Exhibit 49 — In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation (Dkt. 659-8, S.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-02992)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 659-8 · 2026-02-05 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

DX 49 
REDACTED VERSION OF 
DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO 
BE SEALED PURSUANT TO 
STIPULATED 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 
 
 
 Case No. 1-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
  
 
 
EXPERT REBUTTAL REPORT OF CARL PRY 
April 4, 2025 
 
 
 
 
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Table of Contents: 
I. 
ASSIGNMENT AND ROLE ............................................................................................... 1 
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS ............................................................................................................ 1 
III. 
INFORMATION RELIED UPON ...................................................................................... 2 
IV. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 3 
V. 
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................. 8 
A. Unemployment Insurance Fraud .......................................................................................... 8 
B. BANA’s Response to the Widespread Fraud..................................................................... 12 
C. Consent Orders and Remediation Plan .............................................................................. 16 
1. 
Claims Denied as of Remediation Plan ........................................................................ 18 
2. 
Claims Paid as of Remediation Plan ............................................................................. 18 
3. 
........................................................ 19 
VI. 
OPINIONS ......................................................................................................................... 20 
A. Financial Institutions Prioritize Prompt Compensation, Even if it Results in 
Overcompensation, in Responding to Consent Orders. ............................................................ 20 
B. 
 
 ....................................................................................................... 22 
C. 
 
.......................................................................................................... 25 
D. 
 
 .................................................................................................... 27 
E. 
 
 .................................................................................................... 29 
VII. 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 30 
VIII. SIGNATURE ..................................................................................................................... 33 
 
 
Appendices: 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
Appendix 2: Documents Relied Upon 
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I. 
ASSIGNMENT AND ROLE 
1. This matter is a proposed class action brought forth by certain proposed classes of 
plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) against Bank of America, N.A. (“Defendant” or “BANA”). 
Plaintiffs allege that BANA mishandled reports of unauthorized transaction claims 1 
brought by prepaid debit cardholders (“Cardholders”) who were deemed eligible by and 
received unemployment insurance benefits from California’s Employment Development 
Department (“EDD”) during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21. 
2. I have been retained by counsel to BANA, Goodwin Procter LLP (“Counsel”), to serve as 
an expert in regulatory compliance practices within the banking industry. Specifically, I 
was asked to review and respond to certain opinions and assertions set forth in the expert 
report of Greg Regan dated March 4, 2025 (the “Regan Report”) as well as the expert 
report of William Abernathy, Jr. dated March 3, 2025 (the “Abernathy Report”).  
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS 
3. I have worked for more than 35 years in the banking industry. I have served in many 
positions both for and with banks of all sizes, and other financial service organizations, 
including as a compliance officer, Fair Lending officer, compliance department head, and 
related positions focused on consumer protection, fair lending, UDAP/UDAAP, and other 
regulatory compliance areas. In my many years as a banking compliance and risk 
management consultant and advisor, I have assisted hundreds of banks and nonbank 
clients in many areas, including program design and implementation, development of 
compliance policies, procedures, and program protocols, coordinating regulatory 
examinations and compliance audits, and managing responses to findings, among many 
other tasks and responsibilities. In addition, I have coordinated resolution of customer 
disputes and complaints, and explained bank functions and procedures to federal 
regulatory examination teams and to the public.  
4. I am currently an Independent Advisor, most recently providing advisory services and 
expert witness analysis and testimony for FTI Consulting, Inc. (“FTI”). Previously, I was 
 
 
1 This rebuttal report sometimes uses the term “error claims” for unauthorized transaction claims. This rebuttal report 
also uses the general term “claim” to mean an unauthorized transaction claim. 
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with Treliant LLC, a regulatory and risk management compliance consulting firm 
headquartered in Washington, D.C., as a Senior Advisor and Managing Director (i.e., a 
partner of the firm) for twelve years. For many of those years, I was the leader of the 
firm’s Consumer Compliance and Fair Lending practice areas.  
5. I have assisted hundreds of financial institutions, of all asset sizes, including nonbank 
financial institutions, in fulfilling their regulatory compliance obligations. This involved 
advising and training staff, management, and Boards of Directors on the detailed 
requirements of complex banking laws and regulations, plus associated guidance and best 
practice recommendations.  
6. I am a Certified Regulatory Compliance Manager (“CRCM”), a nationally recognized 
compliance credential managed by the American Bankers Association (“ABA”) that 
requires passing a standardized examination of an individual’s ability to apply all banking 
regulatory compliance requirements in situation-based questions. I was named ABA’s 
annual Distinguished Service Award winner in 2015 in recognition of my contributions to 
the banking industry across the country. Only one individual is named annually for this 
prestigious award, reflecting ethical leadership and critical impact on financial institutions 
across the country. 
7. My curriculum vitae, which is attached as Appendix 1, further describes my professional 
credentials and includes a listing of cases in which I was deposed and/or have testified as 
an expert in the last five years as well as publications that I have authored for the last ten 
years. FTI is being compensated at a rate of $715 per hour in this matter for my time. My 
compensation is not conditioned on the substance or outcome of the opinions I have issued 
in this report. 
III. 
INFORMATION RELIED UPON 
8. This report is based on my experience and the information considered herein. The 
conclusions described in this report are mine. The work was performed by me or other 
professionals under my direct supervision. The team of people assisting me included 
accountants and other professionals employed by FTI. This report should not be construed 
to constitute or contain opinions on matters of law. 
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Based on my experience as a long-time senior federal regulator at the OCC, 
which included substantial compliance matters, it is my opinion that when 
regulators require a bank to identify a population of “harmed consumers” 
for remediation the bank is expected to exclude from that population 
individuals who have engaged in fraud. The regulators expect the bank to 
develop and implement a reliable and lawful process that will effectively 
identify “harmed consumers” and exclude fraudsters. Regulators do not 
expect or tolerate payments to be made to fraudsters pursuant to a regulatory 
consent order and remediation plan, especially where the bank has agreed 
 as the Bank did here. Based 
on my experience, when a bank such as Bank of America represents to its 
regulators that it will do something (
 
