OBJECTION to Jury Verdict (Proposed) 547 , filed by Plaintiff USA as to Defendant… — USA v. Ayvazyan et al (Dkt. 552)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 552 · 2021-06-21 · Docket on CourtListener

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TRACY L. WILKISON 
Acting United States Attorney 
SCOTT M. GARRINGER 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
SCOTT PAETTY (Cal. Bar No. 274719) 
CATHERINE AHN (Cal. Bar No. 248286) 
BRIAN FAERSTEIN (Cal. Bar No. 274850) 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
Major Frauds/Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Sections 
1100/1300 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Telephone: (213) 894-6527/2424/3819 
Facsimile: (213) 894-6269/0141 
E-mail: 
Scott.Paetty@usdoj.gov 
 
Catherine.S.Ahn@usdoj.gov 
 
Brian.Faerstein@usdoj.gov 
 
JOSEPH BEEMSTERBOER 
Acting Chief, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
CHRISTOPHER FENTON 
Trial Attorney, Fraud Section 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
1400 New York Avenue NW, 3rd Floor 
Washington, DC 20530 
Telephone: (202) 320-0539 
Facsimile: (202) 514-0152 
 
E-mail: 
Christopher.Fenton@usdoj.gov 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Richard Avazian” and 
    “Iuliia Zhadko,” 
MARIETTA TERABELIAN, 
  aka “Marietta Abelian” and     
      “Viktoria Kauichko,” 
ARTUR AYVAZYAN, 
aka “Arthur Ayvazyan,” and 
TAMARA DADYAN, 
MANUK GRIGORYAN, 
  aka “Mike Grigoryan,” and 
No. CR 20-579(A)-SVW 
GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIONS TO 
DEFENDANT RICHARD AYVAZYAN’S 
PROPOSED VERDICT FORM (ECF 547); 
EXHIBIT A (GOVERNMENT’S AMENDED 
PROPOSED VERDICT FORMS FOR 
DEFENDANTS) 
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      “Anton Kudiumov,” 
ARMAN HAYRAPETYAN, 
EDVARD PARONYAN, 
aka “Edvard Paronian” and 
    “Edward Paronyan,” and 
VAHE DADYAN, 
 
Defendants. 
 
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel 
of record, the Acting United States Attorney for the Central 
District of California, Assistant United States Attorneys Scott 
Paetty, Catherine Ahn, and Brian Faerstein, and Department of 
Justice Trial Attorney Christopher Fenton, hereby files its 
objections to defendant Richard Ayvazyan’s proposed verdict form 
(ECF 547).   
These objections are based upon the attached memorandum of 
points and authorities, the attached exhibit containing the 
government’s amended proposed verdict forms for defendants, the 
files and records in this case, and such further evidence and 
argument as the Court may permit. 
Dated: June 21, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
TRACY L. WILKISON 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
SCOTT M. GARRINGER 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Criminal Division 
 
      /s/ 
 
SCOTT PAETTY 
CATHERINE AHN 
BRIAN FAERSTEIN 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
CHRISTOPHER FENTON 
Department of Justice Trial Attorney 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................. i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................... ii 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.......................... 1 
I. 
INTRODUCTION............................................. 1 
II. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED VERDICT FORM.......... 1 
A. 
Objection #1: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Proposal of a Single Verdict Form for All Defendants 1 
B. 
Objection #2: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Use of “Single or Unitary” to Describe the Charged 
Conspiracies and Schemes and His Framing of the 
Conspiracy Counts................................... 5 
C. 
Objection #3: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Inclusion of the Venue Question as to the Alleged 
Wire Fraud Counts Because He Has Waived a Challenge 
to Venue........................................... 10 
D. 
Objection #4: The Government Objects to the Omission 
of a Question Regarding Defendant Richard Ayvazyan’s 
Commission of Money Laundering While on Pretrial 
Release............................................ 13 
E. 
Objection #5: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Omission of the Specific Felony Predicate for the 
Aggravated Identity Theft Counts................... 14 
III. CONCLUSION.............................................. 15 
 
