Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of TRO — PA Voters Alliance v. Centre County

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania · No. 4:20-cv-01761-MWB · Doc. 63 · 2020-10-19 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
Pennsylvania Voters Alliance, Stephanie 
Borowicz, Kristine Eng, Theodore A. 
Dannerth, Eric Kroner, Eric Nelson, Daryl 
Metcalfe, Dawn Wetzel Keefer, Russ 
Diamond, Chris Dush, Jim Gregory, Francis 
Ryan, Michael Harvey, David Torres, Dasha 
Pruett,  
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Centre County, Delaware County, and the 
City of Philadelphia, and Kathy Boockvar, 
in her official capacity as Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Defendant. 
Civil Action No.:
4:20−CV−01761−MWB
Hon. Matthew W. Brann
Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum 
in Support of Temporary Restraining 
Order 
Oral argument on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief was heard on October 
16, 2020.  At oral argument, the Court invited a supplemental memorandum on the matters 
discussed.   
I.
Plaintiffs have standing because to be left without representation in Congress 
is a concrete injury-in-fact caused by election misconduct—as with the 2018 
North Carolina Ninth Congressional District matter. 
A party invoking federal jurisdiction must allege facts demonstrating that each of the 
following elements have been satisfied in order to have standing to pursue the case: (1) the 
plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 
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Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). (same). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show 
that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ “ Id. (quotation 
omitted). That is, the injury “must actually exist” and “must affect the plaintiff in a personal 
and individual way.” Id. at 1548 (quotation omitted).   
At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel explained that the challenged conduct of the 
Defendants, accepting millions of dollars of Zuckerberg’s private federal election grants to 
turn-out-the-vote in urban areas, could be fairly traced to an invalidation of Congressional 
elections—leaving Plaintiffs without representation in Congress. The Plaintiffs’ 
disenfranchisement involved with not having a representative in Congress is “an invasion of 
a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  
Plaintiffs not having a representative in Congress is an injury that actually exists and affects 
the Plaintiffs in a personal and individual way.  It is not a generalized grievance affecting the 
general public.  Citizens of Congressional Districts whose public election officials refused the 
Zuckerberg private federal election grants would still have representation in Congress. 
At oral argument, the 2018 matter of the North Carolina Ninth Congressional District 
was discussed in the context of standing. In that matter, election misconduct led to invalidation 
of a Congressional election and a vacant Congressional District seat which disenfranchised 
voter within the Congressional district until a special election could be held. In that case, 
election misconduct occurred including illegal ballot harvesting. The U.S. Constitution, Article 
I, section 5, states that the House is the judge of the elections of its members and the final 
arbiter of contests.  While the election contest in the North Carolina Board of Elections was 
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pending, incoming U.S. House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer issued a statement saying House 
Democrats won’t allow Republican Mark Harris to be sworn in because of the ongoing 
investigation, “Given the now well-documented election fraud that took place in NC-09, 
Democrats would object to any attempt by Mr. Harris to be seated on January 3,” Hoyer said, 
adding that “the integrity of our democratic process outweighs concerns about the seat being 
vacant at the start of the new Congress.”1 The North Carolina Board of Elections 
concurred—refusing to certify the November 2018 results and scheduling a special election 
on September 10, 2019.2  So, the residents of North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District 
were without representation in the U.S. House of Representatives from January of 2019 
through September 10, 2019—an actual and concrete injury particularized to the residents of 
that Congressional District.   
At oral argument, the Plaintiffs claimed that their Pennsylvania election officials 
accepting Zuckerberg’s private federal election grants will similarly leave them without 
representation in Congress. 
II.
 A private cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the Elections 
Clause.  
The Plaintiffs amended their complaint adding as Count II an Equal Protection Clause 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has original jurisdiction over such claims. 28 USCA 
§ 1343, titled “Civil Rights and Elective Franchise,” provides that “the district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person” 
1See 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/28/nc-election-board-turns-down-request-
to-certify-a-gop-victory-before-disbanding-1076617 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
2 See https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina%27s_9th_Congressional_District_special_ 
election, 2019. 
