Court filing
Plaintiffs' Reply — Appeal from Magistrate's Stay Order — Chambless v. Redfield (W.D. La.)
Filed June 2, 2021 in Chambless v. Redfield; one of 23 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2021-06-02 |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · No. 3:20-cv-01455-TAD-KDM · Doc. 59 · 2021-06-02 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
CHAMBLESS ENTERPRISES LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:20-cv-1455
Judge Terry A. Doughty
Magistrate Judge Kayla D. McClusky
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY TO THE GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Government once again argues that Plaintiffs should endure a stay of District Court
proceedings just because they exercise their right to appeal the denial of their motion for
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs do not give up their right to advance their case in the District
Court by pursuing the right to an interlocutory appeal.
Moreover, each of the relevant factors cut against staying District Court proceedings.
Plaintiffs do not argue that the Magistrate merely came out the wrong way in a difficult balancing
of divergent factors. On the contrary, Plaintiffs maintain that there was no basis for finding that
any of the factors cut in favor of a stay. And further, Plaintiffs have argued that there is a categorical
rule against imposing a stay where it would cause prejudice to the non-moving party—a point for
which the Government has no response. Nor does the Government dispute the related rule that a
stay is improper where the moving party fails to show a significant hardship should the proceedings
continue.
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Plaintiffs are asking this Court simply to lift the stay, order the Government to produce the
administrative record, and establish a briefing schedule to resolve the merits of this case. Simply
put, Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do what would otherwise have had happened if the
Magistrate had not improperly stayed the case. As Plaintiffs have shown in their opening brief
objecting to the Magistrate’s order, Plaintiffs do not give up the right to pursue the merits of their
claims simply because they chose to exercise their right to appeal the denial of a preliminary
injunction. Plaintiffs clearly have standing to pursue their claims, and those claims are
unquestionably valid. Indeed, four district courts and a panel of the Sixth Circuit have concluded
that the CDC’s eviction moratorium is unlawful. See Tiger Lily, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and
Urban Development, 992 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021); Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S.
Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, No. 20-cv-3377, 2021 WL 1779282 (D.D.C. May 5,
2021); Tiger Lily, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, No. 2:20-cv-02692,
2021 WL 1171887 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2021); Skyworks, Ltd. v. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, No. 5:20-cv-2407, 2021 WL 911720 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2021); Terkel v. Ctrs.
for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 6:20-cv-564, 2021 WL 742877 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2021).
Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to pursue their claims in this Court. Contrary to the Government’s
contention, they have no obligation to illustrate irreparable harm in order to pursue a merits
decision in this Court on the question of whether the CDC’s eviction moratorium is lawful. See,
e.g., Skyworks, Ltd., 2021 WL 911720 (setting aside CDC moratorium under APA section 706
despite concluding plaintiffs did not suffer irreparable harm). Nor is the June 30 expiration date of
the CDC’s current order relevant to the question of a stay of proceedings in this Court. The CDC’s
order has been in effect since last September and has been renewed three times. There is every
reason to believe it will be renewed again and the Government has not said otherwise. The
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Government is, in effect, asking this Court to resolve the stay question by deciding, without benefit
of briefing or argument, that Plaintiffs will either lose on the merits before this Court or that the
Court will conclude the case is moot. But that is wholly inappropriate. This Court should not permit
the government to pursue its strategy of delay in order to avoid a decision on the merits.
ARGUMENT
While the parties agree as to the relevant factors in considering a motion to stay, there is
fundamental disagreement as to what showing is required for those factors. Plaintiffs contend that
all three factors weigh against the Magistrate Judge’s decision to stay proceedings, which would
necessarily mean that the Magistrate abused its discretion in granting the stay. Either way, the
parties do not merely quibble about the exercise of conferred discretion, but rather differ on the
legal question of what showing is required under each factor.
