Government's Sentencing Memorandum — United States v. Austin Martin Siampwizi

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U.S. District Court, Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC · Doc. 34 · 2024-03-22 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The government's sentencing memorandum in United States v. Austin Martin Siampwizi, No. 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, filed March 22, 2024 as Doc. 34. It states that the defendant pleaded guilty on December 14, 2023 to money laundering conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(h), and sets out the government's account of unemployment insurance funds from Washington State and of PPP and EIDL applications. It reports the PSR's total offense level of 19, criminal history category III and a Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months. The memorandum responds to seven defense objections and argues that the other COVID-19-related schemes count as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). It asks for a low-end Guidelines prison term followed by three years of supervised release.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
AUSTIN MARTIN SIAMPWIZI 
 
Criminal Action No. 
1:23-CR-246-WMR-RDC-1 
 
Government’s Sentencing Memorandum 
The United States of America, by Ryan K. Buchanan, United States Attorney, 
and Sarah E. Klapman, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District 
of Georgia, files this Sentencing Memorandum addressing the advisory 
Guidelines range application to Defendant Siampwizi and the Government’s 
recommendation for an appropriate sentence based on the factors set forth in 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
Defendant Siampwizi, who has a previous federal conviction for drug 
trafficking and a previous state conviction for, inter alia, forgery and fraud, 
pleaded guilty to money laundering conspiracy involving unemployment 
insurance funds. During the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment insurance 
fraud became particularly attractive due to the federal supplement to state 
unemployment insurance benefits, an approximately $600 per week additional 
payment that was not available prior to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act, which was signed into law by President Trump on March 
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27, 2020. 
This case began as a joint investigation among the Department of Labor, 
Office of the Investigator General (“DOL-OIG”); the United States Secret Service 
(“USSS”); Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”); the 
United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”); the United States Department 
of Homeland, Security Homeland Security Investigations (“DHS-HIS”); and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).  
In the spring of 2020, the Employment Security Department of Washington 
State (“WA-ESD”), Washington’s state workforce agency, experienced a high 
volume of fraudulent unemployment insurance applications. Fraudsters would 
submit unemployment insurance applications using stolen personal identifiable 
information (“PII”) of real individuals to WA-ESD. Often, the fraudster would 
provide a Green Dot account number or bank account number for WA-ESD to 
deposit the unemployment insurance proceeds. WA-ESD then paid these claims 
onto Green Dot cards or into the bank accounts. Data obtained by DOL-OIG 
indicated that a significant number of money orders were purchased in the 
Northern District of Georgia using Green Dot cards loaded with fraudulent 
unemployment proceeds from WA-ESD.  
The fraudulent unemployment proceeds from WA-ESD were either deposited 
into business bank accounts set up by Siampwizi’s co-conspirators or on Green 
Dot cards. Once funds obtained through fraud were received by the accounts, 
Siampwizi’s co-conspirators quickly moved the money through interstate and 
foreign wire transfer, cash or check withdrawals, debit card transactions, and the 
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purchase of money orders. Siampwizi cashed money orders that were made 
payable to him and purchased by co-conspirators with fraud proceeds in the 
Northern District of Georgia. Money followed through this scheme as follows: 
Fraudulent Claim → State Workforce Agency → Green Dot Card or 
Business Bank Accounts → Money Order Made Payable to Siampwizi → 
Cash 
 
During the investigation, law enforcement discovered that Siampwizi cashed 
money orders that were purchased using a debit card linked to a JP Morgan 
Chase Bank (“Chase Bank”) savings account (ending in x1082) and a Chase Bank 
checking account (ending in x5812). These accounts received 22 deposits from the 
ESD between May 12, 2020, and May 13, 2020 — the unemployment proceeds of 
22 individuals whose PII been stolen as a part of the scheme.  
 
