Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Appeal from Magistrate's Stay Order — Chambless v. Redfield (W.D. La.)

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U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana · No. 3:20-cv-01455-TAD-KDM · Doc. 53-3 · 2021-05-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
MONROE DIVISION 
 
 
 
CHAMBLESS ENTERPRISES LLC, et al., 
 
      Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT REDFIELD, et al., 
 
      Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 Case No. 3:20-cv-1455-TAD-KDM 
 
Judge Terry A. Doughty 
 
Magistrate Judge Kayla D. McClusky 
 
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ APPEAL  
FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
 
On April 19, 2021, the Magistrate Judge entered an order staying further proceedings in 
this case pending the outcome of Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Fifth Circuit of this Court’s denial of 
their motion for preliminary injunction. The Magistrate Judge concluded that a stay was warranted 
because it would cause no prejudice to the Plaintiffs and that proceeding to the merits in this Court, 
while Plaintiffs’ appeal is pending, would both cause prejudice to the Defendants and waste 
judicial resources. All of these conclusions are erroneous and should be reversed.  
As a preliminary matter, the Magistrate improperly accepted an implicit premise of the 
Defendants’ argument, which is that Plaintiffs may either file an interlocutory appeal of the denial 
of their motion for preliminary injunction or continue with the merits before this Court, but they 
may not do both. This premise is entirely unwarranted. Indeed, if it were true, then no case would 
proceed while an interlocutory appeal of a preliminary injunction ruling was pending. While there 
may be reasons in some cases to stay district court proceedings in such a situation, this is not such 
a case.  
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This case involves a challenge to the CDC’s assumption of power to ban all evictions in 
the entire nation under a statute that authorizes it to take certain limited measures to prevent cross-
border transmission of disease. Since this Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction, four courts have ruled that the CDC lacks that power or that the Government is unlikely 
to prevail on the merits. See Terkel v. CDC, No. 6:20-CV-00564, 2021 WL 742877, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Feb. 25, 2021) (vacating CDC’s eviction moratorium order under the APA); Skyworks, Ltd. 
v. CDC, No. 5:20-CV-2407, 2021 WL 911720, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2021) (ruling that the 
CDC lacked statutory authority for its moratorium order); Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States Dep’t 
of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 2:20-CV-02692-MSN-ATC, 2021 WL 1171887, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 15, 2021) (same); Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 21-5256, 
2021 WL 1165170, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021) (denying the Government’s motion to stay a 
District Court decision). Two other courts (including this one) have ruled the other way. And cases 
are pending in other district courts—including in the Northern District of Iowa and in the District 
of Columbia. In short, the issues in this case are being vigorously litigated throughout the country. 
And while the courts have disagreed on the legal questions, there is no question that the issues are 
of great national importance because the CDC’s actions impact many thousands of individuals 
across the nation.  
As such, the issues in this case deserve careful attention. Yet, because the CDC’s eviction 
ban is a temporary order, which the CDC has now renewed twice, it is possible that it will escape 
judicial review. In defending short-term rules—especially when faced with difficult merits 
arguments—any sensible party in the Government’s position would seek to delay a ruling on the 
merits. But litigation strategy is not a proper ground for staying a case.  
 
