Memorandum Opinion — PA Voters Alliance v. Centre County

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U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania · No. 4:20-cv-01761-MWB · Doc. 75 · 2020-10-21 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
PENNSYLVANIA VOTERS 
ALLIANCE, et al., 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
CENTRE COUNTY, et al., 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
No. 4:20-CV-01761 
 
 
(Judge Brann) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
OCTOBER 21, 2020 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action to enjoin Centre County, Delaware 
County, and the City of Philadelphia (collectively “Defendants”) from receiving 
election grants from the Center of Tech and Civic Life (“CTCL”).1  Plaintiffs argue 
that these grants violate the Election and Equal Protection Clauses of the United 
States Constitution,2 and that they are preempted by both the Constitution and federal 
law.3 
 
 
                                                           
1  Doc. 1.  Plaintiffs have since amended their complaint and added Kathy Boockvar, in her 
capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as a Defendant.  Doc. 38 at ¶ 196.  
2  Id. at ¶¶ 102-76. 
3  Id. at ¶¶ 177-216.  Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that these grants are preempted by the Elections 
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Help America Vote Act, and the National Voters 
Registration Act.  Id. 
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A. 
Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs consist of the Pennsylvania Voters Alliance organization (“PVA”) 
and fourteen individual registered voters who reside in Pennsylvania.4  These 
fourteen individuals are residents of Centre County, Delaware County, and the City 
of Philadelphia.5  They all generally oppose the election of “progressive” candidates 
in local, state, and federal elections.6 
B. 
CTCL and the CTCL Grants  
CTCL, a non-party to this action, is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization 
formed in 2012 by a “team of civic technologists, trainers, researchers, election 
administration and data experts” to “foster a more informed and engaged 
democracy” and to help “modernize elections.”7  CTCL has designated 
$250,000,000 in grant money to be paid to election offices across the country “to 
help ensure that [these offices] have the staffing, training, and equipment necessary 
so this November every eligible voter can participate in a safe and timely way and 
have their vote counted.”8   
These funds may be used for election-related expenses, including to: maintain 
in-person polling on election day; obtain personal protective equipment for election 
                                                           
4  Id. at ¶¶ 4-18.  
5  Id. at ¶¶ 5-18. 
6  Id. Several Plaintiffs are members of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and several 
are Republican candidates in the upcoming election.  Id. at ¶¶ 5, 9-18.  But because neither 
group asserts claims based on these statuses, they will be treated the same as the other 
individual Plaintiffs. 
7  Id. at ¶ 44; Doc. 37 at 5.  
8  Doc. 38 at ¶ 55.  
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officials and voters; support drive-thru voting; publish reminders to voters to update 
their voter registration information; educate voters on election policies and 
procedure; recruit and hire poll workers; provide increased cleaning and sanitation 
at poll sites; train poll workers; expand in-person early voting sites; and deploy 
additional staff or technology to improve mail ballot processing.9 
CTCL provides grant funds to any local election office that applies, and the 
final grant is calculated using nonpartisan criteria.10  CTCL reports that over 1,100 
local election administrators across the country have applied for CTCL grants, 
including eighteen counties within Pennsylvania, as well as the Pennsylvania 
Department of State.11  Of these eighteen counties, eleven voted for Donald Trump 
over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, “and five did so by more than a two-to-
one margin.”12 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that CTCL provides funds only to regions that 
contain “demographics with overwhelmingly progressive voters.”13  Plaintiffs count 
Defendants among such regions, and note that for the 2016 presidential election, 
                                                           
9  Id. at ¶ 59. 
10  Doc. 37 at 6. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 17.  Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that CTCL is “a progressive organization [that] 
targets urban counties and cities for its private federal election grants to turn out the progressive 
vote so [that] progressive candidates win.”  Doc. 38 at ¶ 53.  
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Hillary Clinton received 84.3% of the votes in Philadelphia, 61.58% of the votes in 
Delaware County, and 50.93% of the votes in Centre County.14 
C. 
Procedural Posture 
The genesis of this action stems from Defendants’ decision to accept funding 
from CTCL, allegedly without the consent of the United States Congress or the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.15  Each Defendant has accepted grant money from 
CTCL to varying degrees.16  This money has been used to fund various election-
related initiatives and to defray certain election-related expenses.  For example, 
Defendants have used CTCL moneys to: purchase processing equipment for mail-in 
and absentee voting; create satellite election offices; install secure drop-boxes; pay 
for in-person voting expenses; and cover the cost of printing and postage.17  All three 
counties have also received election grants under the Help America Vote Act 
(“HAVA”) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Securities Act, both of 
which are distributed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.18 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ acceptance of the CTCL grants is unlawful 
for two reasons.  First, they argue that any authority granted to the Defendants to 
receive these CTCL grants is preempted by the Elections Clause, the Supremacy 
                                                           
