Brief re 156 Motion for Settlement Notice of Motion and Motion — In re Plaid Inc. Privacy Litigation (Dkt. 166, N.D. Cal. No. 4:20-cv-03056)

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U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · No. 4:20-cv-03056-DMR · Doc. 166 · 2022-05-12 · Docket on CourtListener

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PLAINTIFFS’ OMNIBUS RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS 
TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
CASE NO. 4:20-CV-03056-DMR  
 
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HERRERA KENNEDY LLP 
Shawn M. Kennedy (SBN 218472) 
skennedy@herrerakennedy.com 
Bret D. Hembd (SBN 272826) 
bhembd@herrerakennedy.com 
4590 MacArthur Blvd., Suite 500 
Newport Beach, CA 92660 
Tel: (949) 936-0900 
Fax: (855) 969-2050 
 
HERRERA KENNEDY LLP 
Nicomedes Sy Herrera (SBN 275332) 
nherrera@herrerakennedy.com 
Laura E. Seidl (SBN 269891) 
lseidl@herrerakennedy.com 
1300 Clay Street, Suite 600 
Oakland, CA 94612 
Tel: (510) 422-4700 
Fax: (855) 969-2050 
 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & 
BERNSTEIN, LLP 
Rachel Geman (Pro Hac Vice) 
rgeman@lchb.com 
250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor 
New York, NY 10013-1413 
Tel: (212) 355-9500 
Fax: (212) 355-9592 
Co-Lead Class Counsel 
[Additional counsel on signature page] 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &  
BERNSTEIN, LLP 
Michael W. Sobol (SBN 194857) 
msobol@lchb.com 
Melissa Gardner (SBN 289096) 
mgardner@lchb.com 
Michael K. Sheen (SBN 288284) 
msheen@lchb.com 
Nicholas R. Hartmann (SBN 301049) 
nhartmann@lchb.com 
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 
Tel: (415) 956-1000 
Fax: (415) 956-1008 
BURNS CHAREST LLP 
Christopher J. Cormier (Pro Hac Vice) 
ccormier@burnscharest.com 
4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20016 
Tel: (202) 577-3977 
Fax: (469) 444-5002 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
OAKLAND DIVISION 
IN RE PLAID INC. PRIVACY  
LITIGATION 
Master Docket No.: 4:20-cv-03056-DMR 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ OMNIBUS RESPONSE 
TO OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENT 
 
Date:  
May 12, 2022 
Time: 
1:00 p.m. 
Courtroom: 4 
Judge: 
Hon. Donna M. Ryu 
 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:  
ALL ACTIONS 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
II. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS ......................................................................................... 2 
A. 
The Proposed Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate ................................. 2 
B. 
The Settlement Treats Class Members Equitably ................................................... 4 
C. 
Notice Was Properly Directed to the Class ............................................................. 5 
D. 
The Claims Program is Robust ............................................................................... 6 
E. 
The Opt-Out Procedure is Reasonable .................................................................... 8 
F. 
The Requested Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable in Relation to the 
Settlement Fund ...................................................................................................... 9 
G. 
Helfand’s Objections Regarding Notice and Attorneys’ Fees Are Meritless ....... 10 
III. 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13 
 
 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
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CASES 
Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 
951 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020)...................................................................................................... 5 
Churchill Village LLC v. Gen. Elec. Corp.,  
361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)........................................................................................................ 2 
Collins v. Helfand, 
No. 20-14492-J, 2020 WL 8770265 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2020) ................................................. 10 
Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, 
No. 19-22864-CIV, 2020 WL 7135528 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) ........................................... 10 
Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 
729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013).................................................................................................. 12 
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 
966 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ......................................................................................... 8 
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 
150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)...................................................................................................... 3 
Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.,  
No. 98-CV-01646, 2001 WL 34089697 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) ....................................... 2 
In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 
327 F.R.D. 299 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ................................................................................................. 2 
In re Google Plus Profile Litig.,  
No. 18-cv-06164, 2021 WL 242887 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) ................................................... 2 
In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 
No. C 07-05634 CRB, 2015 WL 3396829 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2015) ........................................ 5 
In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 
895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018)........................................................................................................ 5 
Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 
846 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2017).................................................................................................... 11 
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 
696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012)........................................................................................................ 5 
Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 
No. 11-CV-05188-WHO, 2014 WL 3404531 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) .................................... 1 
Moreno v. Cap. Bldg. Maint. & Cleaning Servs., Inc., 
No. 19-cv-07087, 2021 WL 1788447 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2021) .................................................. 8 
Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 
No. 14-CV-00582-JD, 2021 WL 3053018 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021) ....................................... 10 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797 (1985) ................................................................................................................... 11 
United States v. Oregon, 
913 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1990)........................................................................................................ 3 
Walsh v. Kindred Healthcare, 
No. 11-cv-0050, 2013 WL 6623224 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) ................................................ 10 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
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Williams v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Auto Lease, Inc., 
159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998)................................................................................................ 11, 12 
RULES 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ............................................................................................................................. 8 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) .................................................................................................................. 12 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) .................................................................................................................... 5 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) ............................................................................................................. 12 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A) ...................................................................................................... 3, 8, 9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California,  
Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements ..................................................................... 8 
 
