Blue Flame v. Chain Bridge — JPMorgan Responses to Interrogatories (Exhibit 97)
- Date
- 2021-05-07
Summary
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Responses to Chain Bridge's First Set of Interrogatories, filed May 7, 2021 as Exhibit 97 (Document 131-32) in Blue Flame Medical LLC v. Chain Bridge Bank, N.A., et al., Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00658 (LMB/IDD), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. JPMC, the third-party defendant, answers interrogatories about whether it cancelled a wire transfer to Chain Bridge on March 26, 2020. It contends that it sent no communication cancelling the Wire Transfer, that a 1:37 p.m. call and a Fedwire Recall Message accommodated Chain Bridge's own cancellation request, and that it is not liable under U.C.C. § 4A-211(f). JPMC also argues that the parties' agreement included no indemnity and that Chain Bridge cannot establish causation. A verification executed March 31, 2021 and a certificate of service follow.
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EXHIBIT 97
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
(Alexandria Division)
BLUE FLAME MEDICAL LLC,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-00658 (LMB/IDD)
v.
CHAIN BRIDGE BANK, N.A.,
JOHN J. BROUGH, and
DAVID M. EVINGER,
Defendants.
CHAIN BRIDGE BANK, N.A.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Third-Party Defendant.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.’S RESPONSES TO
CHAIN BRIDGE’S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
Third-Party Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMC”) sets forth the following
responses to Third-Party Plaintiff Chain Bridge Bank, N.A.’s (“Chain Bridge” or “Third-Party
Plaintiff”) First Set of Interrogatories to JPMC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 (each
interrogatory therein, individually, an “Interrogatory” and collectively, the “Interrogatories”),
which Chain Bridge served on March 1, 2021. JPMC hereby incorporates each of its General
Objections and Specific Objections to the Interrogatories, as set forth in JPMC’s Objections to
Third-Party Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories to JPMC, previously served on March 16, 2021
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(the “Objections”). Each of the following Responses incorporate the Objections by reference
and as though restated therein.
RESPONSES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
State whether You contend that JPMorgan never transmitted to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A.,
either orally, electronically, or in writing, a communication cancelling the Wire Transfer.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
JPMC contends that it did not transmit to Chain Bridge any communication cancelling
the Wire Transfer, and refers Chain Bridge to JPMC’s Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2-5 for
further detail.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
If You contend that JPMorgan never transmitted to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A., either
orally, electronically, or in writing, a communication cancelling the Wire Transfer, then
identify with specificity all factual and legal grounds supporting why Timothy Coffey’s
statements during his telephone call with John Brough and David Evinger, at or about
1:37 p.m. ET on March 26, 2020, were not the transmission of an oral communication
cancelling the Wire Transfer.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
JPMC contends that Timothy Coffey’s statements during the telephone call with John
Brough and David Evinger, at or about 1:37 p.m. ET on March 26, 2020, were not a
communication cancelling the Wire Transfer, and refers Chain Bridge to JPMC’s Responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 1, 3-5 for further detail.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
If You contend that JPMorgan never transmitted to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A., either
orally, electronically, or in writing, a communication cancelling the Wire Transfer, then
identify with specificity all factual and legal grounds supporting why the Fedwire service
message attached as Exhibit B to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A.’s Third-Party Complaint in
this Action and sent from JPMorgan to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. at or about 2:05 p.m.
ET on March 26, 2020, was not the transmission of an electronic or written
communication cancelling the Wire Transfer.