Also, the stay factors are not an amorphous ad hoc balancing test. On the contrary, binding
authority confirms not just that the burden is on the moving party to prove clear entitlement to a
stay, but also that this burden can only be satisfied where the moving party proves that: (1) a stay
will not cause prejudice to the non-moving party, and; (2) in the absence of a stay the moving party
will suffer significant hardship. Accordingly, the third stay factor is relevant only where the
moving party has satisfied the first two factors. And while the Government maintains that all three
factors weigh in their favor, their opposition brief does not contest this non-discretionary
framework. Nor do they point to any authority suggesting the Court has discretion to issue a stay
when doing so would cause prejudice, or in the absence of a clear showing of that proceeding to
the merits will cause real hardship.
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I.
The Government Overlooks the Practical Harm of a Stay
The Government argues that there is no prejudice in maintaining a stay because briefing
and final judgment cannot wrap up by the end of June. But no one is pushing to have a merits
decision in June. At this juncture, Plaintiffs ask only that the stay be lifted so that the parties can
obtain a merits decision as expeditiously as possible.
The Government uses the uncertainty of a possible extension of the Order as a strategic
weapon to thwart Plaintiffs’ undisputed rights to both an interlocutory appeal and a final judgment.
Throughout this litigation the Government has avoided saying anything definitive as to whether
the eviction moratorium order will be extended or for how long extensions will continue. Instead,
they have reserved the option of extending the moratorium order indefinitely in short-term
increments. If (and when) the CDC extends the moratorium past June, we can expect the agency
will, once again, assert that there is no basis for moving forward with litigation because its
moratorium will ‘soon expire’, even while planning for the contingency of further extensions.
The Government should not be permitted to enlist this Court in its game of whack-a-mole.
The harm to Plaintiffs is not simply the threat that they will be unable to obtain a decision on the
merits if the stay remains in place, but that they are being improperly prevented from litigating
their case when there is no valid reason to delay. The Government blithely claims that Plaintiffs
have no entitlement to a judicial decision for its own sake, but this ignores that (1) the eviction
moratorium is causing Plaintiffs’ harm right now (whether irreparable or otherwise makes no
difference at this point in the case); (2) that Plaintiffs’ claims are unquestionably valid, given that
four other district courts and a panel of the Sixth Circuit have concluded the moratorium is
unlawful; and (3) that Plaintiffs unquestionably have standing to pursue their claims.
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When there is an active case or controversy the federal court-house doors are open and
there is a presumption that an aggrieved party is entitled to a remedy—which requires a resolution
of the merits. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“It is the role of courts to provide
relief to claimants . . . who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm.”). The APA,
moreover, requires courts to issue judgment where an agency has acted in excess of statutory
authority. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(C). Plaintiffs have no obligation to prove that their harm is irreparable
or that they will prevail on the merits in order to be afforded the right to pursue the merits. The
Government’s argument puts the cart before the horse.
Nor is it relevant that the CDC’s current order will expire on June 30. This Court cannot
decide that the case is moot until it is clear that the case is, in fact, moot. By speculating (without
confirming) that the eviction moratorium will expire, the Government seeks to force Plaintiffs to
prove their claim will not become moot, even though the Government is the only party here in the
position to predict the eviction moratorium’s future. Cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (“[A] defendant claiming that its voluntary
compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”).
Moreover, there are exceptional reasons why a decision on the merits is critical for
providing practical relief in this case. Should the case be mooted without ever reaching the merits
there would remain a significant risk that the CDC would issue a renewed eviction moratorium
order later—reigniting the present controversy—if there is a spike in cases, perhaps from a new
emergent COVID-19 strain this fall or next year. Accordingly, even if the Government is correct
that a party has no right to a merits decision, a stay preventing a resolution on the merits would
ultimately be prejudicial to the Plaintiffs.