 
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Plaintiffs, through Class Counsel, respectfully submit this response to objections to the 
Class Action Settlement Agreement,1 and in further support of their motions for Final Approval 
of Class Action Settlement (Dkt. 156) and Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 157),2 in light of the Class’s 
response to the proposed Settlement. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
As numerous courts have observed, “the absence of a large number of objections to a 
proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class 
settlement action are favorable to the class members.”  Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 11-CV-
05188-WHO, 2014 WL 3404531, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Nat’l 
Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004)).  That 
presumption strongly militates in support of approval here:  of the tens of millions of Class 
Members who stand to benefit from the Settlement, only five Objectors—Richard Laven, Joseph 
P. Soldis, Colin Larimer Rice, John William Grosklaus, and Steven Helfand—each proceeding 
pro se, have submitted objections.3   
The Objectors raise concerns regarding a number of topics, including the adequacy of the 
settlement, the proposed distribution plan, the notice plan, the propriety of the claims and opt-out 
procedures, and the requested award of attorneys’ fees.  As addressed herein, each objection is 
without basis in fact or law.  Accordingly, each should be overruled.  Further, no Class Member 
has objected to Class Counsel’s request for reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses or 
the granting of service awards to the Class Representatives in this case.   
Meanwhile, the response of the Class to the proposed Settlement has been 
overwhelmingly positive.  See Dkt. 156 at 3.  Indeed, only approximately 1,785 Class Members—
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, capitalized terms herein have the same meanings as in the Class 
Action Settlement Agreement (Dkt. 138-1) (the “Agreement” or the “Settlement”).   
2 No oppositions were filed to either of these motions.   
3 See Dkts. 154 (“Laven Obj.”), 155 (“Soldis Obj.”), 158 (“Rice Obj.”), 161 (“Grosklaus Obj.”), 
162 (“Helfand Obj.”).  A sixth Class Member, Jamyl Harris, submitted a letter thanking the Court 
for its work on the case.  See Dkt. 160.  Because Harris implies support for the proposed 
Settlement, their letter is not further addressed herein.  
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just 0.0015% of the estimated 98 million total Class size—have requested exclusion from the 
Class.  Dkt. 165.4  In light of these facts, the Court should approve the Settlement (which resulted 
from extensive negotiations between experienced and informed counsel) as fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.  In addition to robust injunctive relief, the Settlement provides for a $58 million cash 
payment to benefit the Settlement Class—a significant achievement for class members.  The five 
objections, and the low percentage of opt-outs, do not justify a different result.   
II. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS 
The objections provide no cause for the Court to depart from its well-reasoned findings 
that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.  Dkt. 153 (Prelim. Approval Order).  Instead, 
they generally reflect misunderstandings about the Settlement, claims process, and notice 
program, or rest on misinterpretations of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Objector Helfand, a serial objector (and disbarred attorney) who purports to raise the most issues, 
endorses approval of the Settlement.  Instead, he takes issue only with aspects of the Notice and 
Class Counsel’s requested attorneys’ fees.  The objections should be overruled.   
A. 
The Proposed Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate. 
As set forth in Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval (Dkt. 156), the Settlement provides 
significant and meaningful monetary and injunctive relief to a nationwide Class of app users.  
Indeed, Objector Helfand urges approval of the Settlement, describing the proposed injunctive 
relief as “exciting” and “valuable consideration.”  Helfand Obj. at 3.  Only three objectors address 
the substantive merits of the proposed Settlement.  
                                                 
