Court filing
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM filed by Plaintiff USA as to Defendant Artur Ayvazyan — USA v. Ayvazyan et al (Dkt. 1133)
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Central District of California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2021-11-08 |
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 1133 · 2021-11-08 · Docket on CourtListener
Summary
A sentencing memorandum filed by the United States as to defendant Artur Ayvazyan, Document 1133 in United States of America v. Artur Ayvazyan, No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, dated November 8, 2021. It attaches a declaration with one exhibit under seal and a second exhibit. The government argues for the presentence report's criminal history category and an offense level of 37, seeking enhancements for ten or more victims, sophisticated means, and possession and use of identification, and opposing a mitigating role reduction. It asks for 260 months' total imprisonment, five years of supervised release, restitution of $17,723,141.26 and a $2,200 special assessment, and for forfeiture of the property identified in the jury's special verdict form (ECF 646). The memorandum is 30 pages.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
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TRACY L. WILKISON
Acting United States Attorney
SCOTT M. GARRINGER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
SCOTT PAETTY (Cal. Bar No. 274719)
CATHERINE AHN (Cal. Bar No. 248286)
BRIAN FAERSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 274850)
Assistant United States Attorneys
Major Frauds/Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Sections
1100/1300 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-6527/2424/3819
Facsimile: (213) 894-6269/0141
E-mail:
Scott.Paetty@usdoj.gov
Catherine.S.Ahn@usdoj.gov
Brian.Faerstein@usdoj.gov
JOSEPH S. BEEMSTERBOER
Acting Chief, Fraud Section
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
CHRISTOPHER FENTON
Trial Attorney, Fraud Section
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice
1400 New York Avenue NW, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 320-0539
Facsimile: (202) 514-0152
E-mail:
Christopher.Fenton@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARTUR AYVAZYAN,
Defendant.
No. CR 20-00579-SVW-3
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING POSITION FOR
DEFENDANT ARTUR AYVAZYAN;
DECLARATION OF CATHERINE AHN WITH
ATTACHED EXHIBIT 1 (FILED UNDER
SEAL) AND EXHIBIT 2
Sentencing: November 15, 2021
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom of the
Hon. Stephen V. Wilson
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW Document 1133 Filed 11/08/21 Page 1 of 30 Page ID #:18429
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Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central District
of California, Assistant United States Attorneys Catherine Ahn, Scott
Paetty, and Brian Faerstein, and Department of Justice Trial Attorney
Christopher Fenton, hereby files its sentencing position regarding
defendant Artur Ayvazyan.
The government’s sentencing position is based upon the attached
memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Catherine
Ahn and accompanying exhibits, the presentence investigation report,
the files and records in this case, and any other evidence or
argument that the Court may wish to consider at the time of
sentencing. The government reserves the right to file any
supplemental sentencing positions that may be necessary.
Dated: November 8, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
TRACY L. WILKISON
Acting United States Attorney
SCOTT M. GARRINGER
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
/s/
CATHERINE AHN
SCOTT PAETTY
BRIAN FAERSTEIN
Assistant United States Attorneys
CHRISTOPHER FENTON
Department of Justice Trial Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................ii
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES................................1
I.
INTRODUCTION...................................................1
II.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................2
A.
Defendant’s Charges, Testimony and Convictions, and
Motions...................................................2
B.
The Presentence Investigation Report and Objections.......5
III. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PSR’S CALCUATION OF DEFENDANT’S
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RECOMMENDED
OFFENSE LEVEL OF 37............................................7
A.
Defendant’s Recommended Offense Level Calculation
Ignores the Overwhelming Evidence at Trial and
Conflicts with Jury’s Verdicts............................7
1.
The Conspirators’ Attempts to Obtain
Approximately $21.7 Million in Fraudulent Loans
and Launder the Received Funds was Reasonably
Foreseeable to Defendant.............................8
2.
The Court Should Adopt the Enhancements for Ten
or More Victims, Sophisticated Means, Possession
and Use of Identification, and Reject Defendant’s
Attempt to Apply a Mitigating Role Reduction........13
B.
Defendant’s Offense Level Should be Increased by Two
Levels Based on the Vulnerable Victims Enhancement
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1).......................17
IV.
THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION....................21
A.
A Custodial Sentence of 260 Months Is Sufficient But
Not Greater than Necessary to Meet the Goals of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).........................................21
B.
The Court Should Order Restitution and Forfeiture........24
V.
