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RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION -- (re: pldg. ( 1 in MDL No. 2954) ) Filed by Plaintiff Guofeng… — Agent Fee Litigation (Dkt. 29)

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A memorandum of law filed June 24, 2020 before the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in In re Wells Fargo Paycheck Protection Plan Litigation, MDL No. 2954, as Document 29. Plaintiff Guofeng Ma, who brought the putative securities class action Ma v. Wells Fargo & Company et al., 3:20-cv-03697 (N.D. Cal.), opposes DNM Contracting Inc.'s motion to transfer and centralize eight actions in the Southern District of Texas. The memorandum argues under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 that the securities case shares no meaningful common factual core with the other actions, that transfer would not serve convenience or efficiency, and that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 imposes its own lead plaintiff process and discovery stay. It asks the Panel to deny the motion as to the securities action. The seven-page memorandum is signed by Jeremy A. Lieberman of Pomerantz LLP.

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            Case MDL No. 2954        Document 29        Filed 06/24/20      Page 1 of 7




                                    BEFORE THE
                          UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON
                             MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

                                                §
 IN RE WELLS FARGO PAYCHECK                     § MDL DOCKET NO. 2954
 PROTECTION PLAN LITIGATION                     §
                                                §
                                                §

                        MEMORANDUM OF LAW
      IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR TRANSFER AND CENTRALIZATION

       Guofeng Ma (“Ma”), plaintiff in the putative securities class action Ma v. Wells Fargo &

Company et al., 3:20-cv-03697 (N.D. Cal.) (the “Securities Class Action”), respectfully submits

this memorandum of law in opposition to the motion of DNM Contracting Inc. (“DNM” or

“Movant”) to transfer the Securities Class Action to the United States Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) for centralization of the actions in the Southern District of Texas

for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings (the “Motion”).

       I.      PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

       DNM’s Motion seeks transfer into the MDL, for consolidation or coordination, of eight

pending litigations (as enumerated in the Schedule of Actions filed with the Motion (Dkt. No. 1-

2), the “Included Actions”), the only common element among which is that each concerns, in some

respect, the participation of Wells Fargo & Co. (“WFC”) and/or Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells

Fargo Bank” and, together with WFC, “Wells Fargo”) in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”)

recently enacted by Congress. Yet DNM’s motion falls well short of the standard for transfer and

consolidation. Consolidation is proper only where the movant has demonstrated that the cases at

issue share common facts that are numerous or complex and that consolidation would serve “the

convenience of parties and witnesses” and “promote the just and efficient conduct” of the actions.

28 U.S.C. § 1407; In re Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 996 F. Supp.

                                                 1
              Case MDL No. 2954         Document 29     Filed 06/24/20      Page 2 of 7




2d 1374, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2014). Here, all that the Securities Class Action shares with the other

Included Actions is that each includes allegations related in some way to Wells Fargo’s

participation in the PPP. This single and extremely general point of commonality plainly does not

constitute a nexus of common facts that are either numerous or complex. See, e.g., In re Stirling

Homex Corp. Sec. Litig., 442 F. Supp. 547, 549 (J.PM.L. 1977) (consolidation requires “common

factual core” between actions). The claims in the Securities Class Action involve questions of fact

and legal theories (e.g., falsity, materiality, scienter, market efficiency, loss causation, and

statutory damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)) that are

wholly distinct from those at issue in the other Included Actions, none of which concerns securities

fraud. The putative class in the Securities Class Action consists of WFC shareholders, none of

whom are implicated as parties or witnesses in the other Included Actions. Whether WFC and its

top executives knowingly or recklessly made false and misleading statements concerning WFC’s

compliance with the requirements of the PPP is the factual core of the Securities Class Action, a

core that is not shared with any of the other Included Actions. Moreover, the lack of the requisite

common factual core clearly means that centralization would not make the proceedings any more

convenient for the parties and witnesses, nor yield any efficiency gains with respect to the

judiciary, the litigants, or their counsel.

        For the reasons set forth below, Ma respectfully requests that the Panel deny DNM’s

Motion with respect to the Securities Class Action.