 
 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)....................... 13 
Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108 (2016)................................ 3 
United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1994).............. 11 
United States v. Dhaliwal, 468 F. App’x 666 (9th Cir. 2012)........ 2 
United States v. Ghanem, 993 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2021)............ 10 
United States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-00462-CRB, 2018 WL 3619797 
(N.D. Cal. July 30, 2018)..................................... 8 
United States v. Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015)....... 6, 7, 8 
United States v. Nobari, No. 103-CR-05453 OWW, 2006 WL 2535052 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2006)..................................... 3 
United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 2002)........... 11, 12 
United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1994)............ 11 
United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1977)............... 8 
United States v. Rosas, 615 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)............. 13 
United States v. Yagman, No. CR 06-227(A)-SVW, 2007 WL 9724388 
(C.D. Cal. May 3, 2007)...................................... 11 
STATUTES 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)........................................... 14 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5)........................................... 14 
18 U.S.C. § 1343................................................... 8 
18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)................................................ 8 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)....................................... 8 
18 U.S.C. § 1957................................................... 8 
18 U.S.C. § 3147.................................................. 13 
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)............................................... 11 
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RULES 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)................... 10, 12 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(b)........................... 2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions No. 
3.13 ......................................................... 2 
Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions No. 
8.20 ......................................................... 8 
  
 
 
 
 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The government submits the following objections to defendant 
Richard Ayvazyan’s (“defendant”) proposed verdict form (ECF 547).  
The government previously submitted a proposed verdict form that 
included separate verdict forms for each defendant, with the 
objective of simplifying and focusing the jury’s consideration of 
the charges against each defendant (ECF 452).  Conversely, 
defendant’s proposed verdict form injects unnecessary confusion and 
improper argument into what should be a straightforward form guiding 
the jury’s consideration of the charges against each defendant.   
The government respectfully requests that the Court submit to 
the jury the proposed amended verdict form attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, which conforms the government’s prior submission to the 
four defendants that ultimately have proceeded to trial.1 
II. 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED VERDICT FORM 
A. 
Objection #1: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Proposal of a Single Verdict Form for All Defendants 
The government’s proposed individual verdict forms for each 
defendant facilitates the jury’s separate and careful consideration 
of the charges against each defendant.  (See ECF 452.)  This 
approach is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury 
Instruction Number 3.13 for “Separate Consideration of Multiple 
Counts – Multiple Defendants,” which instructs jurors that they 
“must decide the case of each defendant on each crime charged 
 
