RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION by United States of America as to Kisha… — United States of America v. Sutton et al (Dkt. 284)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia · No. 2:24-cr-00192 · Doc. 284 · 2025-06-27 · Docket on CourtListener

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The government's response to defendant Kisha Sutton's motion to dismiss Counts One and Two for lack of venue in United States v. Sutton, No. 2:24-cr-00192, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, filed June 27, 2025 as Document 284. It recounts earlier venue motions, a May 20, 2025 order by Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn denying them, and the Court's ruling that those motions became moot under the Second Superseding Indictment. The response sets out venue law under 18 U.S.C. § 3237, 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i). It argues that Count One (aiding and abetting bank fraud) and Count Two (money laundering) allege conduct at or near Charleston, Kanawha County, and that disputed venue facts belong to the jury. The 21-page filing asks that the motion (ECF No. 264) be denied and ends with a certificate of service.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 
CHARLESTON 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL NO. 2:24-CR-00192 
 
 
KISHA SUTTON – 1 
 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KISHA SUTTON’S MOTION TO 
DISMISS COUNTS ONE AND TWO FOR LACK OF VENUE  
 
Comes now the United States of America, by Jonathan T. 
Storage, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of West Virginia, and files its response to defendant 
Kisha Sutton’s motion to dismiss for lack of venue (ECF No. 264). 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 8, 2025, the defendant filed ten separate motions to 
dismiss, collectively challenging venue for each of the then-
pending counts in the first Superseding Indictment. See ECF Nos. 
184-193. On May 15, 2025, the government filed its response to the 
ten motions to dismiss. ECF No. 201. On May 20, 2025, United States 
Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn held a hearing on the 
defendant’s motions. ECF No. 202. During that hearing, the 
defendant conceded that venue was properly alleged within the 
Southern District of West Virginia as to the former charge of 
conspiracy to commit bank fraud, but she maintained her venue 
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challenges as to aiding and abetting bank fraud.1 On May 20, 2025, 
Judge Aboulhosn entered an Order denying the defendant’s motions 
to dismiss.2  
On May 23, 2025, the defendant objected to Judge Aboulhosn’s 
Order denying her motions to dismiss, effectively appealing Judge 
Aboulhosn’s ruling. ECF No. 204. On May 28, 2025, the government 
responded to the defendant’s objections. ECF No. 216. On June 16, 
2025, the Court “terminated as moot” the defendant’s objections to 
Judge Aboulhosn’s order. ECF No. 257 at 2 (“Due to the substantive 
changes in the charges set forth in the Second Superseding 
Indictment, the Court finds that the Defendant’s pending motions 
to dismiss and objections are moot.”). 
On June 23, 2025, the defendant filed a new motion to dismiss, 
challenging venue as to both counts of the Second Superseding 
Indictment: (1) aiding and abetting bank fraud and (2) money 
laundering. ECF No. 264. 
II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
“When deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment for 
improper venue, the district court assesses only whether the 
 