4 The vast majority of these requests were collected and submitted by a single law firm that 
appears to have engaged in a direct marketing campaign to solicit opt outs.  See March 21, 2022 
Declaration of Rachel Geman (“Geman Decl.”) filed herewith, at ¶¶ 2–6.  In any event, the opt-
out rate in this case falls well within the range accepted by courts in this District in comparable 
cases.  See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 320–21 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(“low rates of . . . opt-outs are ‘indicia of the approval of the class’”; finally approving settlement 
where “only 406 Settlement Class Members have opted out of the Settlement (about 0.0005% of 
the Class).”); In re Google Plus Profile Litig., No. 18-cv-06164, 2021 WL 242887, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (finally approving class settlement where approximately 0.031% of the class 
requested exclusion); see also Hughes v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-CV-01646, 2001 WL 
34089697, at *1, *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2001) (finally approving settlement where “less than 
1%” opted out); Churchill Village LLC v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 361 F.3d 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming settlement approval where 500 class members—or 0.56%—opted out). 
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First, Objectors Rice and Grosklaus urge the court to “reject this settlement and force a 
new one” that “includes a reasonable amount of money (>100$ per potential claimant).”  Rice 
Obj. at 1–2; Grosklaus Obj. at 2 (endorsing Rice’s objection and requesting that Class Counsel 
renegotiate a settlement “that offers just and adequate compensation”).  Neither individual, 
however, adequately explains why the relief already provided for in the Settlement is inadequate 
or unreasonable.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A) (“The objection must . . . state with specificity 
the grounds for the objection.”); United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(objectors bear the burden of proving any assertions they raise when challenging the 
reasonableness of a class action settlement).  They also fail to consider the robust injunctive relief 
provided by the Settlement—which addresses the complained-of conduct and requires Plaid to 
maintain certain changes to its interface, to make more fulsome disclosures to consumers, and to 
delete transactional data for consumers whose apps did not request the data.  That relief benefits 
all Class Members, regardless of whether they make a claim for monetary relief.  These 
objections therefore amount to a mere wish that Plaintiffs had settled for more money.  But 
“[s]ettlement is the offspring of compromise,” and district courts must determine “not whether the 
final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from 
collusion.”  Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998).  Indeed, as this Court 
already found, the “settlement falls well within the range of reasonableness, particularly given the 
robust injunctive relief that will benefit the class.”  Dkt. 153 at 20.  Rice’s and Grosklaus’s 
objections do not warrant a different ruling now.   
Second, Objector Laven appears to oppose a settlement because, in his opinion, Plaid is 
not liable as it “did not mimic or did not have the look and feel of my bank’s account login 
screen.”  Laven Obj. at 1.  Plaintiffs disagree with Laven’s characterization of the facts and note it 
is unclear when Laven examined the Plaid interface—that is, whether it was before or after Plaid 
implemented changes to its interface subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit.  See Dkt. 61 (Cons. 
Am. Compl.) ¶¶ 67 & n.50, 72–73 (describing post-filing changes).  Even if Laven’s contentions 
were true, however, they would provide further cause to approve the Settlement as an eminently 
reasonable resolution of the claims brought on behalf of the Class.   
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In sum, objections to the terms of the Settlement are misplaced.  The combination of 
substantial monetary relief and meaningful forward-looking business practice changes provides 
Class Members with more than adequate relief in light of the costs, risks, and delay associated 
with continued litigation.  The Settlement should be approved. 
B. 
The Settlement Treats Class Members Equitably.  
Objector Grosklaus argues that the Settlement should be rejected because all Class 
Members who submit a claim will receive the same claims-made pro rata disbursement, even 
though some (including Grosklaus himself) linked multiple Financial Accounts using Plaid.  
Grosklaus Obj. at 1–2.  Grosklaus asserts this is unfair “because it does not account for the fact 
that Class Members may have significant differences in the amount of data that was unknowingly 
and/or unnecessarily provided to Plaid.”  Id. at 1.  This argument misconstrues the factual basis 
for Plaintiffs’ claims and the nature of class settlements. 
First, it is not the case that linking more Financial Accounts via Plaid necessarily results in 
greater injury or damages to a Class Member.  Because Plaid uses Class Members’ “credentials to 
obtain the maximum amount of data accessible” from a linked account, the quantity and quality 
of data that Plaid collects will vary depending on the nature of that account.  See Dkt. 61 ¶¶ 49, 
52; see also id. ¶¶ 50, 56 (Plaid obtains all available transactional data, related geolocation data, 
and even information about joint account holders and related accounts).  For Class Members who 
do substantially all of their banking through a single checking account, for example, Plaid might 
obtain more (and more sensitive) data from that single account than it would for Class Members 
who link multiple accounts.  Nor is it true that Class Members’ damages can be measured on a 
linear scale based solely on the raw volume of financial data obtained—as Plaintiffs allege, the 
value of that data is in the aggregate.  Id. ¶ 58; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 63 (multiple users’ aggregated 
financial data could be utilized “to forecast the revenue of companies in advance of equity 
earnings announcements”).   
Further, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[i]t is an inherent feature of the class-action 
device that individual class members will often claim differing amounts of damages—that is why 
due process requires that individual members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) be given an 
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opportunity to opt out of the settlement class to pursue their claims separately, as were the class 
members in this case.”  Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 824 (9th Cir. 2012).  Thus, courts 
must “evaluate the fairness of a settlement as a whole, rather than assessing its individual 
components.”  Id. at 818–19; accord Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1122 (9th Cir. 
2020) (endorsing a “holistic assessment of the settlement’s fairness”).  The fact that some class 
members might have won more at trial does “not cast doubt on [a] district court’s conclusion as to 
the fairness and adequacy of the overall settlement amount to the class as a whole.”  Lane, 696 
F.3d at 924 (emphasis in original); In re Transpacific Passenger Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 
C 07-05634 CRB, 2015 WL 3396829, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2015), aff’d, 701 F. App’x 554 
(9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting class settlement objector’s argument that “the settlements 
inappropriately treat all class members the same despite differences in the value of their claims”); 
cf. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 
609 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Any settlement value based on averages will undercompensate some 
and overcompensate others.”). 
C. 
Notice Was Properly Directed to the Class.5 
Objector Rice claims that the settlement website does not disclose the requested fee 
award, the number of “claimants,” or the predicted disbursement to Class Members.  Rice Obj. at 
1.  He is mistaken.  At least two documents, available through the “Important Documents” page 
of the settlement website,6 respond to these very topics.   
First, the Long Form Notice discloses that Class Counsel will seek an award of attorneys’ 
fees of up to $14.5 million (representing 25 percent of the Settlement Fund) (Question 11), and 
explains that the Settlement Fund will be distributed to Class Members pro rata after deduction of 
Court-approved fees, litigation expenses, service awards and settlement administration costs 
                                                 
