Reply to Response to Motion re 513 Motion to Stay Pending Resolution — In re BofA Unemployment Litigation (Dkt. 541)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 541 · 2025-08-08 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000 
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
Attorneys for Defendant  
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK] 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 3:21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 
STAY PENDING RESOLUTION 
OF ITS RULE 23(f) PETITION  
   
Date:   
September 16, 2025 
Time:   
1:30 PM 
Ctrm:   
12-A – 12th Floor 
Judge:  
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 
 
FILED 
PROVISIONALLY 
UNDER 
SEAL 
PURSUANT TO STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30208     Page
1 of 18

 
 
 
 
i 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. 
BANA’s Rule 23(f) Petition Presents a Substantial Case For Relief. ............ 1 
II. 
The Balance of Equities, Efficiency, and Public Interest All Favor A 
Stay. ................................................................................................................. 5 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30209     Page
2 of 18

 
 
 
 
ii 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Altamura v. L’Oreal, US, Inc., 
2013 WL 4537175 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) ..................................................... 6 
Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc., 
2020 WL 804403 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) .................................................... 2, 5 
Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 
 
2018 WL 4191409 (C.D. Cal. August 28, 2018)  .............................................. 10 
 
Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
2012 WL 5818300 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) ..................................................... 9 
Canchola v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
2025 WL 1712395 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2025) ...................................................... 6 
Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 
402 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 2, 4 
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 
300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) ................................................................................ 8 
Evans v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
2019 WL 7169794 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019) ...................................................... 2 
Johnson v. Yahoo! Inc., 
2018 WL 835339 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2018) .......................................................... 4 
Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 
640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................ 1 
Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Benefit Plan, 
2012 WL 13149096 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2012) ...................................................... 6 
Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ................................................................................. 1, 2, 5, 8 
Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 
31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................. 4 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30210     Page
3 of 18

 
 
 
 
iii 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Ontiveros v. Zamora, 
2013 WL 1785891 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) ...................................................... 6 
Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., 
2021 WL 3186500 (S.D. Cal. July 28, 2021) ....................................................... 8 
Pecora v. Big M Casino, Inc., 
2019 WL 302592 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 2019) ............................................................. 9 
In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 
725 F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013).............................................................................. 2 
Reyes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 
2018 WL 1316129 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018) ...................................................... 8 
Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc., 
383 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2019) ...................................................... 5, 7, 10 
Salhotra v. Simpson Strong-Tie Co., 
2022 WL 1091799 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) ..................................................... 2 
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 
2017 WL 5973487 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) ....................................................... 6 
Tinsley v. McKay, 
2018 WL 11352146 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2018) ...................................................... 6 
Tinsley v. McKay, 
No. 2:15-cv-00185 (D. Ariz.), stayed sub nom. B.K., et al. v. 
McKay, No. 17-17502, Dkt. 19 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2018) ..................................... 6 
Van v. LLR, Inc., 
61 F.4th 1053 (9th Cir. 2023) ........................................................................... 3, 4 
Wang v. Zymergen Inc., 
No. 21-cv-06028-PCP (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2025), Dkt. No. 590 .......................... 2 
Wilcox v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 
2016 WL 917893 (D. Hawaii March 7, 2016) ................................................... 10 
Statutes 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1693f(e)(2), 1693m(a)(1) ..................................................................... 7 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30211     Page
4 of 18

 
 
 
 