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
JPMC contends that the Fedwire service message bearing the Fedwire “Type/Subtype
Code” “1001” and sent from JPMorgan to Chain Bridge at or about 2:05 p.m. ET on March 26,
2020 (the “Recall Message”), was not a communication cancelling the Wire Transfer, and refers
Chain Bridge to JPMC’s Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1-2, 4-5 for further detail.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
State whether You contend that JPMorgan is not liable to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. under
UCC Section 4A-211(f) for any loss or expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees,
incurred by Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. as a result of the cancellation of the Wire Transfer.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
JPMC contends that it is not liable to Chain Bridge under U.C.C. Section 4A-211(f) for
any loss or expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred by Chain Bridge as a result
of the cancellation of the Wire Transfer—which, as already stated and for avoidance of any
doubt, JPMC contends it did not cancel—and refers Chain Bridge to JPMC’s Responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 1-3, 5 for further detail.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
If You contend that JPMorgan is not liable to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. under UCC
Section 4A-211(f) for any loss or expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred
by Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. as a result of the cancellation of the Wire Transfer, then
identify with specificity all factual and legal grounds supporting that contention.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
JPMC is not liable under Section 4A-211(f) for numerous reasons, including: (1) Chain
Bridge cancelled the Wire Transfer, not JPMC, and thus Section 4A-211(f) is inapplicable;
moreover, Section 4A-211(f) would be inapplicable even if the reversal of the Wire Transfer had
been a joint decision by Chain Bridge and JPMC because, in that event, the cancellation would
not be initiated “by the sender,” as required by Section 4A-211(f); (2) there was an agreement
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between JPMC and Chain Bridge, reached through their discussions and course of conduct, and
the agreement did not include any obligation by JPMC to indemnify Chain Bridge; and (3) Chain
Bridge cannot establish causation to recover damages.
Chain Bridge cancelled the Wire Transfer. The record evidence to date shows that Chain
Bridge—after placing a hold on the Wire Transfer on its own initiative and informing JPMC that
it had not credited the funds to Blue Flame—sought and obtained the cancellation of the Wire
Transfer. Thus, Section 4A-211(f) is inapplicable because that provision applies only “if the
receiving bank … agrees to cancellation … of the order by the sender.” U.C.C. § 4A-211(f)
(emphasis added). Here, Chain Bridge (the receiving bank) is responsible for cancelling the
Wire Transfer—not JPMC (the sender). Moreover, even assuming that the cancellation had been
a joint decision by Chain Bridge and JPMC, Section 4A-211(f) would also be inapplicable
because a cancellation in that scenario would not be initiated “by the sender,” as required by
Section 4A-211(f).
Specifically, during a phone call on March 26, 2020, at 1:34 p.m. ET, Mr. Evinger sought
cancellation of the Wire Transfer when he asked Rakesh Korpal if “there [was] any way for
JPMorgan to issue a recall for the wire.” Shortly after this 1:34 p.m. call with Chain Bridge,
Mr. Korpal instructed Mr. Coffey to call Mr. Evinger and accommodate Mr. Evinger’s request to
cancel the Wire Transfer. Thus, at 1:37 p.m. ET, within approximately two minutes of
Mr. Evinger’s oral cancellation request and at the direction of Mr. Korpal, Mr. Coffey called
Mr. Evinger, with John Brough also on the line, and indicated that JPMC would issue the
requested recall notice. Mr. Coffey’s statements during the 1:37 p.m. ET telephone call with
Mr. Evinger and Mr. Brough were not communications indicating that JPMC was initiating a
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cancellation of the Wire Transfer. Instead, they were statements by JPMC of an accommodation
to Mr. Evinger’s oral cancellation request.
Likewise, JPMC’s Recall Message was not a communication cancelling the Wire
Transfer. As explained above, JPMC’s actions were an accommodation to Chain Bridge’s
cancellation request. JPMC did not, on its own volition, issue the Recall Message; rather, the
Recall Message was directed by Chain Bridge. During the 1:37 p.m. ET telephone call between
Chain Bridge and Mr. Coffey, Mr. Brough asked Mr. Coffey “if [he] could send [the Recall
Message] over the Fedline platform.” Mr. Coffey agreed, saying, “Not a problem.” JPMC’s
issuance of the Recall Message was an accommodation to Chain Bridge’s oral cancellation
request, not an independent communication by JPMC seeking to cancel the Wire Transfer.
In addition to contemporaneous communications between JPMC and Chain Bridge,
JPMC’s contention that Chain Bridge cancelled the Wire Transfer is also supported by other
portions of the evidentiary record developed to date through discovery. Namely, the record
shows that Chain Bridge had a number of powerful incentives for cancelling the Wire Transfer.