14  Id. at ¶¶ 72-74. 
15  Id. at ¶¶ 79-83.   
16  Philadelphia received $10,012,000, Delaware County received $2,200,000, and Centre County 
received $863,838.  Id.; see Doc. 37 at 15-16. 
17  Doc. 38-3.  
18  Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 87-97. 
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Clause, HAVA, and the National Voters Registration Act.19  And second, Plaintiffs 
claim that the grants directly violate the Pennsylvania Election Code, the Election 
Clause of the United States Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.20  Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the CTCL grants violate 
the Equal Protection Clause because only some counties chose to apply for them; 
thus resulting in those counties with CTCL funding having more money to spend on 
elections than those who chose to forgo applying.21  It is this resultant inequity that 
Plaintiffs argue is unconstitutional.22  
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction.23  They contend that: they are likely to succeed on the merits 
of their claims; they will be irreparably harmed absent an injunction; there will be 
little to no harm to Defendants should an injunction issue; and the public interest 
weighs in favor of an injunction.24  
Plaintiffs make sweeping constitutional claims.  But there is less to this case 
than meets the eye.  That is because, despite their assertions, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
the threshold standing requirement of Article III.  The Court thus concludes that it 
                                                           
19  Id. at ¶¶ 102-76.   
20  Id. at ¶¶ 176-217.  
21  Id. at ¶¶ 211, 213.   
22  Id. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Boockvar are premised on the alleged illegality of the 
CTCL grants.  Plaintiffs argue that Boockvar is culpable because she permitted Defendants to 
accept the grants.  
23  Doc. 4. 
24  Doc. 5. 
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cannot reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion because they lack standing.  
Accordingly, the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.25 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of the federal 
judiciary to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”26  “For a federal court to exercise 
jurisdiction under Article III, plaintiffs must allege—and eventually prove—that 
they hav[e] ‘standing’ to pursue their claims.”27  “The [United States] Supreme Court 
has repeatedly described the question of Article III standing as a ‘threshold’ issue.”28  
“It is an ‘irreducible constitutional minimum,’ without which a court would not have 
jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the action.”29  “As a result, federal courts ‘have 
an obligation to assure themselves of litigants’ standing under Article III.’”30  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, the “continuing 
obligation to assure that [courts] have jurisdiction requires that [they] raise the issue 
of standing sua sponte.”31 
“The plaintiff, ‘as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,’ bears the burden of 
establishing the minimal requirements of Article III standing: ‘(1) an injury in fact, 
                                                           
25  See Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 164 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because the absence of 
standing leaves the court without subject matter jurisdiction to reach a decision on the merits, 
dismissals ‘with prejudice’ for lack of standing are generally improper”). 
26  Id. at 161-62 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III). 
27  Id. 
28  Wayne Land & Mineral Grp., LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 959 F.3d 569, 573-74 
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019)). 
29  Id. at 574 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
30  Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006) (brackets omitted)). 
31  Id. (brackets and ellipsis omitted). 
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(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is 
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”32  “In assessing whether a 
plaintiff has carried this burden, [courts must] separate [the] standing inquiry from 
any assessment of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”33  “To maintain this 
fundamental separation between standing and merits at the dismissal stage, [courts] 
assume for the purposes of [the] standing inquiry that a plaintiff has stated valid legal 
claims.”34  “While [the Court’s] standing inquiry may necessarily reference the 
nature and source of the claims asserted, [the Court’s] focus remains on whether the 
plaintiff is the proper party to bring those claims.”35  
Plaintiffs assert three theories of standing.36  First, they argue that the CTCL 
grants disadvantage the Plaintiffs because they provide an advantage to progressive 
and Democrat candidates in the counties where Plaintiffs live and vote.37  Second, 
they argue that, without injunctive relief, the CTCL grants will delegitimize and thus 
invalidate the elections, consequently resulting in Plaintiffs lacking political 
representation until the election can be re-done.38  Third, Plaintiffs offer the novel 
                                                           