1 Because not all eight defendants have proceeded to trial, the 
government has limited the caption on the cover page of each 
individual verdict form to the four defendants that are on trial in 
order to avoid potential juror confusion. 
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against that defendant separately.”  Ninth Circuit Manual of Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions No. 3.13.  The government has included 
this model instruction in its proposed jury instructions previously 
submitted to the Court.  (See ECF 373, Government’s Proposed 
Instruction No. 9.) 
Not only is the government’s proposal consistent with the jury 
instructions it anticipates the Court will provide in this case, but 
also it provides a practical means for the jury to evaluate the 
evidence against each defendant and to return verdicts consistent 
with those deliberations.  Should the jury reach an impasse with 
respect to one or more defendants or counts, separate verdict forms 
will better assist the jury in its objective of returning unanimous 
verdicts where it can reach consensus.  Such an approach squares 
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(b), which provides, “[i]f 
there are multiple defendants, the jury may return a verdict at any 
time during its deliberations as to any defendant about whom it has 
agreed,” and “[i]f the jury cannot agree on all counts as to any 
defendant, the jury may return a verdict on those counts on which it 
has agreed.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b)(1)-(2). 
As courts also have recognized, separate verdict forms for each 
defendant may head off juror confusion in multiple defendant cases 
and forestall later challenges arising out of such potential 
uncertainty, including on appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Dhaliwal, 468 F. App’x 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument regarding potential juror confusion on drug 
quantity finding as to defendant where “the jury was given 
separate verdict forms for each defendant”); United States v. 
Nobari, No. 103-CR-05453 OWW, 2006 WL 2535052, at *25 (E.D. Cal. 
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Aug. 31, 2006) (no juror confusion as to unanimity finding where 
“[t]he verdict forms also contained the finding that a unanimous 
verdict had to be reached in every finding as the separate verdict 
forms as to each Defendant”), aff’d, 574 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2009); 
cf. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 124 (2016) (in capital penalty 
phase, approving fact that “court instructed the jury to consider 
the ‘individual’ or ‘particular defendant’ by using four separate 
verdict forms for each defendant, one for each [victim]”). 
In addition, the government’s individual verdict forms provide 
brief descriptions of the transactions charged in the substantive, 
non-conspiracy counts in the superseding indictment.  This approach 
is intended to aid in the jury’s informed and efficient 
consideration of the charges against each defendant without 
requiring jurors to resort to frequent and confusing cross-
references to the trial superseding indictment.  
Defendant’s proposed verdict form undermines all of these 
objectives.  (See ECF 547.)  Defendant proposes a single verdict 
form, combining counts for which all defendants are charged with 
counts for which some but not all defendants are charged with counts 
for which just a single defendant is charged.  Instead of focusing 
the jurors’ attention on a careful, independent, and straightforward 
evaluation of the charges against each defendant, defendant’s 
proposal is disjointed and will sow confusion as the jurors try to 
figure out how to navigate the components of the form.   
For example, for the wire fraud (counts 2-12) and bank fraud 
(counts 13-20) scheme counts, defendant’s form requires the jury 
first to decide whether each defendant is “Not Guilty on All 
Counts,” “Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt on All Counts,” or 
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“Guilty on Some Counts.”  (Id. at 1, 2.)  Since defendant Vahe 
Dadyan is not charged with all wire fraud and bank fraud counts, the 
form provides a placeholder in the middle category differentiating 
him from the other defendants.  The verdict form further confuses 
matters by requiring the jury to write in the specific counts for 
which it finds each defendant guilty, should the jury check off the 
box that it finds a given defendant only “Guilty on Some Counts.”  
The government’s proposed verdict forms, on the other hand, allow 
the jurors to consider each of the wire and bank fraud counts for 
which each defendant is charged separately and simply place an “X” 
on the line for “Guilty” or “Not Guilty.”  
Defendant’s proposed verdict form also does not provide context 
or any substantive information for each charge.  This will require 
jurors to cross-reference the trial superseding indictment in order 
to recall and understand the basis for each charge in defendant’s 
verdict form.  While this might not be a significant lift in a run-
of-the-mill drug or firearms case, it will make the jurors’ job more 
difficult in a fraud case such as this.  The First Superseding 
Indictment is detailed and extensive, with numerous disparate 
charges and 64 overt acts in the wire/bank fraud conspiracy count, 
as well as a multitude of different company names, loan 
applications, and financial transactions.  The government’s proposed 
verdict forms for each defendant include information summarizing the 
relevant information for each substantive count to aid in the jury’s 
deliberations.  Defendant’s three-and-a-half page form omits any 
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such guideposts and will make the jury’s job harder and more complex 
when it deliberates.2 
B. 
Objection #2: The Government Objects to Defendant’s Use of 
“Single or Unitary” to Describe the Charged Conspiracies 
and Schemes and His Framing of the Conspiracy Counts 
In the question headings for the conspiracy and scheme counts 
in defendant’s proposed verdict form, defendant uses the modifier 
“single or unitary” to describe “[c]onspiracy” and “scheme” for 
Counts One (bank/wire fraud conspiracy), Two through Twelve (wire 
fraud), Thirteen through Twenty (bank fraud), and Twenty-Six (money 
laundering conspiracy).  (ECF 547.)  The government’s objection to 
this language is three-fold: (1) defendant’s insertion of this 
modifier improperly seeks to insert one of his apparent (and legally 
incorrect) theories of defense into the verdict form, i.e., that 
there were multiple conspiracies and not just a central bank/wire 
fraud conspiracy and a central money laundering conspiracy; (2) this 
proposed language and the structure of the conspiracy counts in his 
verdict form fail to account for a specific unanimity finding that 
is necessary in this case; and (3) the use of this language will 
further confuse the jury based on the actual charges in this case. 
First, defendant’s inclusion of the modifier “single or 
unitary” is based on a flawed assumption that the evidence in this 
case supports a “multiple conspiracies” instruction and theory of 
defense.  Defendant has included “multiple conspiracies” 
instructions in his proposed jury instructions in connection with 
 