 
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None of the Government’s or the Magistrate’s arguments warrant a stay. First, a stay will 
prejudice the Plaintiffs because it will increase the chances that they will not be able to receive a 
decision on the merits of this case. Indeed, the Government is arguing in the Fifth Circuit appeal 
that the Court should affirm this Court’s ruling without argument on the grounds that Plaintiffs 
have not shown irreparable harm. See Chambless Enterprises, LLC v. Walensky, No. 21-30037, 
Br. of Appellees, Doc. No. 00515831937, 18 (Apr. 21, 2021) (“Because plaintiffs failed to show 
‘a substantial threat of irreparable injury outweighing the harms of granting the preliminary 
injunction,’ the denial of a preliminary injunction would properly be affirmed even if plaintiffs 
could show a likelihood of success on the merits.”). While Plaintiffs disagree with this argument, 
it is possible the Fifth Circuit will side with the Government and decline to reach the merits. If this 
were to happen, Plaintiffs would be back in this Court just starting to litigate the merits many 
months from now without any clarity from the Fifth Circuit as to the dispositive issues. 
Second, there can be no prejudice to the Government in having to litigate the merits now. 
The Government has litigated at least nine cases (counting appeals) like this one and has briefed 
all the issues many times. This case involves only an administrative record, which the Government 
has filed in several other courts. Filing the record here and briefing the issues on the merits once 
more is not a burden—at least not one that should prompt a court to stay an entire case that involves 
the question of whether one agency can control all evictions in the entire nation.  
Third, and for similar reasons, addressing the merits will not waste judicial resources or 
risk conflicting court rulings. This Court has already addressed most of the issues that will come 
up on the merits. If it agrees with its prior decision, the work required in issuing an order will be 
minimal. If it disagrees with its prior decision, the work involved will be both important and vital 
to the case and to Plaintiffs’ rights. Nor is the alleged “risk of conflicting rulings” a valid concern. 
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The only “conflict” possible in this case (if it can be called a “conflict”) would be between the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision and this Court’s decision. If the Fifth Circuit affirms, there is no conflict. 
If the Fifth Circuit declines to address the merits, as Defendants have asked it to, then, again, there 
will be no conflict. If the Fifth Circuit reverses, there might be a “conflict” in that this Court will 
have to follow the Fifth Circuit’s ruling. But that sort of “conflict” is a feature of our system, not 
a bug.  
The Defendants did not come close to carrying their burden in requesting a stay. This Court 
should reverse the Magistrate Judge and allow the case to proceed to the merits.  
ARGUMENT 
While the District Court has discretion to stay proceedings, the burden is on the moving 
party to show that a stay is clearly warranted. Here the Defendants failed to satisfy that burden. As 
such, the Magistrate’s decision should be set aside as clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. 
App. P., Rule 72(a). 
I. A Stay of Proceedings Is Prejudicial to Plaintiffs  
A stay of District Court proceedings is inappropriate “if there is even a fair possibility that 
the stay for which [the moving party] prays will work damage to someone else[.]” Landis v. N. 
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). See also GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 
F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985). Defendants failed to meet this standard. But the Magistrate’s opinion 
improperly flips the inquiry by discounting the likelihood of prejudice identified in Plaintiffs’ 
opposition. 
The Magistrate’s decision errantly concluded that there would be no “material[] prejudice” 
in granting Defendants’ motion to stay because “[a] slight delay is not ordinarily considered 
significantly prejudicial.” Mag. Opinion at 4. But this overlooks the practical reality of the case at 
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hand. This is not a case where a stay merely means delay in attaining a final decision. By the nature 
of the issues presented, this case may evade judicial review unless Defendants are compelled to 
produce the administrative record and Plaintiffs are allowed a chance to pursue a merits decision 
at this juncture. This is so because we are dealing with temporary rules that might be incrementally 
extended further or that might be allowed to expire at any point. As such, a stay necessarily 
prejudices Plaintiffs because a stay significantly raises the odds that they will not be allowed the 
chance to obtain a decision on the merits.  
The Magistrate dismissed this concern on the view that it might not be possible for 
Plaintiffs to attain a final decision by the time the current eviction moratorium order is set to expire 
at the end of June. But this misses the point. While it is possible the Defendants may allow the 
current eviction moratorium order to expire, it is entirely possible (perhaps likely) that the CDC 
will issue another short-term extension, or potentially continued extensions through 2021. For that 
matter, a recent interim rule pronounced by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau gives 
reason to believe the CDC intends to continue enforcing a nationwide eviction moratorium. See 
Debt Collection Practices in Connection with the Global COVID-19 Pandemic, CFPB, RIN 3170-
AA41, 86 Fed. Reg. 21,163, 21,163 (Apr. 22, 2021) (addressing “conduct associated with an 
eviction moratorium issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention”). As such, the 