Bank Account 
Total Deposits 
Chase Bank ending in x1082 
$111,224.00 
Chase Bank ending in x5812 
$96,420.00 
 
$207,644.00 
 
 
Siampwizi’s co-conspirators then purchased money orders at various 
locations throughout the metropolitan Atlanta area. These money orders were 
made payable to Siampwizi. In May 2020, Siampwizi cashed 57 money orders, 
totaling $52,800.00, which had been purchased using funds from the Chase Bank 
accounts. Law enforcement also discovered Siampwizi cashed money orders that 
were purchased using Green Dot Bank cards. Including the money orders 
purchased from the Chase Bank accounts, in a seven-day period, between May 
13, 2020, and May 19, 2020, Siampwizi cashed 269 money orders, totaling 
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$175,642.99. Siampwizi’s co-conspirator, Gabriel Kalembo, cashed approximately 
$75,000 in money orders at the same location (Doc. 32-1, ¶ 14(b)(n.1)). 
Along with the money laundering conspiracy and money laundering, law 
enforcement’s investigation revealed Siampwizi submitted a fraudulent 
unemployment insurance application in March 2020 to the Georgia Department 
of Labor (“GDOL”). As a result of this fraudulent application, from March 2020 
to February 2021, Siampwizi received $29,370.00 in unemployment proceeds 
from the GDOL. 
This investigation also showed that Siampwizi submitted fraudulent Payroll 
Protection Program (“PPP”) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) 
applications using two corporate entities that Siampwizi incorporated: Global 
Car Rental, LLC, and Global Group Development & Construction, LLC (“Global 
Group”). Siampwizi submitted these fraudulent applications from April 3, 2020, 
to April 9, 2021. 
 
Loan Application # 
Corporate Entity 
Amount Funded 
EIDL ending in x2793 
Global Car Rental 
$0.00 
EIDL ending in x4337 
Global Car Rental 
$69,900.00 
($70,000.00 minus $100.00 
processing fee) 
PPP ending in x7410 
Global Group 
$42,400.00 (loan) + 
5,000.00 (advance) 
PPP ending in x8708 
Global Group 
$20,832.00 
EIDL ending in x4337 
Global Group 
$20,832.00 
 
 
$158,964.00 
 
Three organizational victims have been identified in this case: two state 
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workforce agencies and the Small Business Administration (PSR, ¶ 57). There 
were at least 70 individuals whose PII was stolen and used to file fraudulent 
unemployment insurance claims.1 
On December 14, 2023, Siampwizi pleaded guilty to money laundering 
conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(h), as charged in 
Count One of the Indictment, pursuant to a plea agreement (1:23-CR-246, Docs. 
1, 32). In the plea agreement, Siampwizi admitted to personally laundering at 
least $175,600 as part of the money laundering conspiracy (Doc. 32, ¶ 14). He also 
admitted to fraudulently obtaining approximately $150,000 in Economic Injury 
Disaster Loans and Paycheck Protection Program loans for his two businesses 
(Id.). 
II. 
The PSR 
The United States Probation Office issued its final Pre-Sentence Investigation 
 
1 Because of the structure of this money laundering scheme, identification of 
victims can be challenging. To trace the source of funds back to the state 
workforce agency, law enforcement obtained records for money orders 
purchased from, for example, the United States Postal Service. Money orders 
were also purchased from other sources, and records were not always available 
from those sources. Law enforcement then obtained Green Dot records after 
determining Green Dot account numbers from money order purchase records. 
Finally, law enforcement requested data from state workforce agencies to link 
individual claims with Green Dot cards. As a result of the lack of records and this 
arduous process, many individual victims were not identified and may not be 
aware their PII was stolen. Additionally, law enforcement could not notify states 
that fraudulent claims were filed for these unidentified victims, which could 
cause difficulties for individuals who later seek unemployment insurance 
assistance. 
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Report on March 19, 2024. The PSR assesses a base offense level of 20 (PSR, ¶ 60). 
Siampwizi receives a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (PSR, ¶ 61). After 
receiving a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Siampwizi has 
a total offense level of 19 (PSR, ¶¶ 67-68). The PSR also determined Siampwizi 
has a criminal history score of six and a criminal history category of III (PSR, ¶¶ 
75-76). The corresponding advisory Guidelines range for offense level 19 and 
criminal history category III is 37 to 46 months. 
A. Siampwizi’s Objections to the PSR 
Siampwizi has seven objections and/or clarifications to the PSR: (1) he did not 
transfer funds, make cash or check withdrawals, engage in debit card 
transactions, or purchase money orders; (2) he did not purchase money orders at 
Kroger and the United States Post Offices; (3) he did not purchase money orders 
from Publix using Green Dot bank cards; (4) his loss should be confined to the 
money laundering conspiracy that he pleaded guilty to as a part of the WA-ESD 
unemployment scheme, not every other fraud scheme in which he may have 
engaged, such as the Georgia unemployment and the PPP and EIDL loan 
schemes; (5) his restitution should be limited to the WA-ESD unemployment 
scheme; (6) his loss amount is less than $250,000, and his base offense level 
should be 18; and (7) his total offense level should be 16.2 The Government does 
 