2 Defendant’s proposed form injects additional confusion by 
reordering the names of the four defendants at trial in the list of 
defendants under each count, listing the names alphabetically 
instead of in the order they appear in the case caption in the 
superseding indictment.   
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both the bank/wire fraud conspiracy charged in Count One and the 
money laundering conspiracy charged in Count Twenty-Six.  (See ECF 
372, Defense Proposed Instruction Nos. 2, 9.)  He also has proposed 
a “multiple schemes” instruction – though no such model instruction 
exists under the Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions – for the wire fraud and bank fraud charges in this 
case.  (Id., Defense Proposed Instruction No. 7.)  As defendant made 
clear during his opening statement, one of his theories of defense 
will be that there are purportedly multiple “joint ventures” which 
somehow absolves him of responsibility in this case. 
Based on the evidence presented thus far, as well as the 
additional evidence the government expects to admit, there is no 
factual basis for the Court to instruct the jury on “multiple 
conspiracies” – much less to include the “single or unitary” 
language in the final verdict forms.  A defendant is not entitled to 
what amounts to a specific unanimity instruction based on a 
“multiple conspiracies” defense theory unless there is a “genuine 
possibility of confusion” about the existence of multiple 
conspiracies.  See United States v. Lapier, 796 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 
(9th Cir. 2015) (specific unanimity instruction necessary where 
“perfect storm” of potential “jury confusion,” including where 
“indictment was broadly worded and did not name the coconspirators,” 
the “evidence adduced at trial credibly showed at least two separate 
conspiracies,” and “even the prosecutor admitted that the government 
may have proved two separate conspiracies”).  In evaluating whether 
such a “genuine possibility” exists, the Ninth Circuit has 
“considered a non-exhaustive list of factors including the text of 
the indictment, the clarity and presentation of the government’s 
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argument, the complexity of the evidence, and the clarity or 
ambiguity of the jury instructions.”  Id. at 1097. 
Here, the government has alleged and presented evidence 
regarding a conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud in 
connection with the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and Economic 
Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program starting in or around March 
2020.  (ECF 154, 1.)  The government has separately alleged and 
presented evidence regarding a conspiracy to engage in money 
laundering with respect to the fraudulently obtained proceeds of the 
bank/wire fraud conspiracy during the same general time period.  
(Id., Count 26.)  In connection with both alleged conspiracies, the 
government has specifically alleged the coconspirators, provided an 
exemplary list of loan applications and bank transactions in the 
overt acts showing how these specific conspiracies were carried out, 
and presented evidence illustrating clearly the manner, means, 
coconspirators, and fruits of both of the alleged conspiracies.   
At the end of trial, the government does not expect the defense 
to be in any better position to point to credible evidence of an 
entirely separate conspiracy relating to fraudulent PPP/EIDL loan 
applications that could lead to the “genuine possibility of 
confusion” among the jurors about the bank/wire fraud and money 
laundering conspiracies at issue here.3  The proposed “single or 
 