CONCLUSION....................................................25
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
CASES
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)..........................21
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338 (2016)............21
United States v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1998)...........9, 10
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008)...............21
United States v. Cuellar, 165 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished).................................................20
United States v. Etoty, 679 F.3d 292 (2012)........................20
United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.1999)...............20
United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2015)........8, 9, 10
United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2020)..............9
United States v. Ovsepian, 739 Fed. Appx. 448 (9th Cir. October
5, 2018)..................................................14, 15
United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1992).............20
United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010)............9
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1).............................................15
18 U.S.C. § 1028A...................................................8
18 U.S.C. § 1956.................................................5, 8
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)........................................21, 22, 24
California Penal Code 261(a)(2).....................................6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.............................................8, 9, 14
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1...............................................passim
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6...............................................14, 15
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1.................................................5, 7
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1.........................................6, 7, 17, 20
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
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U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2................................................7, 17
U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)..................................................14
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
INTRODUCTION
On June 25, 2021, a jury convicted defendant Artur Ayvazyan of
conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud (count 1), eleven
counts of wire fraud (counts 2 through 12), eight counts of bank
fraud (counts 13 through 20), aggravated identity theft (count 24),
and conspiracy to commit money laundering (count 26). (ECF 1128,
Revised Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), ¶¶ 1-7; see also
ECF 154, Superseding Indictment (“FSI”).) Specifically, beginning in
March 2020 through at least August 2020, defendant conspired with his
wife, his brother, his sister-in-law, his cousin-in-law, and others
to use real and false personal identifiers to create false and
synthetic identities and businesses, submit fraudulent Paycheck
Protection Program (“PPP”) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”)
applications on behalf of those fictitious entities as well as
businesses they controlled, obtain and spend the fraudulent loan
proceeds, and launder those proceeds through bank accounts. (PSR
¶¶ 19-75.) These accounts were in the names of defendant and his
coconspirators, as well as the false and synthetic business and
individual identities created and used by them. (Id.) In total,
defendant and his co-conspirators sought $21,768,962.26 in fraudulent
loan proceeds and obtained $17,723,141.26. (See Exhibit 1 attached
to Decl. of Catherine Ahn (“Ahn Decl.”) (filed under seal).)
For this conduct, the government recommends that this Court find
a total offense level of 37, which – when combined with defendant’s
criminal history category of I - yields an advisory guidelines range
of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The government respectfully
recommends that the Court impose a sentence of 236 months, at the
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mid-point of the guidelines range, plus the mandatory consecutive
sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment for count 24, for a total of 260
months’ imprisonment. The government further recommends that the
Court impose a concurrent period of supervised release of five years
on counts 1-20, three years on count 26, and one year on count 24,
with the conditions recommended by the U.S. Probation Office
(“USPO”), order defendant to pay $17,723,141.26 in restitution, the
$2,200 special assessment, and order the forfeiture of the property
identified in the jury’s special verdict from as to defendant (ECF
646). (See ECF 1127 (USPO Revised Recommendation Letter) at 1-4.)
II.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
A.
Defendant’s Charges, Testimony and Convictions, and Motions
On March 9, 2021, a grand jury returned a first superseding
indictment against defendant and seven codefendants, charging
conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud, substantive wire
fraud and bank fraud counts, aggravated identity theft, and
conspiracy to commit money laundering. (ECF 154.) On June 15, 2021,
defendant and three of his co-conspirators – brother Richard
Ayvazyan, sister-in-law Marietta Terabelian, and cousin-in-law Vahe
Dadyan – went to trial. Defendant was convicted of all counts
charged against him. (ECF 644, Redacted Verdict Form.) Defendant’s
wife, Tamara Dadyan, pleaded guilty to counts 1, 24, and 26 prior to
trial, and – following defendant’s convictions - filed a motion to
withdraw her guilty plea. (ECF 525, 541, and 998.)
At trial, defendant took the stand and, under oath, attempted to
1 The government provided an extensive summary of the facts
presented at trial related to defendant Artur Ayvazyan in its
opposition to defendant’s Rule 29 and 33 motion (ECF 793), and
incorporates by reference the factual background contained therein.
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convince the jury and this Court that his wife, co-defendant Tamara
Dadyan (who did not appear before the jury at trial), was solely
responsible for the voluminous amount of incriminating evidence found
in his possession. Despite testifying that he lacked so much trust
in his wife that he refused to file taxes with her and kept her
separated from the finances for his business, Allstate Towing and
Transport, defendant claimed that he handed her the tax forms for
that very same business and permitted her to submit PPP and EIDL loan
applications without even knowing their amounts. (6/23/21 A.M. Tr.
101:24-103:19 and 108:3-110:12.)
Defendant also tried to explain away the overwhelming proof of
his direct participation in the charged conspiracy found on his
phone. This evidence included personal identifying information for
individuals and businesses used in fraudulent PPP and EIDL
applications (see Government Trial Exhibit (“GEX”) 24b), handwritten
instructions to make changes to identification cards (“IDs”) followed
by images of false and fraudulent IDs matching those instructions
(see GEX 24a at 16-19), and numerous images of checks and
debit/credit cards in names of individuals and businesses used in the
fraud and money laundering conspiracies (see GEX 24c). Defendant
also possessed copies of confirmations of the very same loan
applications whose amounts he allegedly did not see (see GEX 24d).
Defendant’s explanation as to the voluminous evidence of fraud
found on his phone was the same as for the assembly line of
fraudulent documents found at his home – that the false IDs and
incriminating evidence was “likely” put there by his wife, Tamara
Dadyan. (6/23/21 A.M. Tr. 102:14-103:7 and 104:22-105:21.)
According to defendant’s own testimony, defendant routinely handed
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Tamara Dadyan his phone, despite allegedly previously finding other
persons’ IDs on his phone, confronting her about them, and then
supposedly erasing them. (Id. at 88:25-89:4.) Defendant also
testified that – despite mistrusting her to the point of refusing to
file their taxes together - he was nonetheless willing to make
deposits for her and transport escrow documents on her behalf. (Id.
at 88:25-89:4 and 101:24-103:19; see also Exhibit 2 (attached to Ahn
Decl.) (showing selected text messages and attachments from GEX 10
describing “Art’s” participation in recruiting other individuals to
submit PPP and EIDL applications, his knowledge and use of accounts
into which fraudulent loan proceeds were to be transferred,
references to deposits he would make, and participation in the
creation of checks.)
