidity-constrained firms*
This box summarises the results from a micro-simulation analysis conducted by the OECD to assess the
potential effectiveness of STW and WS schemes on the number of jobs at risk of termination in liquidity
constrained firms. The micro-simulations are based on stylised examples of STW and WS schemes, with
the parameters of the schemes set so as to ensure fiscal neutrality. The simulations are based on
comprehensive firm-level data (Orbis), covering approximately 1 million firms across 14 European
countries with rich information on their financial situation at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. The assumed
decline in sales for firms is identical to the economic shocks in the single-hit and double-hit scenarios that
were used to develop the OECD projections of June 2020 (OECD, 2020[5]).

Policy scenarios of STW and WS with and without top-ups by firms
To allow disentangling the direct effect of the government subsidy on the share of jobs in firms with liquidity
problems from the indirect effect that is due to the adjustment in worker earnings that may also be
associated with programme participation, two sets of simulations are conducted: one that assumes firms
fully top up subsidies to maintain worker earnings despite a reduction in working time (this serves to isolate
the direct effect of government support) and one that assumes firms do not top up subsidies in the case of
reduced working hours (workers get paid only for hours worked or the subsidy if earnings are too low).
Top-ups by firms are encouraged in many countries with JR schemes but not usually a legal requirement
(Denmark and the Netherlands being notable exceptions). The difference between the two sets of
simulations gives the additional adjustment in worker earnings that is associated with programme
participation.
Under the stylised STW scheme, workers are compensated by the government at the constant rate of 80%
of the usual wage for any hour not worked. In the absence of top-ups by firms for hours not worked,
employers are assumed to bear the full costs of any hours worked, but none of the costs of hours not
worked. Consequently, labour costs decline towards zero at the same rate as hours worked (Panel A of
Figure 6), while the cost of the subsidy for the government increases and total earnings for workers decline
(Panel B and C of Figure 6). With full top-ups, workers earnings are unaffected by the reduction in working
time, while firms contribute 20% of the cost of hours not worked.
For the purposes of the example here, it is assumed that employers receive a subsidy equal to 40% of
usual earnings, irrespective of the reduction working time (Panel B).1 Note that the actual wage subsidy
used in the simulations is somewhat different due to the need to ensure fiscal neutrality given the assumed
impact of the crisis on firm sales. In the absence of top-ups, employers must pay the wage for hours
actually worked or the subsidy, whichever is higher. As a result, the reduction in labour costs for firms is
equal to the subsidy plus the usual cost of hours not worked (Panel A), while employees do not receive
any compensation for hours not worked unless earnings for hours worked fall below the level of the
subsidy. Workers’ earnings, therefore, fall at the same rate as hours worked until they hit the subsidy floor
at 40% of usual earnings (Panel C). With full tops, workers earnings are unaffected by the reduction in
working time, while firms cover the costs of hours reductions beyond 60%. 2

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
 17

Figure 6. A stylised comparison of STW and WS schemes
% of normal labour costs/earnings by % reduction in working time in the absence of top-ups by firms

A. Labour cost B. Cost to government C Gross replacement rate
Short-time work Wage subsidy Short-time work Wage subsidy Short-time work Wage subsidy

100 100 100
90 90 90
80 80 80
70 70 70
60 60 60
50 50 50
40 40 40
30 30 30
20 20 20
10 10 10
0 0 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Hours not worked Hours not worked Hours not worked