) they do it.6 
 
16. Based on a review and analysis of the documents as set forth in Appendix 2, along with 
my over 35 years of experience in the banking industry—including my experience as a 
compliance officer, compliance department head, and related positions focused on 
consumer protection and other regulatory compliance areas—I am of the opinion 
 
 
 
 
 It is also my opinion that Mr. Abernathy’s assertions relating to 
regulators’ expectations and tolerations are misaligned. Specifically, Messrs. Regan and 
Abernathy fail to consider: 
 As set forth in Section V.A, the COVID-19 pandemic, Coronavirus Aid, Relief, 
and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), and Pandemic Unemployment 
Assistance (“PUA”) program resulted in an unprecedented surge in unemployment 
insurance fraud in California and across the United States. The rampant fraud 
occurred at both the eligibility and claim level, where fraudsters would both falsify 
information to become eligible for unemployment insurance benefits and 
improperly submit unauthorized transaction claims to BANA asserting that 
unauthorized funds were withdrawn from the Cardholders’ account when, in fact, 
those withdrawals were authorized. 
 
 
6 Abernathy Report, ¶ 34. 
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 As set forth in Section V.B, 
 
 
 
7  Additionally, it has been well documented that given the 
unprecedent events around the COVID-19 pandemic, EDD was not able to keep 
up with the volume of unemployment insurance applications and struggled to 
implement suitable eligibility and identity verification procedures. Further, given 
the extent and scope of the fraud that infiltrated the EDD program during the 
pandemic, government agencies have concluded that much of the fraud remains 
undetected and will never be recovered. 
 As set forth in Section VI.A, when financial institutions respond to consent orders, 
they almost always prioritize ensuring prompt compensation to all potentially 
affected consumers. Financial institutions are more inclined to overcompensate 
(including paying consumers who may not have been harmed) rather than risk 
undercompensating or failing to pay consumers who were legitimately harmed. 
 As set forth in Section VI.B, BANA’s 
 
 
 
 
 For example, I estimate that around 
 
 
 There are valid reasons for BANA to adopt this approach, 
including 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Deposition of Michael Letson (Managing Director in BANA’s Global Financial Crimes) (“Letson Deposition”) dated 
February 16, 2024, 105:18-20. 
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 As set forth in Section VI.C, BANA 
 
 
 
 
 
These factors led to BANA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As set forth in Section VI.D, 
 
 
 
 
 Moreover,
 
 
 
8 
 As set forth in Section VI.E,
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. For all these reasons, which are summarized in Section VII, it is my opinion 
 
 
 
8 Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, Ex. (“DX”) 7, Declaration of William M. Martin, ¶ 14. 
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V. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
Unemployment Insurance Fraud 
18. The EDD administers unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and workforce 
development programs to support job seekers and employers across California. 
Individuals deemed eligible by the EDD were able to access unemployment benefits 
through an EDD prepaid debit card issued by BANA. 
 
.9  
19. The COVID-19 Pandemic sparked a surge in widespread unemployment beginning in the 
spring of 2020, with the national unemployment rate reaching almost 15% in April of 
2020:10  
 
 
 
 
9 See Letson Deposition, pp. 105-109.  
10 PX 72, CFPB Consent Order, p. 9. See also the unemployment rate information published by Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Unemployment Rate). 
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20. In response to the sharp rise in unemployment across the country, Congress enacted the 
CARES Act in March 2020. The CARES Act, inter alia, created the PUA program,11 
which expanded unemployment benefits eligibility and provided greater benefit amounts 
than previously available. 12  “The PUA program provided unemployment insurance 
benefits for workers not eligible under regular UI rules for benefits—such as self-
employed workers and independent contractors—who were unable to work as a result of 
the COVID-19 pandemic.” 13  Notably, whereas unemployment benefits recipients 
previously had to provide employment and wage records from their employer to verify 
eligibility, “PUA claimants could self-certify their employment history and eligibility.”14 
21. As a result of the surge in unemployment, the CARES Act, and the PUA, there was an 
unprecedented increase in the number of individuals seeking unemployment benefits from 
the EDD. For example:  
 The number of unique EDD cards increased from less than one million in January 
of 2020 to over six million by July 2020.15 
 The amount of benefits loaded onto the EDD cards increased from approximately 
$1 billion in January 2020 to over $27 billion in July 2020.16  
22. Unfortunately, these changes also led to unprecedented increases and levels of fraud. This 
included fraud at the eligibility level 
 
 as well as at the unauthorized transaction claim level, where individuals 
would submit improper claims of unauthorized transactions to BANA with the goal of 
 