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upon certain elaborated grounds.  28 U.S.C.  § 1343 (a) (3) provides the Court with original 
jurisdiction “to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution 
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all 
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.  § 1343 (a) (4) provides the 
Court with original jurisdiction “to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress 
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.”  Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 provides “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.” 
Additionally, as previously briefed or argued, in this case, there is a “civil action 
authorized by law.”  The Court can provide the equitable remedy sought under the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the Federal Elections Clause, Title 52 of the U.S. Code and related 
federal common law thereto.  For the sake of brevity, previous arguments are not repeated 
here.   
However, one additional argument needs to be clarified. The federal common law 
under the Elections Clause should recognize a private cause of action against a local election 
official for tortious interference with a federal election when a local official uses private 
donations to run a federal election.  Here, it is appropriate for the Court to recognize this tort 
because there is a significant conflict between the federal policy and the use of state law. See 
Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S. 213, 218–19 (1997) (citations omitted) (when courts decide to 
fashion rules of federal common law, the guiding principle is that a significant conflict 
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law must first be specifically 
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shown); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Kamen v. Kemper Financial 
Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991). Federal policy requires that federal elections be exclusively-
publicly-funded.  The local government’s policies are to accept the Zuckerberg moneys which 
conflicts with the federal policy.  Because of this conflict, the federal common law tort should 
be recognized.  If this federal common law tort is recognized under the Elections Clause and 
Title 52 of the U.S. Code, then the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, provides the Court with 
an equitable remedy prior to an election to enjoin local public officials from illegally accepting 
Zuckerberg moneys to fund federal elections. 
The All Writs Act provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 500 
F.3d 322, 328 (3rd Cir. 2007), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).  “The All Writs Act confers on 
courts ‘extraordinary powers’ that are ‘firmly circumscribed.’ “Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 
1351, 1358 (5th Cir.1978)). 
The U.S. Supreme Court in FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 (1966), held that 
the All Writs Act where Congress failed to provide a solution regarding preliminary 
injunctions in Federal Trade Commission matters. At the time, the Federal Trade Commission 
sought a preliminary injunction under the All Writs Act to stop the respondents from merging 
until it reviewed the legality of the merger.  Id. at 605-605. But respondents argued because 
Congress had not given the FTC express statutory authority to request preliminary relief, that 
relief is unavailable. Id. at 605-606.  The Court agreed with the FTC reasoning that Congress 
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could not have entrusted the enforcement of the Clayton Act to the FTC without allowing the 
court of appeals to exercise its derivative power under the All Writs Act. Id. at 605.  Thus, in 
the absence of explicit congressional direction, courts may exercise their authority under 
the All Writs Act to ensure effective judicial review.   
Similarly, the Constitution, Article I, section 5, leaves to each House of Congress to be 
judge of its own elections, “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members.”  But, in this case, Congress has failed to provide specific 
pre-election remedies against local public officials when illegally accepting Zuckerberg moneys 
to fund federal elections.  52 U.S.C. § 21112, regarding federal election standards, is too limited 
requiring only an “appropriate remedy” from the states for HAVA violations, but not the 
meaningful equitable remedy required prior to the federal election—as demonstrated in this 
case—to stop local election officials from using private money to fund public elections. So, in 
this situation, as in FTC v. Dean Food Co., the All Writs Act provides a remedy to the Court 
based on the federal common law claim described above to provide a pre-election preliminary 
injunction to enjoin the local election officials from violating federal law by accepting 
Zuckerberg moneys for federal elections. 
III.
Under Dillon’s Rule, counties and cities, as political subdivisions of 
Pennsylvania, have no power to accept Zuckerberg moneys to run federal 
elections. 
