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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by United States of America as to… — United States of America v. Sutton et al (Dkt. 303)
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| Court | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2025-06-30 |
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia · No. 2:24-cr-00192 · Doc. 303 · 2025-06-30 · Docket on CourtListener
Summary
Proposed jury instructions submitted by the United States in United States of America v. Sutton et al, Criminal No. 2:24-cr-00192, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, filed June 30, 2025 as Document 303. The filing is signed by an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia and runs 33 pages. Its numbered instructions cover Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment, aiding and abetting bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2, and Count Two, aiding and abetting concealment money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 2, as charged against defendants Kisha Sutton and Shamiese Wright. Other instructions define financial institution, mortgage lending business, scheme or artifice and willful blindness, and the last one, No. 24, states the preponderance of the evidence standard.
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Full text
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CRIMINAL NO. 2:24-cr-00192
KISHA SUTTON – 1
SHAMIESE WRIGHT - 2
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
Comes now the United States of America, by Jonathan T.
Storage, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of West Virginia, and respectfully submits the following
proposed jury instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
LISA G. JOHNSTON
Acting United States Attorney
By:
/s/ Jonathan T. Storage
JONATHAN T. STORAGE
Assistant United States Attorney
WV Bar No. 12279
300 Virginia Street, East
Room 4000
Charleston, WV 25301
Telephone: (304) 345-2200
Fax: (304) 347-5705
Email: jonathan.storage@usdoj.gov
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1
COUNT ONE: AIDING AND ABETTING BANK FRAUD
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2)
NATURE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
Counts One of the Second Superseding Indictment charges
defendants KISHA SUTTON and SHAMIESE WRIGHT with violating Title
18, United States Code, Sections 1344 and 2.
Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment charges that
between no later than on or about April 19, 2021, and continuing
until at least on or about May 21, 2021, at or near Charleston,
Kanawha County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of
West Virginia, defendants KISHA SUTTON and SHAMIESE WRIGHT, aided
and abetted by each other, knowingly executed and attempted to
execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution.
On or about April 19, 2021, defendant KISHA SUTTON caused the
submission of a PPP loan application and a Schedule C to Financial
Institution 1 on behalf of defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT and with
defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT’s authorization. The application and the
Schedule C stated that defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT was a sole
proprietor of a business that was established January 1, 2017. The
application stated that in 2020, the business had a gross income
of $75,000. As part of the application, a 2020 Schedule C was
submitted listing gross receipts of $75,000 and a net profit of
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$48,750. In fact, defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT did not have a business
in 2020 with those gross receipts and profit. Defendant SHAMIESE
WRIGHT’s 2020 tax return listed $21,716 in wages and no business
income or expenses.
Defendant
SHAMIESE
WRIGHT
applied
for
unemployment
compensation throughout 2020 and stated, several times, that she
was not self-employed. Financial Institution 1 funded defendant
SHAMIESE WRIGHT’s PPP loan for $15,625 on or about May 7, 2021.
Between on or about May 7, 2021, and on or about May 21, 2021,
Defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT, within the Southern District of West
Virginia, remitted $3,000 of the fraudulent PPP loan proceeds to
defendant KISHA SUTTON. Defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT spent the
remainder of the PPP loan proceeds on personal, ineligible
expenses.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2
COUNT ONE: AIDING AND ABETTING BANK FRAUD
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2)
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Aiding and abetting a crime possesses the same elements as
the underlying offense.
First: A person aids and abets a crime when she intends to
facilitate that offense’s commission.
Second: A person commits bank fraud when he knowingly executes,
or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice -
a.
to defraud a financial institution; or
b.
to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits,
assets, securities, or other property owned by, or
under the custody or control of, a financial
institution, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
United States v. Draven, 77 F.4th 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2023);
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014); 18 U.S.C. §
1344.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3
ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO PROVING BANK FRAUD
Bank fraud may be established under two alternative methods:
(1) defrauding a financial institution OR (2) obtaining property
owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial
institution,
by
means
of
false
or
fraudulent
pretenses,
representations, or promises.
Where a statute defines two or more ways in which an offense
may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one
count.
United States v. Saintvil, No. 22-10004, 2023 WL 3644976, at *4
(11th Cir. May 25, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1067, (2024),
reh’g denied, 144 S. Ct. 2555, (2024).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 4
DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
As used in the Superseding Indictment, the term “financial
institution” means a mortgage lending business.
18 U.S.C. § 20(10).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 5
DEFINITION OF MORTGAGE LENDING BUSINESS
The term “mortgage lending business” means an organization
which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in
real estate, including private mortgage companies and any
subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities affect
interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 27.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 6
DEFINITION OF SCHEME OR ARTIFICE
The words “scheme or artifice” include any plan or course
of action intended to deceive or cheat others.