 
11 “In March of 2020, millions became unemployed and Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act (‘CARES Act’), which created the new Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (‘PUA’) benefit.” (PX 73, 
OCC Consent Order, p. 2). 
12 See 15 U.S. Code § 9021. See also “Covered by PUA [...] People not eligible for, or who have exhausted all rights 
to, regular unemployment compensation or extended benefits under state or federal law or Pandemic Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation.” (U.S. Department of Labor. (n.d.). Pandemic Unemployment Assistance). 
13 United States Government Accountability Office, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance: States’ Controls to Address 
Fraud (July 23, 2024), p. 2. 
14 United States Government Accountability Office, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance: States’ Controls to Address 
Fraud (July 23, 2024), p. 2 (emphasis added). 
15 PX 73, OCC Consent Order, pp. 2-3. 
16 Id. 
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getting BANA to provide credit for the allegedly unauthorized transactions that the 
fraudsters would then abscond with.  
23. This fraud was well publicized. Public articles, court documents, and government reports 
summarize the widespread nature of the fraud that occurred in California and across the 
country: 
 “In March 2020, millions became unemployed and Congress enacted the [CARES 
Act], which created the new [PUA] benefit. The CARES Act and PUA expanded 
unemployment benefits eligibility and provided greater benefit amounts than 
previously available […] Along with the increases in Program participants and 
benefits, the [BANA EDD Prepaid] Program experienced an increase in fraud, 
including with respect to unauthorized transaction claims.”17  
 By January of 2021, nearly $10.4 billion in fraudulent unemployment benefits 
claims and over $32 billion of unemployment benefits were stolen and illegally 
issued in California.18  
 “While the total amount of UI fraud is unknown, since April 2021, 23 states have 
reported estimates that total $60.4 billion.”19 
 “Nationally, the total amount of unemployment insurance fraud is staggering. The 
U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General earlier this year told 
Congress that ‘at least $163 billion in pandemic UI benefits could have been paid 
improperly, with a significant portion attributable to fraud.’”20 
 “In California alone, fraudsters using stolen social security numbers and stolen or 
made up names made off with what state officials conservatively estimate is $20 
 
 
17 PX 73, OCC Consent Order, pp. 2-3. 
18 DX 6, Declaration of Michael J. Letson, p. 6. See also California State Auditor, Employment Development 
Department: Significant Weaknesses in EDD’s Approach to Fraud Prevention Have Led to Billions of Dollars in 
Improper Benefit Payments (January 2021), p. 9.  
19 Pandemic Oversight, Pandemic Unemployment Insurance: How much has been paid to fraudsters? (January 22, 
2025). 
20 NPR, Pandemic-related fraud totaled billions. California is trying to get some of it back (October 18, 2022), p. 4. 
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billion. That's about 11% of the $177 billion in jobless benefits paid out for COVID-
19 relief.”21 
 “In September 2023, [the United States Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”)] estimated that the amount lost to fraud in DOL’s UI programs during the 
pandemic—from April 2020 through May 2023—was likely between $100 billion 
and $135 billion.”22 
 “Of the 4 states we [the U.S. Department of Labor] tested, from March 28, 2020, 
through September 30, 2020, we estimated $30.4 billion of the $71.7 billion in PUA 
and FPUC benefits were paid improperly (42.4 percent). We estimated $9.9 billion 
of that was paid to likely fraudsters (13.8 percent). Notably, in the 4 states, 1 in 5 
dollars initially paid in PUA benefits went to likely fraudsters. The percentages of 
improper payments identified during this audit applied only to the 4 states and were 
not projected to the nation.”23 
 “Paying claimants accurately and preventing improper payments, including fraud, 
continued to challenge states throughout the effective period for the CARES Act 
and CAA—March 28, 2020, through March 14, 2021. To assess eligibility, we [the 
U.S Department of Labor] statistically sampled and tested 214 cases in the 4 states 
where claimants received either PUA or regular UI with an FPUC supplement 
between March 28, 2020, and September 30, 2020. Additionally, we judgmentally 
selected 40 cases (10 from each of the 4 states) from January 1, 2021, through 
March 14, 2021, to assess any impact of legislative changes after CAA required 
proof of wages for PUA rather than relying solely on self-certification. From March 
 