Modelling the effects of STW and WS on the liquidity position of firms
The effects of the different policy scenarios on potential job losses in liquidity-constrained firms are
simulated by taking account of the financial situation of firms at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis and using
different assumptions on the nature of the economic crisis. The simulations are based on comprehensive
firm-level data (Orbis), covering approximately one million firms across 14 European countries with rich
information on their financial situation at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis (or more precisely 2018, the
most recent year for which data are available).
Changes in the liquidity position of firms are measured by focusing on the implied monthly changes in their
operating cash-flow, due to the assumed decline in sales and the limited ability of firms to fully adjust their
operating expenses. The liquidity available to each firm is calculated as the sum of the liquidity buffer held
at the beginning of each month and the shock-adjusted cash-flow. Jobs are considered to be at risk in
firms where liquidity has ran out. To be consistent with the policy responses in most countries, it is assumed
that a debt and tax moratorium is in place. It is also assumed that labour costs adjust by 0.2 % in response
to a 1% fall in revenue even in the absence of job retention support.
The assumed economic shocks are identical to those used to develop the OECD projections of June 2020
under two alternative scenarios for the duration of the shock. A “single-hit” scenario, which foresees a
sharp drop in activity lasting two months, followed by a four-month progressive recovery and a return to
pre-crisis activity levels from the seventh month after the start of the pandemic. A “double-hit” scenario,
which overlaps with the “single-hit” scenario for the first seven months but then models a second outbreak
from the eight month onwards. The decline in sales is assumed to vary across sectors between 15 and
100%, but not across firms within sectors.

The simulated effects of STW and WS on the share of jobs at risk
 STW subsidies are more effective in addressing liquidity problems in firms than WS because the
former are targeted towards firms with greater financial difficulties. According to the simulations
based on the single-hit scenario, STW subsidies reduce the share of jobs at risk by 10 percentage
points from 22%, while this is only 7 percentage points under WS (dark blue bars in Figure 7).

JOB RETENTION SCHEMES DURING THE COVID-19 LOCKDOWN AND BEYOND © OECD 2020
18 

These estimates capture only the direct effect of the subsidy and do not take account of any
adjustments in worker earnings that may also be associated with programme participation.
 WS schemes potentially allow for larger reductions in labour costs for firms at the cost of providing
weaker income protection for workers on reduced working hours. Indeed, the reduction in the share
of jobs at risk is considerably larger if it is assumed that firms do not pay top ups. In this case, the
share of jobs at risk falls by an additional 7 percentage points (light blue bar in Figure 7). There is
no additional worker adjustment under STW as the worker adjustment under STW is identical to
the assumed adjustment in the absence of government support in the stylised example.

Figure 7. The simulated reduction in potential job losses firms due to STW and WS
The reduction in the share of jobs at risk in firms with liquidity shortages (percentage points)1

Government support Worker adjustment

A. Single-hit scenario B. Double-hit scenario
p.p. p.p.
20 20

18 18

16 16

14 14

12 12

10 10

8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

0 0
Short-time work Wage subsidy Short-time work Wage subsidy

1Average effect across 14 European countries by the end of 2020.

Notes:
“Single-hit” scenario: sharp drop in activity lasting two months, followed by a four-month progressive recovery and a return to pre-
crisis activity levels from the seventh month after the start of the pandemic.
“Double-hit” scenario: overlaps with the “single-hit” scenario for the first seven months but then models a second outbreak from
the eight month onwards.
Source: OECD calculations based on ORBIS.

1. This subsidy comes at a similar cost to the government as the STW scheme based on replacement rate
of 80% for hour worked under the assumption that the decline in working time is uniformly distributed
across firms. In this case, fiscal neutrality is achieved by ensuring that the surface under the cost curves
for the government are identical under the two schemes.
2. The stylised comparison and the simulations below abstract from eligibility thresholds which tend to be
common in both STW and WS schemes as well as the difference in labour costs for firms and gross wage
for workers due to the presence of employer social security contributions. To allow simulating the effects
of the stylised JR schemes, it is further assumed that reductions in sales translate one-to-one in reductions
in working time, while employment remains constant.

* The analysis in this box builds on the analysis of government support measures on the incidence of illiquid firms in (OECD, 2020[5]) OECD
Economic Outlook, Volume 2020 Issue 1, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/0d1d1e2e-en and was prepared in collaboration with Lilas Demmou, Guido
Franco, Sara Calligaris and Dennis Dlugosch of the OECD’s Economics Department.