iv 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Other Authorities 
12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(1) ........................................................................................... 7 
Bryan Lammon, An Empirical Study of Class-Action Appeals, 22 J. 
App. Prac. & Process 283, 315 (2022) ................................................................. 8 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30212     Page
5 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
1 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plaintiffs’ brief effectively argues that the case should not be stayed because 
the district court decided class certification in their favor. See Dkt. 529, Class Cert. 
Opp. (“Opp.”). This argument could be made in every case where a Rule 23(f) 
petition is filed, yet district courts routinely stay further proceedings pending 
appellate resolution of such petitions (and appeal, if allowed). See Dkt. 513, Motion 
(“Mot.”) at 2 n.2 (citing cases). Regardless of whether the Court uses Landis or Nken, 
BANA demonstrated that a stay is appropriate. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to litigate 
the merits of BANA’s petition through their opposition, Nken does not ask the Court 
to consider whether it will change its own mind, nor does it ask the Court to assess 
whether it is more likely than not that the petition will ultimately succeed. Nken v. 
Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). Rather, this Court need only consider whether BANA 
has a “substantial case for relief on the merits”—meaning the petition raises “serious 
legal questions” or has a “fair prospect” of success. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 
962, 966-68 (9th Cir. 2011). BANA easily satisfies this standard. See Mot. at 9-10; 
Dkt. 513-2, BANA’s Rule 23(f) Petition (“Mot. Ex. 1”).1  
Plaintiffs further attempt to skirt the fact that the Court has already found it 
would be an unnecessary waste of resources and would cause prejudice to BANA to 
force the parties to prepare pretrial motions seeking class-wide decisions on the 
merits before class certification issues are resolved. Dkt. 448, Stay Order, at 8-9. 
Against this prejudice, the Court also found that Plaintiffs and their classes will not 
be prejudiced by a stay because every single class member has already been paid. Id. 
at 8. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief compels a different result now, before the 
Ninth Circuit potentially decertifies or alters the classes. See infra pp. 6-7. The Court 
should stay all proceedings until BANA’s Rule 23(f) Petition is resolved. 
I. 
BANA’s Rule 23(f) Petition Presents a Substantial Case For Relief. 
To start, Plaintiffs’ argument that Landis does not apply to a stay pending 
 
1 See also BANA’s Reply Brief in Support of Rule 23(f) Petition, Exhibit 1 (“Reply 
Ex. 1”) to the Declaration of Valerie A. Haggans submitted herewith. 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30213     Page
6 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
2 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
resolution of a Rule 23(f) petition, Opp. at 5 n.1, is both wrong and irrelevant. Many 
courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have applied Landis in this context, as recently 
as this week. E.g., Order at 2, Wang v. Zymergen Inc., No. 21-cv-06028-PCP (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2025), Dkt. No. 590 (applying Landis to grant stay pending Rule 23(f) 
appeal); see also Evans v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2019 WL 7169794, *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 
Oct. 23, 2019) (same, and noting other courts also apply Landis).  
Regardless of which test applies (Landis or Nken), BANA has demonstrated 
that a stay is warranted here. See Mot. at 2-10 & Ex. 1; Reply Ex. 1. The Nken test 
does not require BANA to convince the Court to change its own mind. See Salhotra 
v. Simpson Strong-Tie Co., 2022 WL 1091799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2022) (“[O]f 
course the Court thinks [its Order] is correct; that’s why the Court issued it.”). Nken 
only requires that a petition raise “serious legal questions” or has a “fair prospect” of 
success. Mot. at 9 (quoting Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 967-68); Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc., 
2020 WL 804403, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020) (serious legal questions “satisfy 
this first prong” of Nken). BANA’s petition clearly satisfies each of the circumstances 
that allow Rule 23(f) review. See Mot. at 9-10 & Ex. 1; Reply Ex. 1. 
Plaintiffs misunderstand the “death knell” factor. Plaintiffs misstate a 
standard for a Rule 23(f) petition, and contend it requires an “evidentiary showing 
that the defendant lacks the resources to defend the case to a conclusion.” Opp. at 7 
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is not the standard. The pertinent death knell 
is “the death knell of the litigation,” not the defendant. Chamberlan v. Ford Motor 
Co., 402 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Further, “it is enough that 
certification generates unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious or marginal 
claims,” which a “vast sum in damages” that is “subject to trebling” could create even 
for an amply capitalized defendant. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 
725 F.3d 244, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2013); accord Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 958 (Rule 
23(f) enables review of certifications that “put considerable pressure on the defendant 
to settle independent of the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims” (citation modified)). If 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30214     Page
7 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
3 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
the law were otherwise, no large company could ever obtain Rule 23(f) review. 
Plaintiffs cannot deny that the 
 they seek easily satisfies this factor. 
BANA demonstrated manifest errors. BANA’s petition identified a number 
of manifest errors that, individually and collectively, raise substantial legal questions 
with a fair prospect of success. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 9-12, 14-23; Reply Ex. 1 at 3-10. 
First, as BANA explained, the Class Certification Order misapplied Van. See 
Dkt. 494 (“Order”). BANA identified undisputed evidence that there were 
 