A “scheme or artifice to defraud” may be shown by deceptive
acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid
suspicion, or avert further inquiry into a material matter.
Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases, Eric Wm.
Ruschky, 2020 Online Edition (pg. 262); United States v. Colton,
231 F.3d 890, 901 (4th Cir. 2000).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 7
DEFINITION OF DEFRAUD
“To defraud” means wronging one in his property rights by
dishonest methods or schemes and usually signifies the deprivation
of something of value by trick, deceit, chicanery, or overreaching.
Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases, Eric Wm.
Ruschky, 2020 Online Edition (pg. 262).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8
SHOWING OF ACTUAL FINANCIAL LOSS OR INTENT TO CAUSE FINANCIAL
LOSS NOT REQUIRED
The bank fraud statute does not require the government to
show any ultimate financial loss or a showing of intent to cause
financial loss.
Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 67 (2016).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9
“KNOWINGLY”
An act is performed “knowingly” if it is done voluntarily and
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other
innocent reason.
United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 789 (4th Cir. 1984).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 10
COUNT TWO: AIDING AND ABETTING CONCEALMENT MONEY LAUNDERING
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 & 2)
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Aiding and abetting a crime possesses the same elements as
the underlying offense.
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), makes
it a crime to conduct financial transactions with the intent to
conceal the proceeds of an unlawful activity. For you to find the
defendants guilty, the government must prove each of the following
beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendants conducted or attempted to conduct
a financial transaction having at least a minimal effect on
interstate commerce or involving the use of a financial institution
which is engaged in, or the activities of which have at least a
minimal effect on, interstate or foreign commerce;
Second, that the property that was the subject of the
transaction involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
Third, that the defendant knew that the property involved
represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and
Fourth, that the defendant knew that the transaction was
designed in whole or in part, to conceal or disguise the nature,
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the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of the unlawful activity.
The government need not prove that all of the money involved
in the transaction constituted the proceeds of the criminal
activity; it is sufficient if the government proves that at least
part of the money represented such proceeds.
The mere receipt of funds can constitute a transaction subject
to criminal prosecution under § 1956.
Eric Wm. Ruschky, Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal
Cases - District of South Carolina, 2020 Online Edition at page 349
(https://www.scd.uscourts.gov/pji/) (last visited June 30, 2025);
United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 222 (4th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (“[W]hen the funds used in a particular transaction originated
from a single source of commingled, legally-and illegally-acquired
funds, it may be presumed that the transacted funds, at least up to
the full amount originally derived from crime, were the proceeds of
the criminal activity.”); United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755,
764 (4th Cir. 2011).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 11
MONEY LAUNDERING DEFINITIONS
The term “knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity” means that the person knew the property involved in the
transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under
State, Federal, or foreign law, regardless of whether or not such
activity is “specified unlawful activity,” as defined by the
statute.
The term “proceeds” means any property derived from or
obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of
unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.
The term “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or
participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction.
The term “transaction” includes a purchase, sale, loan,
pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and with
respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal,
transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension
of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of
deposit, or other monetary instrument, use of a safe deposit box,
or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a
financial institution, by whatever means effected.
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The term “financial transaction” means (A) a transaction
which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce
(i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii)
involving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the
transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft, or (B) a transaction involving the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.
“Interstate commerce” includes commerce between one State,
Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.
The term “monetary instruments” means (i) coin or currency of
the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks,
personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or (ii) investment
securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise
in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
For the purposes of this criminal case, the “specified
unlawful activity” alleged is aiding and abetting bank fraud.
18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); 18 U.S.C. § 10.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 12
AIDING AND ABETTING
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.
To convict a defendant of being an aider and abettor, the
government must show that the defendant’s conduct amounted to
counseling, assisting, or facilitating the commission of a federal
crime.
18 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. Honeycutt, 311 F.2d 660, 662 (4th
Cir. 1962).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 13
“WILLFUL BLINDNESS”
The United States may prove that the defendant acted
“knowingly” by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise
have been obvious to him. No one can avoid responsibility for a
crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious. A finding beyond
reasonable doubt of the intent of the defendant to avoid knowledge
or enlightenment would permit the jury to infer knowledge. Stated
another way, a defendant’s knowledge of a particular fact may be
inferred from a deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate
or intentional blindness to the existence of that fact.
One may not willfully or intentionally remain ignorant of a
fact material or important to his conduct to escape the
consequences of criminal law. If you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was aware of a certain fact but he
deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact so he
could deny knowledge if apprehended, then you may treat this
deliberate avoidance as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you
find the defendant actually believed this fact not to be true. A
showing of negligence, mistake or even foolishness on the part of
the defendant is not enough to support an inference of knowledge.
