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Home Court filings Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC (PAED 589575) Response to Motion re 53 Motion for Leave to File — Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC (Dkt. 54, E.D. Pa. No. 5:21-cv-04337)

Court filing

Response to Motion re 53 Motion for Leave to File — Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC (Dkt. 54, E.D. Pa. No. 5:21-cv-04337)

Filed December 8, 2022 in Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, LLC; one of 344 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Filed2022-12-08

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG · Doc. 54 · 2022-12-08 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
ALICIA MARSHALL, DANIEL PRONSKY, 
PARIS TOWNSEND, NANCILEE HOLLAND, 
LEONA OWSLEY, KOLAWOLE AHMADOU, 
KIANA DERVIN, KRISTINA HENDERSON, 
DUSTIN INNIS, KELLY STALNAKER and 
JAMIE JONES, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC and CHICANOS 
POR LA CAUSA, INC., 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
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Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG 
 
RESPONSE OF DEFENDANTS PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC AND CHICANOS POR LA 
CAUSA, INC. TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
Defendants Prestamos CDFI, LLC (“Prestamos”) and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. 
(“CPLC”) respectfully submit this response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Authority, ECF No. 53. The extraneous documents that Plaintiffs attempt to 
introduce to the Court are irrelevant to the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, 
and do not comprise “authority” for resolving the jurisdictional and substantive arguments in 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, the Court should 
deny Plaintiffs’ Motion and disregard the documents they attach to it. 
Plaintiffs moved the Court for leave to file as “supplemental authority” two documents: a 
draft report from the United States House of Representatives’ Select Subcommittee on the 
Coronavirus Crisis entitled “‘We Are Not The Fraud Police’: How Fintechs Facilitated Fraud in 
the Paycheck Protection Program” (the “Fintech Report,” attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion as Exhibit 
1), and a December 8, 2022 Press Release by the United States Small Business Administration 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 1 of 8

 
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related to the Fintech Report (the “SBA Press Release,” attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion as Exhibit 
2). Even a cursory examination of these documents reveals that Plaintiffs misrepresent their 
contents as well as their relevance to this action. Plaintiffs’ putative class action is based on 
Prestamos’s alleged delay in funding their loans, which—according to Plaintiffs’ own 
allegations—is plausibly attributable to plaintiffs’ banks flagging and rejecting attempted PPP 
deposits into their accounts. That theory is antithetical to the basis of the Fintech Report and SBA 
Press Release—that certain Fintech companies lacked measures that should have resulted in the 
flagging and rejecting of more ineligible or fraudulent PPP loans. That is, the Seconded Amended 
Complaint attempts to police Prestamos for not funding plausibly problematic loans, while the 
Fintech Report and SBA Press Release criticize Fintech companies for causing the over-
distribution of too many loans, i.e., ineligible or fraudulent loans.1  
Plaintiffs lack true “supplemental authority” to combat Prestamos’s jurisdictional and 
substantive challenges that are fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, Plaintiffs hope to avoid dismissal 
with an eleventh-hour attempt to tag Prestamos with impertinent materials. 
The Fintech Report. The Fintech Report declares its purpose in its first paragraph: to 
present findings from an investigation into “the role of financial technology companies . . . in 
facilitating . . . fraudulent and otherwise ineligible loans through the Paycheck Protection Program 
(PPP).” See Fintech Report at 1 (emphasis added). Motivating the investigation was the Select 
Subcommittee’s concern that PPP funds were disbursed to “ineligible or fraudulent applicants,” 
id., to the enrichment of financial technology companies—like Blueacorn, with which Prestamos 
contracted to assist with its PPP program—and not lenders, see id. at 1–4. As one of the largest 
                                                 
1  
Defendant CPLC is not mentioned in the Fintech Report or the SBA Press Release, besides a 
one-sentence statement in the Fintech Report that “Prestamos is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of a nonprofit organization, Chicanos Por La Causa (CPLC).” See Fintech Report at 44. 
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lenders of PPP loans, Prestamos willingly cooperated in the Select Subcommittee’s investigation, 
acknowledging only that they received more PPP applications than they had anticipated but strove 
to meet the demand because of a commitment to its mission of serving underserved communities. 
See id. at 44–45. 
Remarkably, Plaintiffs submitted to the Court an outdated version of the Report that omits 
critical words from the testimony of Prestamos’ CEO. The corrected version of the Report, 
available on the Select Subcommittee’s website and attached here as Exhibit A, shows that 
Prestamos in fact diligently assessed Blueacorn’s fraud-prevention practices before contracting 
with them. Compare Exhibit A, at 44 (“Prestamos’ CEO stated: ‘No, we didn’t. We did spend a 
lot of time on the front end to try to understand what they were doing to prevent or eliminate any 
fraud.’”), with Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1, at 44 (omitting the words “We did”). At base, far from 
recommending penalties for specific lenders, the Fintech Report expressly calls on Congress to 
continue funding CDFIs, like Prestamos. See id. at 84. 
The SBA Press Release. As for the SBA Press Release, it makes no finding of fraud or 
wrongdoing on the part of any entity, let alone Prestamos. Instead, it announces simply that the 
agency would conduct an investigation into “possible fraud facilitated by third-party companies” 
and “continue to . . . examine the evidence laid out in [the Fintech Report].” See SBA Press Release 
at 1–2. The only enforcement action the SBA Press Release announces (conveniently obscured in 
the version of the release attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion) is directed to financial technology firms 
like Blueacorn. See https://www.sba.gov/article/2022/dec/08/us-small-business-administration-
statement-house-select-subcommittee-coronavirus-crisis-report 
(suspending 
“non-lenders 
Blueacorn and Womply . . . from working with the SBA in any capacity”). 
The Court should deny Plaintiffs leave to file these documents as supplemental 
authority. The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for at least three reasons. First, the Fintech 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 3 of 8