, which was “sufficient to prove that an 
inquiry into the circumstances and motivations behind each of the [thousands of class 
members] might be necessary.” Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2023); 
see also Mot. Ex. 1 at 14-18; Reply Ex. 1 at 3-6. The Order did not meaningfully 
require Plaintiffs to propose a response, thus finding predominance satisfied where 
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 14-18; Reply Ex. 1 at 3-6.  
Second, the Order wrongly determined predominance is no obstacle to 
certification so long as BANA shoulders all the work of conducting the required case-
by-case adjudications. This is wrong in at least four different ways: (1) the 
predominance analysis focuses on whether individualized inquiries will be required, 
not which party furnishes the evidence needed to conduct them; (2) irrespective of 
who bears the burden, a class cannot be certified on the premise that the defendant 
will not be entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims; (3) it is 
Plaintiffs that have the burden of proving each individual’s account was subject to 
EFTA and that they suffered actual damages; and (4) the information necessary to 
prove class members’ legitimacy and entitlement (or not) to actual damages lies with 
EDD, the class members themselves, and other third parties, not just BANA. Mot. Ex. 
1 at 9-12, 20-23; Reply Ex. 1 at 4-6.  
Finally, in relying on the class definition to solve the predominance problem, 
the Order turned it into a failsafe problem, which Plaintiffs have now compounded 
by claiming (Opp. at 13) no trial time is needed to determine who should be in the 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30215     Page
8 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
4 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
classes because BANA can unilaterally kick out—and Plaintiffs will simply accept—
anyone it suspects engaged in fraud. Mot. Ex. 1 at 18-20; Reply Ex. 1 at 7-11. 
Plaintiffs’ willingness to completely abdicate the interests of persons whom they 
purport to represent raises a host of further issues, including their “adequacy of 
representation and loyalty to the class[es].” Johnson v. Yahoo! Inc., 2018 WL 
835339, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2018) (“[C]ounsel’s idea to exclude potential class 
members based on defendant’s investigation” presents adequacy concerns.).  
BANA’s petition raises unsettled issues of law. Manifest error would be 
enough to grant the petition by itself, Chamberlan, 402 F.3d at 952, but this case also 
warrants review to clarify the applicable legal principles for courts in this Circuit. 
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the petition presents no “unsettled issue” rests on a 
misstatement of the issues presented. See Opp. at 7. The petition seeks “guidance on 
how to assess whether individualized inquiries predominate when all agree the class 
contains some number of uninjured class members.” Mot. Ex. 1 at 24 (emphasis 
added). Olean made it clear that “[w]hen individualized questions relate to the injury 
status of class members, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the court determine whether 
individualized inquiries about such matters would predominate over common 
questions.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 
F.4th 651, 668 (9th Cir. 2022). But Olean said nothing about how the uninjured might 
be “winnow[ed] out” in a manner comporting with the predominance requirement 
because it ultimately found that “all class members ha[d] standing here.” Id. at 683. 
It falls to some other case—like this one—to provide the necessary guidance. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs’ brief only ratcheted up the need for guidance (and guardrails), as their 
disingenuous claim that they can solve predominance by allowing BANA to 
unilaterally exclude any class member places this case at the intersection of the 
predominance and failsafe lines of cases. Opp. at 13. To the extent Plaintiffs’ argue 
BANA can “challenge the Court’s application of [Olean and Van] after entry of final 
judgment” (Opp. at 8), this ignores that these critical issues are likely to evade end-
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30216     Page
9 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
5 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
of-case review given intense settlement pressure on BANA, which is the point of 
Rule 23(f) review for defendants. Supra pp. 2-3; Reply Ex. 1 at 10-11.  
II. 
The Balance of Equities, Efficiency, and Public Interest All Favor A Stay.  
The remaining Nken prongs substantially overlap with Landis,2 and are easily 
satisfied. See Mot. at 8-9. As the Court has already held, BANA will be prejudiced 
by the continuation of litigation while class issues remain undecided. See Dkt. 448 at 
8-9. This prejudice stands to harm BANA irreparably. See Mot. at 10; infra pp. 5-6. 
The Court has further acknowledged that any potential prejudice to the already-
compensated Plaintiffs and class members is not enough to overcome the benefits of 
judicial and party efficiency that a brief stay would provide. See Dkt. 448 at 8. 
Plaintiffs’ latest objections based on fading witness memory and stale contact 
information are overblown, disingenuous, and insufficient to require a different 
result. And the public’s interest in the efficient adjudication of this case supports a 
stay, particularly where any interest in the timely enforcement of the consumer 
protection laws at issue was already satisfied by the regulatory settlement.  
BANA faces irreparable harm absent a stay. The Court has already found that 
barreling through class-wide dispositive motions and other pretrial activities while 
class certification issues remain undecided will prejudice BANA. See Dkt. 448 at 8-
9 (“engaging in unnecessary ‘motion practice, planning and preparing for trial’” 
would be an “unnecessary waste of resources” while class action issues remained 
undecided). There is no reason for the Court to make a different finding now, 
especially when courts have found such waste of resources can amount to irreparable 
harm under Nken. See Alvarez, 2020 WL 804403, at *2; Mot. at 10. Plaintiffs cite 
cases for the general proposition that litigation expenses usually do not constitute 
irreparable harm. See Opp. at 16-17. But even those cases acknowledge that where, 
as here, “granting a motion to stay would avoid substantial, unrecoverable, and 
 