It is, of course, entirely up to you as to whether you find
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any deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the eyes and the
inferences to be drawn from any such evidence.
You may not infer that the defendant had knowledge, however,
from proof of a mistake, negligence, carelessness, or a belief in
an inaccurate proposition.
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
‘ 17.09 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 551
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996); United States v. Gordon,
754 F. App’x. 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (jury could infer defendant
willfully avoided learning that funds came from illegal activity
by failing to ask questions of person who supplied the funds, or
notice obvious red flags raised by the odd nature of transactions)
(evidence at trial supported both actual knowledge and willful
blindness; if jury concluded defendant lacked actual knowledge as
to the nature of the funds, they could conclude he willfully
avoided learning this fact); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d
854, 859 (4th Cir. 1992) (real estate agent willfully blind to
client’s use of drug proceeds to purchase house); United States v.
Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1992) (real estate agent
willfully blind to client’s use of drug proceeds to purchase
house); United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir. 2017)
(where evidence suggested, “at a minimum,” defendant failed to ask
questions that might have incriminated him, trial court acted well
within its discretion in giving willful blindness instruction);
United States v. Hoffler-Riddick, No. 4:05cr9, 2006 WL 2381859, *5
(E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2006) (person who has a “strong suspicion” that
the money a drug dealer is using to conduct a financial transaction
is drug proceeds is willfully blind if she deliberately avoids
learning the truth) (“a willful blindness instruction is
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge
and deliberate ignorance”); aff’d in part, rev’d in part, &
remanded by 253 F. App’x. 249 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Sterling, 701 F. App’x. 196 (4th Cir. 2017) (willful blindness
instruction appropriate where defendant in lottery scam received
large sums of cash and wire transfers from persons she did not
know and subsequently transferred most of those funds to co-
conspirators in Jamaica; evidence also showed defendant’s fax
machine was used in the middle of the night to send documents
furthering the lottery scam); United States v. Nicholson, 176 F.
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App’x. 386, 400 (4th Cir. 2006) (willful blindness instruction as
to defendant’s knowledge of the source of the money she used to
buy a house was appropriate where the money came from defendant’s
son, who dealt drugs from defendant’s home and had no other visible
source of income); United States v. Hatcher, 132 F. App’x. 468,
475 (4th Cir. 2005) (“a willful blindness instruction is
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge
and deliberate ignorance”); United States v. Hatcher, 132 F. App’x.
468, 475 (4th Cir. 2005) (“a willful blindness instruction is
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge
and deliberate ignorance”); United States v. Matai, 173 F.3d 426
(4th Cir. 1999) (Table) (willful blindness instruction appropriate
where there is evidence of deliberate ignorance even though there
is also evidence of actual knowledge).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14
EVIDENCE INFERENCES -- DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL
There are two types of evidence from which you may find the
truth as to the facts of a case -- direct and circumstantial
evidence. Direct evidence is the testimony of one who asserts
actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.
Circumstantial evidence is where one fact or a chain of facts
gives rise to a reasonable inference of another fact. If one fact
or group of facts on the basis of common sense and common
experience leads you logically and reasonably to infer other facts,
then this is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is
no less valid and no less weighty than direct evidence provided
the inferences drawn are logical and reasonable. In a criminal
case where a defendant’s state of mind is at issue, where there
are questions of what the defendant intended or what his purpose
was, circumstantial evidence is often an important means of proving
what the state of mind was at the time of the events in question.
Sometimes it is the only means of proving state of mind.
While you should consider only the evidence, you are permitted
to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits
as you feel are justified in the light of common experience. In
other words, you may make deductions and reach conclusions that
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reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts that have
been established by the evidence.
The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given
to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Nor is a greater
degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of
direct evidence. Do not be concerned about whether evidence is
“direct evidence” or “circumstantial evidence.” You should
consider and weigh all of the evidence that was presented to you.
Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of
the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 1.08 (1990); 1A
O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, ‘
12.04 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Dizdar, 581 F.2d 1031, 1036-
37 (2d Cir. 1978).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15
STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL AND STIPULATIONS
Statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the
case. When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as to
the existence of a fact, you may, however, accept the stipulation
as evidence, and regard that fact as being proven. You are not
bound by stipulations, however, because the jury alone decides the
facts and their importance to the case.
United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 678 (4th Cir. 1996).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 16
“ON OR ABOUT” -- PROOF OF
You will note the Indictment charges that the offenses were
committed “on or about” a certain date. The proof need not
establish with certainty the exact date of the alleged offenses.
It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed on a date
reasonably near the date alleged.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 17
“AT OR NEAR” -- PROOF OF
You will note the Indictment charges that the offenses were
committed “at or near” a certain location. The proof need not
establish with certainty the exact location of the alleged
offenses. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed at a
location reasonably near the location alleged.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 18
“SYMPATHY”
You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try
the issues of fact presented by the allegations of the Indictment
and the denial made by the not guilty plea of the defendant. This
must be decided on the evidence that is presented in this case and
not from anything else.