During Oral Argument before this Honorable Court, counsel for Defendants argued 
“... the Dillon rule has nothing to do with this case.  Right ? … In fact, the election code 
basically provides that it’s up to counties to run these elections.”  October 16, 2020, TR pp. 60-
61.
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Under the Elections Clause, counties and cities, as political subdivisions of 
Pennsylvania, have no power whatsoever over federal elections. The Elections Clause allocates 
the powers exclusively to the state legislatures and Congress: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as 
to the Places of chusing Senators. (sic) 
U.S. Const., art. I, § 4, cl. 1.    
The Election Clause’s phrase “manner of holding elections” for Senators and 
Representatives “refers to the entire electoral process, from the first step of registering to the 
last step of promulgating honest returns.”  U.S. v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 284 (W.D. La. 
1963).  The Supreme Court has stated that the Elections Clause has two functions: “Upon the 
States it imposes the duty (‘shall be prescribed’) to prescribe the time, place, and manner of 
electing Representatives and Senators; upon Congress it confers the power to alter those 
regulations or supplant them altogether.”  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 
1, 8-9 (2013).   
The Supreme Court states that the Elections Clause invests the state with power over 
Congressional elections subject to Congressional control: 
The power of Congress over the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional 
elections “is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent 
which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the 
regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent 
therewith.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880). Inter Tribal 
Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. at 9.   
So, the States have “no power qua sovereigns” regarding federal elections; whatever 
powers the States have regarding federal elections is because Congress allows it.  Fish v. Kobach, 
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840 F.3d 710, 731–32 (10th Cir. 2016).  Nor does the Constitution impose on the United States 
the costs incurred by Congress’s alterations of federal elections, traditionally borne by the 
States.  Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1995).   
“Accordingly, the logic behind the plain-statement rule—that Congress must be 
explicit when it encroaches in areas traditionally within a state’s core governmental 
functions—does not apply when Congress acts under the Elections Clause, as it did in enacting 
the NVRA.” Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 455 (6th Cir. 2008).   “To this end, state election 
laws cannot ‘directly conflict’ with federal election laws on the subject.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. 
Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 399 (5th Cir. 2013), quoting Voting for America, Inc. v. Andrade, 488 
Fed.Appx. 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 775 
(5th Cir.2000)).  
To be sure, Governors and independent redistricting committees, established under 
state law, have been found constitutionally permissible under the Elections Clause.  Smiley v. 
Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) (whether Governor of State through veto power shall have part in 
making of state laws concerning the time, place and manner for holding elections is matter of 
state policy); Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Com’n,  576 U.S. 787 
(2015) (Elections Clause did not preclude State’s people from creating commissions operating 
independently of state legislature to establish Congressional Districts).  
But, in contrast, counties and cities have no powers over federal election policies 
because they are mere political subdivisions of the state. Importantly, under the Federal 
Elections Clause, the federal common law Dillon’s Rule applies.  See Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 
U.S. 213, 218–19 (1997) (citations omitted) (when courts decide to fashion rules 
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of federal common law, the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some 
federal policy or interest and the use of state law must first be specifically shown); United States 
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 
90, 98 (1991). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed Dillon’s Rule in Pennsylvania 
Restaurant and Lodging Association v. City of Pittsburgh:
This bedrock legal principle sometimes is referred to as “Dillon’s Rule,” after 
Judge John F. Dillon, who explained: 
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights 
wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without 
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may 
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, 
the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a 
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal 
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of 
no limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned. 
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.  City of Clinton 
v. Cedar Rapids & M.R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868) (emphasis in original). 
211 A.3d 810, 816, n. 3 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis in original). 
This philosophy has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in statements 
such as: 
“We think the following principles have been established by them and have 
become settled doctrines of this court, to be acted upon wherever they are 
applicable. Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the 
state as may be intrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers 
properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and 
manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration of the 
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they 
shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their 
charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them 
property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or 
manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a 
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contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The 
state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may 
take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other 
agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it 
with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All 
this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent 
of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is 
supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, 
may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United 
States.” Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907).   