32  Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 162 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (ellipsis 
omitted)). 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
36  Plaintiff PVA premises its associational standing on the standing of its members, the individual 
named Plaintiffs in this case.  Doc. 39 at 4.  Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ 
standing together.  Similarly, because Plaintiffs base their theories of standing against all 
Defendants on the same injuries, the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ standing against the 
Defendants as a whole.   
37  Id. at 5-7.  
38  Id. at 7.  
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theory that they have suffered an injury as a third-party beneficiary to the “social 
contract” between the federal government and the individual States.39   
None of these theories are persuasive.  Plaintiffs have not shown that they can 
satisfy any of the three elements of standing.  That is, Plaintiffs have not shown that 
they will suffer an injury in fact, that any injury is fairly traceable to Defendants, or 
that any purported injury is likely to be redressable.  Consequently, their complaint 
is dismissed.  
A. 
Injury in Fact 
Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury in fact sufficient to support standing.  “To 
establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual 
or imminent.’”40  Plaintiffs’ injuries lack particularity and imminence, and the Court 
accordingly dismisses this action for lack of standing.  
1. 
Particularity 
All three of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries constitute generalized grievances and 
are thus insufficiently particularized to support standing.  Limiting jurisdiction to 
those cases which are “personal and individual” to the party “ensures that courts 
exercise power that is judicial in nature.”41  Thus, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that “[a] federal court is not ‘a forum for generalized grievances.’”42  The 
                                                           
39  Id. at 9-10.  
40  Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).  
41  Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).  
42  Gill v. Whitford, 183 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018).  
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Supreme Court defines generalized grievances as those “predicated upon an 
interest . . . which is held in common by all members of the public.”43  As a result, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected challenges to government action 
premised solely on an individual’s general interest in ensuring that the law is 
followed.44 
In the voting rights context, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that a 
person’s right to vote is individual and personal in nature.”45  But this right does 
not give plaintiffs carte blanche to challenge any action that conceivably infringes 
upon that right.  For example, a mere violation of the Elections Clause, on its own, 
will not support standing because it constitutes a generalized grievance.46  Nor will 
“statewide harm” to a voter’s interest in “collective representation in the 
legislature” or in “influencing the legislature’s overall ‘composition and 
policymaking.’”47  To the extent that the latter interest is recognized, it is 
“embodied in [an individual’s] right to vote for [his or her] representative.”48 
In asserting their first theory of standing, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants, by 
accepting and using CTCL funding, have disadvantaged and wasted Plaintiffs’ votes 
                                                           
43  Lance, 549 U.S. at 441. 
44  E.g., id. at 442; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974); Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21 (1974).  
45  Lance, 549 U.S. at 442.  
46  Id. 
47  Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1931.  
48  Id.  
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in the upcoming state and federal elections.49  They claim that Defendants accepted 
CTCL funding “for the specific purpose to maintain, promote, or favor a historic 
specific demographic group that can influence the outcome of federal elections 
within the boundaries of those counties and city.”50  The general crux of this 
argument seems to be that Defendants’ use of CTCL funding will improve voter 
turnout which in turn will make it more likely that progressive candidates will 
succeed in the upcoming election.   
Importantly, however, Plaintiffs try to dodge the burden of articulating 
precisely which of their interests have been purportedly infringed.  Despite citing 
their “right to vote,” Plaintiffs do not allege that CTCL funding has actually been 
used to restrict that right.  They do not argue that Defendants have used the CTCL 
funding to impede Plaintiffs’ ability to vote or deny them the ability to effectively 
participate in the upcoming election.  Moreover, Plaintiffs remain free to advocate 
on behalf of their preferred candidates and encourage others to vote.51  Thus, 
Plaintiffs’ appear to allege only that their right to vote has been infringed   because 
it now might be more difficult for them to elect their preferred candidate.    
Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing because, at core, their claim is merely a 
generalized grievance.  Though Plaintiffs have done a valiant job of disguising it, 
                                                           