In contrast, defendant testified that his brother, Richard
Ayvazyan, who had not pleaded guilty and was contesting the charges
at trial with defendant, was a “great guy” to whom he had transferred
fraudulent loan proceeds (albeit only after first transferring it
through two other bank accounts) simply to repay a supposed business
loan from many years earlier. (Id. at 89:5-18 and 111:18-113:4; see
also GEX 115 at 7.)
The jury rejected defendant’s inconsistent testimony and attempt
to shift all blame to his wife, Tamara Dadyan, and convicted
defendant of all counts for which he was charged.
Following defendant’s convictions, defendant moved for a
judgment of acquittal and a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 29 and 33. (ECF 686, 687.) The government
opposed, and on August 20, 2021, the Court denied defendant’s
motions, finding them “largely conclusory” and that “there was
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overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt.” (ECF 875 at 11.) The
Court further concluded that “[t]he evidence in this case does not
preponderate heavily against the verdict. Instead, it preponderates
heavily in favor of the verdict against Defendant.” (Id. at 12.)
B.
The Presentence Investigation Report and Objections
The USPO filed its revised PSR, its addendum in response to the
parties’ objections, and revised recommendation letter on November 8,
2021, in which it calculated a criminal history category of I and
total offense level of 35, yielding an advisory guidelines range of
168 to 210 months’ imprisonment for counts 1-20 and 26, plus a
mandatory consecutive term of 24 months’ imprisonment for his
aggravated identity theft conviction in count 24. (See PSR ¶¶ 81-
113, 115-125, and 176-178 and ECF 1129 (“Addendum”).) The USPO’s
offense level calculation of 35 was based on the following: a base
offense level of 7 (see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1)); +20 for a loss
between $9.5 million and $25 million (see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K));
+2 for ten or more victims (see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)); +2 for
sophisticated means (see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)); +2 for the use of
identifications2 (see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)); and +2 for
defendant’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (see U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B)). (PSR ¶¶ 81-112.)
The USPO recommended that this Court impose a total sentence of
192 months’ imprisonment (comprised of 168 months’ imprisonment at
the low-end of the advisory guidelines range, plus the mandatory
consecutive 24 months for count 24), to be followed by five years of
2 Although the PSR and addendum referred to identifications
found in defendant’s possession (PSR ¶¶ 98-99 and Addendum at 4), the
government respectfully recommends the Court apply it for possession
and use of authentication features, as further discussed, below.
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supervised release, and order restitution of $17,723,141.26. (ECF
1127 at 1-7.)
Both parties timely filed objections to USPO’s initial
calculation of defendant’s offense level, with the government
recommending an additional two-level vulnerable victims enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) for a total offense level of 37,
and defense recommending a total offense level of 16. (See ECF 1038
(“Def. PSR Obj.”) at 12; CR 1041 (“Govt. PSR Obj.”) at 2-4; and Table
1, infra at 7.) The government also provided to defendant and to the
USPO updated loan and loss charts showing an intended loss of
$21,768,962.26, and an actual loss of $17,723,141.26. (See Ahn Decl.
Exhibit 1.)
Neither party objected to the USPO’s calculation of defendant’s
criminal history category as I, which was based on one criminal
history point derived from defendant’s disorderly conduct conviction
in 2015. (PSR ¶¶ 122, 124-125.) Defendant currently faces a pending
133-count felony indictment in the Los Angeles County Superior Court
for numerous mortgage fraud, theft, money laundering, forgery, and
conspiracy counts, among others, for which his wife Tamara Dadyan and
brother Richard Ayvazyan are also charged. (PSR ¶ 127.) On November
4, 2021, defendant was arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department
for violating California Penal Code 261(a)(2): Rape: Force/Fear/Etc.3
(ECF 1113 at 2-3.)
A table showing the parties’ offense level calculations based on
the recommended criminal history category of I is included, below:
3 According to California Penal Code 261(a), the statute outlaws
“an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator” (emphasis added). As such, the victim of
the alleged rape does not appear to be co-defendant Tamara Dadyan.
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Table 1. An Overview of the Recommended Offense Level Calculations
Offense Level Calculation (PSR with +2 Recommended by Govt.)
USSC Provision
Base Offense Level
7
2B1.1(a)(1)
Loss > $9.5 million < $25 million
+20
2B1.1(b)(1)
Ten or More Victims
+2
2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)
Sophisticated Means
+2
2B1.1(b)(10)
Possession/use of Authentication Features
+2
2B1.1(b)(11)
Conviction for 18 USC 1956
+2
2S1.1(a)(1)
Govt. Recommended: Vulnerable Victims
+2
3A1.1(b)(1)
PSR Total Offense Level:
35
With Govt. +2 Recommendation:
37
Low
Mid
High
Guidelines Range (based on OL 37)
210
236
262
Plus 24 Months (1028A/count 24)
234
260
286
Govt. Proposed Recommendation: 260 months' imprisonment
Defense Offense Level Calculation
USSC Provision
Base Offense Level
7
2B1.1(a)(1)
Loss of > $250,000 < $550,000
+12
2B1.1(b)(1)
Mitigating Role Reduction
-3
3B1.2
Def. Recommended Total Offense Level
16
Low
Mid
High
Guidelines Range (based on OL 16)
21
24
27
Plus 24 Months (1028A/count 24)
45
48
51
III. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PSR’S CALCUATION OF DEFENDANT’S
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RECOMMENDED
OFFENSE LEVEL OF 37
A.
Defendant’s Recommended Offense Level Calculation Ignores
the Overwhelming Evidence at Trial and Conflicts with
Jury’s Verdicts
The government concurs with the PSR’s offense level calculation
(but see footnote 2, supra) but further recommends a +2 vulnerable
victims enhancement, as discussed below, for an overall offense level
of 37. (Govt. PSR Obj. at 2-4.)