        II.      ARGUMENT

        Transfer of an action for coordination or consolidated pretrial proceedings is only

warranted if: (1) the actions share common questions of fact; (2) transfer would be for the

convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer would advance the just and efficient



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           Case MDL No. 2954         Document 29       Filed 06/24/20     Page 3 of 7




conduct of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). All three criteria must be met for transfer to be

proper. “[C]entralization under Section 1407 should be the last solution after considered review

of all other options.” In re Best Buy Co., Inc. Cal Song Beverly Credit Card Act Litig., 804 F.

Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (emphasis supplied). Here, all three criteria weigh against

transfer of the Securities Class Action to the MDL.

       A. The Securities Class Action Lacks Meaningful Factual and Legal Commonality
          with the Other Included Actions

       There is no meaningful factual or legal commonality between the Securities Class Action

and the other Included Actions. In its motion brief, DNM inaccurately asserts that the Securities

Class Action “seeks certification of [a class] consisting of eligible PPP applicants who were

harmed as a result of Defendants’ illegal practices.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5. DNM is wrong. The

Securities Class Action does not assert claims on behalf of eligible PPP applicants. Rather, it is

on behalf of a putative class of investors who purchased or otherwise acquired WFC securities

between April 5, 2020 and May 5, 2020 (the “Class Period”) and alleges fraud claims arising under

the Exchange Act—namely, that WFC and certain of its executives knowingly or recklessly made

false or misleading statements during the Class Period concerning Wells Fargo’s compliance with

the requirements of the PPP. See generally Securities Class Action Dkt. No. 1. Considering

Movant’s wholly inaccurate description of the Securities Class Action, Ma respectfully submits

that DNM’s motion appears to rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the class at issue and

claims alleged in the Securities Class Action.

       Of the seven other Included Actions:

       •   Five assert claims related to Wells Fargo Bank’s alleged prioritization of certain
           customers for PPP loans;1

1
  BSJA, Inc., et al. v. Wells Fargo & Co., et al., 2:20-cv-03588 (C.D. Cal.); DNM Contracting,
Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4:20-cv-01790 (S.D. Tex.); Physical Therapy Specialists, P.C. v.
                                                 3
            Case MDL No. 2954        Document 29        Filed 06/24/20      Page 4 of 7




        •   One action is brought by purported third-party “agents” claiming that they are owed
            fees by Wells Fargo Bank and other lenders in connection with assistance provided to
            PPP borrowers;2 and

        •   One action challenges Wells Fargo Bank’s requirement that PPP loan applications have
            a pre-existing business checking relationship with the bank.3

        The following questions of fact that are central to the Securities Class Action are thus

wholly irrelevant to the seven other Included Actions: (1) whether Defendants’ statements of

compliance with PPP requirements were false; (2) whether Defendants’ statements were material;

(3) whether Ma and other WFC investors relied on the foregoing statements; (4) whether the

market for WFC securities was “efficient”; (5) whether Defendants made the false statements with

scienter; (6) whether the false statements were the proximate cause of the losses incurred by Ma

and other WFC investors; (7) whether Ma and other WFC investors suffered economic loss when

WFC’s stock price declined; and (8) calculation of WFC’s statutory damages under the Exchange

Act (which typically involves use of a regression analysis or “event study” unique to securities

class actions).

        All that the Included Actions have in common, then, is that each broadly pertains, in some

respect, to Wells Fargo’s PPP participation. Clearly “individual facts contained in these actions []

will predominate over any alleged common fact questions,” In re Abbott Labs., Inc., Similac Prods.

Liab. Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2011), and the Included Actions thus lack the requisite

meaningful “common factual core” for centralization to be appropriate. Stirling Homex Corp.,

442 F. Supp. at 549.



Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 1:20-cv-01190 (D. Colo.); Marselian v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al.,
4:20-cv-03166 (N.D. Cal.); and Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Company, et
al., 3:20-cv-00956 (S.D. Cal.).
2
  Full Compliance, LLC, et al. v. Amerant Bank, N.A., et al., 1:20-cv-22339 (S.D. Fla.).
3
  Scherer, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 4:20-cv-01295 (S.D. Tex.).
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          Case MDL No. 2954           Document 29        Filed 06/24/20      Page 5 of 7




       B. Transfer Would Neither be Convenient for the Parties and Witnesses in the
          Securities Class Action nor Promote its Just and Efficient Conduct