49  Doc. 39 at 6.  
50  Id. 
51  Their efforts may even be more easily rewarded now that Defendants have taken additional 
steps to facilitate early and in-person voting.  
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the only interest they have identified is of a general nature: that Plaintiffs ability to 
influence state and federal elections will be diluted if Defendants take steps that 
might result in increased voter turnout.  This is not a legally cognizable injury under 
Article III.  And it is “precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance 
about the conduct of government that [the Supreme Court has] refused to 
countenance in the past.”52  The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs’ first theory 
insufficient to support standing.  
Plaintiffs’ second theory of standing also fails because it constitutes a 
generalized grievance.  Plaintiffs argue that maintaining CTCL’s grants to 
Defendants would result in Plaintiffs losing representation in their individual 
districts (because the election results would be subsequently invalidated).  But the 
Court is not aware of any cases holding that the right to be politically represented is 
a legally cognizable interest under Article III.  And the Court declines to expand 
standing doctrine in such a manner, especially given that any right to political 
representation would be one “held in common by all members” of the county.53  This 
injury is not sufficiently particularized, and thus does not satisfy standing. 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ third theory of injury also constitutes a generalized 
grievance.  They claim that there is a social contract between the federal government 
and the individual States, and that Plaintiffs, as citizens, are third-party beneficiaries 
                                                           
52  Lance, 549 U.S. at 442.  
53  Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220. 
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to this contract.  The general thrust of this argument is that Plaintiffs’ interest as 
third-party beneficiaries are harmed whenever the government violates the 
Constitution, and that this injury is particularized enough to predicate standing.   
The Court cannot accept this argument.  To adopt Plaintiffs’ conception of 
standing would be to reject the entirety of standing doctrine as it exists today.  Under 
Plaintiffs’ theory, any citizen of the United States would have standing to challenge 
any constitutional violation for any reason.  This is simply not supported by 
precedent or doctrine.54  And the Court declines to take such an expansive approach 
in this case.       
2. 
Imminence  
Even if Plaintiffs could establish that their first two theories state a 
particularized and concrete injury, the alleged injuries are far too speculative to 
support standing.55  To show standing for an alleged future injury, a party must show 
that the injury is imminent.56  “Although imminence is concededly a somewhat 
elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure the 
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is 
                                                           
54  Lance, 549 U.S. at 441 (asserting only that the law has not been followed is insufficient to 
establish standing); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-77 (holding that a federal taxpayer does not 
have standing to challenge certain CIA expenditures as a violation of the Constitution’s 
Accounts Clause absent a showing that he suffered a particular injury); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 
at 220 (“[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here 
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract 
nature of the injury all citizens share.”).  
55  It is clear that Plaintiffs’ “social contract” theory is too generalized to establish standing.   
56  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.  
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certainly impending.”57  Standing thus cannot be predicated on a “highly attenuated 
chain of possibilities.”58  And courts should exercise caution when determining 
whether to “endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of 
independent actors.”59   
Plaintiffs’ theories of standing fail to show that any alleged injury is certainly 
impending because they rely on a highly attenuated causal chain of events.  For 
example, both theories require the Court to assume that: (1) CTCL funding will 
result in higher voter turnout; (2) any higher voter turnout will be in support of 
progressive candidates; (3) the higher voter turnout will be significant enough to 
impact the outcome of the election; (4) this turnout will impact the election in favor 
of progressive candidates; and (5) regarding Plaintiffs’ second theory, that a party 
will challenge the election if this Court does not grant Plaintiffs’ motion and that 
challenge will result in the invalidation of the election results.   
None of these assumptions are supported by the record.  Defendants have used 
CTCL funding in a nonpartisan way to facilitate the upcoming election; they have 
spent the CTCL money to set up satellite election offices, offer dropboxes, and pay 
for various election-related expenses.  Defendants have notably not attempted to use 
the CTCL funds to increase voter turnout by, for example, implementing get-out-
the-vote efforts.  There simply is no indication in the record that CTCL funds will 
                                                           
57  Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992)) (emphasis in original).  
58  Id. at 410.  
59  Id. at 414.  
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increase voter turnout at all, which Plaintiffs allege is the root cause of their 
purported harm.60 
Further, nothing in the record suggests that, if Defendants’ use of the CTCL 
funding does increase voter turnout, it will necessarily benefit progressive 
candidates.  The implication that increased voter turnout is inherently beneficial to 
progressive candidates is dubious at best.61  And the Court finds this assumption 
far too dependent on the actions of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of voters to 
premise standing.  As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ injuries are too 
speculative and not sufficiently imminent to support standing.   
B. 
 Causation 
Plaintiffs also fail to establish that any alleged injury “is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct of the defendant.”62  In Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court 
concluded that standing was absent where “[t]he links in the chain of causation 
between the challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury [we]re far too 
weak for the chain as a whole to sustain respondents’ standing.”63  There, the 
plaintiffs challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s grant of tax-exempt status to 
                                                           