Defendant, by contrast, argues for an overall offense level of
16, less than half that calculated by the PSR and the government, by
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excluding from the scope of defendant’s relevant conduct all loans
other than the two he received in the name of his business, Allstate
Towing and Transport. (Def. PSR Obj. at 8.) Defendant’s
recommendation should be rejected. The scope of relevant conduct
asserted by defendant directly conflicts with the principles of the
U.S.S.G. and Ninth Circuit caselaw and ignores the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict for counts for which he was convicted.
In short, defendant relies on a counterfactual reality wholly at odds
with the overwhelming weight of evidence against him and the import
of the jury’s verdict in seeking to reject all enhancements and argue
for a -3 mitigating role reduction. (Def. PSR Obj. at 2-3, 6-12.)
Defendant’s recommended offense level also blatantly conflicts with
the straightforward application of the guidelines as to substantive
counts of conviction, including the inclusion of loans associated
with Anna Dzukaeva – the identity that was the basis for defendant’s
18 U.S.C. § 1028A conviction (count 24) – and the +2 enhancement
required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (count 26).
1.
The Conspirators’ Attempts to Obtain Approximately
$21.7 Million in Fraudulent Loans and Launder the
Received Funds was Reasonably Foreseeable to Defendant
At sentencing, a defendant is responsible for “all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense.” United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d
1128, 1142–45 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). As
such defendant is accountable for the conduct of his conspirators
that are: “(i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
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activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.” Id. (citing United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d
990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (overruled on other grounds in United
States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2020) and United States v.
Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1998)). While the district
court need not “proceed item-by-item through a complete list of all
losses attributed to a criminal conspiracy,” it must make
particularized findings about “‘the scope of the criminal activity
the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake.’” Blitz, 151
F.3d at 1012–13 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2).
Defendant’s entire position on the scope of relevant conduct
depends on the mistaken argument that he should only be held
accountable for loans he directly submitted. The Court already
rejected a similar argument when sentencing defendant’s co-defendant,
Vahe Dadyan. And for good reason. Defendant’s argument is
inconsistent with how relevant conduct is analyzed in the scope of
jointly undertaken criminal activities, like the conspiracies for
which defendant was convicted (counts 1 and 24). For example, in
Lloyd, the Ninth Circuit explained how this analysis works in an
analogous context:
[T]he scope of a joint undertaking for sentencing purposes
depend[s] on whether the telemarketers worked together, relied
on one another to make a sale, attended the same sales meetings,
and depended on the success of ... the operation as a whole for
their financial compensation. If two defendants, working
together, design and execute a scheme to sell fraudulent stocks
in a telephone boiler-room operation, each is accountable for
all the fraud losses that result. The conduct of each is in
furtherance of their jointly undertaken criminal activity and is
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity. To determine a defendant’s fraud-loss amount and
resulting offense level, a district court must consider that
defendant’s role in the overall scheme.
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Lloyd, 807 F.3d at 1142-1143 (citing Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1005
(quoting Blitz, 151 F.3d at 1013), among others) (internal quotations
omitted).
The evidence in this case demonstrates that defendant – like his
wife, Tamara Dadyan, and other coconspirators with whom he directly
conspired – should be held accountable for the full scope of the
conspiracy. Defendant was not merely involved in the submission of
loan applications related to his own business. As extensively
discussed in the Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Rule 29 and
33 motions, the text messages exchanged between his wife (Tamara
Dadyan) and his brother (Richard Ayvazyan), the evidence discovered
on defendant’s own phone, the evidence found in his home, and even
his own testimony at trial show that defendant was intimately aware
of the manner and scale of the conspiracy and should be held
accountable for the full scope of its associated losses. (ECF 793
(“Govt. Opp. to Rule 29 and 33 Motions”) at 2-13; see also Ahn Decl.
Exhibit 2.) For example, as reflected in one of his wife’s texts to
his brother, stating that “Tom coming over now I told art to show him
the decline letter from the eidl and its simple its 35 percent for
ppp,” defendant was aware of the submission of other PPP and EIDL
loan applications and actively recruited other individuals to help
submit them. (GEX 10 at 18; see also Ahn Decl. Exhibit 2 and
Testimony of Special Agent Massino (6/21/21 P.M. Tr. 71:4-75:2).)
Defendant also participated in and benefited from the use of
accounts belonging to other individuals or entities to receive,
transfer, and spend the resulting fraudulent loan proceeds. (See Ahn
Decl. Exhibit 2.) This stands in stark contrast to defendant’s
assertion in his objections to the PSR that his knowledge and
involvement extended only to the loans he obtained for his own
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business – an assertion rejected by the jury’s verdict holding him
guilty of substantive counts of bank fraud, wire fraud, and
aggravated identity theft. For instance, defendant received a “wire
for Art for $73,500” (as described in his wife’s and brother’s text
messages) that was transferred through his “best friend” Thanh P.
Tran’s New Acre Farm account and the Runyan Tax Service account and
roughly constituted 35% of a loan earlier obtained as part of the
conspiracy. (6/21/21 P.M. Tr. 71:4-75:2 and GEX 10-24.) A copy of
the front and back of Thanh Tranh’s driver’s license, and a
confirmation for the PPP application for New Acre Farm Produce were
further found in defendant’s own phone. (See GEX 24b at 20, 27-28,
and GEX 24d at 12.)