 
21 Id. 
22 United States Government Accountability Office, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance: States’ Controls to Address 
Fraud (July 23, 2024), p. 1. 
23 U.S Department of Labor, Report to the Employment and Training Administration, COVID-19: ETA and States did 
not Protect Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays, 
(September 30, 2022), p. 3. 
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28, 2020 through September 30, 2020, we found the 4 states paid 118 of 214 cases 
improperly—$1,435,132 of the total $3,381,823 (42.4 percent) paid.”24 
 “The unprecedented demand for UI benefits and the need to quickly implement the 
new programs increased the risk of fraud. In February 2023, the Comptroller 
General of the United States testified before the Committee on Ways and Means of 
the U.S. House of Representatives that DOL and the states were not adequately 
prepared to handle UI fraud risks when the pandemic began. In March 2023, we 
[the GAO] were asked to continue our work to develop a comprehensive estimate 
of UI fraud during the pandemic and address DOL and states’ efforts for identifying 
and recovering UI overpayments. In September 2023, we estimated that the amount 
lost to fraud in DOL’s UI programs during the pandemic—from April 2020 through 
May 2023—was likely between $100 billion and $135 billion. Additionally, our 
analysis found higher fraud rates for PUA payments than for other UI program 
payments.”25 
 “States faced challenges in rapidly implementing their new PUA programs and in 
establishing effective antifraud controls in response to the unprecedented 
unemployment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.”26 
B. 
BANA’s Response to the Widespread Fraud 
24. BANA investigated the fraud discussed in Section V.A and found detailed instructions on 
the dark web27 
 
 
28  Additionally, BANA, government 
committees, and the California State Auditor observed: 
 
 
24 U.S Department of Labor, Report to the Employment and Training Administration, COVID-19: ETA and States did 
not Protect Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays, 
(September 30, 2022), p. 4. 
25 United States Government Accountability Office, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance: States’ Controls to Address 
Fraud (July 23, 2024), p. 1. 
26 Id. 
27 See DX 103, Dark Web Materials Id.me Bypass and DX 121, Dark Web Materials. 
28 DX 6, Declaration of Michael J. Letson, pp. 8-9. 
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VI. 
OPINIONS 
A. 
Financial Institutions Prioritize Prompt Compensation, Even if it Results in 
Overcompensation, in Responding to Consent Orders.  
39. When financial institutions respond to consent orders, they almost always prioritize 
ensuring prompt compensation to all potentially affected consumers. Financial institutions 
are more inclined to overcompensate (including paying consumers who may not have been 
harmed) rather than risk undercompensating or failing to pay consumers who were 
legitimately harmed. 
40. Enforcement actions, such as consent orders issued by federal banking regulators 
(especially ones that are made public, such as the ones here issued by the CFPB and OCC), 
almost always provide for remedial actions financial institutions must take to resolve 
alleged violations. Alleged violations and public enforcement of consumer protection laws 
and regulations (like EFTA and Regulation E) can carry a high degree of reputation risk66 
for the institution. Reputation risk is in addition to compliance risk67 (i.e., risk of criticism 
by the bank’s examiners, which will be enhanced in the years after an enforcement action 
is issued), as well as litigation risk (the risk the bank may be sued by its customers). 
Therefore, in order to reduce these risks, banks typically take an extremely generous and 
consumer-friendly position when agreeing to and implementing remediation plans 
required by and agreed to pursuant to regulatory consent orders. Put simply, in my 
experience, banks try their best to remediate the alleged wrongdoing and put these 
significant matters behind them as soon as possible, even if that means compensating 
individuals who were not actually harmed by the alleged conduct. 
 
 
66 See e.g., “Litigation can expose a bank to negative public opinion. A damaged reputation may affect the bank’s 
ability to establish new relationships or services or to continue servicing existing relationships, which may adversely 
affect current and future earnings. Widely publicized litigation, regardless of its ultimate outcome, can affect a bank’s 
community standing, limit its business opportunities, and impair its basic franchise value. Some banks have elected 
to settle litigation rather than be subject to prolonged court cases. Settlement is designed to limit negative publicity 
and avoid prolonged reputation damage. Limiting reputation damage is particularly important for business lines, such 
as asset management, that depend on a sound reputation.” (Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s 
Handbook: Safety and Soundness (January 2015), p. 3. 
67 See e.g., “Compliance risk is the threat to an organization’s finances, organization, and reputation due to violations 
of rules, regulations, and laws governing its activity. Compliance risk can attract the attention of local, state, and 
federal regulators and result in fines, penalties, and civil and criminal court proceedings. A compliance failure can 
also expose an organization to reputational risk, which can impact its stock price and the public’s perception of the 
brand and alienate customers and employees.” (Dow Jones, What is Compliance Risk?). 
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41. In the present situation, where BANA was addressing public enforcement actions that 
involved a consumer protection rule (Regulation E), and which also involved financial 
remuneration to potentially impacted consumers, it would be expected that it would act in 
a manner to quickly and comprehensively satisfy the conditions of the CFPB’s and OCC’s 
Consent Orders and the Remediation Plans above all else. This would mean almost always 
choosing to err on the side that would benefit a potentially impacted consumer even if it 
would result in them getting overpaid.68 Further, compensation would be provided to a 
consumer in many instances even without conclusive information that the consumer was 
legitimately financially harmed at all. The risk that a consumer, whom the bank’s 
regulators believed may have been legitimately harmed, would not receive compensation 
required by the consent orders far outweighs the negative financial impact on the bank 
that would result from compensating consumers that are not entitled to it (or where it is 
debatable or unclear whether compensation is justified or required by the consent orders 
or any other applicable rule or law). As discussed further below, 
 
 
 