60  It could be argued that safer, more efficient funding will increase voter turnout in these areas. 
However, it is equally likely that even without safe and efficient funding, voters in a 
presidential election—especially one that is viewed as highly consequential to both Republican 
and Democratic voters—will still be motivated to turn out in the same numbers regardless of 
any risks associated with voting during a pandemic. 
61  As the adage goes, “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995).   
62  Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 162. 
63  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
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certain racially discriminatory schools, arguing that such tax-exempt status aided the 
schools in maintaining segregation and, accordingly, in harming their children by 
forcing them to attend segregated schools.64 
Such alleged harm was “not fairly traceable to the Government conduct 
respondents challenge as unlawful” because there was no evidence that “there were 
enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in 
respondents’ communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an 
appreciable difference in public school integration.”65  The Supreme Court noted 
that it was unclear “how many racially discriminatory private schools [we]re in fact 
receiving tax exemptions,” whether the withdrawal of tax-exempt status “from any 
particular school would lead the school to change its policies,”  “whether any given 
parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child 
to public school as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made 
by the private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status,” or 
“whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the numerous 
relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that collectively would 
have a significant impact on the racial composition of the public schools.”66 
Ultimately, any alleged harm “involve[d] numerous third parties (officials of 
racially discriminatory schools receiving tax exemptions and the parents of children 
                                                           
64  Id. at 743-45 
65  Id. at 757-58. 
66  Id. at 758. 
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attending such schools) who may not even exist in respondents’ communities and 
whose independent decisions may not collectively have a significant effect on the 
ability of public school students to receive a desegregated education.”67 Given that 
the harm was not directly traceable to the IRS, the Supreme Court concluded that 
plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue their claims.68 
Here too, Plaintiffs’ alleged harms result from a third-party and, thus, their 
alleged injuries are not fairly traceable to Defendants.  The purported injuries here 
arise not from Defendants’ acceptance of CTCL funds, but from CTCL’s decision 
to allegedly direct those funds to counties with higher rates of progressive voters.  
Indeed, Plaintiffs make clear in their amended complaint that they are not harmed 
by the use of funds to secure a safer and more efficient election, but instead “are 
injured by CTCL’s private federal election grants because they are targeted to 
counties and cities with progressive voter patterns.”69  Because Plaintiffs’ injuries 
are not fairly traceable to Defendants’ actions but, instead, to the actions of a non-
defendant (CTCL), Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their claims in this 
action.70 
 
 
                                                           
67  Id. at 759. 
68  Id. at 759-60. 
69  Doc. 38 at 2. 
70  See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (injury indirect insufficient to support 
standing because injury turned on the action of a prosecutor who was not a party not before 
the court); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (injury too indirect to support 
standing where injury turned on the action of non-party actor). 
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C. 
Redressability  
Lastly, the Court finds that standing is absent because Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated that any purported harm is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision.71  At bottom, Plaintiffs claim rests on supposition—their conclusion that 
safer and more efficient voting as a result of CTCL funds will necessarily lead to 
increased progressive voter turnout, thereby harming Plaintiffs’ preferred 
conservative candidates.  
However, as discussed above, there is no evidence that CTCL funds will result 
in an increase in voter participation.  Indeed, a majority of the funding appears to be 
dedicated to assisting with the processing of mail-in voting and, thus, would appear 
likely to have no discernable effect on voter turnout.  It appears then that the harm 
alleged by Plaintiffs would instead be caused by the number of progressive voters 
who may turn out to vote, not by additional funding that increases the safety and 
efficiency of the election in the Defendant counties.  Consequently, simply forcing 
Defendants to return all CTCL funding is not likely to stem the harm of which 
Plaintiffs complain, as those voters may still turn out regardless of whether or not 
Defendants keep or return the CTCL grant.  
It is therefore “entirely conjectural whether the . . . activity that affects 
respondents will be altered or affected by” the Court blocking Defendants from using 
                                                           
71  Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 162. 
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CTCL funding.72  Because Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries stem from the actions of 
voters, not Defendants, their claims are not redressable and the Court finds that they 
lack standing.  
III. 
CONCLUSION  
 
In accordance with the above discussion, Plaintiffs’ complaint will be 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. 
An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 
s/ Matthew W. Brann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew W. Brann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States District Judge 
                                                           
72  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571. 
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