Defendant’s awareness of the overall scheme is further
demonstrated by his possession of numerous check images, debit/credit
cards, and actual screenshots of PPP and EIDL application
confirmations beyond the two loans he received for his direct
business, Allstate Towing. (See GEX 24b, 24c, and 24d.) The names
of individuals and businesses found on his phone reflect those used
in the PPP and EIDL fraud, along with the accounts used to receive
and launder the resulting proceeds, showing his actual knowledge of
and participation in the full scope of the fraud and money laundering
conspiracies. This evidence further includes fraudulent California
IDs, as well as copies of handwritten notes describing what to put on
these fraudulent IDs, including two versions of a California Driver’s
License bearing different photographs for Anna Dzukaeva (see GEX 24b
at 1-4), Osbaldo Velasquez (see GEX 24b at 8-9), and Miykhailo
Diuzehnko (see GEX 24b at 11-14). Defendant’s phone also contained
screenshots of confirmations of loans in amounts that differed from
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the loans obtained for his business, Allstate Towing, and included
confirmations for fictitious businesses used in the conspiracy to
receive loans, such as “Green Label nutrienrs” (see GEX 24d at 5), LK
Designs (see GEX 24d at 10), and individuals other than himself, such
as Alak Mikhaelian (GEX 24d at 7) and Mikhael Diuzehnko (see GEX 24d
at 7 and 11).
As such, defendant’s argument that the scope of his relevant
conduct should be limited to the two loans applied for in the name of
his business, totaling $274,000, is simply not credible. (Def. PSR
Obj. at 8.) Most tellingly, defendant does not even include as
relevant conduct the loan applications associated with Anna Dzukaeva,
the identity theft victim whose name and date of birth defendant and
co-defendant Tamara Dadyan used without lawful authority as the jury
found in convicting defendant of count 24. But just as implausibly,
defendant’s argument wholly ignores the evidence and statements of
coconspirators directly linking defendant to affirmative acts in
furtherance of the fraud and money laundering conspiracies. (See Ahn
Decl. Exhibit 2.)
The PSR rightly focused on the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal conduct in analyzing defendant’s relevant conduct.
(Addendum at 2-3.) Based on the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s
knowledge and participation in the fraud and money laundering
conspiracies, the principles set forth in the U.S.S.G., and
corresponding Ninth Circuit authority, the full scope of those
conspiracies was foreseeable to defendant and he should be held
accountable for all of the loans sought, and actually received, as a
result. The Court should therefore adopt the intended loss of
$21,768,962.26 and actual loss of $17,723,141.26 incurred against the
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more than ten victims of defendant’s criminal conduct. (See Ahn
Decl. Exhibit 1.)
2.
The Court Should Adopt the Enhancements for Ten or
More Victims, Sophisticated Means, Possession and Use
of Identification, and Reject Defendant’s Attempt to
Apply a Mitigating Role Reduction
a.
The Court Should Adopt the PSR’s Recommendation
that the Ten or More Victims Enhancement Applies
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)
Given the basis of defendant’s objection to the PSR’s
application of the +2 enhancement for ten or more victims was its
improperly narrow definition of relevant conduct, the Court should
adopt the PSR’s application of the +2 enhancement for ten or more
victims pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). (Def. PSR Obj. at
8-9 and PSR ¶ 95.) As indicated in the attached loans and loss
chart, there were more than ten victims as a result of defendant’s
conduct. (See Ahn Decl. Exhibit 1; see also Addendum at 3.)
b.
The Court Should Adopt a +2 Enhancement for
Possession or Use of an Authentication Feature
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii)
The intricacy of the fraud and money laundering conspiracies’
use and transfer of numerous identities, real and fake businesses,
and financial accounts is exemplified by the evidence found on
defendant’s own phone. This evidence and the immigration documents
and records found at his residence in the names of his foreign
exchange student and visitor victims further show defendant’s
knowledge of and involvement in conduct that falls squarely within
the +2 enhancement described in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11).
If the offense involved
(A) the possession or use of any . . . (ii) authentication
feature; (B) the production or trafficking of any
(i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access
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device, or (ii) authentication feature; or (C) (i) the
unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification
unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of
identification, or (ii) the possession of 5 or more means
of identification that unlawfully were produced from, or
obtained by the use of, another means of identification
increase by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(11) (emphasis added).
While defendant is eligible to receive the +2 enhancement under
either U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii), (B)(i), (B)(ii), (C)(i),
and/or (C)(ii), the government respectfully recommends this Court
apply the enhancement based on U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii), as
affirmed in United States v. Ovsepian, 739 Fed. Appx. 448 (9th Cir.
October 5, 2018). In that case, the panel rejected the defendant’s
argument that applying the +2 enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(11) was impermissible “double-counting” prohibited by
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. App. Note 2. 739 Fed. Appx. at 448. The note
states that where a sentence for aggravated identity theft is imposed
with one “for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific
offense characteristic for the transfer, possession, or use of a
means of identification when determining the sentence for the
underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for
this factor for the underlying offense of conviction, including any
such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the
defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Id.
(emphasis added).
In Ovsepian, the district court applied the enhancement not for
means of identification, but for the authentication features found on
the copies of driver’s licenses maintained by defendants in fake
patient files. (ECF 23, Government Answering Brief, United States v.
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Ovsepian, Case No. 18-50026, at 26.) An authentication feature is
defined by statute and in the guidelines as a “hologram, watermark,
certification, symbol, code, image” or other feature used on an
identification document or means of identification to determine its
authenticity. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. App.