The U.S. Supreme Court, more recently, affirmed the principal “The 
States’ political subdivisions have no such inherent power and can levy taxes only to the 
extent authorized by the State.” See 16 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations § 44.05, 
pp. 19–24 (rev.3d ed.2003); see also Wiggins Ferry, 107 U.S., at 375, 2 S.Ct. 257 (noting “[t]he 
power of [a State] to authorize any city within her limits to impose a license tax” on ferries). 
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. 1, 27 (2009). Under Dillon’s Rule, the 
Pennsylvania counties and cities have no inherent powers separate and apart from express 
grants of power.  And, in this case, Pennsylvania’s counties and cities have no express grants 
of power to accept private federal election grants to fund their own federal election policies.  
Article 7, Section 6, of Pennsylvania’s Constitution expressly provides “All laws 
regulating the holding of elections by the citizens, or for the registration of electors, shall be 
uniform throughout the State, …”  Art. 7, §6. PA Const. [Emphasis added] 
Article 7, Section 11, of Pennsylvania’s Constitution expressly provides at Article 7, 
Section 11, Section 11. Election Officers: 
“District election boards shall consist of a judge and two inspectors, who shall 
be chosen at municipal elections for such terms as may be provided by law. 
Each elector shall have the right to vote for the judge and one inspector, and 
each inspector shall appoint one clerk. The first election board for any new 
district shall be selected, and vacancies in election boards filled, as shall be 
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provided by law. Election officers shall be privileged from arrest upon days of 
election, and while engaged in making up and transmitting returns, except upon 
warrant of a court of record or judge thereof, for an election fraud, for felony, 
or for wanton breach of the peace. In cities they may claim exemption from jury 
duty during their terms of service.” Art. 7, §11. PA Const.
Pennsylvania statutes expressly limit municipal powers. Local subdivisions of 
Pennsylvania state government are not sovereigns.  Title 53 Pa.C.S.A., Section 2962, 
Limitation on Municipal Powers, specifically limits local governments’ powers. 
§ 2962. Limitation on municipal powers. 
(a) Powers granted by statute.--With respect to the following subjects, the home rule 
charter shall not give any power or authority to the municipality contrary to or in 
limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes which are applicable to a class 
or classes of municipalities: 
(1) The filing and collection of municipal tax claims or liens and the sale of real or 
personal property in satisfaction of them. 
(2) The procedures in the exercise of the powers of eminent domain and the assessment 
of damages and benefits for property taken, injured or destroyed. 
(3) Boundary changes. 
(4) Regulation of public schools. 
(5) The registration of electors and the conduct of elections. 
(6) The fixing of subjects of taxation. 
(7) The fixing of the rates of nonproperty or personal taxes levied upon nonresidents. 
(8) The assessment of real or personal property and persons for taxation purposes. 
(9) Defining or providing for the punishment of any felony or misdemeanor. 
(10) Municipal planning under the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L.805, No.247), known as the 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code.  53 Pa.C.S.A. §2962. 
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Pennsylvania’s counties and cities, because they are not sovereign under Dillon’s Rule, cannot 
claim powers they do not have.  Centre County is not a Home Rule County and is governed 
by the Second through Eighth Class County Code.  Delaware County has elected Home Rule 
by virtue of the County Home Rule provisions found in Pennsylvania law.  Philadelphia has 
opted to be a First-Class City Home Rule entity pursuant to the First-Class City Home Rule 
Act.  53 P.S. §13131. 