Magistrate was simply wrong in assuming that this case would be mooted on June 30, 2021. 
The prejudicial effect of this stay is apparent if one considers the likely timeline for 
Plaintiffs’ pending appeal and a subsequent resumption of District Court proceedings. Under a 
best-case scenario Plaintiffs might hope to secure a decision from the Court of Appeals by late 
July. Supposing then that the CDC has extended its moratorium through the end of August but 
does not intend to renew thereafter, Plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to secure a merits decision. 
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They would have to file a motion to reinitiate District Court proceedings and could only then move 
for judgment on the pleadings once the Defendants produce the administrative record—a process 
that could easily run out the clock to allow the Defendants to avoid a merits decision altogether.  
Moreover, the prejudicial effect of the stay is clear in considering the distinct standards the 
courts apply in reviewing a preliminary injunction motion. To prevail in their interlocutory appeal 
Plaintiffs must not only demonstrate that they are likely to win on the merits, but also that they are 
suffering irreparable harm and that an injunction would serve the public interest. As such, it’s 
possible that the Fifth Circuit may issue a decision affirming the judgment of this Court as to one 
of those prongs without even addressing Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits. In that case 
the Plaintiffs would be in exactly the same place they were last December, and without a clear 
signal from the Court of Appeals as to how this case should be resolved. At that juncture they 
would seek resolution on the merits, but would be much more likely to face mootness issues if the 
CDC were to allow its moratorium order to expire. 
As Plaintiffs set out in their opposition previously, they should not be penalized for 
exercising their right to an interlocutory appeal of the denial of their preliminary injunction. They 
have both a right to pursue that appeal and a right to pursue a judgment on the merits. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 65. See also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that “the purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as 
to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits”). See also § 3921 
Interlocutory Injunction Appeals—In General, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3921 (3d ed.) 
(analyzing the history of § 1292(a)(1) to conclude that the section was designed to address the 
“need to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps 
irreparable consequence”) (quoting Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955), 
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overruled on other grounds by Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 
(1988) (per Reed, J.)). Neither the Defendants nor the Magistrate cited any authority for issuing a 
stay where the stay would likely inhibit a plaintiff from obtaining judgment on the merits. For that 
matter, none of the cases Defendants cited in moving for a stay concerned a stay of proceedings 
during an interlocutory appeal. E.g., Eaton Vance Municipals Tr. v. Conegie, No. 4:06CV1117-P-
B, 2007 WL 1484539 (N.D. Miss. May 18, 2007) (concerning a stay where defendant’s collateral 
estopple theory hinged upon the outcome of an appeal in a separate suit); ING Bank N.V. v. M/V 
Bulk Finland, IMO, No. 9691577, No. 15-5975, 2017 WL 2798469 (E.D. La. June 28, 2017) 
(staying district court proceedings only after concluding that there was little potential prejudice to 
the non-moving party).  
II. Defendants Will Suffer No Hardship if This Case Proceeds 
Not only must a moving party demonstrate that there is no significant risk of prejudice to 
another party in granting a stay, they must also prove that they face a significant harm that can 
only be avoided by issuing a stay. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 (1997 (refusing to grant 
a stay of a trial court’s proceedings in a case against a sitting president because plaintiff’s right to 
prosecute her case outweighed any impact the case might have on the president’s ability to 
discharge his duties). See also Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 537, 
541 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (denying Microsoft’s motion to stay proceedings pending a motion to 
transfer and consolidation before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). Here as well, the 
Defendants failed to satisfy their burden. The Magistrate’s opinion errantly assumed hardship to 
the Defendants notwithstanding the fact that that it would be a simple and straightforward process 
for the Defendants to submit the administrative record and to file competing motions for summary 
judgment.  
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The Magistrate acknowledged that this case requires no discovery. The Defendants would 
need only to produce the administrative record. And this would require minimal effort because the 
Defendants have already produced the record in several related cases. To file that same record here 
would require no exertion.  
But the Magistrate concluded that the Defendants would face hardship if required to defend 
on the merits while Plaintiffs’ appeal remains pending. This portion of the Magistrate’s analysis 
conflicts with its analysis on the judicial economy factor wherein the Magistrate assumed that the 
Court would likely resolve the issues presented in the same way the Court did in considering 
Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion late last year. That belies recognition that the parties will 
be advancing roughly the same arguments at the merits stage as before. As Plaintiffs argued 
previously in opposition to the motion to stay, Defendants have briefed the issues in this case 