Note 1, 10(A). The features highlighted in these California Driver’s
Licenses included the images – a photograph – of their bearers, a
hologram, and other markings the verify authenticity. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the enhancement,
holding that “Despite Appellants’ argument to the contrary, under the
facts in this case, Application Note 2 to section 2B1.6 did not bar
the two-level authentication-feature enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii).” Ovsepian, 739 Fed. Appx. at 448.
Similarly, the Court in this case should hold defendant
accountable for the multiplicity of authentication features found in
his possession. This includes copies of California Drivers Licenses
in names that were not his own clearly showing watermarks, seals,
raised lettering, and signatures of the identified cardholder,
including for Roza Avakian, Thanh Tran, Anastasia Rysik, Egia
Kapemyan, Tony Gleb, Viktoria Babetska, and Leoncio Galver, more.
(See GEX 24b.) The possession of these California Driver’s Licenses,
along with copies bearing different photographs but the same
signature image, additional watermarks and other indicia of
authenticity, also renders defendant eligible for the enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(b)(ii) (production of any
authentication feature). (Id.; see also GEX 24a at 16-19 (showing
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handwritten notes directing the information to be included in an
identification document and the fraudulent California Driver’s
License bearing the instructed information along with a photograph,
the image of a signature, watermarks/background images, and other
authentication features).)
c.
The Court Should Adopt the PSR’s Recommendation
that the Sophisticated Means Enhancement Should
Apply Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)(i)
A +2 sophisticated means enhancement is applicable where “he
offense otherwise involved sophisticated means and the defendant
intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting
sophisticated means,” defined as “especially complex or especially
intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment
of an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) and App. Note 9(B). The
voluminous number of fake IDs, the careful reproduction of the
signatures, watermarks, and other forms of authentication on those
fake IDs found in defendant’s possession (see GEX 24a and 24b), the
use of victims’ PII to open numerous financial accounts in their
names and the fake businesses used to submit PPP and EIDL
applications, and then launder the resulting proceeds through
multiple accounts (see GEX 24c, GEX 24d, and Exhibit 2 at 1-2
(selected excerpts from GEX 10)), all provide ample basis for the
sophisticated means enhancement. Therefore, this Court should adopt
the PSR’s recommendation to apply this enhancement to defendant’s
offense level. (PSR ¶ 96; see also Addendum at 3.)
d.
A Mitigating Role Reduction Should Not Apply
Furthermore, given defendant’s active participation in the
conspiracies for which he was convicted, including assisting in
recruiting individuals into the conspiracy and making the financial
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transactions that enabled the parties to obtain, launder, and spend
the fraudulent proceeds, defendant does not qualify for a mitigating
role reduction. (See PSR ¶¶ 105-106 and Def. PSR Obj. at 10-12.)
Such reductions apply to “a defendant who plays a part in committing
the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the
average participant in the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 App.
Note cmt. 3(A). Defendant could hardly be considered substantially
less culpable than an average participant in this conspiracy.
Indeed, the voluminous amount of incriminating evidence found in his
home and on his phone demonstrates just the opposite. Such evidence
includes, among other things, the personal identification documents,
images of checks and debit/credit cards in the names of individuals
used in the PPP/EIDL fraud and money laundering conspiracies, and
confirmations of PPP/EIDL loans submitted as part of the scheme. The
evidence also reflects defendant’s knowing and active use of the
information of foreign exchange students and visitors (as evidenced
by his conviction for count 24) to perpetrate those crimes.
Defendant’s argument for a mitigating role is, as with his other
arguments, based on his attempts to ignore the overwhelming evidence
supporting, and fact of, his convictions and should be rejected by
the Court.
B.
Defendant’s Offense Level Should be Increased by Two Levels
Based on the Vulnerable Victims Enhancement Pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1)
The government respectfully recommends that this Court adopt the
offense level calculated by the USPO (offense level 35) but further
apply a two-level increase because defendant “knew or should have
known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.”
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). Defendant not only targeted individuals that
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qualify as vulnerable victims – either through the deceased status of
the individuals used to submit the fraudulent applications and
launder the resulting proceeds, or their foreign immigrant status,
which rendered them uniquely unable to respond to the fraudulent use
of their names and information.4 As described at trial, one of the
deceased individuals used by the coconspirators to submit fraudulent
loan applications was Alak Mikaelian. (GEX 10 at 9.) When Richard
Ayvazyan praised his credit score, he noted “You can do 2 on this
guy,” to which Tamara Dadyan replied, “Let’s go the fool is dead on
armo land.” (Id.) When Richard inquired about personal accounts,
Tamara Dadyan responded “Yes wells” and forwarded information
regarding a PPP applications. (Id.) A copy of a Wells Fargo check
for an account in the name of Alak Mikaelian and the front and back
of a Wells Fargo Visa Platinum Debit Card, also in the name of Alak
Mikaelian, was found on defendant’s phone. (GEX 24c at 6-8.)