Philadelphia is subject to the limitations set forth in Section 13133 of the First Class 
City Code as follows: 
“No city shall exercise any powers or authority beyond the city limits except 
such as are conferred by an act of the General Assembly, and no city shall 
engage in any proprietary or private business except as authorized by the 
General Assembly. Notwithstanding the grant of powers contained in this act, 
no city shall exercise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement 
of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly which are-- 
(a) Applicable to a class or classes of cities on the following subjects: 
(1) Providing for the filing and collection of municipal and tax claims or liens 
and for the sale of real or personal property in satisfaction thereof; 
(2) Providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the 
procedure for the condemnation of property for public purposes; 
(3) Providing for the assessment of damages and benefits for property taken, 
injured or destroyed; 
(4) Providing methods for the incurring or increasing of indebtedness; 
(5) Providing for the annexation or exclusion or detachment of territory; 
(6) Regulating public schools; 
(7) Providing for the personal registration of electors;
(8) Limiting rates and fixing subjects of taxation; 
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(9) Providing for the assessment of real or personal property and persons for 
taxation purposes. 
(b) Applicable in every part of the Commonwealth. 
(c) Applicable to all the cities of the Commonwealth, including, but not limited 
to, those acts providing for the disability compensation of police officers and 
firefighters.” 53 P.S. §13133 [Emphasis added] 
Section 13113 - Conduct of Elections; returns. of the Chapter 32 - Home Rule of the 
First Class City Code, 53 P.S. §13113, provides in relevant part as follows: 
“All elections provided for in this act shall be conducted by the election 
officers for such city in accordance with the Pennsylvania Election Code.
The election officers shall count the votes cast and make return thereof to the 
county board of elections. The result of any such election shall be computed by 
the county board of elections in the same manner as is provided by law for the 
computation of similar returns at any such election. Certificates of the result of 
any such election shall be filed by the county board of elections with the city 
council of the city and with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.” 53 P.S. 
§13113 [Emphasis added]
Section 3253 - Contributions or Expenditures by National Banks, Corporations, or 
Unincorporated Associations, 25 P.S. §3253, of Pennsylvania’s Election Code provides as 
follows: 
“It is unlawful for any National or State Bank, or any corporation incorporated 
under the laws of this or any other state .... except those corporations formed 
primarily for political purposes or as a political committee, to make a 
contribution or expenditure in connection with the election of any candidate 
or for any political purpose whatever except in connection with any question 
to be voted on by the electors of this Commonwealth.  Furthermore, it shall 
be unlawful for any ... other person to knowingly accept or receive any 
contribution prohibited by this section ...” 25 P.S. §3253 [Emphasis added] 
“As a general matter, municipalities are creatures of the state and “possess only such 
powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the 
same into effect.” Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board v. City Council of Philadelphia, 928 
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A.2d 1255, 1270-71, 593 Pa. 241 (2007); quoting, Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 580 Pa. 564, 
862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 
579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (2004)). “A municipality is therefore powerless to enact 
ordinances except as authorized by statute, and ordinances not in conformity with the 
municipality’s enabling statute will be void.” PA Gaming Board at 1271.
“Further, the First Class City Home Rule Act provides that a city ‘taking advantage of 
this act and . . . amending its charter thereunder shall have and may exercise all powers and 
authority of local self-government and shall have complete powers of legislation and 
administration in relation to its municipal functions . . . [,]’ subject to certain enumerated 
limitations. 53 P.S. § 13131. Among the limitations are that ‘no city shall exercise powers 
contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly 
which are . . . [a]pplicable in every part of the Commonwealth.’ 53 P.S. § 13133(b). With respect 
to this second limitation, this Court has explained that ordinances enacted by home rule 
municipalities are negated when they conflict with a statute the General Assembly has enacted 
concerning ‘substantive matters of statewide concern.’“ Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board v. City 
Council of Philadelphia, 928 A.2d 1255, 1270-71, 593 Pa. 241 (2007); quoting, Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 
545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996). 
 
It is quite clear from the evidence presented with respect to the request for temporary 
restraining order that Defendants have entered into private agreements which are prohibited 
under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Election Code of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, and, in particular, Defendants have received contributions for political purposes 
in contravention of the law. 
