RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION by United States of America as to Kisha… — United States of America v. Sutton et al (Dkt. 289)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia · No. 2:24-cr-00192 · Doc. 289 · 2025-06-28 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The government's response in opposition to defendant Kisha Sutton's motion in limine to exclude evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in United States of America v. Sutton et al, No. 2:24-cr-00192, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, filed June 28, 2025 as Doc. 289. Filed by an Assistant United States Attorney, it asks the Court to deny the motion (ECF No. 263). It argues that evidence linking the defendant to other PPP loan applications, including IP addresses, loan applications, DocuSign records and bank and CashApp records, is intrinsic to the charged bank fraud scheme. It argues in the alternative that the evidence meets the Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 standards, and that the government gave sufficient pretrial notice. The response is 19 pages with a certificate of service.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 
CHARLESTON 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL NO. 2:24-CR-00192-1 
 
 
KISHA SUTTON – 1 
 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO  
DEFENDANT KISHA SUTTON’S MOTION IN LIMINE 
 TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS PURSUANT 
TO RULES 4O3 AND 404(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
Comes now the United States of America, by Jonathan T. 
Storage, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of West Virginia, and files its response to defendant 
Kisha Sutton’s motion to exclude potential Rule 404(b) evidence. 
ECF No. 263. For the reasons stated herein, the government 
respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion. 
I. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not 
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character or trait.” Fed. R. Evid. 
404(a)(1). “The Rule 404(b) inquiry . . . applies only to evidence 
of other acts that are ‘extrinsic to the one charged.’” United 
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009). 
“Rule 404(b) . . . protects against the introduction of 
extrinsic act evidence when that evidence is offered solely to 
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prove character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
“[A]acts intrinsic to the alleged crime do not fall under 
Rule 404(b)’s limitations on admissible evidence.” United States 
v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87–88 (4th Cir. 1996). 
“Evidence of uncharged conduct is not ‘other crimes’ evidence 
subject to Rule 404 if the uncharged conduct ‘arose out of the 
same series of transactions as the charged offense, or if [evidence 
of the uncharged conduct] is necessary to complete the story of 
the crime on trial.’” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 316 
(4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Cooper, 
482 F.3d 658, 663 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that evidence of bad 
acts that “provide[s] context relevant to the criminal charges” is 
admissible without consideration of the requirements of Rule 404); 
see also United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 
2000) (evidence of other criminal acts admissible without regard 
to Rule 404(b) where the evidence “served to complete the story” 
of the charged crimes). 
“[E]vidence of transactions and conduct not charged is 
relevant to proving the existence of and the boundaries of the 
conspiracy or scheme.” United States v. Bajoghli, 785 F.3d 957, 
963 (4th Cir. 2015). “[A]ll executions of a scheme [] need not be 
charged.” Id. at 963 (citing United States v. Pless, 79 F.3d 1217, 
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3 
 
1220 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“That the government chose to charge as the 
execution of the scheme only the three deposits in National [Bank] 
does not reduce the boundaries of the scheme, which the statute 
requires the government to prove. . . . [I]t is not necessary for 
the government to charge every single act of execution of the 
scheme in order to prove the whole scheme.”)). 
“[B]ecause evidence of conduct not charged in a specific 
execution may be relevant to the nature and scope of a scheme . . 
., such evidence is intrinsic to the ‘scheme’ element, and Rule 
404(b) therefore does not . . . regulate it as ‘other bad acts’ 
evidence.” Bajoghli, 785 F.3d at 964 (citing United States v. 
Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 832 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen ‘other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts’ evidence is relevant to establishing an element 
of the offense, Rule 404(b) is not even implicated.”)).  
Even when a prior act is not intrinsic, the “evidence may be 
admissible 
for 
another 
purpose, 
such 
as 
proving 
motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
A district court’s “discretion must be balanced by the need 
to give the government adequate latitude to prove its case.” 
Bajoghli, 785 F.3d 964. 
“Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment 
of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue 
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involves the actor’s state of mind and the only means of 
ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from 
conduct.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685. 
The government is required to give advanced notice of its 
intended use of Rule 404(b) evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). 
Specifically, the government is required to “(A) provide 
reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends 
to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
meet it; (B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for 
which the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the 
reasoning that supports the purpose; and (C) do so in writing 
before trial--or in any form during trial if the court, for good 
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). 
“To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be ‘(1) 
relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) 
reliable.’” Siegel, 536 F.3d at 317. 
“In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant 
only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and 
that the defendant was the actor.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689. 
When “other crime” evidence is shown to establish a modus 
operandi, it is admissible under Rule 404(b). Siegel, 536 F.3d at 
318; see also United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 
1997) (“[T]he more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical 
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similarity or mental state) to the act being proved, the more 
relevant it becomes.”). 
“Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also 
satisfy Rule 403’s requirement.” Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319. “Under 
this rule, ‘damage to a defendant’s case is not a basis for 
excluding probative evidence,’ because ‘evidence that is highly 
probative invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.’” Basham, 
561 F.3d at 326 (quoting Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 833). 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
The defendant’s motion should be denied because (A) the 
government’s proposed evidence is intrinsic to the charged bank 
fraud scheme and does not implicate Rule 404(b); (B) even if the 
Court determines that some or all of the proposed evidence 
constitutes extrinsic “other bad acts” evidence, the proposed 
evidence sufficiently meets the rule’s standards, Fourth Circuit 
case law, and Rule 403 considerations; and (C) the government 
provided sufficient notice under the rules.    
A. 
The government’s proposed evidence is intrinsic to the 
bank fraud scheme; thus, Rule 404(b) does not apply. 
 