3 The government has moved in limine to preclude defense 
evidence or argument regarding a separate indictment brought by the 
State of California alleging a mortgage and green loan fraud scheme 
that took place in the years before the PPP/EIDL programs under the 
CARES Act.  (See ECF 550.)  But even if evidence of this separately 
alleged scheme by the State, focused predominantly on the years 
between 2014 and 2019, was admissible for some purpose, the 
factually distinct allegations in that case do not provide a 
credible basis for the “genuine possibility of confusion” about the 
conspiracies alleged here. 
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unitary” language is thus unfounded and should be rejected.  See 
United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 574, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(affirming trial court’s refusal to give multiple conspiracies 
instruction, explaining “[t]he crucial point that defendants miss in 
this case is the fact that the jury could find that there were 
several different agreements involving the defendants, all of which 
would then connect the defendants to the general overall conspiracy 
as charged in the indictment”); United States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-
00462-CRB, 2018 WL 3619797, at *35 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2018) (“[T]he 
standard is not whether it is possible that jurors might find 
multiple conspiracies, but whether there is a ‘genuine possibility 
of confusion’ among the jurors.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Lapier, 796 F.3d at 1096). 
Second, defendant compounds his error in including this “single 
or unitary” language in his verdict form by not separately 
accounting for the two distinct objects of each of the bank/wire 
fraud conspiracy and the money laundering conspiracy.  Specifically, 
Count One alleges that the defendants conspired to commit both wire 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and bank fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2).  (ECF 154, Count 1.)  Similarly, 
Count Twenty-Six alleges that the defendants conspired to commit 
both concealment money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and transactional money laundering, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  (Id., Count 26.)  However, the jury does not 
need to find the defendants conspired to commit both objects in each 
alleged conspiracy to find them guilty.  See Ninth Circuit Manual of 
Model Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 8.20 (“You must find that 
there was a plan to commit at least one of the crimes alleged in the 
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indictment as an object of the conspiracy with all of you agreeing 
as to the particular crime which the conspirators agreed to 
commit.”).  Thus, the government accounts for these two separate 
objects in each charged conspiracy in its proposed verdict forms, 
allowing the jury to determine whether each defendant conspired to 
commit one or both of these alleged objects, requiring the jurors’ 
unanimity on each of these findings.  (See generally ECF 452.)   
Defendant’s proposed verdict form glosses over this distinction 
and improperly seeks to require the government to prove a “single or 
unitary” conspiracy to achieve both alleged objects in the charged 
conspiracy counts.  To be clear, the government believes the 
evidence supports a finding that defendants conspired to commit both 
objects in each of the two alleged conspiracies.  But it is not 
required to prove as much, and defendant’s attempt to confuse the 
jury with the “single or unitary” modifier should be rejected.  
Finally, the use of “single or unitary” to modify both 
conspiracies in defendant’s verdict form is especially confusing in 
that the government has in fact charged two separate conspiracies in 
this case.  The alleged conspiracies cover different objects and, 
when properly instructed, the jury should not be confused about its 
independent evaluation of the distinct conspiracies with which 
defendants are charged.  The use of “single or unitary” in the 
verdict form (as well as the factually unsupported “multiple 
conspiracies” jury instruction) will only inject confusion where it 
does not otherwise exist.  The same reasoning applies for 
defendant’s proposed use of the “single or unitary” modifier in his 
verdict form for the wire fraud scheme and the bank fraud scheme, 
which charge distinct harms and are based clearly upon the 
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fraudulent PPP/EIDL loan applications at the heart of this case.4 
C. 
Objection #3: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Inclusion of the Venue Question as to the Alleged Wire 
Fraud Counts Because He Has Waived a Challenge to Venue 
Defendant proposes a question regarding venue with respect to 
the wire fraud scheme alleged in Counts Two through Twelve.  (See 
ECF 547 at 1.)  The government objects to defendant’s inclusion of 
this question because defendant waived a challenge to venue by 
failing to object to it before trial pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A)(i).  A challenge to venue “must be 
raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then 
reasonably available and the motion can be determined without a 
trial on the merits.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3).  The Ninth Circuit 
has “held that a failure to timely raise a pretrial objection 
required by Rule 12, ‘absent a showing of good cause,’ constitutes a 
waiver – we will not review the objection, even for plain error.”  
United States v. Ghanem, 993 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2021).  
Defendant provides no good cause for his failure to challenge venue 
before trial, and thus his request to include a venue question in 
the proposed verdict form should be rejected. 
In addition, even though defendant has waived his right to 
challenge venue or submit it to the jury, the government notes that 
the content, formulation, and placement of defendant’s proposed 
venue question with respect to the wire fraud scheme misstates the 
 