5 Objector Helfand’s arguments regarding the Notice’s content are addressed in Section I.G, infra.   
6 Important Documents, Plaid Inc. Privacy Litigation, 
https://www.plaidsettlement.com/important-documents.php. 
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(Question 13).7  Further, because “[t]he amount of the payments to individual Class Members will 
depend on the number of valid claims that are filed,” the Long Form Notice necessarily cannot 
and does not include a concrete estimate for how much each Class Member will receive.  The 
contents are Long Form Notice are reproduced on the Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) 
page of the settlement website.8 
Second, the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order (Dkt. 153), also available on the 
settlement website, discloses additional detail regarding:  (i) Class Counsel’s requested fee award 
(id. at 12, 20, 28); (ii) the total estimated class size (id. at 14, 20); (iii) the estimated number of 
claimants (id. at 27); and (iv) the amount of individual payments based on the estimated claims 
rate (id. at 20).9 
Because these documents were readily available to all Class Members, in accordance with 
the Court’s orders, notice was proper and Rice’s objections should be overruled. 
D. 
The Claims Program is Robust.  
Objector Soldis makes a series of objections to the claims process.  First, he asserts that 
the e-mail Notice he received “lacks any specific link that takes the claimant to the claims form” 
and “requires that the party cut/paste text from the e-mail and open a new page to reach the claim 
form.”  Soldis Obj. at 1.  In fact, the e-mail Notice contains a hyperlink to the Settlement 
Website’s homepage (www.plaidsettlement.com).  Dkt. 159, Ex. B (e-mail notice).10  On the 
main page of the settlement website is a prominently displayed tab labeled “SUBMIT A 
CLAIM.”  See id., Ex. K (website).  Clicking that tab prompts Class Members who received 
personalized Notice to enter—i.e., cut-and-paste—a Notice ID and Confirmation Code from the 
                                                 