42. This fact is ignored by Mr. Abernathy when he opines that regulators expect banks to 
exclude fraudsters when implementing remediation plans and that regulators would not 
“tolerate” payments to fraudsters. 69 The primary purpose of remediation plans is to 
remediate consumers who were potentially affected by the alleged conduct. While I agree 
that regulators do not want banks to make payments to fraudsters, they do not want to 
relieve banks from making payments to those entitled to receive them, and there may be 
many practical reasons to err on the side of being overinclusive to avoid being 
underinclusive or to avoid delays in making payments.  
43. Mr. Abernathy fails to properly consider all of the circumstances as to why making some 
payments to fraudsters was unavoidable in this case. For example, as discussed above, 
BANA frequently did not possess evidence necessary to reach a conclusion, one way or 
 
 
68
 
 
PX 74, Remediation Plan, p. 5). 
69 Abernathy Report, p. 18. 
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50. In summary, BANA’s decision to 
 
 While reasonable and consistent with 
regulator expectations,
 
 
 
 
C. 
 
. 
51. BANA had limited time to complete its investigation of claims under Regulation E and 
often had limited evidence to review, leading to BANA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52. 
 
 
  
53. The CFPB Consent Order described BANA’s manual review process prior to the 
implementation of the CFF as follows: 
From January 2020 until late-September 2020, upon receiving a notice of 
error from an unemployment insurance benefit prepaid debit cardholder 
concerning alleged unauthorized EFTs, [BANA] would conduct an 
investigation that could include, among other steps: comparing the location 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 1 
 
 
Carl Pry, CRCM, CRP 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Introduction 
Experienced and well-rounded compliance, consumer protection, anti-fraud, and fair lending executive 
with over 35 years of experience in banking law and regulatory compliance. Possesses managerial 
experience and thought leadership, with extensive presentation and writing background. Versed in all 
aspects of consumer and commercial banking law and compliance, including consumer protection and fair 
lending, UDAP/UDAAP, deposits/operations, lending, financial crimes, anti-fraud measures, investment, 
operational risk, privacy, tax, legal issues, electronic/online banking, payments, and risk management 
issues. 
Education, Licenses and Certifications 
• 
Bowling Green State University, Bachelor of Science in Business Administration (specialization in 
Finance) 
• 
University of Toledo, Juris Doctor (passed the Florida Bar Exam) 
• 
University of Toledo, Master of Business Administration (specialization in Financial Management) 
• 
Certified Regulatory Compliance Manager (CRCM), current 
• 
Certified Risk Professional (CRP), current 
Experience 
Throughout Mr. Pry’s more than thirty-five years in the banking industry, he has worked in many positions 
both for and with banks of all sizes, and other financial service organizations, in positions such as teller, 
customer service representative, loan officer, branch manager, compliance officer, Fair Lending officer, 
department head (commercial compliance), and related positions focused on customer service, consumer 
protection, fair lending and UDAP/UDAAP, anti-fraud  measures, deposit, lending and marketing, branch 
operations, financial fraud and crime, and regulatory compliance. In his many years as a banking 
compliance and risk management consultant, he has assisted dozens of banks and nonbank clients in many 
areas, including program design and implementation, development of compliance policies, procedures, and 
program protocols, coordinating regulatory examinations and compliance audits, and managing responses 
to findings, among many other tasks and responsibilities. In addition, he has coordinated resolution of 
customer disputes, complaints, explained bank functions and procedures to federal regulatory examination 
teams, and to the public. 
Mr. Pry is an Independent Advisor, most recently providing expert witness testimony for FTI Consulting, 
Inc. Previously, he was with Treliant LLC, a regulatory and risk management compliance consulting firm 
headquartered in Washington, D.C., as a Senior Advisor and Managing Director (i.e., a partner of the firm) 
for twelve years. For many of these years he was the leader of the firm’s Consumer Compliance and Fair 
Lending practice areas. He has assisted hundreds of financial institutions, of all asset sizes, and nonbank 
financial institutions, in fulfilling their regulatory compliance obligations. To a great degree this has 
involved training staff, management, and Boards of Directors on the detailed requirements of complex 
banking laws and regulations, plus associated guidance and best practice recommendations. 
During the last thirty years, he has provided a great deal of regulatory compliance and operational training 
for national and state banking associations, federal and state banking agencies and many individual financial 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 2 
 