3. Adapting job retention schemes to the post-confinement phase of the
COVID-19 crisis

During the confinement phase, JR schemes were mainly designed to provide immediate support to firms
and workers and avert an initial surge in unemployment. As countries relax restrictions to economic
activities, the design of the schemes should be adapted to enhance their targeting to jobs that are likely to
return viable. Indeed, the schemes can help firms that experience a temporary shock preserve valuable
job-specific human capital with potentially positive effects on productivity in the medium term. However, if
the schemes end up supporting jobs that are unlikely to recover, they run the risk of slowing the reallocation
of employment towards high-performance firms and sectors, hindering aggregate productivity and the
economic recovery. Improving the targeting of the JR schemes requires addressing three difficult policy
challenges.
The first question is how to adapt the schemes to deal with the economic aftermath of the health crisis.
The main challenge is to target JR schemes more towards those jobs at risk of being terminated, but that
are viable in the longer term. Indeed, it is inevitable that for some firms will not be able to recover fully or
quickly from the shock and will have to resort to permanent layoffs. Jobs that have become unviable should
be allowed to end and affected workers should be supported by unemployment benefits, in combination
with active labour market policies to facilitate transitions towards new and viable jobs. However,
discriminating between viable and unviable jobs is inherently difficult given the uncertainty facing firms and
workers. As discussed in further detail below, countries can use a number of levers to enhance the
targeting of the benefits towards jobs more likely to survive and provide support to workers in jobs that
remain at risk. Some countries have already announced changes to the schemes in these directions – see
Box 2.
The second question is when to phase out or adapt JR measures that offer generous support with few
safeguards against their possible negative effects. This is a difficult question given that uncertainty remains
high and the risk of second wave of the epidemic is still looming. The answer to this question is a difficult
balancing act. On the one hand, restricting access to JR schemes too soon risks allowing the destruction
of jobs that could still be viable and induce a surge in layoffs. On the other hand, extending easy-access
JR schemes increases the chances of preserving unviable jobs, wasting valuable resources and slowing
the necessary reallocation of employment towards expanding firms and sectors. In general, governments
have been clear that support will remain available for as long as restrictions remain in place, but less so
about their plans for extending or phasing out job retention measures beyond this initial period or the
criteria that would be used to make such decisions. This creates uncertainty for firms and workers about
the availability of support and increases the risk that decisions are determined by political rather than
economic considerations. Making use of a clear time-table and objective criteria for making adjustments
can help reduce uncertainty.
The third question is to whom any adjustments should apply, and particularly, whether the adaptation of
JR schemes should be differentiated across sectors. While in some sectors, economic activity may pick
up quickly (e.g. manufacturing), others will continue to face legally imposed restrictions or longer-lasting
changes in demand for their products and services (e.g. tourism). Sectors whose activity remains legally
curtailed may require continued JR support in the de-confinement phase. In sectors where business can
resume, JR schemes could be adjusted to avoid the risk that they support jobs that have become

permanently unviable. France is currently the only country that applies more favourable conditions to
sectors that remain subject to government-imposed restrictions. More specifically, since June 2020,
employers in “open” sectors are required to contribute 10% of the usual cost of hours not worked or,
equivalently, 15% of the gross benefit received by workers, with a further tightening foreseen in November
(see Box 4).
The remainder of this section focuses on the first question of how to adapt JR schemes to the economic
aftermath of the health crisis. It first discusses a number of options to enhance the targeting of the JR
support towards jobs that are more likely to survive and then how a gradual shift from protecting jobs to
supporting workers in jobs at risk of termination could be achieved.

Target JR support to jobs at risk of termination in firms experiencing temporary
difficulties

Governments can reduce the risk of supporting jobs that are unviable even in the medium term by requiring
employers to cover part of the cost of hours not worked and limiting the maximum duration of JR support.
Requiring firms to contribute to the cost of hours not worked also provides stronger incentives for resuming
regular work schedules and leaving JR support. To the extent that a faster return of business activity is
socially desirable, for example because it entails significant positive demand externalities, there may be
an argument for complementing STW schemes with a work resumption subsidy (discussed below).
A greater emphasis on enforcing the proper use of STW support is further needed to prevent firms from
claiming support for hours worked (e.g. teleworking, continued claims after the resumption of work).