 
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Report and SBA Press Release are irrelevant to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Both documents 
reveal governmental action targeted at financial technology companies, none of whom are 
defendants here. And in a telltale sign of the Fintech Report’s irrelevance, Plaintiffs muster only 
five cherry-picked lines from the 128-page document (excluding exhibits, which Plaintiffs did not 
attach), one of which is not about Prestamos at all, and the others of which mostly parrot immaterial 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. 
If anything, the documents support Defendants’ position. The Fintech Report condemns 
lenders’ funding too many PPP loans because of reduced capacity to detect fraud—the exact 
opposite of what Plaintiffs allege, i.e., that Prestamos did not fund enough loans because of 
plaintiffs’ banks flagging and rejecting funding attempts by Prestamos. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 
227.f. Plaintiffs do not explain how any of the cited conduct in the Fintech Report would bolster, 
or even relate to at all, their breach of contract and statutory claims. Additionally, the SBA Press 
Release shows enforcement and oversight of the PPP proceeding as Congress intended—not via 
private class action lawsuits, but by the SBA and other governmental actors—undermining 
Plaintiffs’ arguments that they have a right to sue to enforce PPP rules and emphasizing why the 
CARES Act set forth no private right of action. Accord Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 46-1, at 
17.  
Second, the Fintech Report and SBA Press Release are not proper “authorities” for this 
Court to consider when resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Courts deciding a motion to 
dismiss may consider only “the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, . . 
. [and] document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 
F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). Although courts may also take notice of certain public records when 
ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong 
Shipping Group, Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426–27 (3d Cir. 1999), Plaintiffs do not cite any authority 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 4 of 8

 
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holding that a Congressional subcommittee report and agency press release satisfy that standard. 
Even if they did, however, the law is clear that, on a motion to dismiss, the court may take notice 
only of the existence of the record, and not the facts it purportedly contains. See id. at 426 (“[W]e 
may take judicial notice of another court’s opinion—not for the truth of the facts recited therein, 
but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its 
authenticity.”). That Congress and the SBA have investigated and reported on the PPP bears in no 
way on Plaintiffs’ claims.  
Third, Plaintiffs’ Motion is nothing more than an attempted end-run around this Court’s 
page limitations for opposition briefing, which Plaintiffs already have exhausted but which they 
now seek to exceed with more than one hundred pages of supplemental material. See Judge John 
M. Gallagher Policies and Procedures ¶ II.B.4 (20-page limit for opposition briefs); ECF No. 49 
(Plaintiffs’ 20-page opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss). The Court should not 
countenance this ploy.   
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Leave to File Supplemental Authority.2 
 
 
                                                 
2 
The plaintiffs in another putative PPP class action bringing similar claims and pending in 
the Northern District of Texas, Greathouse v. Capital Plus Financial, LLC, No. 22-cv-686 
(N.D. Tex.), recently moved to file the Fintech Report and SBA Press Release in support 
of their opposition to the motion to dismiss. See id., ECF No. 48 (Dec. 13, 2022). The Court 
there denied the motion, finding that the documents were inappropriate to consider on a 
motion to dismiss. See Order, ECF No. 54 (Dec. 22, 2022).  
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 5 of 8

 
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Dated: December 23, 2022 
 
 
 
Respectfully, 
 
By: /s/ Marcel S. Pratt 
 
 
 
Marcel S. Pratt (Pa. ID 307483) 
 
 
Michael R. McDonald (Pa. ID 326873) 
 
 
Alexa L. Levy (Pa. ID 327973) 
 
 
1735 Market Street, 51st Floor 
 
 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
 
T: 215-665-8500 / F: 215-864-8999 
 
 
PrattM@ballardspahr.com 
 
 
McDonaldM@ballardspahr.com 
 
 
LevyA@ballardspahr.com 
 
 
 
Roy Herrera* 
 
 
Daniel A. Arellano* 
 
 
Jillian Andrews* 
 
 
530 East McDowell Road 
 
 
Suite 107-150 
 
 
Phoenix, AZ 85004 
 
 
T: 602-567-482 
 
 
roy@ha-firm.com 
 
 
daniel@ha-firm.com 
 
 
jillian@ha-firm.com 
 
 
 
*pro hac vice admission to be sought 
 
 
 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 6 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
ALICIA MARSHALL, DANIEL PRONSKY, 
PARIS TOWNSEND, NANCILEE HOLLAND, 
LEONA OWSLEY, KOLAWOLE AHMADOU, 
KIANA DERVIN, KRISTINA HENDERSON, 
DUSTIN INNIS, KELLY STALNAKER and 
JAMIE JONES, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC and CHICANOS 
POR LA CAUSA, INC., 
 
 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
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Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG 
 
[PROPOSED] ORDER  
 
AND NOW, on this _____ day of December, 2022, upon consideration of the for Leave to 
File Supplemental Authority, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Honorable John M. Gallagher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States District Judge  
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 7 of 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on December 23, 2022, I caused this response, along with the 
attached proposed order and exhibit, to be filed on the Court’s CM/ECF system, which served 
copies of same on all counsel of record via electronic mail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Marcel S. Pratt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marcel S. Pratt  
 
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG     Document 54     Filed 12/23/22     Page 8 of 8

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