At the outset, the government submits that it provided pre-
trial Rule 404(b) notice out of an abundance of caution, as the 
government believes that the proposed evidence is, in fact, 
intrinsic to the charged conduct. The government did not want to 
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assume what the Court would decide at trial regarding the nature 
of the evidence and thus risk having its evidence (Rule 404(b) or 
otherwise) excluded for lack of notice.   
The government notified the defendants that it intends to 
present evidence linking defendant Kisha Sutton to the PPP loans 
applied for and received in the names of Lydia Spencer, Cylena 
Sutton, Rahmel Meekins, William Powell, Damisha Brown, and Jasmine 
Spencer. The evidence includes internet protocol addresses (“IP 
addresses”), Verizon subscriber information, IRS Form 1040-
Schedules C, PPP loan applications, DocuSign records, bank account 
records, CashApp account records and the like.  
This evidence includes expected witness testimony from 
cooperating witnesses who have already pleaded guilty before the 
Court and have stipulated to Kisha Sutton’s involvement in a wide-
ranging bank fraud scheme. See United States v. Lydia Spencer, 
Case No. 2:23-cr-00118; United States v. William Powell, Case No. 
2:24-cr-00192-5; United States v. Damisha Brown, Case No. 2:24-
cr-00192-6; and United States v. Jasmine Spencer, Case No. 2:24-
cr-00192-7. 
The evidence will show that defendant Kisha Sutton and others 
conspired to perpetrate a bank fraud scheme and then executed on 
their devised scheme. Evidence about Lydia Spencer, William 
Powell, Jasmine Spencer, and Damisha Brown’s fraudulent PPP loans 
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is intrinsic to the charged crimes here because their conduct was 
a part of the same scheme to defraud, with defendant Kisha Sutton 
in the middle of it all. The government’s evidence will show that 
the same IP address was used to submit fraudulent PPP loans for 
Lydia Spencer, Jasmine Spencer, William Powell, Damisha Brown, and 
defendant Shamiese Wright. Moreover, as to these individuals, the 
government’s evidence will show that the scheme to defraud was 
executed in identical fashion: Defendant Sutton received personal 
information from aiders and abettors residing in West Virginia, 
she created loan applications from her registered IP address in 
New Jersey, she filled in materially false but identical 
information on each loan application, and she instructed her fellow 
aiders and abettors on how to compensate her for the role she 
played in the scheme. This information is necessary to tell the 
complete story of the defendant’s fraud scheme.  
The Fourth Circuit recognizes the importance of allowing the 
government to present evidence of acts that were a part of the 
overall scheme but not specifically charged. “[E]vidence of 
transactions and conduct not charged is relevant to proving the 
existence of and the boundaries of the conspiracy or scheme.” 
United States v. Bajoghli, 785 F.3d 957, 963 (4th Cir. 2015). 
“[A]ll executions of a scheme [] need not be charged.” Id. at 963 
(citing United States v. Pless, 79 F.3d 1217, 1220 (D.C.Cir.1996) 
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(“That the government chose to charge as the execution of the 
scheme only the three deposits in National [Bank] does not reduce 
the boundaries of the scheme, which the statute requires the 
government to prove. . . . [I]t is not necessary for the government 
to charge every single act of execution of the scheme in order to 
prove the whole scheme.”)). 
At trial, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud. United 
States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2001). (“One of the 
elements of bank fraud is proof of a scheme to defraud.”). 
“[B]ecause evidence of conduct not charged in a specific execution 
may be relevant to the nature and scope of a scheme . . ., such 
evidence is intrinsic to the ‘scheme’ element, and Rule 404(b) 
therefore does not . . . regulate it as ‘other bad acts’ evidence.” 
Bajoghli, 785 F.3d at 964.  
The government’s evidence showing that defendant Kisha Sutton 
applied for multiple PPP loans within essentially the same 
timeframe in spring 2021 and executed on the same scheme to defraud 
in the same manner is highly relevant and exceedingly probative to 
this case. In such instances, the Fourth Circuit has held that 
“when ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ evidence is relevant to 
establishing an element of the offense, Rule 404(b) is not even 
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implicated.” United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 832 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
The government’s use of cooperating witness testimony and 
corroborating evidence to show that defendant Kisha Sutton and 
defendant Shamiese Wright were a part of a wide-ranging, singular 
scheme to defraud is not only relevant to the case, but the 
evidence is also intrinsic to it - intertwined so tightly by common 
facts and circumstances as to render the parties involved nearly 
interchangeable. For example, testimony from Lydia Spencer is 
expected to link defendants Sutton and Wright together, as Ms. 
Spencer connected defendant Wright with defendant Sutton for the 
purpose of engaging in the bank fraud scheme. Such evidence is 
matter-of-factly intrinsic.  
The Court should conclude that the evidence the government 
noticed as Rule 404(b), which was noticed as a precautionary 
measure, is truly intrinsic to the scheme to defraud at the center 
of this case. The defendant’s motion should be denied.  
B. 
The government’s proposed evidence satisfies Rule 404(b) 
because it is relevant to an issue other than character, 
necessary to the government’s case, and reliable. 
 
