Motion in Limine by USA as to Austin Martin Siampwizi — USA v. Siampwizi (Dkt. 30, N.D. Ga.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC · Doc. 30 · 2023-10-23 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
AUSTIN MARTIN SIAMPWIZI 
 
Criminal Action No. 
1:23-CR-246-WMR-RDC 
 
Government’s Motion in Limine 
The United States of America, by Ryan K. Buchanan, United States Attorney, 
and Sarah E. Klapman, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District 
of Georgia, files the following motion in limine. 
 On July 25, 2023, a grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia returned a 
multi-count indictment against defendant Austin Martin Siampwizi for crimes 
related to COVID-relief programs. (Doc. 1). Specifically, Siampwizi was charged 
with one count of money laundering conspiracy and three substantive money 
laundering counts related to the laundering of fraudulent proceeds from false 
claims for unemployment insurance filed with state agencies using stolen 
personally identifiable information. (Doc. 1). Siampwizi was also charged with 
bank fraud in connection with an Economic Injury Disaster Loan application 
submitted to the United States Small Business Administration in the summer of 
2020. (Doc. 1). This case has now been certified ready for trial. The United States 
moves to preclude Siampwizi from presenting inadmissible and irrelevant 
evidence regarding the penalties he faces. 
Case 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC     Document 30     Filed 10/23/23     Page 1 of 4

2 
 
The Constitution provides criminal defendants with the general right to 
present evidence and call witnesses in their own favor. See United States v. Hurn, 
368 F.3d 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2004); see also U.S. CONST. amends V, VI. However, 
such rights are not absolute. See Hurn, 368 F.3d at 1365-66. Indeed, it “is 
axiomatic that a defendant’s right to present a full defense does not entitle him to 
place before the jury irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence.” United States 
v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1519 (11th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, a defendant is only 
constitutionally entitled to present evidence that is relevant to an element of the 
charged offense or to an affirmative defense. See Hurn, 368 F.3d at 1365-66; United 
States v. Masferrer, 514 F.3d 1158, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008) (“where the proffered 
evidence does not bear a logical relationship to an element of the offense or an 
affirmative defense . . . a defendant has no right to introduce that evidence”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
Under the federal rules, evidence “is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401; see 
Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible,” while “[i]rrelevant is not 
admissible”). Notably, even when evidence is relevant, courts may exclude that 
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Fed. R. 
Evid. 403. Trial courts have “broad discretion to determine the relevance and 
admissibility of any given piece of evidence.” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 
1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). 
Case 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC     Document 30     Filed 10/23/23     Page 2 of 4

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It is well-settled that arguments or evidence regarding punishment are 
improper because the potential penalties faced by a defendant are irrelevant to 
the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. See Shannon v. United States, 512 
U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“a jury has no sentencing function, it should be admonished 
to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed’”) 
(quoting United States v. Rogers, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)). The Eleventh Circuit has 
unequivocally stated that the “question of punishment should never be 
considered by the jury in any way in deciding the case.” United States v. 
McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991); accord ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Criminal), Basic Instruction No. 10.1 (2020) (“You must 
never consider punishment in any way to decide whether the Defendant is guilty 
or not. If you find the Defendant guilty, the punishment is for the Judge alone to 
decide later.”). And the rationale for excluding penalty evidence is plain – the 
penalties associated with a conviction are not probative of guilt or innocence. 
Instead, evidence relating to the punishment serves only to compromise the 
verdict, confuse the jury, or invoke sympathy for the defendant. See McDonald, 
935 F.2d at 1222. 
As a result, the government moves to preclude Siampwizi from arguing or 
introducing evidence regarding the potential penalties he faces upon conviction, 
including: (a) the maximum penalties associated with the charged offenses; and 
(b) that if convicted, Siampwizi could be sentenced to prison. 
 
 
Case 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC     Document 30     Filed 10/23/23     Page 3 of 4

600 U.S. Courthouse, 75 Ted Turner Drive S.W., Atlanta, GA 30303 
(404) 581-6000   fax (404) 581-6181 
4 
 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the 
Court grant the requested relief. The government reserves the right to amend its 
motion in limine if additional facts become available. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
RYAN K. BUCHANAN 
United States Attorney 
/s/SARAH E. KLAPMAN 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 437221 
sarah.klapman@usdoj.gov 
 
 
Case 1:23-cr-00246-WMR-RDC     Document 30     Filed 10/23/23     Page 4 of 4

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