Enhance the targeting of JR support by requiring firms to contribute to the costs of reduced
working hours

Governments could require firms participating in STW schemes to cover part of the cost of hours not
worked. This would reduce the attractiveness of STW for firms in general, but would strengthen incentives
to use the scheme to support jobs that are more likely to re-start after the crisis and resume regular work
schedules as soon as possible. To avoid reinforcing the financial difficulties of firms, employers’
participation could take the form of a delayed payment or (zero-interest) loan.5 Since 1 June 2020, in
France, firms are required to pay 15% of the benefit workers receive for hours not worked. Beginning in
July 2020, the United Kingdom has gradually increased the cost to employers for keeping workers on
furlough.
By design, wage subsidies schemes tend to reduce the cost of hours worked to employers and relieve
them entirely of any cost for hours not worked. To ensure that employers bear some of the cost of hours
not worked – at least for large reductions in working hours – countries could require them to pay a fraction
of a workers’ usual wage regardless of hours worked with the subsidy set to cover only part of that pay.
For example, New Zealand encourages – but does not legally require – employers to pay 80% of usual
earnings, while the subsidy amounts to roughly 30% of average earnings. Employers complying with this
recommendation will pay more than 50% of usual earnings when hours are reduced by more than 50%,
hence bearing some of the cost of hours not worked. The wage subsidy scheme operated in the
Netherlands mimics STW schemes that require firms to share some of the cost of hours not worked. While
workers continue to receive 100% of their earnings, employers receive a varying subsidy, which is at most
90% of the wage. This may induce some employers to request support only for workers whose jobs are
viable in the longer term.

5
This would be similar to experience-rating employer social-security contributions, i.e. making future contributions
dependent on firms’ use of short-time work subsidies during the crisis, but would be simpler to implement.

The duration of JR support should be time-limited to reduce the risk of supporting unviable
jobs, but limits should not be set in stone

Limits to the duration of STW and WS help reduce the risk of supporting firms and jobs that are no longer
viable even in the longer term. Indeed, evidence from Switzerland during the global financial crisis of
2008-09 indicates firms tended to leave STW as soon as it became economically viable to do so, while
those firms which did use the scheme up to the maximum duration tended to layoff some workers
eventually (Kopp and Siegenthaler, 2019[6]). Maximum limits signal that support is temporary and reduce
the risk of supporting permanently unviable jobs.
While limits to the duration of support have a role to play they should not be set in stone and may need to
adjust according to the health and economic situation. If the economic crisis lasts longer and affects a
larger share of firms than initially expected, extending schemes might be essential to prevent a sudden
surge in unemployment and to preserve jobs that might become viable as the general economic climate
improves. Some countries have recently announced extensions to the maximum duration of support
(e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom). In other countries, where the maximum duration of job
retention support is relatively long, it may be appropriate to shorten the maximum duration of job retention
subsidies for new applications. Semi-automatic rules could be used to strengthen the timeliness,
predictability and economic justification of any such adjustments as is the case of for regular unemployment
benefits in some countries (e.g. Canada, United States).

Consider strengthening incentives of firms for resuming regular work schedules

Reductions in working time through STW schemes do not generate revenues for firms and may entail
some costs. Firms therefore have strong incentives to increase hours as soon as it becomes profitable
to do so. However, it might be more socially desirable to subsidise firms to increase hours even when
this is not yet profitable than to subsidise them to remain idle. The resumption of yet-unprofitable activity
might contribute to stimulate the economy through increased product demand from business-to-business
linkages or consumption by workers. WS schemes already provide strong incentives to firms to start
production earlier because firms can use the subsidies to reduce the cost of hours worked. To provide
the same incentives, STW schemes could be complemented with a temporary wage subsidy for workers
resuming normal hours. The downside of the subsidy is that it would also provide support for firms that
would increase working hours anyway, generating some potential waste of resources. While the benefits
arising from the stimulus aspect of the subsidy are more likely to outweigh the costs in the context of a
severe and prolonged economic slowdown, these measures are likely to require a significant amount of
public resources. Spain has recently reintroduced the payment of social security contributions for hours
not worked in firms using its STW scheme, but in an attempt to encourage the resumption of working
hours, lower rates are applied to firms with some active workers than to firms with no activity. The
United Kingdom has introduced a Job Retention Bonus of GBP 1 000 that employers will be able to
claim from February 2021 for each employee brought back from furlough under the Coronavirus Job
Retention Scheme.