For example, Chain Bridge was concerned about the Wire Transfer’s impact on its capital ratios
and that the Wire Transfer could deplete its capital and cause it to fail. Likewise, Chain Bridge
deprived Blue Flame of the Wire Transfer by placing a hold on the Wire Transfer upon receipt
and before ever speaking to JPMC, and according to Mr. Brough, Chain Bridge would not have
made the Wire Transfer available to Blue Flame even in the absence of a recall. Indeed, Chain
Bridge’s wire transfer policy required that it return the funds to California because Chain Bridge
had reasonable doubts concerning Blue Flame’s entitlement to the funds. Moreover, Chain
Bridge wanted to avoid the reputational risk of being associated with a party purportedly seeking
to exploit a global pandemic, which would have likely resulted in the unwelcome interest of
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regulators and law enforcement. Furthermore, Chain Bridge’s actions were motivated by its own
concerns that the Wire Transfer would run afoul of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).
Notwithstanding the above, assuming that Chain Bridge’s oral request for a recall does
not constitute a cancellation request within the meaning of Section 4A-211(f), indemnification
pursuant to Section 4A-211(f) would nevertheless be inapplicable because the reversal of the
Wire Transfer would have alternatively been a joint decision by Chain Bridge and JPMC, and
not a cancellation request “by the sender.”
The parties’ agreement did not include any obligation by JPMC to indemnify Chain
Bridge. Based on the parties’ communications and interactions on March 26, 2020, there was an
agreement between JPMC and Chain Bridge as to how to proceed with the Wire Transfer and it
did not include an indemnity, as reflected by their discussions and course of conduct.
JPMC executed the Wire Transfer at 11:55 a.m. ET on March 26, 2020. During a
12:30 p.m. ET telephone call with Mr. Evinger, JPMC learned that Chain Bridge had placed a
hold on the Wire Transfer, had not credited the beneficiary, and had directly and unilaterally
contacted the State of California, JPMC’s client, to raise concerns about Blue Flame and the
legitimacy of the underlying transaction. JPMC learned that Chain Bridge had taken these
actions without ever speaking to JPMC or knowing whether JPMC had any concerns about the
Wire Transfer. Chain Bridge’s independent and unilateral actions made clear to JPMC that,
upon receipt of the Wire Transfer and based on pre-existing concerns regarding its own client,
Blue Flame, Chain Bridge had decided not to move forward with the Wire Transfer and was
seeking to reverse it.
Moreover, during the course of communications with JPMC, Chain Bridge indicated that
it did not “like the smell” of the transaction because, among other things, (1) the size of Wire
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Transfer was unusual for its own client, (2) the Blue Flame account had just been opened, and
(3) the account was owned by a lobbyist without experience in the PPE industry. The
substantive concerns that Chain Bridge communicated to JPMC, along with Chain Bridge’s
independent and unilateral actions upon receipt of the Wire Transfer, made clear to JPMC that
Chain Bridge’s actions were motivated by concerns that the Wire Transfer would run afoul of the
BSA.
Finally, after having communicated with JPMC, Chain Bridge’s actions reiterated to
JPMC that Chain Bridge intended to reverse the Wire Transfer regardless of JPMC’s actions.
For example, as already discussed, Chain Bridge transmitted to JPMC an oral communication
requesting cancellation of the Wire Transfer. Moreover, despite receiving confirmation from the
State of California that the Wire Transfer was authorized and for the benefit of Blue Flame,
Chain Bridge continued to hold the funds and unilaterally contacted additional departments
within the State of California to raise the concerns it had about Blue Flame.
Chain Bridge’s decision to reverse the Wire Transfer was thus based on its own
substantive concerns regarding its own client, Blue Flame—as underscored by Chain Bridge’s
unilateral decision to close Blue Flame’s accounts—and it was understood that JPMC’s
accommodation of Chain Bridge’s cancellation request would not result in JPMC assuming
liability pursuant to Section 4A-211(f). In sum, as the record evidence to date shows, there was
an agreement between JPMC and Chain Bridge reached through their discussions and course of
conduct, and the agreement did not include any obligation by JPMC to indemnify Chain Bridge.