“To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be ‘(1) 
relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) 
reliable.’” Siegel, 536 F.3d at 317. 
 
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1. Non-character Purpose 
The government has made no suggestion that it plans to use 
the challenged evidence to prove the defendant’s character. “Rule 
404(b) . . . protects against the introduction of extrinsic act 
evidence when that evidence is offered solely to prove character.” 
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added). Rather, the 
government notified the defendant that it intended to use the 
evidence for permissible purposes, including proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident. 
The permitted uses of evidence under Rule 404(b) largely 
overlap. For instance, if the government can show that a defendant 
engaged in a particular or specific modus operandi (“M.O.”), the 
permitted use of the M.O. evidence comes from linking the defendant 
to matters of identity, knowledge, plan, preparation, intent, lack 
of accident, etc. 1  When “other crime” evidence is shown to 
establish an M.O., it is admissible under Rule 404(b). Siegel, 536 
F.3d at 318. In fact, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that “the 
more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical similarity or 
 
1 For example, in the popular 1990 film, “Home Alone,” Marv, a bungling burglar, 
established an M.O. by leaving faucets running in his victims’ houses to cause 
flooding. As he was being arrested at the end of the film, one police officer 
quips, “Nice move. Always leaving the water running? Now we know each and every 
house you’ve hit.” Proud of having established his calling card, Marv confirms 
his association with “The Wet Bandits.”  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QhaICfThNGw (last visited June 27, 2025). 
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mental state) to the act being proved, the more relevant it 
becomes.” Queen, 132 F.3d at 997 (emphasis added). 
Should the Court determine that the other PPP loans are “other 
bad acts” such that Rule 404(b) is implicated, the government 
submits that because the other acts were carried out in exactly 
the same way and over the same period of time, those acts establish 
M.O. evidence, which satisfies Rule 404(b)’s requirements. See 
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689 (“In the Rule 404(b) context, similar 
act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude 
that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.”). 
2. Necessary Evidence  
Additionally, the evidence is necessary for the government’s 
case. If the government is limited to showing the jury only the 
interactions between defendant Sutton and defendant Wright, the 
jury would be kept away from compelling and consistent evidence 
demonstrating that what occurred as between defendants Sutton and 
Wright was no accident, no case of mistaken identity, etc. The 
M.O. was the same, and each fraudulent loan had at least one person 
in common: defendant Sutton.  
A district court’s “discretion must be balanced by the need 
to give the government adequate latitude to prove its case.” 
Bajoghli, 785 F.3d 964. “Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical 
to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, 
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especially when that issue involves the actor’s state of mind and 
the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing 
inferences from conduct.” Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685. 
3. Reliable  
The proposed evidence is also reliable. Much of it is self-
authenticating business record evidence from such sources as 
banks, internet service providers, mortgage lenders, and financial 
technology companies. Additionally, anticipated witness testimony 