Tackle abuse by firms

Concerns about potential abuse may become more important as firms could be tempted to continue
claiming short-time work subsidies for hours not worked even after workers have returned to work and
resumed their normal working hours. These concerns add to pre-existing ones about companies that
require employees to continue to work from home while also claiming short-time work subsidies for these
working hours. Such abuses increase the fiscal costs of short-time work. To tackle abuse, governments
can make greater use of labour inspectors to verify whether actual working practices are consistent with
claims for JR support. Rather than conducting random checks, it may be possible to conduct more
targeted site visits. Statistical profiling tools could be used to identify firm types that are more likely to

make incorrect or false claims. Integrated administrative systems could be developed to identify
suspicious cases that link the claiming history of firms with information on business activity (in terms of
sales or working hours) from tax or social-security records. Designated hotlines or notification
procedures could be set up to solicit anonymous complaints by workers or their representatives. Such
complaints are more likely when benefits are relatively limited and workers have strong incentives to
resume normal working hours.
Since wage subsidy schemes are explicitly designed to reduce the costs for firms of hours worked, abuse
comes in a different form. The main concern is that firms may over-report the decline in sales that is
applied to determine eligibility (e.g. backdating or postponing bills).

Box 3. Should dividend payments be banned in firms receiving public support?
A widely discussed issue in many countries is whether firms that benefit from job retention support
should be allowed to engage in dividend payments and other forms of profit sharing in the same year
(Müller and Schulten, 2020[7]). A number of countries have introduced bans. For example, Spain
requires companies that make use of JR support during the current crisis (ERTE) to reimburse the full
amount of the subsidy if they pay any dividends. The Netherlands has recently introduced a ban on
dividend payments, share buybacks and bonuses for executives in firms benefitting from wage
subsidies in the same year.
Bans on dividend payments and other profit-sharing instruments address a number of possible
concerns. They send a clear message that job retention subsidies should be used to support jobs and
not any other causes. They avoid that job retention subsidies end up benefitting shareholders or
executive managers who do not require public support. They also reduce moral hazard effects,
i.e. excessive risk-taking by investors or managers based on the expectation that the state will cover
any major losses (to preserve jobs or prevent contagion effects).
Bans on dividend payments, however, also have potential limitations. They may discourage some firms
from claiming job retention support, reinforcing job losses. Indeed, firms that are profitable over the year
may still experience acute liquidity problems as a result of sharp but short-lived reductions in sales with
potentially significant effects on layoffs. Bans also do not guarantee that public support is exclusively
used for job retention or other causes that are considered worthy of public support. The reason for this
is that they do not address the fact that profits can be higher as a result of public support.
Whether dividend payments and other forms of profit sharing in firms receiving JR support should be
allowed or not is therefore not an easy question. It is worth noting that having bans in place does not
necessarily prevent firms from paying dividends. They can still do so but they will typically have to
reimburse the subsidy.

Gradually shift the emphasis back from protecting jobs to supporting workers in jobs at
risk

While the main aim of JR schemes is to preserve jobs, they will not be successful in all cases as some
jobs may have become permanently unviable. Some workers in subsidised jobs may therefore have
limited career prospects and remain at risk of losing their job eventually. This suggests a shift may be
required from protecting jobs to supporting workers in jobs at risk of termination. This may involve
rebalancing between STW and UB, making public employment services available to persons in
subsidised jobs and encouraging training for workers on reduced working hours.