2 See Romero v. Securus Techs., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 
(outcome of request to stay is often “the same under either standard”).  
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30217     Page
10 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
6 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
wasteful” “pretrial litigation” expenses, the irreparable harm test may be satisfied. 
E.g., Canchola v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2025 WL 1712395, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 
2025). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Tinsley is also misplaced. The district court’s decision 
there was promptly reversed by the Ninth Circuit, which granted the stay. Tinsley v. 
McKay, No. 2:15-cv-00185 (D. Ariz.), stayed sub nom. B.K., et al. v. McKay, No. 
17-17502, Dkt. 19 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2018). Indeed, even the district court recognized 
continuing with pretrial activities could cause irreparable harm. See Tinsley v. 
McKay, 2018 WL 11352146, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2018).  
Plaintiffs argue (wrongly) that this case is different because dispositive motion 
practice and pretrial activities would be the same even if the classes were decertified. 
Opp. at 17-18. But what is left of the case may well be “changed in scope or 
eliminated on appeal,” which bears heavily on both the irreparable harm and public 
interest factors under Nken. Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Benefit Plan, 2012 WL 
13149096, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2012).3 In these circumstances, courts have found 
“Defendants will suffer substantial harm if [actions are] not stayed pending appeal” 
and that it does not make sense to “devote[] very substantial time and resources on 
the litigation, particularly with respect to . . . dispositive motions and trial preparation 
on class claims” if an appeal would change what remains of the case. Senne v. Kansas 
City Royals Baseball Corp., 2017 WL 5973487, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017).  
If the case is not stayed, arguments that may be raised at summary judgment 
could either be mooted or require re-briefing if any classes are decertified or their 
parameters are modified. At the most basic level, if all classes remain certified, the 
parties may move for summary judgment as to each of the five classes and the claims 
they are pressing. If any class (or aspects or claims thereof) are decertified, arguments 
 
3 See also Ontiveros v. Zamora, 2013 WL 1785891, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) 
(defendant would suffer irreparable harm if “forced to proceed to trial, only to 
afterwards” receive a favorable Ninth Circuit opinion, which “would constitute a 
hollow victory”); Altamura v. L’Oreal, US, Inc., 2013 WL 4537175, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 26, 2013) (if “class is eventually decertified,” stay helps courts “avoid[] costly 
and potentially unnecessary litigation”). 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30218     Page
11 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
7 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
would be different, and many may not need to be decided at all.4 Even taking 
Plaintiffs at their word that they would “pursue their claims on an individual basis” 
if any of the classes were decertified (Opp. at 17), the evidence presented on summary 
judgment would be different. For example, if Plaintiffs’ EFTA classes are decertified, 
Plaintiffs would need to show—and BANA would attempt to refute—that: (1) each 
individual plaintiff’s account was “established for personal, family, or household 
purposes,” not criminal or fraudulent purposes, as required to trigger EFTA’s 
protections; (2) each disputed transaction was unauthorized; and (3) each individual 
plaintiff incurred “actual damages” as alleged. See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(1); 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1693f(e)(2), 1693m(a)(1); see also Mot. Ex. 1 at 9-10, 20 n.2. 
Expert motions may also change based on the appeal. Opinions offered by the 
parties’ damages experts, in particular, would be implicated if there is no class, or if 
class scopes change. Similarly, Plaintiffs claim the petition will have no impact on 
their request to depose Messrs. Moynihan and Montag (Opp. at 17) but the stated 
purpose for both depositions is solely to seek evidence supporting punitive damages 
for two common law claims and a state due process claim. Dkt. 488 at 18. Those 
claims may be mooted or of less import if the classes bringing them are decertified, 
in whole or in part. The expenditure of “unrecoverable time and resources spent on 
class discovery weighs in [Defendant's] favor.” Romero, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.  
A stay will not harm Plaintiffs or the classes because 
 