2 This objection appears to have a mathematical error. If Siampwizi’s base 
level offense should be 18, as Siampwizi argues in his sixth objection to the PSR; 
Siampwizi receives an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) for a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (+2); and Siampwizi receives credit for his 
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not disagree with Siampwizi as to his first three objections.3 The remaining four 
objections will be discussed further below. 
B. Siampwizi’s loss amount, restitution, and Guidelines calculations 
properly include Siampwizi’s other COVID-19-related fraud 
schemes.  
Siampwizi argues that his loss amount, restitution, and Guidelines 
calculations should not include the Georgia unemployment or PPP and EIDL 
loan schemes because Siampwizi only pleaded guilty to the money laundering 
conspiracy that was part of the WA-ESD unemployment scheme.  
Proper Guidelines calculations require consideration of all relevant conduct. 
United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014). Section 1B1.3 
establishes several types of relevant conduct. For certain types of offenses, 
Section 1B1.13(a)(2) provides that an expanded range of relevant conduct, often 
referred to as “expanded relevant conduct,” including certain actions and 
omissions that took place on occasions beyond the charged offense, are to be 
considered. In assessing relevant conduct for an offense to which (a)(2) applies, 
the Court must consider all the conduct described in (a)(1) and include it not just 
when it was done in preparation for, during, or in the course of avoiding 
 