As detailed above and in previous filings, defendant knew of the
foreign immigrant status of many of the individuals used by him and
his coconspirators to submit fraudulent PPP and EIDL filings and
laundering the resulting proceeds, including the victim of count 24,
Anna Dzukaeva, and others, such as Liudmyla Kopytova. (Govt. Opp. to
4 This is the same reasoning used to apply the vulnerable
victims enhancement to co-defendant Richard Ayvazyan. The USPO
applied the enhancement based on his targeted use of deceased father-
in-law Nazar Terabelyan’s name and information and that of Iulia
Zhadko, a real Ukranian exchange visitor, to apply for and then
transfer the fraudulent loan proceeds. (See ECF 1121 (Revised PSR
for Richard Ayvazyan) at ¶¶ 62-64 and ECF 1122 (Second Addendum to
the PSR for Richard Ayvazyan) at 2.) The government is seeking a
similar enhancement for Tamara Dadyan; the USPO in that PSR declined
to apply the enhancement because the government had not directly
shown the connection to the money laundering conspiracy, which the
government will address in its sentencing memorandum for Tamara
Dadyan. (See ECF 1001 (Govt. Response to Tamara Dadyan PSR) and ECF
1119 (Addendum to the PSR for Tamara Dadyan) at 2.)
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Rule 29 and 33 motions at 4-8.) The evidence found on defendant and
Tamara Dadyan’s phone shows that he not only assisted in the use and
transfer of fraudulent California Driver’s Licenses bearing
authentication features (as detailed above) for these victim
immigrants, he knew of and assisted in the laundering of the
resulting proceeds. (See Exhibit 2 (excerpts of GEX 10) and GEX 24c
and 24d.) Images for a check in the name of Anna Dzukaeva and the
front and back of a debit card bearing the name of Liudmyla Kopytova
were further found on his phone. (GEX 24c at 5, 9-10).
The application of the vulnerable victims enhancement is
supported by the plain language of the guidelines and Ninth Circuit
opinions. According to the U.S.S.G., the vulnerable victims
enhancement applies to an individual that is “unusually vulnerable
due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise
particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.1(b)(1) App. Note 2. The purpose of the adjustment is to
punish and deter criminals like defendant from victimizing those who
cannot protect themselves:
The “vulnerable victim” sentencing enhancement is intended
to reflect the fact that some potential crime victims have
a lower than average ability to protect themselves from the
criminal. Because criminals incur reduced risks and costs
in victimizing such people, a higher than average
punishment is necessary to deter the crimes against them. .
. . Defrauders who direct their activities not against
banks, insurance companies, or large investors, but instead
against people [with] . . . mental or educational
deficiencies, . . . do not need to take as many precautions
against the discovery of their scheme by the intended
victims and in any event are less likely to be prosecuted,
because the victims are less likely to know that they have
been defrauded or if they know to have the know-how and
initiative required to press a criminal complaint or bring
a civil suit.
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United States v. Etoty, 679 F.3d 292, 296 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir.1999)).
The use of the “dead on armo land” Alak Mikaelian’s name and
information, and the presence of his Wells Fargo account information
on defendant’s phone, show that defendant knew of and attempted to
use this individual’s information in support of the fraud and money
laundering conspiracies. In United States v. Cuellar, 165 F.3d 918
(9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished), the Court affirmed the district
court’s application of a two-level “vulnerable victim” enhancement
where defendant used the identity of a deceased individual to
fraudulently obtain a credit card in the deceased’s name. Of note,
the district court had found that the families of the deceased were
the vulnerable victims, who were particularly susceptible to
defendant’s conduct at a difficult time. (Id. (further noting that
“[a] vulnerable victim under section 3A1.1 need not be the victim of
the offense of conviction”).) “In determining whether a victim is
‘particularly susceptible’ within the meaning of section 3A1.1(b), a
sentencing court must consider the characteristics of the defendant's
chosen victim, the victim's reaction to the criminal conduct, the
circumstances surrounding the criminal act, and whether the defendant
could reasonably have anticipated the victim's reaction.” Cuellar,
165 F.3d at 918 (citing United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410, 1417
(9th Cir. 1992)).
Using the same analysis, the family of Alak Mikaelian and the
foreign exchange students targeted by defendant and his
coconspirators should also qualify as vulnerable victims. Alak
Mikaelian appears to have died overseas; similarly, the foreign
exchange students and visitors had left the United States years prior
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to the onset of COVID-19 and were no longer present in the United
States to monitor or even respond to the fraudulent use of their
information. That time and distance makes it particularly difficult
to detect and address the theft and fraudulent use of their names in
a crisis-induced federal loan program. Like the families of the
deceased, these victims’ characteristics, their reaction (or lack of
ability to react) to the criminal conduct, the circumstances
surrounding the criminal act, and whether the defendant could
reasonably have anticipated the victim's reaction (or lack of
reaction), are all dispositive. These victims were chosen by
defendant and his coconspirators because - given the length of time
since the victims had departed the U.S. and their immigrant status –
their circumstances made it difficult for them to respond to the
fraudulent use of their identities. As such, the government
respectfully recommends that the two-level enhancement be applied to
defendant for a total offense level of 37.
IV.
THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION
A.
A Custodial Sentence of 260 Months Is Sufficient But Not
Greater than Necessary to Meet the Goals of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)
The Court should impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to reflect the purposes of sentencing identified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th
Cir. 2008). The advisory guidelines range provides the “starting
point and . . . initial benchmark” for sentencing. Molina-Martinez
v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in arriving at the appropriate
sentence, the Court should consider, among other factors, the nature
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and circumstances of the offense and defendant’s history and
characteristics, § 3553(a)(1); the need for the sentence to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and
provide just punishment for the offense, § 3553(a)(2)(A); the need
for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, § 3553(a)(2)(B); the need for the sentence imposed to
protect the public from further crimes of defendant, § 3553(a)(2)(C);
and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, § 3553(a)(6).