 
institutions across the United States, as well for various federal regulatory agencies such as the FDIC and 
NCUA, where he provided instruction in laws and regulations such as Fair Lending (ECOA/Regulation B 
and FHA), and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money laundering (AML) provisions, including anti-
fraud measures, among others. He has also conducted hundreds of training sessions for the American 
Bankers Association, Consumer Banking Association, Mortgage Bankers Association, over two dozen 
individual state banking and bar associations, and various other industry trade groups and associations. He 
has trained newly-commissioned FDIC examiners at their examiner school, and in 2023 he trained staff at 
the Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka. He has also been vetted and approved by both the OCC and 
Department of Justice to deliver training for related to a consent order. 
He is a Certified Regulatory Compliance Manager (CRCM), a nationally recognized compliance credential 
managed by the American Bankers Association (ABA) that requires passing a standardized examination of 
an individual’s ability to apply all banking regulatory compliance requirements in situation-based questions. 
The CRCM candidate is only eligible to take the test and become certified after obtaining sufficient industry 
experience and must maintain continuing professional education over the life of the certification. The 
CRCM is widely recognized as the standard of professional expertise in the financial institution regulatory 
compliance field. He also served on the ABA’s CRCM Board for over twelve years. This Board determines 
the subject matter content of the CRCM examination, authors test questions, and evaluates standards for 
certification. He is also a Certified Risk Professional (CRP), which is a certification of the Bank 
Administration Institute (BAI), which recognizes a professional’s expertise and experience in the area of 
banking risk management. 
He has also served for over eighteen years on the ABA Bank Compliance magazine’s Editorial Advisory 
Board, and currently serves as its Co-Chair. He has authored more than ninety feature articles and columns 
on regulatory compliance matters impacting the banking industry. He has also authored dozens of additional 
articles and columns for various other industry publications, including the ABA Banking Journal, the 
American Banker, the ABA Bank Marketing magazine, and various state bar association journals and 
publications. 
He has also served as an Instructor at the ABA’s Foundational, Intermediate, and Advanced Compliance 
Schools, where he has provided instruction on laws and regulations including the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA; Regulation Z), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA; Regulation B), the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (Regulation C; HMDA), Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), and the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA), among others. He also serves as an adjunct member of the ABA’s Compliance School Board.  
He was named ABA’s annual Distinguished Service Award winner in 2015 in recognition of his 
contributions to the banking industry across the country. Only one individual is named annually for this 
prestigious award, reflecting ethical leadership and critical impact on financial institutions across the 
country.  
Qualifications 
• 
Executive, Senior Leadership and Department/Service Line Leader 
• 
Fair Lending Officer 
• 
Fair Lending Analytics and Reporting 
• 
Compliance Program Director 
• 
Operations Officer 
• 
Regulatory Compliance Senior Management  
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 3 
 
 
• 
Tax Reporting and Analysis  
• 
Risk Management and Risk Assessment Specialist 
• 
Retail Branch Management Professional, Branch Manager 
• 
Mortgage Regulatory Compliance Specialist 
• 
Regulatory Compliance Litigation Support 
 
Regulatory Compliance Publications 
Mr. Pry has authored and published over one hundred risk management, tax, Internet banking, and 
regulatory compliance articles and reference materials in national and regional financial institution and 
bar association publications. Mr. Pry also serves on the editorial advisory board of the American Bankers 
Association’s Bank Compliance magazine. 
Mr. Pry’s publications within the last ten years include the following: 
• 
Reconsideration of value (ROV): A critical component of appraisal review, ABA Bank Compliance, 
May 2025, Print. 
• 
New FDIC Signage Rules for Digital Channels: Ensuring Digital Signage is Compliant, ABA Bank 
Compliance, March 2025, Print. 
• 
Preparing for 2025: Navigating Compliance in a Time of Change, Cover Story, ABA Bank 
Compliance, January 2025, Print. 
• 
So You Want to Be a Certified Regulatory Compliance Manager? ABA Bank Compliance, April 
2024, Print. 
• 
Compliance Priorities for 2024, ABA Bank Compliance, January 2024, Print. (Reprinted in ABA 
Banking Journal, January 2024) 
• 
Fair Lending Data Requirements for Fannie/Freddie Servicers, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, 
March 2023, Print. 
• 
Compliance Priorities for 2023, Cover Story, ABA Bank Compliance, January 2023, Print. 
(Reprinted in ABA Banking Journal, January 2023) 
• 
Understanding Digital Redlining, Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, October 2022, Print. 
• 
Appraisal Bias – What Can Banks Do About It? Column, ABA Bank Compliance, May 2022, Print 
• 
2022: On the Horizon, Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, March 2022, Print. 
• 
Fair Servicing – More Important Than Ever, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 2022, Print. 
• 
Fair Lending and Prohibited Bases – New Developments, Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, Nov. 
2021; Print. 
• 
2020’s In the Rearview (Finally); What’s in Store for 2021? Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 
2021; Print. 
• 
What Can We Expect for HMDA in 2020? Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 2020; Print. 
• 
2018 HMDA Data is Submitted – Now What? Feature, ABA Bank Compliance June 2019; Print. 
• 
Compliance in 2019: What to Expect, and Where Should Your Focus Be? Feature, ABA Bank 
Compliance Jan. 2019; Print. 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 4 
 
 
• 
Magically-Expanding LARs: Increased Data Collection and Submission Responsibilities under 
HMDA and ECOA, Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, August 2017, Print. 
• 
What is a REMA and What Should You Do About It? Column, ABA Bank Compliance, June 2017, 
Print. 
• 
Is There No Such Thing as a Preapproval Anymore? Column, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 2017, 
Print. 
• 
Don’t Overlook the Military Lending Act, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, June 2016, Print. 
• 
Conducting Drawings and Contests: Can We Do It? Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, June 2016, 
Print. 
• 
Planning for 2016 – 10 Issues to Put on Your List, Feature, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 2016, Print. 
• 
The Natural Next Step: Fair Lending in Servicing, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, Jan. 2016, Print. 
• 
Obscure Corner of TRID – Trust Coverage - Column, ABA Bank Compliance, Nov. 2015, Print. 
• 
How to Deal with ApplyPay? Column, ABA Bank Compliance, Sept. 2015, Print. 
• 
TRID Round 2, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, June 2015, Print. 
• 
Not Just a Paperwork Switch: TRID Involve Critical Process Changes that Banks Should be Working 
on Now, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, April 2015, Print. 
• 
3 Shades of Red(lining), Column, ABA Bank Compliance, March 2015, Print. 
• 
Understanding the Total Exceptions Picture, Column, ABA Bank Compliance, March 2015, Print. 
 