acceptance of responsibility (-3), Siampwizi’s total offense level would be 17 (See 
PSR, ¶¶ 60-68).  
3 The Government has no evidence that Siampwizi personally performed the 
activities discussed in Siampwizi’s first three objections. But this information 
gives the Court context because these activities were undertaken by Siampwizi’s 
co-conspirators as a part of and in furtherance of the money laundering scheme. 
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detection for the offense of conviction, but also if it was done as part of the “same 
course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as the conviction. U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2). These two phrases have distinct but related meanings. Siampwizi’s 
other fraud schemes satisfy both provisions. 
i. Common scheme or plan 
First, for two or more offenses to constitute part of a common scheme or plan, 
they must be substantially connected to each other by at least one common 
factor, such as: common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or 
similar modus operandi. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 app. note 5(B)(i); United States v. 
Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (separate health care fraud scheme 
involving nearly identical conduct was part of a common scheme or plan); United 
States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1525 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted) (noting 
only one common factor is required). Here, Siampwizi’s schemes defrauded the 
same type of victim: government agencies. And the WA-ESD unemployment 
fraud underlying the money laundering conspiracy has the same purpose and 
modus operandi as Siampwizi’s Georgia unemployment, PPP, and EIDL 
schemes: to make money by filing fraudulent applications to government 
agencies to obtain proceeds intended for COVID-19 relief. 
ii. Same course of conduct 
Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may 
nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct “if they are sufficiently 
connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part 
of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 app. 
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note 5(b)(ii). To determine whether offenses have the same course of conduct, the 
Court looks to numerous factors, including the degree of similarity of the 
offenses, the regularity of the offenses, and the time interval between the 
offenses. Id.  
Here, if Siampwizi had also been convicted of the wire fraud schemes, the 
offenses would have been grouped together as “closely related” under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2(d) because the offense levels are determined largely by loss amount. See 
U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1, 2S1.1. The nature of the offenses is a relevant consideration. 
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 199 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2006) (fraud 
committed prior to a previous term of incarceration was in the same course of 
conduct as the instant offense, given the similarity in modus operandi). The 
offense of conviction, money laundering conspiracy, necessarily involved a 
specified unlawful activity, specifically the unemployment insurance fraud 
scheme targeting WA-ESD, that is similar to Siampwizi’s other fraud schemes. 
Additionally, the schemes are all wire fraud offenses that occurred repeatedly 
within a 13-month period.  
Because Siampwizi’s other COVID-19-related fraud schemes are relevant 
conduct, the loss amount, restitution, and Guidelines calculations properly 
include Siampwizi’s other COVID-19-related fraud schemes. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(2).  
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III. 
A low-end Guidelines sentence of imprisonment followed by three 
years of supervised release is reasonable considering the factors set 
forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). 
The Court must first correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, and 
then consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining the appropriate sentence. 
Section 3553(a) requires district courts to consider these factors in imposing a 
sentence: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect 
(A) the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; (B) to provide general deterrence; (C) to provide 
specific deterrence; and (D) to provide the defendant with appropriate 
rehabilitation options; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the advisory 
Guidelines range; (5) the Guidelines’ policy statements; (6) the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution. 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a 
matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. 
Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  
The COVID-19 pandemic fundamentally changed the United States, affecting 
almost every aspect of social interaction and human activity, including how 
criminals earned money and laundered their proceeds. Fraudsters here and 
abroad heavily exploited government-led economic support programs during 
the pandemic, exploiting our country during a time of unprecedented crisis 
when we were most vulnerable. Money launderers like Siampwizi facilitate and 
conceal crime—the fraudsters here could not have enjoyed the fruits of their 
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crimes without a money launderer to help conceal their criminal conduct. Money 
laundering harms our society and undermines our financial systems, which is 
why the Government seeks to detect, punish, and deter these separate harms.  
The Government has received victim impact statements from individuals 
deeply impacted by this conspiracy. Portions of these statements from three 
victims are excerpted below: 
- “I felt violated when I discovered someone had stolen my personal 
information to fraudulently use my name to unlawfully claim 
unemployment benefits.” 
- “This is a serious crime against individuals, the state, and country during a 
particularly troubling time period in our nation’s history: COVID trauma.” 
- “We all work hard for what we have for ourselves, family, or loved ones. 
Most of us contribute to society [and] when individuals or groups . . . 
dedicate their lifes [sic] to rob others for their satisfaction, lazines [sic] I 
believe they belong in prison away from harming others the way they do.” 
- “Mr. Siampwizi’s actions were a hassle as I had to file reports, alert 
creditors, and overall become very vigilant. This took time and energy . . . I 
work with students who had they been unable to get unemployment 
would have been homeless. I feel like his actions were extremely selfish 
and short sighted.” 
The Court should also consider specific and general deterrence. Siampwizi’s 
criminal history reflects that he has not been deterred from criminal conduct by 
either shorter custodial sentences or non-custodial sentences. The Eleventh 
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Circuit has also recently spoken about general deterrence in white collar cases: 
General deterrence is more apt, not less apt, in white collar crime cases. 
The reason is that economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool 
and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, which 
makes them prime candidates for general deterrence. White collar 
criminals often calculate the financial gain and risk of loss of their crimes, 
and an overly lenient sentence sends the message that would-be white-
collar criminals stand to lose little more than a portion of their ill-gotten 
gains and practically none of their liberty.  
United States v. Howard, 28 F.4th 180, 209 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
A low-end Guidelines sentence also avoids unwarranted sentence disparities 
with his co-conspirators. Two of Siampwizi’s co-conspirators, Gabriel Mutambo 
Kalembo and Bamidele Muraina, have been sentenced for their roles in this 
offense (See 1:20-CR-284, Docs. 86, 88).  
- Kalembo pleaded guilty to money laundering conspiracy and was 
sentenced to 50 months in prison with three years of supervised release to 
follow (1:20-CR-284, Docs. 1, 86). Kalembo received an aggravating role 
enhancement, as he recruited others into the conspiracy and directed their 
activities. He also had a recent federal conviction for conspiracy to commit 
wire and bank fraud (See 1:17-CR-110, Docs. 14, 40). Unlike Kalembo, 
Siampwizi receives no role enhancement and will be sentenced after 
Amendment 821, which provides that Siampwizi will receive no status 
points for his recent criminal convictions (See PSR, ¶¶ 63, 75).  
- Muraina pleaded guilty to theft of government funds and aggravated 
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identity theft and was sentenced to 70 months in prison (46+24) with three 
years of supervised release to follow (1:20-CR-284, Docs. 1, 73). Muraina 
perpetrated the fraud in the underlying unemployment insurance scheme 
and a separate tax fraud scheme (See 1:20-CR-284, Doc. 73-1 at 3, 6). He 
received upward adjustments for the number of victims and sophisticated 
means, and the Court downwardly departed following a motion from the 
Government (See id.).  
IV. 
Conclusion 
The Government respectfully urges the Court to sentence Siampwizi to a low-
end Guidelines term of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised 
release. 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
RYAN K. BUCHANAN 
United States Attorney 
/S/ SARAH E. KLAPMAN 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 437221 
sarah.klapman@usdoj.gov 
 
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