Align STW and unemployment benefits more closely in countries where the gap is large

In most countries, short-time benefits for hours not worked exceeded regular unemployment benefits
during the confinement phase (Figure 4). The difference in terms of total incomes can be even larger for
workers who combine full pay for hours worked with short-time work benefits for hours not worked. This
clearly increases the attractiveness of short-time work in comparison to (full) unemployment and the
willingness of workers, including those not directly at risk of being laid off, to accept a reduction in
working hours as part of a STW scheme. As concerns about the cost effectiveness of support beco me
more important, there may be a case for reducing the gap between short-time work benefits and regular
unemployment benefits, notably in countries with particularly generous STW benefits. Alternatively, STW
benefits could be allowed to decline over the spell. Since in most countries the level of support for the
unemployed tends to decline over the spell already, this would at least prevent the gap between the two
from increasing.
These changes would help contain the overall cost of STW schemes, and might improve the targeting
of short-time work schemes to jobs at risk of being destroyed. Lower subsidies might also increase
incentives for workers to resume normal working hours or actively look for another job altogether. Even
with a smaller difference when compared to unemployment benefits, STW is likely to remain attractive
because it preserves the employment contract and the non-wage benefits linked to it (fringe benefits,
social security, including access to health insurance in some countries). France has already announced
that from November 2020, the gross replacement rate for workers will decline from 70% to 60% – see
Box 4.

Promote the mobility of workers from subsidised to unsubsidised jobs.

The mobility of workers from subsidised to unsubsidised jobs can be promoted by requiring or
encouraging workers on short-time work to register with the public employment services and benefit
from their support (e.g. job-search assistance, career guidance and training) (OECD, forthcoming[8]).
OECD analysis shows that early interventions – including those before job displacement takes place –
can be very effective in promoting smooth job transitions (OECD, 2018[8]). However, only a few countries
require workers on short-time work to register with the public employment services and to engage in
active job search. Countries may not see this as a priority since many of the workers on reduced working
hours are expected to stay with their current firm even after the programme ends. There may even be a
risk that imposing mandatory job-search requirements might push some workers whose job is at risk
only temporarily into lower quality employment. Job-search requirements have traditionally been more
common in countries where short-time work subsidies are paid directly to workers since this establishes
a contact point between workers and the providers of employment services (Hijzen and Venn, 2011[1]).
Irrespective of whether payments are made to the worker or to the firm, countries could encourage
workers to register with the public employment services on a voluntary basis to allow them to benefit
from their services and support their career progression (in their current firm or a different one).

Promote training while on reduced working hours

Participation in training while on reduced working hours can help workers improve the viability of their
current job or improve the prospect of finding a new job. Several countries encourage training during
short-time work by providing financial incentives to firms or workers (e.g. France, Germany). In few
countries participation in training is a requirement for receiving short-time work subsidies (e.g. Hungary,
Netherlands). In the Netherlands, employers applying for JR support have to declare that they actively
encourage training since June 2020, while the government has taken additional measures to make
on-line training and development courses freely available. The main challenge is to organise training in
such a way that it can be combined with part-time work and irregular work schedules. This is easier
when training courses are targeted at individuals rather than groups, delivered in a flexible manne r

through online teaching tools and their duration is relatively short (OECD, forthcoming[10]). In the present
context, training courses that promote the return to work may be particularly valuable , including by
providing the digital skills that are needed for teleworking, as would training courses to promote the
mobility of workers to jobs in expanding firms and industries (e.g. online services).

Box 4. Recent developments in selected OECD countries (based on the information available
end September 2020)
France
Since 1 June 2020, France has reintroduced a cost to employers for using its Activité Partielle scheme
in sectors where economic activity is gradually resuming. While workers still get 70% of their usual
gross wage for hours not worked, firms now pay 15% of this amount. Hence, the cost to a firm of a
worker on zero hours has increased from null to 10% of the usual full-time labour cost. Activité Partielle
will become less generous towards both firms and workers from November 2020. Workers will see a
decline in the gross replacement rate for hours not worked from 70% to 60%, and firms will be required
to pay for 40% of this (bringing the cost to a firm of a worker on zero hours to 24% of usual full-time
labour cost). Sectors that continue to be subject to restrictions (e.g. tourism, catering or culture) remain
exempt until the end of December 2020.
From 1 July 2020, firms facing longer-term difficulties can also apply for Activité Partielle de Longue
Durée (APLD), which will run into 2022. The scheme allows for a maximum reduction in hours of 40%
and ensures that workers get 70% of their usual gross wage for hours not worked. Employers have to
pay 15% of the benefit for workers. Claims can only be made if there is an agreement between workers
and employers and the agreement may explicitly prohibit any lay-offs.