1 The previous conspiracy charge was Count One of the Superseding Indictment; 
Counts Two through Ten charged the defendant with aiding and abetting bank 
fraud. ECF No. 68. 
2 The defendant’s motion as to Count One of the Superseding Indictment was 
deemed moot because of the defendant’s concession. ECF No. 203 at n.1.  
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allegations of the indictment, if true, would suffice to establish 
venue. The court may not, at this stage, consider evidence beyond 
the indictment.” United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 134 (4th 
Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted). Likewise, in an appeal 
from the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, 
the Fourth Circuit will not consider the evidence that was 
presented at trial. Id. at 134. 
“[T]he selection of venue in a bank fraud prosecution is 
governed by the general venue statute for federal criminal 
offenses, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3237.” United States v. Bankole, 
39 F. App’x 839, 842 (4th Cir. 2002). “Venue for a federal criminal 
prosecution is to be determined ‘from the nature of the crime 
alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.’” Id. 
at 842. 
“Venue must be determined from the nature of the crime 
alleged, determined by analyzing the conduct constituting the 
offense, and the location (or, if the crime is a continuing one, 
locations) of the commission of the criminal acts. If the crime 
consists of distinct parts, taking place in different localities, 
then venue is proper wherever any part can be proved to have taken 
place.” United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2001). 
“One of the elements of bank fraud is proof of a scheme to defraud.” 
Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
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Bank fraud is a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), 
and venue is proper wherever the offense was “begun, continued, or 
completed.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 36; see also Bankole, 39 F. App’x 
at 843 (“[The verdict] supports a finding that the bank fraud 
offense was begun in Maryland, continued into New Hampshire, and 
was completed in the Eastern District of Virginia.” (emphasis in 
original)); see also United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 822 
(5th Cir. 1997) (“Bank fraud, false statement, and money laundering 
offenses are ‘continuing’ offenses for purposes of § 3237.”). 
“A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series 
of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an 
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Where 
such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions, 
the offense is committed and cognizable in each.” United States v. 
Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (quoting with 
approval Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 F. 1 (8th Cir. 
1907), aff’d, 209 U.S. 56 (1908)). 
The Fourth Circuit has noted that “it was not always possible 
by the use of one analytical tool to discern the location of where 
a crime has been committed.” United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 
413, 417 (4th Cir. 1993), as amended (Jan. 5, 1994). “A review of 
relevant authorities demonstrates that there is no single defined 
policy or mechanical test to determine constitutional venue. 
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Rather, the test is best described as a substantial contacts rule 
that takes into account a number of factors—the site of the 
defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus 
of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each 
district for accurate factfinding.” Id. at 417 (quoting with 
approval United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
The Fourth Circuit has noted that an “examination of verbs 
employed in the statute is not an exclusive method [for determining 
venue] and ‘there are crimes where the situs is not so simple of 
definition.’” Cofield, 11 F.3d at 417. “[A]lthough the ‘verb test’ 
as an interpretative tool enjoys both the support of precedent 
from this circuit and the force of logic, its use to the exclusion 
of other interpretative guides would violate the overriding 
principle of United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699 (1946), that 
we must consider ‘the nature of the crime alleged and the location 
of the act or acts constituting it.’” Id. at 417 (superfluous 
citations omitted). 
“The Constitution does not limit venue for a crime to one 
exclusive district - it requires only that venue be determined 
from the nature of the crime and the location of the acts 
constituting it.” Cofield, 11 F.3d at 419. 
“[T]he submission of a venue question to a jury is a proper 
procedure when the facts underlying venue are disputed.” Bankole, 
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39 F. App’x 841; see also Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 
857 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that “the trial court erred in failing 
to submit the question of venue to the jury.”). At trial, “[t]he 
burden is on the Government to prove venue by a preponderance of 
the evidence.” United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 378 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
“For some offenses, there may be ‘more than one appropriate 