is expected to be consistent with statements made in Stipulations 
of Fact and statements made while under oath at plea hearings 
before the Court.  
The government’s proposed evidence is relevant to issues not 
related to the defendant’s character, the evidence is necessary, 
and the evidence is reliable. Siegel, 536 F.3d at 317. Accordingly, 
the government has satisfied Rule 404(b)’s requirements, as 
interpreted by the Fourth Circuit.  
4. Rule 403 
“Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must also 
satisfy Rule 403’s requirement.” Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319. “Under 
this rule, ‘damage to a defendant’s case is not a basis for 
excluding probative evidence,’ because ‘evidence that is highly 
probative invariably will be prejudicial to the defense.’” Basham, 
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561 F.3d at 326 (quoting Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 833) (emphasis 
added). 
The government’s proposed evidence would neither mislead the 
jury nor confuse the issues. The evidence is a critical part of 
the government’s case to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant knowingly executed a bank fraud scheme as charged. 
“Once it is recognized that evidence is probative of an element of 
the crime charged, ‘the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in 
favor of admissibility, and evidence should be excluded only 
sparingly.’” Bajoghli, 785 F.3d at 966 (quoting United States v. 
Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996))(emphasis added). 
In Bajoghli, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 because the lower court’s 
ruling reflected “a misunderstanding of what constitutes unfair 
prejudice under Rule 403.” 785 F.3d at 966 (emphasis in original). 
The Court declared that “unfair prejudice ‘speaks to the capacity 
of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into 
declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the 
offense charged.’” Id. at 966 (quoting Basham, 561 F.3d at 327) 
(emphasis in original).  
The government’s proposed evidence would not “lure” the jury 
into convicting the defendant on some ground different from what 
the proof elements of the charged offenses are. As such, the 
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government’s evidence is not “unfair;” but the government 
recognizes it would damage the defendant’s case. So be it. Basham, 
561 F.3d at 326 (stating that damage to a defendant’s case is not 
a basis for excluding probative evidence).2 
The probative value of the proposed evidence significantly 
outweighs any unfair prejudice that might result. But more 
specifically, the government submits that the use of the proposed 
evidence would not be unfair and would not confuse or mislead the 
jury. Rather, the evidence completes the whole story about what 
the defendant did. 
C. 
The government has provided sufficient notice of its 
intended use of any Rule 404(b) evidence.  
 
The government is required to give advanced notice of its 
intended use of Rule 404(b) evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). 
Specifically, the government is required to “(A) provide 
reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends 
to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
meet it; (B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for 
 
2 Of note, the defendant provides no reasoning for her Rule 403 challenge to 
the government’s proposed evidence. In fact, her entire Rule 403 argument is 
contained in just one sentence: “Ms. Sutton challenges the proposed 404(b) 
evidence as being irrelevant, non-probative to any issue in the case, or its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” ECF No. 263 at 7. The defendant’s 
blanket, one sentence Rule 403 challenge contained in an 8-page filing should 
not be taken seriously.  
 