Notwithstanding the above, assuming that the parties did not have such an agreement,
JPMC would not be obligated to indemnify Chain Bridge pursuant to Section 4A-211(f) because
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the reversal of the Wire Transfer would have alternatively been a joint decision by Chain Bridge
and JPMC, and not a cancellation request “by the sender.”
Chain Bridge cannot establish causation. Assuming Chain Bridge can successfully rely
on and/or invoke Section 4A-211(f), JPMC contends that, pursuant to Section 4A-211(f), Chain
Bridge cannot recover losses that are not “a result of the cancellation.” Here, the evidentiary
record shows that Blue Flame’s damages, if any, are not a result of the Wire Transfer’s
cancellation. Instead, Blue Flame’s damages, if any, are a result of conduct by Third-Party
Plaintiff Chain Bridge, non-party State of California, non-parties news media, and/or Blue
Flame’s own conduct. By consequence, Chain Bridge’s losses and expenses, if any, are a result
of its own conduct, and the conduct of non-party State of California, non-parties news media,
and Blue Flame’s own conduct, not a result of the Wire Transfer’s cancellation.
For example, among other things, Chain Bridge failed to conduct due diligence on its
own client, Blue Flame. Chain Bridge’s failure to know its client, including being generally
unaware of Blue Flame’s business dealings and disbelieving that Blue Flame would in fact
receive a wire transfer that constituted half of Chain Bridge’s assets, led Chain Bridge to receive
the Wire Transfer and to immediately take steps to seek its reversal. Moreover, Chain Bridge—
before communicating with JPMC and without JPMC’s involvement whatsoever—placed the
Wire Transfer on hold, and directly contacted JPMC’s client, the State of California, to raise
concerns about Blue Flame and the legitimacy of the underlying transaction. As a result of
Chain Bridge’s independent actions, Blue Flame never had access to the funds, and in fact, Chain
Bridge never intended to make the Wire Transfer available to Blue Flame. Indeed, Mr. Brough
testified that Chain Bridge would have deprived Blue Flame of the funds regardless of JPMC’s
actions, and Chain Bridge’s own internal wire transfer policy required that it return the Wire
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Transfer to California regardless of JPMC’s actions. The record is clear that Blue Flame would
have never accessed the Wire Transfer and that Chain Bridge would have cancelled the Wire
Transfer regardless of JPMC’s actions. Because any and all damages alleged by Blue Flame in
this case would have followed even in the absence of JPMC’s alleged cancellation, Blue Flame’s
damages, if any, are “a result of” Chain Bridge’s actions, not JPMC’s. By consequence, Chain
Bridge’s losses and expenses, if any, are not “a result of” JPMC’s alleged cancellation because
they would exist even in the absence of any such cancellation.
Likewise, the State of California—having learned concerning information about Blue
Flame directly from Chain Bridge—decided not to reissue the Wire Transfer or move forward
with the Blue Flame transaction. California’s decision not to move forward with the Blue Flame
transaction caused Blue Flame’s damages, if any. By consequence, Chain Bridge’s losses and
expenses, if any, are not “a result of” JPMC’s alleged cancellation, but rather, California’s
intervening and superseding actions.
Similarly, months later, the news media began reporting on the events that transpired on
March 26, 2020, including allegedly portraying Blue Flame as a party seeking to exploit a global
pandemic and allegedly injuring Blue Flame’s reputation. Blue Flame’s damages, if any, are “a
result of” such press coverage, which JPMC had nothing to do with—not “a result of” JPMC’s
alleged cancellation. Therefore, Chain Bridge’s losses and expenses, if any, are not “a result of”
the Wire Transfer’s cancellation, but rather, the intervening and superseding actions by the news
media.
To the extent Blue Flame prevails on its surviving state law claims, Chain Bridge’s losses
and expenses for those claims also would not be a result of the cancellation. Instead, Chain
Bridge’s losses and expenses would result from conduct falling outside the scope of the U.C.C.,
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including but not limited to Chain Bridge’s alleged defamatory statements regarding Blue Flame
and Chain Bridge’s alleged interference with Blue Flame’s contract with the State of California
and others. Accordingly, JPMC would not be liable for losses and expenses resulting from Blue
Flame’s non-U.C.C. claims. And to the extent Chain Bridge incurred losses and expenses in
connection with Blue Flame’s non-U.C.C. claims, Chain Bridge cannot recover such losses and
expenses from JPMC because Chain Bridge would have incurred such losses and expenses in the
absence of JPMC’s purported cancellation.