7 Notice of Class Action Settlement, https://angeion-
public.s3.amazonaws.com/www.PlaidSettlement.com/docs/Long+Form+Notice.pdf. 
8 Frequently Asked Questions, Plaid Inc. Privacy Litigation, 
https://plaidsettlement.com/frequently-asked-questions.php. 
9 Other documents downloadable from the website likewise contain the information Rice seeks, 
including Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval (Dkt. 137), Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. 157), and the Long Form Notice (Dkt. 159, Ex. J).  See 
https://plaidsettlement.com/important-documents.php.  
10 Even if Soldis was unable to click or activate the hyperlink from his e-mail application, he 
appears to have successfully navigated to the settlement website.  See Soldis Obj. at 6–7. 
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e-mail they received.  Id.  This exceedingly simple process satisfies Rule 23.  Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment (claims process should not be “unduly 
demanding”).   
Second, Soldis asserts that “the online claim form offers only three methods to be paid”—
namely, PayPal, Venmo, or Direct Deposit.  Soldis Obj. at 1 (emphasis in original).  This is 
incorrect.  Immediately below those three options is the following language with link allowing 
Class Members to elect to receive their payment by paper check:  “If you prefer to receive a paper 
check instead of a faster and more convenient option listed above, click this link.”11  See 
Declaration of Angeion Group, LLC (“Angeion Decl.”) filed herewith, at ¶ 6. 
Third, Soldis asserts he was unable to submit an online claim form because he received an 
“error” code stating that the account information he entered was invalid.  Soldis Obj. at 1.  Based 
on the response from the Class to date, this does not appear to be a common problem.  Angeion 
Decl. ¶ 5.  Nevertheless, because such technical issues inevitably arise, the notice and claims 
programs were designed to be highly interactive.  Class Members had several ways to ask 
questions or seek assistance, including via the case website, a toll-free phone number, or by e-
mailing or calling Angeion or Class Counsel.  See Dkt. 159, Ex. J at 4 (listing Class Counsel’s 
contact information), 14 (FAQ addressing “How do I get more information?”).  Class Members 
have not been shy about reaching out:  as of January 28, 2022, Angeion’s toll-free number had 
received 8,770 calls (Dkt. 159 ¶ 22) and Class Counsel has received dozens of calls and e-mails 
with questions about the settlement (Geman Decl. ¶¶ 7–8).  In Soldis’s case, Angeion reached out 
to him directly to assist in addressing any technical issues.12  Angeion Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Dkt. 159 
¶ 26.  Rule 23 does not require more.  Cf. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 941 
                                                 
11 In addition to being factually inaccurate, Soldis’s contention that the claims program “denies 
payment to those without a bank account (i.e. homeless, indigent, those who can’t qualify for a 
bank account, etc)” is inapposite here.  Soldis Obj. at 1–2.  Because the Class is comprised of 
individuals who linked a Financial Account to a payments app, the number of Class Members 
who are unable to accept payment via payment app or direct deposit into a financial account 
should be exceedingly small.   
12 Angeion provided Soldis with a PDF claim form, but he indicated in response that he would (to 
paraphrase) “ask the Court to resolve the problem.”  Angeion Decl. ¶ 4. 
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(N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 638 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he question whether a settlement is 
fundamentally fair within the meaning of Rule 23(e) is not the same as asking the reviewing court 
if perfection has been achieved.”).   
E. 
The Opt-Out Procedure is Reasonable. 
Objector Rice argues that the Court should reject the settlement because opting out 
requires Class Members to “fill out a paper letter and mail it in.”  Rice Obj. at 1.  This process 
suggests “bias,” according to Rice, because “[i]t must be as simple for a claimant to reject a 
settlement as to accept it”; and because it “allows lawyers to increase their fees by making it 
harder for claimants to remove themselves from the settlement.”  Id.  Rice is incorrect on both 
points.   
First, Rice offers no authority for the proposition that a class settlement must employ the 
same method for submitting claims and opt-outs.  See id.  Rule 23 has no such requirement.  Cf. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment (the method for opting out 
“should be as convenient as possible, while protecting against unauthorized opt-out notices.”).13  
Indeed, this District’s Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements14 states that requests for 
exclusion should be submitted by mail.  See Procedural Guidance, Preliminary Approval § 4 
(class notice “should instruct class members who wish to opt out of the settlement to send a 
letter . . . to the settlement administrator”).  Both here and in at least one other recent case, this 
Court approved opt-out procedures that comply with the Guidance.  See Dkt. 153 at 32–33; see 
also, e.g., Moreno v. Cap. Bldg. Maint. & Cleaning Servs., Inc., No. 19-cv-07087, 2021 WL 
1788447, at *16 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2021) (Ryu, M.J.) (quoting Procedural Guidance and 
                                                 