Regulatory Compliance Teaching Experience and Industry Appearances 
Mr. Pry develops and delivers extensive risk management, tax, accounting, regulatory compliance, and 
bank operations training materials for multiple organizations across the country. His resource materials 
and additional job aids, charts, guides, and interpretive summaries are widely used by industry 
professionals in banks and other financial institutions across the country.  
A sampling of the organizations includes: 
• 
AllRegs – Compliance Instructor 
• 
American Bankers Association – Lead Instructor for Private CFPB-Regulated In-Bank Compliance 
Schools for large financial institutions 
• 
American Bankers Association – Instructor, Foundational Compliance School 
• 
American Bankers Association – Instructor, Intermediate Compliance School 
• 
American Bankers Association – Regulatory Compliance Webinar Instructor for multiple webinars 
• 
Alabama Bar Association – Guest Speaker 
• 
Alabama Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
American Land Title Association (ALTA) – Guest Speaker 
• 
American Strategic Learning Institute – Compliance Instructor 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 5 
 
 
• 
Bank Administration Institute – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Bank Compliance Association of Connecticut – Compliance Instructor 
• 
BankersOnline – Compliance Instructor 
• 
California Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Center for Financial Training – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Central Florida Compliance Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Chicagoland Compliance Association, Inc. – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Connecticut Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Credit Union Executive Society (CUES) – Compliance Instructor, instructor for multiple webinars 
• 
Dallas Area Compliance Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Eastern Massachusetts Compliance Network – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) – Keynote Speaker 
• 
Florida Bankers Association –Compliance Instructor 
• 
Georgia Bankers Association – Compliance School and Compliance Conference Instructor 
• 
Heartland Compliance Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Illinois Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Indiana Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Indiana Department of Financial Institutions – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Iowa Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Kansas Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Massachusetts Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Michigan Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Missouri Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Mississippi Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Montana Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor  
• 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) – Backup Instructor for NCUA Compliance School 
• 
Nebraska Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
New Hampshire Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
New Jersey Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
New York Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor  
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 6 
 
 
• 
North Carolina Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Ohio Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor  
• 
OnCourse Learning (formerly Total Training Solutions) – Compliance Lecturer and instructor for 
hundreds of webinars 
• 
Oregon Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Sioux Falls (South Dakota) Compliance Professionals Organization – Compliance Speaker 
• 
South Carolina Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
South Florida Compliance Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Suncoast Bankers Compliance Association (Florida) – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Tennessee Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor  
• 
Texas Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Tri-State League of Financial Institutions – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Utah Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor and Keynote Speaker 
• 
Virginia Association of Community Bankers – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Virginia Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor  
• 
Washington Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
• 
Western Massachusetts Bankers Association – Compliance Instructor 
 
Litigation Support 
Mr. Pry has served as litigation support for various law firms to defend financial institutions on subject 
matters including, but not limited to: 
• 
Bank Core Processing Servicing and Operations  
– 
Commercially-reasonable policies, procedures, and practices 
• 
Check fraud and related financial fraud 
• 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B 
– 
Fair lending principles, including disparate treatment and disparate impact 
– 
Statistical analyses and reporting 
• 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E 
– 
Disputes and fraud 
– 
Resolution timeframes 
• 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
– 
Reporting responsibilities 
– 
Customer Identification Program (CIP) responsibilities 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 7 
 
 
– 
Identification of suspicious activities 
– 
Identity verification, identity theft, and synthetic identity theft 
• 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 
– 
Meaning of “consumer report” and “consumer report information” 
– 
Identify Theft Prevention Program  
– 
Use of consumer reports 
• 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Regulation X 
– 
Escrow accounting 
– 
Kickbacks and unearned fees 
– 
Servicing requirements 
• 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z 
– 
Coverage of consumer-purpose loans 
– 
Calculation of Annual Percentage Rate 
– 
Reimbursement 
 
Recent Expert Witness Services (Last Five Years) 
Rodeo Electrical Service, Inc., and Scott Rosenberg v. Sunflower Bank. State of New Mexico Case No. D-
101-CV-2020-1341. Testified at Trial 
Marco A. Fernandez, individually and as a representative of the class, Plaintiff, vs. Corelogic Credco, 
LLC, Defendant. United States District Court, Southern District of California, Case No. 3:20-cv-1262-
JM-AGS). Expert Witness Reports.  
Paul H. Hulsey and Hulsey Law Group, LLC, Plaintiffs. vs. Frank M. Cisa; Cisa & Dodds, LLP; 
Pinnacle Bank, Successor in Interest to Southcoast Community Bank; Robert A. Daniel, Jr.; Lawton 
Limehouse, Sr.; Lawton Limehouse, Jr.; L&L Services, LLC; WLL, LLC; Richard B. Homes; Richard B. 
Homes, CPA, LLC; United Bank, Successor in Interest to CresCom Bank, Defendants. United States 
District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, Civil Docket No. 2:17-cv-03095-
JD. Expert Witness Reports and Deposition. 
Sparkman v. Comerica Bank, Conduent, United States District Court, Northern District of California, 
Case No. 4:23-cv-02028-DMR. Expert Witness Report and Deposition; potential Testimony. 
Scroggins v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions FL, Inc., United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 
Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-545-MHL. Expert Witness Reports and Deposition; potential Testimony. 
Nauful v. Navy Federal Credit Union, United States District Court, South Carolina District, Case No. 
3:23-cv-02357-MGL. Expert Witness Reports and Deposition; potential Testimony. 
Spectrum v. Capital One Bank, N.A., Supreme Court of the State of New York, Index No.: 653779/2023. 
Expert witness report and Deposition. 
CFPB v. FirstCash, United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Civil Action No. 21-2151. 
Expert Witness Report and potential Deposition.  
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 659-8     Filed 02/05/26     PageID.57253 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025 
Appendix 1: CV of Carl Pry 
 