venue, or even a venue in which the defendant has never set foot.’” 
United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2005). 
“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, 
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. To convict a defendant 
of being an aider and abettor, the government must show that the 
defendant’s conduct amounted to counseling, assisting, or 
facilitating the commission of a federal crime. See United States 
v. Honeycutt, 311 F.2d 660, 662 (4th Cir. 1962). 
“An aider and abettor may be prosecuted in the district in 
which the principal acted in furtherance of the substantive crime.” 
United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1982); see 
also United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(recognizing that 18 U.S.C. § 2 “has been construed to permit the 
prosecution of an aider and abettor not only in the district in 
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which he committed the accessorial acts but also in the district 
where the substantive crime was committed.”).  
A prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 may be brought in “any 
district in which the financial or monetary transaction is 
conducted.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(A). “For purposes of [§ 1956], a 
transfer of funds from [one] place to another, by wire or any other 
means, shall constitute a single, continuing transaction. Any 
person who conducts (as that term is defined in subsection (c)(2)) 
any portion of the transaction may be charged in any district in 
which the transaction takes place.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(3). “[T]he 
term ‘conducts’ includes initiating, concluding, or participating 
in initiating, or concluding a transaction.” 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(c)(2). 
A person directing others to move money “conducts” a financial 
transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 830 
(4th Cir. 2000) (defendant aided and abetted § 1957 offense when 
he directed third party to purchase cashier’s checks); United 
States v. Smith, 824 F. App’x. 508, 511 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(“sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that 
[defendant] was the source of money” sent in wire transfer; while 
defendant did not make transfer himself, he called co-conspirator 
“with the information needed to retrieve the money from Wells 
Fargo, told [co-conspirator] that the transfer was to reimburse 
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[co-conspirator] for drugs he smuggled to [defendant] in prison, 
and gave [co-conspirator] the identity of person transferring the 
money”); United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 276–77 (5th Cir. 
2001) (defendant who never handled money, but was one of several 
who planned sale of drugs and delivery of proceeds to original 
source, was guilty of conducting transaction); United States v. 
Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2000) (defendant conducts 
transaction when he directs third party  to withdraw cash from a 
bank, or to send him a check); United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 
381, 389 (5th Cir. 1995) (defendant conducted transaction where he 
asked associate to open bank account and associate deposited checks 
from victims and wired proceeds to defendant’s personal account). 
A receiver of wired funds “conducts” a transaction for the 
purposes of the money laundering venue provision. See United States 
v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1125 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding a money 
laundering conviction where the defendant was the recipient of 
money transfers from Tennessee to Florida.). 
An aider and abettor of money laundering is not “required to 
be in possession of the money as it was being laundered.” United 
States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995). 
III. 
DISCUSSION  
The defendant’s legal arguments regarding venue as applied to 
the charges now pending in this case are wrong. The government has 
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sufficiently pleaded venue for both charges contained within the 
Second Superseding Indictment, and dismissing the charges against 
the defendant on venue grounds pre-trial would be premature.  
A. 
Venue Allegations  
Dismissal of the charges at this stage of the proceedings is 
premature, as the government has sufficiently alleged venue in 
this district. “When deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss an 
indictment for improper venue, the district court assesses only 
whether the allegations of the indictment, if true, would suffice 
to establish venue.” Powers, 40 F.4th at 134 (internal citation 
omitted). 
Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment alleges: 
From no later than on or about April 19, 2021, and 
continuing until at least on or about May 21, 2021, at 
or near Charleston, Kanawha County, West Virginia, 
within the Southern District of West Virginia and 
elsewhere, defendants KISHA SUTTON and SHAMIESE WRIGHT, 
aided and abet[ed] by each other, did knowingly execute 
and attempt to execute a scheme to defraud Financial 
Institution 1 and obtain money owned by and under the 
custody and control of Financial Institution 1 by means 
of 
materially 
false 
and 
fraudulent 
pretenses, 
representations, and promises. 
 