Defendant was a knowing and active participant in a massive PPP
and EIDL fraud and money laundering scheme that took nearly $20
million in much-needed assistance away from small businesses and
their employees. Despite claiming, on the witness stand, that he
suffered from a loss in business due to COVID-19 (6/23/21 A.M. Tr.
86:13-23), he readily admitted that he used the loan proceeds to
transfer money to his brother, Richard Ayvazyan (id. at 111:12-15),
and one of his first recorded expenses after receiving government
funds was for a Harley Davidson motorcycle, using an approximately
$24,067.15 cashier’s check (id. at 122:3-123:1).
Furthermore, despite his attempts to escape the reality of his
own conduct, the overwhelming evidence found at his home and on his
own phone shows that he played a critical role in producing the
actual fraudulent IDs used to submit the fraudulent PPP and EIDL
applications. The plethora of fraudulent IDs, ID-making implements,
checks, and debit/credit cards found in his phone and his residence
shows that he not only knew about the fraud, he actively assisted in
one of its most critical aspects – the generation of IDs needed to
submit the fraudulent applications and facilitate access to the
financial accounts needed to launder the proceeds.
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW Document 1133 Filed 11/08/21 Page 27 of 30 Page ID #:18455
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When confronted with the voluminous evidence of his crimes,
defendant took the stand and – under oath – spun a fantastical and
inherently contradictory tale of how it was all his wife’s fault, who
was conveniently not present at trial to contest his protestations of
innocence at her expense. Defendant pointed the finger at his wife
but not his present-at-trial co-defendant brother, despite sitting
through lengthy testimony highlighting the sometimes gleeful text
messages between his brother and his wife detailing their, and
defendant’s own, extensive role in the fraud and money laundering
conspiracies. (See GEX 10 and attachments.) Defendant’s self-
serving and false statements were rightly rejected by the jury when
they convicted him of all counts charged against him.
Furthermore, defendant continues to try to minimize his conduct,
in spite of the jury’s clear rejection of his testimony, as evidenced
by his attempts to take responsibility for only the loans submitted
specifically in his or his business’ name. (Def. PSR Obj. at 6.)
This shows that defendant has not understood or accepted, in any
meaningful way, the seriousness of the crimes for which he was
convicted, or his role in perpetrating those crimes well beyond the
mere $274,000 obtained in the name of his business. A significant
term of imprisonment is therefore necessary to protect the public
from further crimes of defendant and afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct as to defendant specifically when he is released
from custody. Given the backdrop of the national catastrophe that
defendant exploited in engaging in the callous and brazen fraud and
money laundering conspiracies, a significant custodial sentence is
also necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, and provide just punishment.
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW Document 1133 Filed 11/08/21 Page 28 of 30 Page ID #:18456
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Based on a criminal history category of I and offense level of
37, defendant’s guidelines range is 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment,
plus a mandatory consecutive 24 months for aggravated identity theft
(count 24), yielding a total effective range of 234 to 286 months’
imprisonment. Given the aggravating factors described above,
including the nature and content of defendant’s testimony at trial, a
low-end sentence would be insufficient to meet the goals of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The government therefore recommends the Court impose a
sentence of 260 months’ total imprisonment, based on 236 months at
the mid-point of the guidelines range, plus the mandatory consecutive
24 months for count 24, to be followed by five years of supervised
release. The government recommends that the Court impose a
concurrent sentence of 236 months on counts 1-20 and 26, followed by
count 24’s mandatory consecutive term of 24 months, and a concurrent
period of five years of supervised release on counts 1-20, one year
of supervision on count 24, and 3 years of supervision on count 26.5
Such a sentence would be sufficient, but no more than necessary, to
meet the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
B.
The Court Should Order Restitution and Forfeiture
Defendant attempts to evade responsibility for his conduct by
arguing that he should only be responsible for $260,000 in loans
submitted directly in his or his business’ name. As discussed in
detail above, this contradicts the guidelines, Ninth Circuit
precedent, and the jury’s verdicts. Based on information obtained
from the U.S. Small Business Administration and provided to
5 The maximum term of imprisonment for counts 1-20 is 30 years,
two years for count 24, and 20 years for count 26. The statutory
maximum term of supervision for counts 1-20 is five years, one year
for count 24, and 3 years for count 26. (PSR ¶¶ 176-177, 180-187.)
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defendant, defendant’s conduct – including acts that were foreseeable
to him as part of the conspiracy - resulted in an actual loss of
$17,723,141.26, based on an intended loss of $21,768,962.26. (Ahn
Decl. Exhibit 1.) As such, this Court should hold defendant
accountable for his conduct and order restitution for $17,723,141.26
and further order payment of the $2,200 special assessment.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of trial, the jury made a series
of findings as to defendant’s forfeiture of property involved in
defendant’s offenses of conviction. Consistent with those findings,
the government respectfully requests that the Court include in its
judgment and commitment order an order forfeiting the property
identified in the jury’s special verdict form as to defendant (ECF
646).
V.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the government respectfully
requests that the Court sentence defendant to 260 months’ total
imprisonment (comprised of a concurrently served 236 months on counts
1-20 and 26 and the mandatory consecutive term of 24 months on count
24), five years of supervised release (comprised of a concurrently
served five years on counts 1-20, 1 year of supervision on count 24,
and 3 years of supervision on count 26), order defendant to pay
$17,723,141.26 in restitution, order forfeiture consistent with the
jury’s forfeiture findings, and order $2,200 in special assessments.
Case 2:20-cr-00579-SVW Document 1133 Filed 11/08/21 Page 30 of 30 Page ID #:18458File and source
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