several times and having to brief the issues one more time will cost the Defendants very little time. 
That is especially true now that the Defendants have concluded their briefing in Plaintiffs’ pending 
interlocutory appeal, given that the Defendants have concluded merits arguments in at least three 
district courts to date. 
There is no basis for presuming prejudice to the Defendants in the mere fact that they might 
be required to repurpose arguments they’ve already fleshed out in other briefs. For one, there is no 
possibility that Defendants may face concurrent briefing schedules since they have already filed 
their brief on appeal. And while it is true that the merits analysis might involve slightly different 
issues (for example, the impact of Congress’ moratorium during January and any issues raised by 
the administrative record), those issues will not likely be burdensome to address.  
Yet even if this Court accepts Defendants’ contention that there is some burden in being 
required to brief the merits, that burden pales in comparison to the prejudice the Plaintiffs may 
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face if forced to wait to begin litigating the merits until after resolution of their pending 
interlocutory appeal. Again, given the temporary nature of the CDC’s Order, a stay likely means 
that the Plaintiffs are never able to litigate the merits.  
III. There Are No Issues of Judicial Economy 
The Defendants also failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that a stay is necessary 
to preserve judicial resources. Here the Magistrate was wrong in concluding that a stay should be 
granted to avoid potentially “duplicative proceedings” or the possibility of “inconsistent ruling.” 
For one, a decision on the merits would be non-duplicative because it would be decided on the full 
administrative record—i.e., a record that neither this Court nor the Fifth Circuit have had the 
benefit of reviewing. And there is simply no risk of inconsistent rulings because this Court will 
inevitably defer to the judgment of the Fifth Circuit to the extent the Fifth Circuit provides 
guidance on the merits issues.  
The Magistrate assumed that the District Court’s analysis was unlikely to change on the 
merits. But if the District Court’s analysis is to be as rote as the Magistrate suggests, then there 
would be no significant expenditure of judicial resources. For that matter, Plaintiffs agree that this 
Court could resolve competing motions for summary judgment quickly. 
Still, there are good reasons to think that the District Court might approach the merits 
differently at this juncture, considering the numerous courts that have since ruled that the CDC 
lacks authority to enforce its nationwide eviction moratorium. And further, it is possible that the 
District Court might take a different view on the merits—at least with regard to Plaintiffs’ 
procedural claims under the APA—when given the benefit of reviewing the administrative record. 
But even so, that does not give rise to a risk of duplicative proceedings or inconsistent rulings. 
A merits decision would not be duplicative first and foremost because the standard of 
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review is distinct. And even in so far as the analysis is similar, concurrent summary judgment 
motions pending before this Court would not likely be resolved before the Fifth Circuit can issue 
an opinion—meaning that this Court would then have the benefit of both the parties’ briefing as 
well as the Fifth Circuit’s guidance. But even if this Court should choose to quickly issue a decision 
affirming its initial view of the merits, that would only serve the benefit of enabling the Court of 
Appeals to decide the important issues of national concern presented in this case.  
In any event, the Magistrate wrongly assumes that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling will be 
determinative of the merits. Given the standards applicable for review of denial of a motion for 
preliminary injunction, there is simply no assurance that the Fifth Circuit will provide such 
guidance. Accordingly, the interest of justice and judicial economy are both served by allowing 
proceedings to continue forward in the District Court so that Plaintiffs are at least in a position to 
obtain a merits decision in short order once the Fifth Circuit renders its decision.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully urge this Court to reverse the Magistrate 
Judge’s Order dated April 19, 2021. 
 
 
 
 
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DATED:  May 3, 2021. 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/ Steven M. Simpson                     
STEVEN M. SIMPSON* 
DC Bar No. 462553 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
3100 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 610 
Arlington, VA 22201 
Tel: (202) 888-6881 
SSimpson@pacificlegal.org 
 
/s/ James C. Rather, Jr.  
JAMES C. RATHER, JR.  
Louisiana Bar No. 25839  
ALKER & RATHER, LLC  
4030 Lonesome Rd., Suite B  
Mandeville, LA 70448  
Tel: (985) 727-7501  
JRather@alker-rather.com 
LUKE A. WAKE* 
DC Bar No. 1009181 
ETHAN W. BLEVINS* 
Washington State Bar No. 48219 
HANNAH SELLS MARCLEY* 
Washington State Bar No. 52692 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
930 G Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Tel: (916) 419-7111 
Fax: (916) 419-7747 
LWake@pacificlegal.org  
EBlevins@pacifclegal.org 
HMarcley@pacificlegal.org 
*Pro hac vice 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 3, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the 
Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF system, which will cause a copy to be served upon counsel of 
record. 
DATED:  May 3, 2021. 
 
 
/s/ Steven M. Simpson 
 
STEVEN M. SIMPSON 
 
 
 
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