This language, on its face, sufficiently alleges venue in the 
Southern District of West Virginia. The Court should not look to 
evidence 
and 
argument 
beyond 
the 
charging 
document 
when 
considering challenges to venue at the pre-trial stage. Powers, 40 
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F.4th at 134 (“The court may not, at this stage, consider evidence 
beyond the indictment.”). 
 
The same is true for Count Two: the government has 
sufficiently alleged venue, and the Court should not dismiss the 
charges for lack of venue at the pre-trial stage. Count Two alleges 
that the financial transaction at issue was conducted at or near 
Charleston, Kanawha County, West Virginia, within the Southern 
District of West Virginia and elsewhere. No plainer allegation of 
venue can be made here. 
It is the government’s task of proving venue at trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Robinson, 275 F.3d at 378. And “the 
submission of a venue question to a jury is a proper procedure 
when the facts underlying venue are disputed.” Bankole, 39 F. App’x 
841; see also Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 
1962) (holding that “the trial court erred in failing to submit 
the question of venue to the jury.”). 
Because the government has sufficiently alleged venue and 
because venue challenges raise factual questions to be decided by 
the jury, the Court should deny the defendant’s motion on these 
grounds, alone.  
B. 
Venue for Bank Fraud  
As discussed above, diving into the anticipated trial 
evidence is inappropriate at this phase of the proceedings. 
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Nevertheless, the government submits that the evidence in this 
case will sufficiently prove venue in the Southern District of 
West Virginia.  
Bank fraud is a continuing offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), 
and venue is proper wherever the offense was “begun, continued, or 
completed.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 36; see also Bankole, 39 F. App’x 
at 843 (“[The verdict] supports a finding that the bank fraud 
offense was begun in Maryland, continued into New Hampshire, and 
was completed in the Eastern District of Virginia.” (emphasis in 
original)); see also United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 822 
(5th Cir. 1997) (“Bank fraud, false statement, and money laundering 
offenses are ‘continuing’ offenses for purposes of § 3237.”). 
“A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series 
of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an 
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Where 
such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions, 
the offense is committed and cognizable in each.” United States v. 
Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (quoting with 
approval Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 F. 1 (8th Cir. 
1907), aff’d, 209 U.S. 56 (1908)). 
Accoridngly, a bank fraud scheme can occur over a period of 
time and in more than one place or jurisdiction.  
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The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the commission 
of bank fraud is a discrete, singular event. In fact, during the 
hearing before Judge Aboulhosn on the previous motions to dismiss, 
counsel for the defendant asserted that it was the “clicking of 
the mouse” in New Jersey (the submission of the fraudulent PPP 
loan) that was the beginning, middle, and end of the bank fraud 
scheme. In fact, the defendant claims, “The fact that it is alleged 
that Ms. Sutton and Ms. Wright devised a scheme to defraud is 
irrelevant.” ECF No. 264 at 5. Further, the defendant states, “[I]t 
is irrelevant that Ms. Wright may have sent Ms. Sutton $3,000 [] 
as a kickback, because the crime of bank fraud had already been 
completed at the point where she submitted the false application.” 
ECF No. 264 at 5. The case law addressing bank fraud simply does 
not support such a conclusion.  
 “One of the elements of bank fraud is proof of a scheme to 
defraud.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 36 (emphasis added). In a bank fraud 
prosecution, the “scheme to defraud” is the offense conduct, and 
the United States Supreme Court has said as much. In examining the 
ways in which Congress changed the common law application of the 
certain fraud offenses (to include mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
bank fraud), the Supreme Court observed that by enacting the fraud 
statutes, Congress prohibited “the scheme to defraud, rather than 
the completed fraud.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) 
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(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). This makes sense 
because Congress punishes bank fraud, attempted bank fraud, and 
conspiracy to commit bank fraud exactly the same. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1344 & 1349 (demonstrating that the same penalties apply, whether 
the scheme is executed, attempted, or agreed be executed or 
attempted by two or more people (conspiracy)).   
 Of course, one cannot execute a scheme without first having 
devised a scheme. It follows, then, that the defendant is wrong 
when she argues that any bank fraud scheming that occurred between 
herself and defendant Shamiese Wright is irrelevant to issues of 
venue. 
The defendant dogmatically recites case law discussing 
“essential conduct” elements of an offense in the context of venue 
determination. Yes, the case law supports such an inquiry when the 
nature of the offense charged calls for it, but the defendant 
ignores caselaw in this circuit that discredits a uniform approach 
to evaluating venue. The Fourth Circuit has noted that “it was not 
always possible by the use of one analytical tool to discern the 
location of where a crime has been committed.” Cofield, 11 F.3d at 
417.  
For example, the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “For some 
offenses, there may be ‘more than one appropriate venue, or even 
a venue in which the defendant has never set foot.’” Ebersole, 411 
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F.3d at 524 (emphasis added). “The Constitution does not limit 
venue for a crime to one exclusive district - it requires only 
that venue be determined from the nature of the crime and the 
location of the acts constituting it.” Cofield, 11 F.3d at 419. 
“A review of relevant authorities demonstrates that there is 
no single defined policy or mechanical test to determine 
constitutional venue. Rather, the test is best described as a 
substantial contacts rule that takes into account a number of 
factors—the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature 
of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and 
the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.” Id. at 
417 (quoting with approval United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 
481 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
Simply put, venue is evaluated circumstantially. “Venue must 
be determined from the nature of the crime alleged, determined by 
analyzing the conduct constituting the offense, and the location 
(or, if the crime is a continuing one, locations) of the commission 
of the criminal acts. If the crime consists of distinct parts, 
taking place in different localities, then venue is proper wherever 
any part can be proved to have taken place.” Scott, 270 F.3d at 35 
(emphasis added).  
As discussed, bank fraud is a continuing offense, and one of 
the elements of the offense is devising a scheme to defraud. The 
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offense may be stretched over a period of time and may implicate 
multiple judicial districts. The defendant’s alleged scheme to 
defraud devised with defendant Shamiese Wright is absolutely 
relevant and binds the defendant to the Southern District of West 
Virginia.  
The fact that the defendant was charged with aiding and 
abetting bank fraud more concretely connects the defendant to this 
district. “Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its 
commission, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. To 
convict a defendant of being an aider and abettor, the government 
must show that the defendant’s conduct amounted to counseling, 
assisting, or facilitating the commission of a federal crime. See 
United States v. Honeycutt, 311 F.2d 660, 662 (4th Cir. 1962). “An 
aider and abettor may be prosecuted in the district in which the 
principal acted in furtherance of the substantive crime.” United 
States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1982); see also 
United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1972) 
(recognizing that 18 U.S.C. § 2 “has been construed to permit the 
prosecution of an aider and abettor not only in the district in 
which he committed the accessorial acts but also in the district 
where the substantive crime was committed.”).  
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The defendant would have the Court rule that, no matter how 
much a bank fraud scheme is developed in or connected to a 
particular  district, the “execution” of the scheme may only occur 
in one place.3 As the defendant’s argument goes, every act taken 
in furtherance of the scheme is mere preparation. This position is 
simply not the law.  
As charged in this case, defendants Sutton and Wright aided 
and abetted one another to execute the fraud scheme. The defendant 
could not have a submitted a PPP loan on defendant Wright’s behalf 
without her personal information, including her Social Security 
Number, date of birth, and bank account information. Likewise, 
defendant Wright would not have received the fraudulent loan 
proceeds in Charleston, West Virginia, without the defendant’s 
submission of the loan documents. And without defendant Wright’s 
participation, the defendant would not have received her kickback 
payment from Charleston, West Virginia, to the defendant in New 
 