13 Rice objects to the method for “exit[ing] the settlement,” which Plaintiffs understand to mean 
exclusion from (rather than objection to) the settlement.  See Rice Obj. at 1.  It is notable, 
however, that Rule 23 and this District’s Procedural Guidance presume that objections will be 
submitted in writing.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A) (an objection “must state whether it applies 
only to the objector, to a specific subset of the class, or to the entire class, and also state with 
specificity the grounds for the objection.”); Procedural Guidance, Preliminary Approval § 5 (class 
notice “should instruct class members who wish to opt out of the settlement to send a letter” 
“should instruct class members who wish to object to the settlement to send their written 
objections only to the court.” (emphasis added)). 
14 Available at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidance-for-class-action-
settlements/. 
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preliminarily approving class settlement requiring opt-out by mail).  Tellingly, Rice does not 
claim that mailing a letter is so onerous as to constitute a deprivation of Class Members’ due 
process—indeed, the fact that hundreds of Class Members have opted out of proves that it is not.   
Second, Rice is incorrect that fewer opt-outs results in more fees for Class Counsel.  
Pursuant to the Agreement, Class Counsel have moved for fees on a percent-of-the-fund basis.  
See Agreement ¶ 108 (Class Counsel to seek fees “in an amount not to exceed 25% of the 
Settlement Fund”); Dkt. 157 (Motion for Fees) at 1, 5 (same).  The number of opt-outs does not 
alter the size of the fund; nor does it alter the amount Class Counsel has requested in fees.  In 
other words, Class Counsel’s requested fees are in no way tied to the number of Class Members 
that opt out of the settlement.  In any event, this Court will provide the final word on the amount 
of Class Counsel’s fee award.  See, e.g., Dkt. 153 at 25 (“The court will address the exact amount 
of fees to be awarded in the order for final approval.”); see also Agreement ¶ 110 (if the Court 
awards less than the amount sought, the difference remains in the Settlement Fund for distribution 
to Class Members or cy pres recipients pursuant to the terms of the Agreement).   
F. 
The Requested Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable in Relation to the Settlement 
Fund.15 
Two Objectors raise issues broadly relating to Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees, 
but neither provides good reason for the Court to depart from the benchmark.  Objector Rice 
argues that the requested fee (which he incorrectly assumes to be 30%) “amount[s] to a usurious 
fraction” in light of the compensation that individual Class Members likely will receive.  See Rice 
Obj. at 1–2.  Objector Grosklaus echoes Rice’s “concerns regarding the amount of compensation 
for Class Counsel relative to the expected compensation for Class Members.”  Grosklaus Obj. at 
2.  Both Objectors, however, fail to “state with specificity the grounds for the objection” to the 
requested fees, which is reason enough to overrule them.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A); see also id. 
advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment (“[O]bjections must provide sufficient specifics to 
enable the parties to respond to them and the court to evaluate them.”).  In any event, the 
                                                 
15 Objector Helfand’s arguments regarding the requested fee award are addressed in Section I.G, 
infra.   
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requested fee is plainly reasonable when measured against the total settlement fund and strong 
injunctive relief obtained for the Class.  See, e.g., Dkt. 153 (Prelim. Approval Order) at 28 (“Class 
Counsel’s anticipated request for 25% of the common fund is presumptively reasonable”); Walsh 
v. Kindred Healthcare, No. 11-cv-0050, 2013 WL 6623224, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) 
(“[W]hen the Court considers the value of [the injunctive relief obtained], it reduces the overall 
percentage of fees that counsel will receive.”). 
G. 
Helfand’s Objections Regarding Notice and Attorneys’ Fees Are Meritless. 
The most detailed objections lodged against the proposed Settlement come from Objector 
Steven Helfand.  Helfand is “an attorney who lost his license to practice law in California and 
who district court judges have described as a ‘serial’ objector to class action settlements.”  Collins 
v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 19-22864-CIV, 2020 WL 7135528, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 
2020) (“specifically ordering Helfand . . . to not speak” at the fairness hearing), appeal dismissed 
sub nom. Collins v. Helfand, No. 20-14492-J, 2020 WL 8770265 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2020).16  
Indeed, Judge Donato recently denied Helfand’s objections to the class settlement in another 
matter, joining other courts in finding that Helfand “was not a credible witness” and noting that 
“he has ‘been involved in 50 or 60 cases . . . as an objector or as an attorney for objectors.’”  
Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, No. 14-CV-00582-JD, 2021 WL 3053018, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. July 20, 2021).  Helfand’s objections here are similarly lacking in credibility.   
Notice Content.  Helfand asserts that the Notice “is misleading and violates due process” 
because it “implies, erroneously, that the judge overseeing this case is an Article III judge.”  
Helfand Obj. at 1.  Not so.  As all state court judges surely would attest, use of the honorific 
“Judge” without the prefix “Magistrate” simply does not “imply” appointment under Article III of 
the Federal Constitution—and presumably, those who care deeply about the distinction between 
Article III and Magistrate Judges would be the least likely to draw that inference.  Further, while 
the fact Judge Ryu is a Federal Magistrate Judge is not material for purposes of class notice, Class 
                                                 