. The Court already found a stay would not harm Plaintiffs and the 
classes 
. Dkt. 448 at 8 (“injured class 
members have received direct compensation, and if sought and approved, 
consequential damages,” so “the economic vulnerabilities raised by Class Plaintiffs 
are not as paramount as they claim”). Plaintiffs do not meaningfully explain why the 
 
4 For example, if the EMV class is decertified, the Court likely would not need to 
consider arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ CCPA claims, because these claims are 
brought only on behalf of the EMV class. See Order at 64. 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30219     Page
12 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
8 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
outcome should be different now, arguing only that the prior stay “was decided under 
a different standard (Landis) and in a different posture (pre-certification)” and that 
BANA “now seeks a potentially far longer stay.” Opp. at 19 n.8.  
With respect to the potential harm to Plaintiffs or the classes, the Landis and 
Nken tests ask the same question, so Plaintiffs’ complaints about the “different 
standard” ring hollow.5 And Plaintiffs offer no explanation for how the “different 
posture” impacts the Court’s assessment of how they will be prejudiced by a stay. 
Opp. at 19 n.8. Further, their arguments about the stay’s length are misleading. 
Plaintiffs cite statistics about how long it takes to resolve a “civil appeal.” Id. But 
BANA has not filed a civil appeal; it filed a Rule 23(f) petition that will likely be 
decided within 30 days from the hearing on this Motion.6 If the Ninth Circuit denies 
the petition, the stay will lift and the case will proceed, likely as soon as this fall. If 
the Ninth Circuit accepts BANA’s petition and allows the filing of a civil appeal, it 
will be because the appellate court agrees there are serious questions regarding class 
treatment of this case—which in and of itself will justify a stay regardless of how 
long it may be. See, e.g., Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., 2021 WL 3186500, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. July 28, 2021) (granting stay for appeal); Reyes v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 
2018 WL 1316129, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2018) (same). 
As to the memories of witnesses, discovery is substantially complete, and the 
record is effectively set. The only potentially outstanding testimony from BANA 
witnesses is the two apex depositions, which BANA has been telling Plaintiffs for 
years present no risk of “lost” or “fading” memory because the apex executives do 
not have relevant, unique information. See, e.g., Dkt. 453 at 1-2; Dkt. 503-1 at 9-12. 
Plaintiffs’ fear that class member memories will fade is disingenuous. Indeed, 
 
5 Compare CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Landis, 
and considering “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay”), 
with Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (assessing “whether issuance of the stay will substantially 
injure the other parties”). 
6 See Bryan Lammon, An Empirical Study of Class-Action Appeals, 22 J. App. Prac. 
& Process 283, 315 (2022) (87% of petitions decided within 120 days). 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30220     Page
13 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
9 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Plaintiffs’ entire argument for class certification was that class member testimony 
and inquiries assessing the merits of their individual accounts, claims, and damages 
are not necessary. See, e.g., Dkt. 378, Class Cert. Reply, at 6-7 (arguing there is no 
need for “individualized inquiries” into Plaintiffs’ EFTA claims because the statute 
carries a “presumption of harm”), 10 (common law claims require “no individualized 
evidence”), 13 (rejecting need for “‘unique facts to each class member’” to support 
punitive damages). If, as Plaintiffs apparently now claim, class member testimony is 
necessary, that just further shows that the classes must be decertified for the reasons 
set out in the Rule 23(f) Petition. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 15-18. 
Plaintiffs’ concern about stale contact information for class members is 
addressed by the Parties’ proposed notice plan. See Opp. at 19. The Parties agreed to 
use email notice as part of the negotiated notice plan should class notice be necessary, 
and BANA has email addresses for 85-90% of class member cardholders. See Dkt. 
518, Class Notice Joint Statement, at 2. Courts have recognized that “while mailing 
addresses tend to change, e-mail addresses are more likely to stay the same,” 
resolving Plaintiffs’ concern. See Pecora v. Big M Casino, Inc., 2019 WL 302592, at 
*5 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 2019). Further, the notice administrator will use “skip tracing” 7 
to update contact information for class members when needed. See Haggans Decl. ¶¶ 
5-6. And in any event, any risk that a small percentage of class members’ information 
may become stale is outweighed by the unnecessary confusion that would arise in the 
event the Order is reversed or modified. See Mot. at 11; Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 2012 WL 5818300, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (finding “that the balance 
of hardships tips sharply toward a stay” on this basis).8 
 