Equitable estoppel. Even if Chain Bridge establishes that some damages are a result of
JPMC’s alleged cancellation, JPMC contends that Chain Bridge is equitably estopped from
invoking Section 4A-211(f) because, unlike JPMC, Chain Bridge benefitted from the reversal of
the Wire Transfer (see Response to Interrogatory No. 7), and Chain Bridge’s actions led JPMC
to believe that indemnification was inapplicable in this case (see supra discussion regarding the
parties’ agreement, which did not include an indemnity).
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
State whether You contend that JPMorgan is not liable to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. for
unjust enrichment in the event that any judgment is entered in favor of Blue Flame
Medical on its claims against Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. in this Action.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
As stated in its Objections, JPMC reiterates that it cannot adequately respond to this
Interrogatory without speculating as to the basis for any potential unjust enrichment award, and
specifically reserves its right to supplement this response in the event a relevant judgment is
entered for Blue Flame. In any event, JPMC contends that it is not liable to Chain Bridge for
unjust enrichment in the event that any judgment is entered in favor of Blue Flame, and
respectfully refers Chain Bridge to JPMC’s Response to Interrogatory No. 7 for further detail.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
If You contend that JPMorgan is not liable to Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. for unjust
enrichment in the event that any judgment is entered in favor of Blue Flame Medical on
its claims against Chain Bridge Bank, N.A. in this Action, then identify with specificity all
factual and legal grounds supporting that contention.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
As stated in its Objections, JPMC reiterates that it cannot adequately respond to this
Interrogatory without speculating as to the basis for any potential unjust enrichment award, and
specifically reserves its right to supplement this response in the event a relevant judgment is
entered for Blue Flame. In any event, JPMC is not liable for unjust enrichment for numerous
reasons, including because the claim fails on each element.
First, Chain Bridge did not confer any benefit on JPMC—indeed, JPMC did not benefit
in any way from the Wire Transfer’s return to the State of California. By contrast, Chain Bridge
was incentivized to reverse the Wire Transfer (see Response to Interrogatory 5) and benefitted
from the reversal in multiple ways. The benefits Chain Bridge obtained by returning the funds,
include but are not limited to the following: Chain Bridge no longer had to resolve the issue of
dealing with a transaction it had already determined was a “scam,” including by consulting
regulators or law enforcement regarding how to proceed with the Wire Transfer; Chain Bridge
was able to get the Wire Transfer off its books, effectively eliminating its concerns regarding
how to comply with capital and reserve requirements; Chain Bridge was able to proceed with
closing Blue Flame’s account, drawing away unwanted attention from regulators; returning the
funds to California eliminated an existential threat to Chain Bridge—that is, any error in
handling the Wire Transfer, which was half of the bank’s assets, could easily deplete Chain
Bridge’s capital and cause it to fail; Chain Bridge prevented the reputational harm of being
perceived as working alongside a party seeking to exploit a global pandemic; and, Chain Bridge
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avoided additional legal exposure through the reversal of the Wire Transfer because it complied
with its own wire transfer policy, which required Chain Bridge to return the Wire Transfer
because it had substantial doubts about Blue Flame’s right to payment.
Second, JPMC knew of no benefit it would gain (conferred by Chain Bridge or
otherwise) from issuing the requested recall notice and subsequently returning the funds to
California, and reasonably did not expect to have to pay Chain Bridge. As explained in the
preceding paragraph, Chain Bridge did not confer any benefit on JPMC as a result of the Wire
Transfer reversal. Chain Bridge was the party that requested and benefitted from the return of
the funds, not JPMC (which, as already explained, did not benefit in any way from the reversal).
Moreover, as set forth in more detail in Response to Interrogatory No. 5, JPMC and Chain
Bridge agreed, based on their discussions and course of conduct, that JPMC would not have to
indemnify Chain Bridge for any losses or expenses that resulted from the reversal of the Wire
Transfer.