You are to perform this duty without bias or prejudice as to
any party. You are not permitted to be governed by sympathy or
public opinion. Both the defendant and the public expect that you
will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the
case, follow the law as stated by the Court and reach a just
verdict, regardless of the consequences.
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 19
JUDICIAL NOTICE
During the course of this trial, the Court took judicial
notice of the fact that the municipalities of Charleston, Kanawha
County, West Virginia; South Charleston, Kanawha County, West
Virginia; and Huntington, Cabell County, West Virginia, are
located in Kanawha County, within the Southern District of West
Virginia. Additionally, the Court took judicial notice of
provisions contained in the Federal Register relating to the rules
and regulations of the Paycheck Protection Program.
Since this is a criminal case, you may, but are not required
to, accept as conclusive any facts of which the Court has taken
judicial notice. If you choose to accept, as conclusive, any facts
which the Court has judicially noted, then such facts may be
regarded as evidence in the case without further proof and are to
be weighed by you along with other evidence in the case.
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
‘ 12.03 (6th ed. 2008) (modified).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 20
TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS
Recordings of various events and conversations have been
admitted into evidence. Transcripts of these recordings have been
prepared. The recording – not the transcript – is the evidence.
Therefore, the transcript is not in evidence. The transcript is
only to be used as a guide in following the recording. Your
understanding of the recording, rather than the transcript, is to
govern your deliberations.
If you detect any discrepancy between the recording and the
transcript, you are to consider as evidence only what you observe
in the recording.
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
‘ 11.10 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418,
1428 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200,
1203 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 243
(4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bryant, 480 F.2d 785, 791 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 21
VENUE – BANK FRAUD
Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, a defendant
must be tried where the alleged crime was committed.
The Constitution does not limit venue for a crime to one
exclusive district - it requires only that venue be determined
from the nature of the crime and the location of the acts
constituting it.
The selection of venue in a bank fraud prosecution is governed
by the general venue statute for federal criminal offenses.
The general venue statute provides that any offense against
the United States begun in one district and completed in another,
or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and
prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed.
Venue for a federal criminal prosecution is to be determined
from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act
or acts constituting it.
There may be more than one appropriate venue for such a
federal criminal charge, and a particular venue is not improper
simply because the defendant was never physically present there.
Unlike the elements of a charged crime, which must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the government must prove venue by a
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preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Bankole, 39 F. App’x 839 (4th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 1993), as
amended (Jan. 5, 1994)
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 22
VENUE – CONCEALMENT MONEY LAUNDERING
A prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 may be brought in any
district in which the financial or monetary transaction is
conducted.
For purposes of § 1956, a transfer of funds from one place to
another, by wire or any other means, constitutes a single,
continuing transaction.
Any person who conducts any portion of the transaction may be
charged in any district in which the transaction takes place.
The term “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or
participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction.
A person directing others to move money “conducts” a financial
transaction.
A receiver of wired funds “conducts” a transaction for the
purposes of the money laundering venue provision.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(3); 18 U.S.C. §
1956(c)(2); United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 830 (4th Cir.
2000) (defendant aided and abetted § 1957 offense when he directed
third party to purchase cashier’s checks); United States v. Elder,
90 F.3d 1110, 1125 (6th Cir. 1996).
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UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 23
VENUE – AIDING AND ABETTING
An aider and abettor may be prosecuted in the district in
which the principal acted in furtherance of the substantive crime.
United States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1982)
Case 2:24-cr-00192 Document 303 Filed 06/30/25 Page 31 of 33 PageID #: 1539
32
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 24
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
The burden of showing something by a preponderance of the
evidence simply requires the jury to believe that the existence of
a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010).
Case 2:24-cr-00192 Document 303 Filed 06/30/25 Page 32 of 33 PageID #: 1540
33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
It is hereby certified that the foregoing “PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES” has been electronically filed
and service has been made on opposing counsel by virtue of such
electronic filing this 30th day of June, 2025.
Connor D. Robertson, Esq.
2702 Main Street
Hurricane, WV 25526
Email: cdr@croblaw.com
Michelle R. Fox, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF MICHELLE ROMAN FOX
3359 Teays Valley Road
Hurricane, WV 25526
Email: michellefox@smithlawpllc.net
/s/ Jonathan T. Storage
JONATHAN T. STORAGE
Assistant United States Attorney
WV Bar No. 12279
300 Virginia Street, East
Room 4000
Charleston, WV 25301
Telephone: (304) 345-2200
Fax: (304) 347-5705
Email: jonathan.storage@usdoj.gov
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