4 The government also objects to defendant’s use of “or 
artifice” in his proposed language for both the wire fraud and bank 
fraud questions in his verdict form.  (See, e.g., ECF 547, Counts 2-
12 (“. . . charging the transmission of wires for the purpose of 
executing a single or unitary scheme or artifice to defraud . . 
.”).)  This language is superfluous and unnecessary, and will lead 
to juror confusion. 
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law and injects additional unnecessary confusion. 
First, defendant’s limitation of the basis for venue as to 
whether “the wire was sent to or from the Central District of 
California” is legally incorrect.  Because “[w]ire fraud is a 
‘continuing offense’ . . . venue may lie in all of the places where 
any part was accomplished.”  United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 
350 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)) (emphasis added).  
“Crimes that are not unitary but instead span space and time . . . 
may be considered continuing offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  
Continuing offenses may be prosecuted ‘in any district in which such 
offense was begun, continued, or completed.’”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1994)).  With respect 
to wire fraud in particular, under the continuing offense 
construction, “venue is established in those locations where the 
wire transmission at issue originated, passed through, or was 
received, or from which it was ‘orchestrated.’”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis 
added).  See also United States v. Yagman, No. CR 06-227(A)-SVW, 
2007 WL 9724388, at *17 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2007) (“Consequently, as 
long as one act furthering the execution of a single scheme to 
defraud under Section 157 occurs within the Central District of 
California (such as in a wire fraud case), venue is proper before 
this Court.”) (citing Pace, 314 F.3d at 350). 
Here, the government expects that at a minimum, the proof at 
trial demonstrates that defendants “orchestrated” the wire fraud 
scheme from the Central District of California, including for the 
time period encompassed by the wire transmissions charged in the 
First Superseding Indictment.  There is no requirement that “the 
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wire was sent to or from the Central District of California,” and 
thus defendant’s legal construction of the standard is incorrect. 
Second, the formulation of the venue question for this 
continuing offense in defendant’s proposed verdict form, with a 
separate finding for each charged transmission, is unnecessary, 
duplicative, and confusing.  Because wire fraud is a continuing 
offense, “venue may lie in all of the places where any part was 
accomplished.”  Pace, 314 F.3d at 350.  Listing out each wire 
transmission separately is thus unnecessary, as the jury could make 
a finding as to venue for the wire fraud counts based on evidence 
the government presents with respect to the orchestration of the 
scheme as a whole for the time period encompassed by the relevant 
wire transmissions. 
Finally, defendant’s placement of the venue question for each 
wire fraud count in between the foundational questions as to the 
wire fraud counts for which defendants are guilty or not guilty is 
confusing and disjointed.  In addition to the structural issues the 
government identified above with respect to the formulation of the 
wire fraud questions (as explained in Objection Nos. 1 and 2 
herein), the interjection of the venue question in the middle of the 
wire fraud scheme section interrupts the natural flow of the jurors’ 
consideration of the issue of substantive guilt. 
In sum, defendant’s proposed venue question should be rejected 
because defendant waived any challenge to venue by not raising it 
before trial.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(i).  If the Court 
overlooks defendant’s waiver, his proposed venue question should be 
rejected as legally erroneous and confusing. 
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D. 
Objection #4: The Government Objects to the Omission of a 
Question Regarding Defendant Richard Ayvazyan’s Commission 
of Money Laundering While on Pretrial Release  
In its proposed verdict form as to defendant Richard Ayvazyan, 
the government includes a conditional follow-up question for each of 
the five concealment money laundering counts charged against 
defendant in Counts Twenty-Eight through Thirty-Two.  The follow-up 
questions pertain to the charges against defendant for committing 
offenses while on pretrial release, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3147.  Specifically, the follow-up questions ask the jury to make 
a finding (if they have found defendant guilty of the underlying 
money laundering offense) as to whether defendant committed the 
offense while on pretrial release.  (See ECF 452 at ECF-stamped 
pages 18-22.)  The government included these follow-up questions 
because the allegations against defendant in the First Superseding 
Indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 have the potential to increase his 
sentencing exposure beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying 
offense, and thus must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See United States v. Rosas, 615 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2010); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).5 
Defendant’s proposed verdict form fails to specify any follow-
up questions with respect to the section 3147 allegations against 
him in Counts Twenty-Eight through Thirty-Two of the First 
Superseding Indictment.  The government objects to defendant’s 
failure to account for this issue in his proposed verdict form.  
 
5 The government also has included a jury instruction to account 
for defendant’s alleged commission of crimes while on pretrial 
release in its proposed jury instructions.  (See ECF 373, 
Government’s Proposed Instruction No. 27.) 
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E. 
Objection #5: The Government Objects to Defendant’s 
Omission of the Specific Felony Predicate for the 
Aggravated Identity Theft Counts 
In his proposed verdict form, for the aggravated identity theft 
counts charged against defendant and his coconspirators Marietta 
Terabelian and Artur Ayvazyan, defendant describes the relevant 
charge as “Aggravated Identity Theft in Relation to a Felony.”  (See 
ECF 547 at 3 (Counts 21, 22, 24).)  The government objects to the 
omission of the underlying predicate felony alleged in the 
indictment with respect to each of these counts, proof of which is a 
required element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 
Section 1028A(a)(1) prescribes the knowing transfer, 
possession, or use, without lawful authority, of a means of 
identification of another person “during and in relation to any 
felony violation enumerated in subsection (c)” of the statute.  18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).  The statute provides an enumerated list of 
predicate felonies, which includes bank fraud and wire fraud.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5).   
Defendant’s formulation of the aggravated identity theft counts 
in his proposed verdict form implies that any felony can be a 
predicate offense, which is not the law.  In its proposed verdict 
forms as to each defendant, the government identifies the charged 
predicate felony (bank or wire fraud, as specified in the First 
Superseding Indictment) for each aggravated identity theft count.  
This approach ensures the jury will make a finding as to the 
aggravated identity theft charges that is expressly based on a 
legally sufficient predicate offense. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests 
that this Court deny defendant Richard Ayvazyan’s request that his 
proposed verdict form be submitted to the jury and instead provide 
the government’s amended proposed verdict forms, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, to the jury. 
 
   
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