Third, JPMC did not accept or retain any benefit (conferred by Chain Bridge or
otherwise) without paying for its value—let alone accept or retain a benefit in circumstances that
render it inequitable for JPMC to retain the (nonexistent) benefit without paying for its value.
Again, Chain Bridge did not confer any benefit on JPMC—indeed, JPMC did not benefit as a
result of the Wire Transfer reversal at all—whereas Chain Bridge benefitted in multiple ways.
Notably, JPMC returned the Wire Transfer in full to California and retained $0. Chain Bridge
cannot credibly argue that JPMC retained any benefit from the reversal of the Wire Transfer.
Nor can Chain Bridge credibly argue that the circumstances are inequitable, especially where, as
here, Chain Bridge sought the cancellation of the Wire Transfer and benefitted from the
cancellation of the Wire Transfer.
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Fourth, even assuming Chain Bridge could establish liability for unjust enrichment,
JPMC contends that Chain Bridge may not recover damages from JPMC under this theory of
liability. The measure of recovery for unjust enrichment is generally limited to the benefit
realized and retained by the defendant. Here, the record is clear: JPMC returned the Wire
Transfer in full to California on March 26, 2020. JPMC therefore retained no benefit from the
cancellation because it retained no portion of the Wire Transfer. Under these circumstances,
Chain Bridge cannot recover from JPMC for unjust enrichment.
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AS TO OBJECTIONS AND LEGAL WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
CONTENTIONS: AND DORR LLP
Dated: March 31, 2021 /s/ Meredith K. Loretta
Meredith K. Loretta (92369)
Albinas J. Prizgintas (pro hac vice)
1875 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel.: (202) 663-6981
meredith.loretta@wilmerhale.com
Alan E. Schoenfeld (pro hac vice)
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
Tel.: (212) 230-8800
alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com
Margarita M. Botero (pro hac vice)
1225 17th Street, Suite 2600
Denver, CO 80202
Tel.: (720) 274-3135
margarita.botero@wilmerhale.com
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
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VERIFICATION OF INTERROGATORY ANSWERS
I, Rakesh Korpal, verify under penalty of perjury that the factual statements in the
foregoing interrogatory answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief, and based on reasonable inquiry.
Executed on March 31, 2021
Rakesh Korpal
Executive Director
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that, on March 31, 2021, I caused the aforementioned document to be served
electronically by email on the following counsel:
Gary A. Orseck Peter H. White
Matthew M. Madden Jason T. Mitchell
Donald Burke Gregory Ketcham-Colwill
ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP
ORSECK, UNTEREINER 901 Fifteenth Street, NW, Suite 800
& SAUBER LLP Washington, DC 20005
2000 K Street, NW, 4th Floor pete.white@srz.com
Washington, DC 20006 jason.mitchell@srz.com
gorseck@robbinsrussell.com gregory.ketcham-colwill@srz.com
mmadden@robbinsrussell.com
dburke@robbinsrussell.com William H. Gussman, Jr.
SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP
Counsel for Defendants, 919 Third Avenue
Third-Party Plaintiff New York, New York 10022
bill.gussman@srz.com
Counsel for Plaintiff
Dated: March 31, 2021 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
HALE AND DORR LLP
/s/ Meredith K. Loretta
Meredith K. Loretta (92369)
Albinas J. Prizgintas (pro hac vice)
1875 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20006
Tel.: (202) 663-6981
meredith.loretta@wilmerhale.com
Alan E. Schoenfeld (pro hac vice)
7 World Trade Center
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
Tel.: (212) 230-8800
alan.schoenfeld@wilmerhale.com
DocuSign Envelope ID: A551669D-714C-4844-8719-0FCF0F9A5A73
Case 1:20-cv-00658-LMB-IDD Document 131-32 Filed 05/07/21 Page 18 of 18
PageID# 2370
Margarita M. Botero (pro hac vice)
1225 17th Street, Suite 2600
Denver, CO 80202
Tel.: (720) 274-3135
margarita.botero@wilmerhale.com
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