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Finally, the Government suggests that a stay is not consequential if the District Court is
affirmed in its conclusion that Plaintiffs are suffering no irreparable harm. But here they conflate
preliminary injunction standards with the merits. A showing of irreparable harm is, by design,
more difficult than a showing of an Article III injury and is appropriate in the context of a
preliminary injunction precisely because at that stage the court is making an assessment as to
whether immediate judicial intervention is appropriate before final resolution of the merits. By
contrast, a remedy issued upon a final ruling on the merits is essential for redressing the Plaintiffs’
injury. And if the practical effect of a stay is to deny that remedy then there is unquestionably
prejudice to the Plaintiffs here.
II.
The Government Identifies No Real Hardship in Producing the Administrative
Record and Repurposing Merits Arguments for Dispositive Motions
The Government fails to explain why moving to the merits in this case would be a hardship
at all. They take issue only with the prospect that they might be compelled to address the merits in
dispositive briefing after submitting the record. But this is no hardship at all. The Government is
litigating several cases on the statutory and constitutional authority of the CDC eviction
moratorium. It has briefed and argued every issue this case presents and filed the record several
times. The notion that having to do one more round of briefing in this case causes the Government
some undue hardship is preposterous. It ought to go without saying that defending its laws and
regulations in court is part of the Government’s job, not some undue irritation that the Government
should have to suffer only when it sees fit to explain its actions. That is always true, but is
especially true when the Government purports to exercise the authority to shut down evictions
throughout the entire nation in the face of several courts that have concluded that it lacks the
authority to do so.
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III.
The Government Fails to Identify any Legitimate Issue of Judicial Economy in
Allowing Continued District Court Proceedings
Plaintiffs have argued that there are no issues of judicial economy here for several reasons.
First, the merits proceedings would not be duplicative because those would be decided on the
administrative record. Second, if the Court is inclined to uphold the eviction moratorium on the
basis of its prior rationale, such an opinion would require minimal judicial resources. And third, if
the Court should change its view on the merits, that would not give rise to “duplicative
proceedings” or the possibility of “inconsistent rulings,” as the Magistrate assumed. The
Government does not directly respond to any of these arguments.
Instead, the Government simply asserts that lifting the stay might lead to “significant
wasted judicial effort.” But that is not so. Just as the District Court will retain discretion to set the
briefing schedule upon lifting the stay, the Court will retain discretion in deciding when to decide
the merits. This Court controls its own proceedings. Even assuming the merits are fully briefed by
the end of August or September, nothing would compel this Court to immediately begin drafting
an opinion. As Plaintiffs have suggested already, it’s likely in that scenario that the Court might
elect to have the parties file short supplementary briefs once the Fifth Circuit renders its decision
within a short time thereafter.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs respectfully urge this Court to reverse the Magistrate Judge’s Order dated
April 19, 2021.
DATED: June 1, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ STEVEN M. SIMPSON
STEVEN M. SIMPSON*
DC Bar No. 462553
Pacific Legal Foundation
3100 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 610
Arlington, VA 22201
Tel: (202) 888-6881
SSimpson@pacificlegal.org
/s/ JAMES C. RATHER, JR.
JAMES C. RATHER, JR.
Louisiana Bar No. 25839
ALKER & RATHER, LLC
4030 Lonesome Rd., Suite B
Mandeville, LA 70448
Tel: (985) 727-7501
JRather@alker-rather.com
LUKE A. WAKE*
DC Bar No. 1009181
ETHAN W. BLEVINS*
Washington State Bar No. 48219
HANNAH SELLS MARCLEY*
Washington State Bar No. 52692
Pacific Legal Foundation
930 G Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Tel: (916) 419-7111
Fax: (916) 419-7747
LWake@pacificlegal.org
EBlevins@pacifclegal.org
HMarcley@pacificlegal.org
*Pro hac vice
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Case 3:20-cv-01455-TAD-KDM Document 59 Filed 06/02/21 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 788
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I served this document today by filing it using the Court’s CM/ECF
system, which will automatically notify all counsel of record.
Dated: June 1, 2021
/s/ Steve M. Simpson
Case 3:20-cv-01455-TAD-KDM Document 59 Filed 06/02/21 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 789File and source
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