3 The defendant bends over backwards to maneuver around the fact that bank fraud 
is a continuing offense by citing Bankole, 39 F. App’x at 843, for the 
proposition that the wire/server transactions from one district to another is 
what matters for venue, as that is a part of the “execution” of the offense. 
See ECF No. 264 at 6. But the defendant is mistaken. The defendant cannot 
shoehorn a bank fraud case into a wire fraud case. While wire transactions can 
be relevant in a bank fraud case, bank fraud is not limited to the use of an 
interstate wire, as wire fraud obviously is. Bank fraud can be committed in a 
multitude of ways, including transactions involving no electronic communication 
whatsoever. The fact that bank and third-party processor servers do not exist 
in this district is of no moment.   
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Jersey. The point being, the execution of the bank fraud scheme 
was, in part, executed in the Southern District of West Virginia.  
Venue exists in this district for both defendants for the 
aiding and abetting bank fraud charge: (1) the scheme to defraud 
was conceived and developed in this district, (2) the person whose 
name is on the loan resided in this district at the time the loan 
was submitted & approved, (3) the proceeds from the fraudulent 
loan were received and used by defendant Wright in this district, 
and defendant Wright transmitted kickback payments to the 
defendant from this district.  
In short, the scheme was partially executed in this district, 
and the nature of the offense permits venue to exist is more than 
one place. Bankole, 39 F. App’x at 842 (“Venue for a federal 
criminal prosecution is to be determined ‘from the nature of the 
crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting 
it.’”); see also, Scott, 270 F.3d at 35 (“Venue must be determined 
from the nature of the crime alleged, determined by analyzing the 
conduct constituting the offense, and the location (or, if the 
crime is a continuing one, locations) of the commission of the 
criminal acts. If the crime consists of distinct parts, taking 
place in different localities, then venue is proper wherever any 
part can be proved to have taken place.”).  
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Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
venue as to Count One should be denied.  
C. 
Venue for Money Laundering  
At the outset, the government notes that in her motion, the 
defendant did not make any legal arguments against venue as to 
Count Two, despite moving to dismiss that count. Nevertheless, 
venue is properly alleged and supported by the law.  
As discussed above, for the purpose of assessing a pre-trial 
venue challenge, the Court should take as true the allegations 
contained within the charging document. Powers, 40 F.4th at 134. 
Here, the government has sufficiently alleged that defendants 
Sutton and Wright, within the Southern District of West Virginia 
and elsewhere, aided and abetting each other in conducting a 
financial transaction that (1) involved proceeds of a specified 
unlawful activity and (2) was made to conceal or disguise the 
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of 
the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.  
The fact that the defendant may have been residing in New 
Jersey when the kickback payment was made does not shield her. A 
receiver of wired funds “conducts” a transaction for the purposes 
of the money laundering venue provision. See Elder, 90 F.3d at 
1125 (upholding a money laundering conviction where the defendant 
was the recipient of money transfers from Tennessee to Florida.). 
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Moreover, while anticipated evidence at trial should not be 
a consideration for a venue challenge at this stage of the 
proceedings, 
the 
government 
proffers 
that 
it 
anticipates 
introducing at trial evidence showing that the defendant provided 
specific instructions on how she wanted to receive her kickback 
payments. Such evidence, alone, would establish venue in this 
district because a person directing others to move money “conducts” 
a financial transaction. See, e.g., Butler, 211 F.3d at 830 
(defendant aided and abetted § 1957 offense when he directed third 
party to purchase cashier’s checks); Smith, 824 F. App’x. at 511 
(“sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that 
[defendant] was the source of money” sent in wire transfer; while 
defendant did not make transfer himself, he called co-conspirator 
“with the information needed to retrieve the money from Wells 
Fargo, told [co-conspirator] that the transfer was to reimburse 
[co-conspirator] for drugs he smuggled to [defendant] in prison, 
and gave [co-conspirator] the identity of person transferring the 
money”); Delgado, 256 F.3d at 276–77 (defendant who never handled 
money, but was one of several who planned sale of drugs and 
delivery of proceeds to original source, was guilty of conducting 
transaction); Prince, 214 F.3d at 748 (defendant conducts 
transaction when he directs third party  to withdraw cash from a 
bank, or to send him a check); Sneed, 63 F.3d at 389 (defendant 
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20 
 