Greece
Greece introduced a new temporary STW scheme (Syn-ergasia) effective from 15 June 2020 to
15 October 2020. The scheme is available for employers who have experienced at least a 20% loss in
revenue during the month(s) prior to participation. Under the scheme, employers are allowed to reduce
working hours by up to 50% for one or more of their employees. Workers receive a compensation of
60% of net wages for hours not worked by the government. Employer social security contributions are
also covered by the government during the first six weeks of the scheme. Only full-time dependent
employees are eligible.

Netherlands
The Netherlands initially extended its temporary Emergency Bridging Measure from 6 July 2020 to
1 October 2020 and subsequently to 1 July 2021, while making a number of adjustments. Since July
2020, firms that have used support under the scheme are no longer allowed to pay dividends or bonuses
in the same year. The rules for dismissal during programme participation have been slightly relaxed
(economic dismissals trigger a reduction in the subsidy of 100% of worker earnings instead of 150%
previously; collective dismissals of 20 workers or more have to consult the trade union). Firms are
obliged to encourage their worker to engage in training. From October, the reimbursement to employers
will be lowered gradually from 90% until October 2020 to 60% in the three months to July 2021. From
January 2021, the threshold for eligibility will be increased from a reduction of 20% of sales to one of
30%. From April 2021, the maximum subsidy per worker will be halved and be similar to the level of
unemployment benefits.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom extended its Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme from 30 June 2020 to 31 October
2020 for ongoing claims (no new claims will be accepted) and provided a time-table for its phase out.
From 1 July, furloughed workers can go back to work part time. From 1 August, employers will be
required to cover part of the cost hours not worked, with the required contribution of firms increasing in
steps until the phase out of the scheme (employer social contributions for hours not worked in August,
plus an additional 10% of normal earnings in September and again in October). Workers continue to
receive at least 80% of wages. In addition, the Government has introduced a Job Retention Bonus of
GBP 1 000 that employers will be able to claim from February 2021 for each employee brought back
from furlough under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme.
The government recently announced the new Job Support Scheme which will operate between
November 2020 and April 2021. The scheme allows for a maximum reduction of working time of 70%.
Workers receive 67% of their usual earnings for hours not worked. Employers are be required to pay
half of the cost of hours not worked with the other half paid by the government.

References

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Hijzen and Salvatori (forthcoming), “Job retention schemes during the COVID-19 lockdown and [4]
beyond: An OECD perspective”, OECD Social, Employment and Social Affairs Working
Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Kopp, D. and M. Siegenthaler (2019), “Short-Time Work and Unemployment in and after the [6]
Great Recession”, KOF Working Papers, No. 462, ETH, Zurich,
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Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/0d1d1e2e-en.

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Contact
Stefano SCARPETTA ( stefano.scarpetta@oecd.org)
Mark PEARSON ( mark.pearson@oecd.org)
Alexander HIJZEN ( alexander.hijzen@oecd.org)
Andrea SALVATORI ( andrea.salvatori@oecd.org)

Acknowledgements

This paper was prepared as a background document for Chapter 1 of the OECD Employment Outlook
2020 “COVID-19: From a health to a jobs crisis”. The authors would like to thank Andrea Bassanini,
Stephane Carcillo, Orsetta Causa, Emmanuele Ciani, Andrea Garnero, Masato Hayashikawa, Sebastian
Königs, Herwig Immervoll, Ulrik Knudsen, Mark Pearson, Stefano Scarpetta and Cyrille Schwellnus for
their comments and suggestions. The authors are particularly grateful to Lilas Demmou, Guido Franco,
Sara Calligaris and Dennis Dlugosch of the OECD’s Economics Department for their contribution to the
box on the effects of job retention schemes on jobs at risk in liquidity-constrained firms. The authors would
like to thank Natalie Corry for excellent editorial assistance. The views in this paper are those of the authors
and cannot be attributed to the OECD or its member countries. Any remaining errors are sole responsibility
of the authors.

This paper is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not
necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international
frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.

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