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which the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the 
reasoning that supports the purpose; and (C) do so in writing 
before trial--or in any form during trial if the court, for good 
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3).  
The government has complied with the rule. The defendant cites 
to the Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Hall, 885 F.3d 254 
(4th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that the government must 
identify each proper purpose for its evidence and specifically fit 
the evidence into a chain of inferences that it puts into a written 
notice. ECF No. 263 at 3. But such a detailed, inference-based 
approach is not appropriate when the proposed Rule 404(b) evidence 
is directly tied in time, place, and manner to the charged conduct.  
In United States v. Bell, police executed a “no-knock” warrant 
at a house in Maryland. 901 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 2018). “In the 
basement, where Bell was found, officers found approximately 112 
grams of heroin and various drug-trafficking paraphernalia, 
including a digital scale, empty pill capsules, a capsule-filling 
device, and bottles of cutting agents.” Id. at 460. Officers “also 
found a loaded rifle magazine that was compatible with the Mini-
14 Ruger rifle. In the master bedroom upstairs, the officers found 
in a nightstand several more grams of heroin, another scale, 
approximately $2,000 in cash, a letter addressed to Bell, and 
Bell’s driver’s license.” Id. at 460.  
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Four months later, Bell was arrested in Washington, D.C. 
Officers found Bell with a loaded Glock pistol, as well as 
approximately $1,000 in cash in a vehicle he had been sitting in. 
Id. at 460. Officers also found several small baggies of marijuana, 
heroin, and crack cocaine in the car’s center console. Id. at 460.  
In Bell’s trial for the offenses discovered during the 
execution of the search warrant, the district court permitted the 
introduction of the Washington arrest as Rule 404(b) evidence. The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling and distinguished 
the case from  Hall, 885 F.3d 254.  
The Fourth Circuit noted in Bell that the proposed evidence 
against Hall was much different:  
The prior convictions, however, all predated the 
offenses in Hall’s indictment by at least five years, 
and the government provided only the date and statutory 
citation of each conviction without offering any other 
information regarding the circumstances giving rise to 
the convictions. We held that the district court had 
abused its discretion because the defendant’s criminal 
history was either irrelevant to the purpose for which 
it had been admitted or, for certain purposes, so 
marginally relevant and unduly prejudicial as to violate 
Rule 403. Our holding in Hall, however, is far afield, 
as the evidence admitted there was the bare fact of the 
defendant’s convictions from more than a half-decade 
before. In this case, by contrast, the evidence at issue 
is the defendant’s own conduct and statements, which had 
a close factual and temporal nexus to the crimes charged 
in the indictment. Bell’s reliance on Hall is thus 
unavailing. 
 
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Id. at 466 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  
 
Here, the defendant’s case is likewise distinguishable from 
Hall. The government’s proposed evidence is not some distant, 
unrelated set of transactions. The evidence is close in time, 
place, and manner to what is charged. And the evidence is, itself, 
evidence that the defendant is the individual who engaged in the 
charged crimes at hand, as opposed to some theoretical family 
member or friend who was sitting at the defendant’s computer 
filling out defendant’s Wright’s PPP application.  
 
The Court should conclude that the government has provided 
sufficient notice under Rule 404(b). But even if the government’s 
notice was somehow inadequate, the Court should rule that the 
filing of this response more than satisfies the pre-trial notice 
requirements.   
III. 
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons stated herein, the government respectfully 
requests that the defendant’s motion (ECF No. 263) be denied 
because the proposed evidence is intrinsic to the charged offenses, 
rendering Rule 404(b) inapplicable. Even if Rule 404(b) is 
implicated, the government respectfully submits that it has 
complied with the notice requirements under the rule and has 
satisfied the rule’s permitted use standards. Accordingly, the 
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Court should deny the defendant’s motion (ECF No. 263) challenging 
the government’s use of proper Rule 404(b) evidence.  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
LISA G. JOHNSTON 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
s/Jonathan T. Storage            
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV State Bar No. 12279 
300 Virginia Street, East 
Room 4000 
Charleston, WV 25301 
Telephone: 304-345-2200 
Fax: 304-347-5104 
E-mail: Jonathan.Storage@usdoj.gov  
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
It is hereby certified that the foregoing “GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT KISHA SUTTON’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS PURSUANT TO RULES 4O3 
AND 404(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE” 
has been 
electronically filed and service has been made on opposing counsel 
by virtue of electronic mail this the 28th day of June, 2025, to: 
 
Connor D. Robertson, Esq. 
2702 Main Street 
Hurricane, WV 25526 
Email: cdr@croblaw.com 
 
 
Michelle R. Fox, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF MICHELLE ROMAN FOX 
3359 Teays Valley Road 
Hurricane, WV 25526 
Email: michellefox@smithlawpllc.net 
 
 
 
 
s/Jonathan T. Storage            
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV State Bar No. 12279 
300 Virginia Street, East 
Room 4000 
Charleston, WV 25301 
Telephone: 304-345-2200 
Fax: 304-347-5104 
E-mail: Jonathan.Storage@usdoj.gov  
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