16 See also https://apps.calbar.ca.gov/attorney/Licensee/Detail/206667 (last visited March 21, 
2022; showing Helfand’s license status as “Disbarred”).   
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Members are on notice of that fact here:  it is prominently disclosed in filings available on the 
settlement website,17 on this case’s public docket on PACER,18 on the Northern District of 
California’s website,19 and via simple internet searching.20  Helfand’s publicly filed objection 
(and now, this response) provides additional notice of that fact.  This more than satisfies the 
requirements of due process.21 
In any event, Helfand’s objection to the Notice is premised on a material 
misrepresentation of non-binding case law.  The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the consent of 
absent class members is not required for a magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction over a class 
settlement.  Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 846 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We conclude 
that the statute requires the consent of the named plaintiffs alone.”).  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
case on which Helfand relies is fully in accord.  See Williams, 159 F.3d at 269 (“[A]bsent class 
members are not ‘parties’ before the court in the sense of being able to direct the litigation.  
Instead, the named representative . . . is the ‘party’ to the lawsuit who acts on behalf of the entire 
class, including with regard to the decision to proceed before a magistrate judge.” (citations 
omitted)).  Perhaps for that reason, Rule 23 does not require parties to disclose whether the 
                                                 
17 For instance, the signature block for the Preliminary Approval Order conspicuously states 
“United States Magistrate Judge.”  ECF No. 153 at 36.  That Order is publicly available in the 
“IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS” tab of the settlement website, at 
https://plaidsettlement.com/important-documents.php. 
18 Question 33 on the “FAQs” tab of the settlement website (“How do I get more information?”) 
explicitly refers and links to the PACER system and provides the case number.  See 
https://plaidsettlement.com/frequently-asked-questions.php. 
19 See https://cand.uscourts.gov/judges/ryu-donna-m-dmr/. 
20 A Google search for “Judge Ryu,” for example, produces numerous results (and a header and a 
sidebar) identifying Donna M. Ryu as a “Magistrate Judge.”   
21 To borrow from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts:  “the 
Constitution does not require more to protect what must be the somewhat rare species of class 
member who is unwilling to” consent to magistrate jurisdiction, but for whom Article III “is 
nonetheless so important that he cannot be presumed to” have expended the bare minimum effort 
to determine whether the presiding judge is a magistrate.  472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985) (addressing 
the burden of executing an opt-out form).  The Williams case is not to the contrary:  the court 
stated that a class notice’s disclosure of adjudication by a “Magistrate Judge” would be sufficient 
to defeat a hypothetical challenge; it did not hold that such a disclosure was necessary.  See 
Williams v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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presiding judge is a magistrate judge in a notice of class settlement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(c)(2)(B) (listing what must be disclosed); see also id. advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment (“[M]andatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) . . . is designed to fulfill 
requirements of due process.”).   
Contrary to Helfand’s contention, the Seventh Circuit’s (non-binding) opinion in Williams 
did not write such a requirement into Rule 23.  Rather, Williams posits that an absent class 
member who challenges magistrate judge jurisdiction must make a showing that “the decision to 
consent [was not] made by a party who adequately represents (or represented) the absentee’s 
interests.”  Williams, 159 F.3d at 269–70; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (governing class 
representative adequacy).  Here, neither Helfand nor any other objector has even attempted to 
make such a showing.22  Thus, by Williams’s own terms, this objection should be overruled in its 
entirety. 
Attorneys’ Fees.  Helfand’s criticism of the requested fee award is similarly meritless.  
He asserts that a 3.29 multiplier is “excessive” based upon one Class Counsel firm’s utilization of 
partners with supposedly high hourly rates instead of associates.  Helfand tellingly does not take 
issue with the total amount of fees requested, the hours expended, or the hourly rates charged by 
attorneys with Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (“LCHB”) and Burns Charest LLP 
(“BC”).  Rather, he speculates that Herrera Kennedy LLP (“HK”)’s work was duplicative and 
criticizes the Court’s case management in appointing three firms as Class Counsel.  Helfand Obj. 
at 4–5.  As Class Counsel has explained, however, “[p]rosecution of this complex litigation 
required an enormous amount of work, effort, and expense” by each of the three Class Counsel 
                                                 