conducted transaction where he asked associate to open bank account 
and associate deposited checks from victims and wired proceeds to 
defendant’s personal account). 
Accordingly, the government requests that the defendant’s 
venue challenge as to Count Two be denied. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION  
Because the government has sufficiently alleged venue in the 
charging document as to both Count One and Count Two, the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 264) should be denied.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
LISA G. JOHNSTON 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
s/Jonathan T. Storage            
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV State Bar No. 12279 
300 Virginia Street, East 
Room 4000 
Charleston, WV 25301 
Telephone: 304-345-2200 
Fax: 304-347-5104 
E-mail: Jonathan.Storage@usdoj.gov  
 
 
Case 2:24-cr-00192     Document 284     Filed 06/27/25     Page 20 of 21 PageID #: 1407

21 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
It is hereby certified that the foregoing “GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KISHA SUTTON’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS ONE 
AND TWO FOR LACK OF VENUE” has been electronically filed and 
service has been made on opposing counsel by virtue of electronic 
mail this the 27th day of June, 2025, to: 
 
Connor D. Robertson, Esq. 
2702 Main Street 
Hurricane, WV 25526 
Email: cdr@croblaw.com 
 
 
Michelle R. Fox, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF MICHELLE ROMAN FOX 
3359 Teays Valley Road 
Hurricane, WV 25526 
Email: michellefox@smithlawpllc.net 
 
 
 
 
s/Jonathan T. Storage            
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV State Bar No. 12279 
300 Virginia Street, East 
Room 4000 
Charleston, WV 25301 
Telephone: 304-345-2200 
Fax: 304-347-5104 
E-mail: Jonathan.Storage@usdoj.gov  
 
 
 
 
 
Case 2:24-cr-00192     Document 284     Filed 06/27/25     Page 21 of 21 PageID #: 1408

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