7 Skip tracing is a process by which, if mail or email is returned as non-deliverable, 
an analysis is conducted by the notice administrator to locate more recent contact 
information for a given individual. See  Haggans Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. 
8 Plaintiffs claim that language in the Long-Form Notice regarding the existence of 
BANA’s Rule 23(f) petition can resolve the confusion that would arise from appeal. 
Opp. at 22. This naively assumes that every class member will actually read the Long-
Form Notice (which would only be available on the administrator’s website) and then 
track the appeal themselves. See Dkt. 518 at 4. Even if that were to occur, and it 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30221     Page
14 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
10 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
The efficient use of resources and the public interest support a stay. The 
district court should have the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s view on predominance 
issues before deciding dispositive motions. See Mot. at 11-12. Plaintiffs assert that 
the public has an interest in prompt enforcement of consumer protection laws. Opp. 
at 24. But the public’s interest in prosecution of this particular case is comparatively 
low here where the laws at issue have already been enforced by the OCC and CFPB, 
with BANA having entered into settlements with both regulators. Order at 32. The 
point is further mooted where all of the class members 
 
 
. See Dkt. 448 at 7-8. All Plaintiffs have left to seek in this case are treble 
damages, which the Court has already found do not warrant denying a stay. Id. 
Meanwhile, as the Court also already found, a stay would conserve judicial 
resources—avoiding costly litigation over issues that may be mooted, modified, and 
require re-litigation if the classes are decertified or defined differently. See supra pp. 
6-7. Thus, a stay pending resolution of these issues would better serve the public 
interest. See Romero, 383 F. Supp 3d at 1077. 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
For the forgoing reasons and the reasons in BANA’s opening brief, BANA 
respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion to stay.  
 
certainly will not, there would still be substantial confusion if and when the classes 
are decertified or modified regarding class members’ standing, representation, and 
potential right to sue, and staying class notice would further prevent the unnecessary 
dissemination of personal information (which Plaintiffs’ counsel has requested for 
class members). See, e.g., Romero, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 1077 (“stay may benefit class 
members as it would protect against the possibility of unnecessary disclosure of 
personal information and avoid any confusion caused by issuing a class notice that 
may later need to be revised or withdrawn”); Wilcox v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 2016 
WL 917893, at *7 (D. Hawaii March 7, 2016) (“if the parties are obligated to 
disseminate class notice prior to such a decision, significant confusion could result 
to potential class members who would be uncertain whether they needed to opt out 
of the class or whether they were still included in the class action at all”). Even 
Andrews, which Plaintiffs cite (Opp. at 19), acknowledges the potential for confusion 
for class notice in large class actions. See 2018 WL 4191409, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. 
August 28, 2018) (denying stay, in part, because subclass at issue had only 500 
members). 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30222     Page
15 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
11 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
Dated:  August 8, 2025 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
By: s/ James W. McGarry__________________ 
 
 JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
THOMAS M. HEFFERON (pro hac vice) 
THefferon@goodwinlaw.com 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N St. NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
Tel: +1 202 346 4000  
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
 
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100) 
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500 
Fax: +1 617 346 4444 
 
VALERIE A. HAGGANS (pro hac vice) 
VHaggans@goodwinlaw.com 
LINDSAY E. HOYLE (pro hac vice) 
LHoyle@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
620 Eighth Avenue 
New York, NY 10018  
Tel: +1 212 813-8800  
Fax: +1 212 355-3333 
 
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice) 
YChan@jonesday.com 
JONES DAY 
100 High Street 
Boston, MA  02110 
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939 
Fax: +1 617 449 6999 
 
JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433) 
jbrown@myersnave.com 
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 278405) 
mnazareth@myersnave.com 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30223     Page
16 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
12 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
MEYERS NAVE 
600 B Street, Suite 1650 
San Diego, CA 92101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30224     Page
17 of 18

 
 
 
 
 
13 
REPLY ISO DEFENDANT’S MOT. TO STAY 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the 
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by 
using the CM/ECF system on August 8, 2025.  I further certify that all participants 
in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the 
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
 
 
Executed: 
August 8, 2025 
 
s/ James W. McGarry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 541     Filed 08/08/25     PageID.30225     Page
18 of 18

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.casd.709615.541.0.pdf

Size

246,545 bytes

SHA-256

c2bbcb1af4ab373b9ec3be2312665b274d69bcd9f6bf063f9003ed9d1bbc1581

Our copy

gov.uscourts.casd.709615.541.0.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)