22 In parenthetical dicta, the court in Williams speculated that an absent class member “may” be 
entitled to have her challenge to the class representatives’ adequacy decided by an Article III 
judge.  159 F.3d at 269.  Even under its most charitable interpretation, therefore, Williams does 
not fashion a novel procedural mechanism for Helfand to “specifically request that this matter be 
referred back to an Article III judge for evaluation of fairness under Rule 23.”  See Helfand Obj. 
at 3.  If Helfand desired adjudication of his claims by an Article III judge, he could have opted out 
of the Settlement, filed his own claims against Plaid, and declined to consent to magistrate 
jurisdiction.  See Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing Williams and holding that “the absent class members in many class actions, including 
this one, could opt out of a settlement and not be bound by the judgment entered by a non-Article 
III judge”).  
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firms, who were “actively and personally involved” in litigating this case.  Dkt. 157-1 (Joint 
Decl.) ¶¶ 2–3.  The three Class Counsel firms are united in their belief that all of “the time 
expended in connection with this matter was necessary to ensure the success of the action and 
reasonable in amount, particularly given the result achieved by the Settlement and the novelty and 
complexity of the litigation.”  Id. ¶ 2.  
Further, HK partner and co-lead Class Counsel Shawn M. Kennedy was the first to 
investigate the underlying privacy violations alleged in this action, facts that did not arise from a 
public statement by Plaid, a news report, or a government investigation.  HK drew on Mr. 
Kennedy’s “extensive substantive knowledge regarding financial and other technology issues, 
having founded technology companies in the legal and financial technology industries.”  Dkt. 
51-2 ¶ 5.23  All three firms—not just two—worked closely together on strategy, briefing, oral 
argument, discovery, and settlement.24 
Finally, while Helfand makes much of the fact that HK did not employ lower-billing 
associates, he ignores the fact that Class Counsel’s work on this matter was shared among three 
firms that, from the outset, shared responsibility and divided tasks as appropriate.  The time 
submitted by LCHB and BC shows that associates from those firms handled a great deal of 
associate-level work for the Class Counsel team.  See Dkt. 157-1 (Joint Decl.), Exs. B & C. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court overrule the 
objections and grant final approval of the Settlement.   
 
                                                 
23 The rest of the HK team similarly have credentials that were important to the development and 
prosecution of this case.  For example, HK partner Nicomedes Sy Herrera has nearly 25 years of 
experience investigating and prosecuting a broad range of complex, high-impact class actions and 
qui tam suits each involving billions of dollars in damages, and Bret Hembd is an accomplished 
attorney who has litigated high-stakes consumer class actions and qui tam lawsuits in federal 
courts across the nation.  See Dkt. 157-1 ¶¶ 57–58.   
24 As this Court is aware, for example, Mr. Kennedy joined Ms. Geman in arguing the motion to 
dismiss and the motion for preliminary approval. 
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Dated:  March 21, 2022 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &  BERNSTEIN, LLP 
 
By: /s/ Rachel Geman            
       Rachel Geman 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & 
BERNSTEIN, LLP 
Rachel Geman (Pro Hac Vice) 
rgeman@lchb.com 
250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor 
New York, NY 10013-1413 
Tel: (212) 355-9500 
Fax: (212) 355-9592 
 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN &  
BERNSTEIN, LLP 
Michael W. Sobol (SBN 194857) 
msobol@lchb.com 
Melissa Gardner (SBN 289096) 
mgardner@lchb.com 
Michael K. Sheen (SBN 288284) 
msheen@lchb.com 
Nicholas R. Hartmann (SBN 301049) 
nhartmann@lchb.com 
275 Battery Street, 29th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 
Tel: (415) 956-1000 
Fax: (415) 956-1008 
 
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HERRERA KENNEDY LLP 
 
By: /s/ Shawn Kennedy 
 
Shawn M. Kennedy 
HERRERA KENNEDY LLP 
Shawn M. Kennedy (SBN 218472) 
skennedy@herrerakennedy.com  
Bret D. Hembd (SBN 272826) 
bhembd@herrerakennedy.com  
4590 MacArthur Blvd., Suite 500 
Newport Beach, CA 92660 
Telephone: (949) 936-0900 
Fax: (855) 969-2050 
 
HERRERA KENNEDY LLP 
Nicomedes Sy Herrera (SBN 275332) 
nherrera@herrerakennedy.com 
Laura E. Seidl (SBN 269891) 
lseidl@herrerakennedy.com 
1300 Clay Street, Suite 600 
Oakland, CA 94612 
Telephone: (510) 422-4700 
Fax: (855) 969-2050 
 
 
 
BURNS CHAREST LLP 
 
By:  /s/ Christopher Cormier  
 
 
Christopher J. Cormier 
 
BURNS CHAREST LLP 
Christopher J. Cormier (Pro Hac Vice) 
ccormier@burnscharest.com 
4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20016 
Tel: (202) 577-3977 
Fax: (469) 444-5002 
 
BURNS CHAREST LLP 
Warren T. Burns (Pro Hac Vice) 
wburns@burnscharest.com 
900 Jackson Street, Suite 500 
Dallas, TX 75202 
Tel: (469) 904-4550 
Fax: (469) 444-5002 
 
 
Co-Lead Class Counsel  
 
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