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Plaintiffs’ sole justification for their acceptance of the unprecedented financial 
contributions is their assertion that Pennsylvania’s Election Code does not expressly prohibit 
them from accepting the money.  Dillon’s Rule is applicable because the United States 
Constitution grants Pennsylvania’s Legislature with the sole authority to regulate the time, 
place, and manner of elections within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Further, 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution requires uniformity in the election process throughout the 
Commonwealth.  Defendants’ actions are in violation of Pennsylvania’s Constitution in that 
Defendants have ceded control of their elections to a third party entity in exchange for 
unregulated private financial support.   
These “Grants,” which are actually private contracts containing dire consequences as 
set forth in the “claw back provisions” require the Defendants to expend the grant money for 
the purposes set forth in the grants.  It is therefore clear that where this money is currently 
being used to pay the salaries of Election officers (Pennsylvania Constitution Article 7, Section 
11 prescribing the manner of the make-up of “District Election Boards” in Pennsylvania) 
clearly establishes that the Zuckerberg money paid through CTCL is being used to pay the 
salaries of Pennsylvania constitutional officers in contravention of the law. (See also, 25 P.S. 
Section 2645 “Expenses of county boards and of primaries and elections to be paid by county 
... “) 
Further, Defendant Centre County’s application to CTCL states in relevant part “The 
mobile drop box will be deployed to rural areas of the County and to precincts where there is 
a low return rate for mail-by-ballot.” Centre County Application p. 6. Defendant City of 
Philadelphia’s application states in relevant part “…The Office of the City Commissioners 
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understands CTCL’s interest in maximizing the number of polling locations and will work to 
identify over 800 locations.  However, given the nature of Philadelphia’s neighborhoods, there 
are scenarios where more locations could result in voters having to travel farther to less 
convenient locations in order to have a higher number of total locations. The Commissioners 
will make the final decisions based on ADA standards, relative distance to the division, 
accessibility, and voter convenience.”  Philadelphia Application p. 6.
There is no legal authority for the utilization of mobile voting vehicles.  Further, the 
boards of election have no authority to engage in “get-out-the-vote” activities.     
It is abundantly clear that the scheme engaged in by CTCL utilizing the huge financial 
resources of Mr. Zuckerberg totaling more than $350 Million is violative of the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Constitution of the United States and therefore is 
contrary to the requirements set forth in the Election Clause of the United States Constitution 
which defers only to the “Legislatures” of each state and not to the City of Philadelphia, 
County of Delaware, or County of Centre.  For these reasons, the Temporary Restraining 
Order should issue to maintain the status quo and to prevent further violation of the United 
States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, Pennsylvania’s Election Code.  
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Dated: October 19, 2020 
Respectfully Submitted, 
/s/ Thomas W. King, III 
 
Thomas W. King, III (Pa. I.D. No. 21580) 
Email: tking@dmkcg.com  
Thomas E. Breth (Pa. I.D. No. 66350) 
Email: tbreth@dmkcg.com  
Ronald T. Elliott (Pa. I.D. No. 71567) 
Email: relliott@dmkcg.com  
Jordan P. Shuber (Pa. I.D. No. 317823) 
Email: jshuber@dmkcg.com  
Special Counsel for the Amistad Project 
of the Thomas More Society 
Dillon, McCandless, King, Coulter 
& Graham, L.L.P. 
128 West Cunningham Street 
Butler, PA 16001 
Telephone: (724) 283-2200 
Facsimile: (724) 283-2298 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
/s/ Erick G. Kaardal 
Erick G. Kaardal (Wis. I.D. No. 1035141)* 
Email: kaardal@mklaw.com  
Special Counsel for the Amistad Project 
of the Thomas More Society 
Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A. 
150 South Fifth Street, Suite 3100 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 
Telephone: (612) 341-1074 
Facsimile: (612) 341-1076 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
*Admitted Pro Hac Vice  
Case 4:20-cv-01761-MWB   Document 63   Filed 10/19/20   Page 17 of 17

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