       Even assuming arguendo that sufficient common factual questions existed to support

centralization, Movant must still satisfy its burden with respect to the other two necessary

criteria—namely, to demonstrate that centralization: (i) serves the convenience of the parties and

witnesses; and (ii) promotes the just and efficient conduct of the Included Actions. See, e.g., In re

Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244, 254 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (“[N]either the convenience of witnesses

and the parties nor the just and efficient conduct of actions are served, ipso facto, by transfer just

because there are common questions of fact in the civil actions involved.”); In re Joel Snider Litig.,

2020 WL 1503250, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Mar. 27, 2020) (centralization not warranted despite “some

factual overlap” where the actions were “already . . . proceeding in an orderly manner in the two

districts in which they [were] pending”).

       DNM has failed to carry its burden with respect to either of these criteria. WFC’s principal

executive offices are located in San Francisco, California. With respect to convenience for parties

and witnesses, then, centralization of the Included Actions in the Southern District of Texas carries

no evident advantages whatsoever. Moreover, the significant factual differences between the

Included Actions (as detailed above) necessarily mean that centralization will not prevent

duplicative discovery or proceedings, prevent inconsistent trial readings, or promote judicial

efficiency by preserving Court, party, or counsel resources. Rather, consolidation is more likely

to promote inefficiency, as any judge overseeing the multi-district litigation contemplated by

DNM would need to address a multiplicity of case-specific factual and legal issues, as well as

discovery. See ERISA Litig., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1371 (“These case-specific issues are likely to

undermine the alleged efficiencies that could be gained from centralizing an already minimal

number of actions.”).

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           Case MDL No. 2954          Document 29         Filed 06/24/20      Page 6 of 7




       Compounding all of the foregoing inefficiencies is the fact that, unlike the other seven

Included Actions, the Securities Class Action is governed by the Private Securities Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), including provisions governing the appointment of a Lead

Plaintiff and Lead Counsel and imposing a mandatory stay of discovery pending resolution of a

motion to dismiss. Pursuant to the PSLRA, any member of the putative class in the Securities

Class Action may seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff for the class and approval of its selection of

Lead Counsel on or before August 3, 2020. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A). Accordingly, until

after the August 3, 2020 Lead Plaintiff motion deadline, it is unclear whether Ma will in fact

ultimately be responsible for pursuing claims against WFC and the other Defendants on behalf of

the WFC shareholder class in the Securities Class Action, or will in fact be succeeded by another

class member who meets the PSLRA’s statutory “most adequate plaintiff” criteria. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B). In addition, the PSLRA imposes a mandatory stay of discovery pending

resolution of a motion to dismiss the claims in the Securities Class Action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

4(b)(3)(B).   With discovery effectively a non-issue in the Securities Class Action until a

significantly later stage than in the other Included Actions, coordination of discovery across all of

the Included Actions will thus, in the best-case scenario, yield little benefit in the Securities Class

Action, and is more likely to add considerations unique the Securities Class Action to the

administrative burden of a judge handling multiple discovery schedules involving a litany of

different parties. That an entire specific statutory schema already exists, in the PSLRA, to govern

the proceedings in the Securities Class Action only underscores the inappropriateness of

centralizing the Securities Class Action with the other Included Actions.

                                              *****




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          Case MDL No. 2954          Document 29        Filed 06/24/20     Page 7 of 7




       Failure to satisfy any one of the foregoing three criteria would suffice to mandate denial of

DNM’s Motion. Having failed to meet its burden with respect to any of these criteria, DNM’s

motion obviously fails.

           C. CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, Ma respectfully requests that this Panel deny DNM’s Motion to

the extent it seeks transfer of the Securities Class Action for consolidation or coordination with

the other Included Actions.



Dated: June 24, 2020                                 Respectfully submitted,

                                                     POMERANTZ LLP

                                                     /s/ Jeremy A. Lieberman
                                                     Jeremy A. Lieberman
                                                     600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
                                                     New York, New York 10016
                                                     Telephone: (212) 661-1100
                                                     Facsimile: (917) 463-1044
                                                     jalieberman@pomlaw.com

                                                     Attorney for Guofeng Ma




                                                7


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