Page 8 
 
 
Leyva v. Space Coast Credit Union, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 
2:24-cv-14168-DMM. Expert Witness Report and Deposition. 
* Note other litigation support-related work done pursuant to position at Treliant LLC, and is therefore 
restricted under confidentiality provisions of contract with Treliant LLC. 
 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025            HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Appendix 2: Documents Relied Upon 
 
 
Page 1 
 
 
I reviewed or supervised FTI in its review of the following documents, in whole or in part, in 
forming the expert opinions set forth in my rebuttal report:  
 
Expert Reports  
1. Expert Class Certification Report of J. Daniel Kreis, filed In re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation (August 29, 2024), Case No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-
MSB. 
2. Expert Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, filed In re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation (March 4, 2025), Case No. 3-21-md-02992-GPC-MSB. 
3. Expert Report of William J. Abernathy Jr., filed In re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation (March 3, 2025), Case No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB. 
Depositions and Related Exhibits 
4. Deposition of Jennifer Lennon dated February 23, 2024, filed In re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, No. 3:21-02992-md-LAB-MSB. 
5. Deposition of Michael Letson dated February 16, 2024, filed In re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB. 
6. Deposition of Shane Daniels dated February 6, 2024, filed In re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB. 
7. Deposition of William Matthew Martin dated February 14, 2024, filed In re: Bank of 
America’s California Unemployment Litigation, Case No. 3:21-md-02992-LAB-MSB. 
Declarations  
1. Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Ex. (“DX”) 6, Declaration of Michael J. Letson. 
2. DX 7, Declaration of William M. Martin.  
3. DX 8, Declaration of Jennifer Lennon. 
Court Documents, Consent Orders, and Remediation Plan 
4. BANA Response to Interrogs. 2 and 6 dated December 1, 2023, Exhibit 1. 
5. DX 14, Examining Widespread Fraud in Pandemic Unemployment Relief Programs 
(September 10, 2024). 
6. DX 103, Dark Web Materials Id.me Bypass. 
7. DX 121, Dark Web Materials. 
8. DX 43, BANA’s Second Set of Responses to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Set of ROGs (ROG 39). 
9. PX 147, 1st Addendum to the Remediation Plan (October 12 version). 
10. Declaration of Connie K. Chan in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Ex. 
(“PX”) 72, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) Consent Order. 
11. PX 73, Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) Consent Order. 
12. PX 74, Unemployment Insurance Prepaid Card Program Remediation Plan. 
13. PX 82, Adequate Investigation Standard Operating Procedure. 
 
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Expert Rebuttal Report of Carl Pry dated April 4, 2025            HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Appendix 2: Documents Relied Upon 
 
 
Page 2 
 
 
Publications 
14. California State Auditor, Employment Development Department: Significant Weaknesses 
in EDD’s Approach to Fraud Prevention Have Led to Billions of Dollars in Improper 
Benefit Payments (January 2021). 
15. Dow Jones, What is Compliance Risk? 
16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Unemployment Rate.  
17. NPR, Pandemic-related fraud totaled billions. California is trying to get some of it back 
(October 18, 2022). 
18. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Safety and Soundness 
(January 2015). 
19. Pandemic Oversight, Pandemic Unemployment Insurance: How much has been paid to 
fraudsters? (January 22, 2025). 
20. U.S Department of Labor, Report to the Employment and Training Administration, 
COVID-19: ETA and States did not Protect Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper 
Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays (September 30, 2022).  
21. U.S. Department of Labor. (n.d.), Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. 
22. United States Government Accountability Office, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance: 
States’ Controls to Address Fraud (July 23, 2024). 
Other  
23. 15 U.S. Code § 1693f. 
24. 15 U.S. Code § 9021. 
25. BANA PowerPoint titled Benefits Fraud | Patterns Observed (BANA_EDD_MDL-
00430148). 
26. Denial Evidence Template for Cardholder Eric Kessler (BANA_EDD_MDL_00698618). 
27. Denial 
Evidence 
Template 
for 
Cardholder 
Michael 
Sims 
II 
(BANA_EDD_MDL_00137325). 
28. Denial Evidence Template for Cardholder Richard Caton (BANA_EDD_MDL_00137712). 
29. DX 58, R.S. Additional Fraud Review PowerPoint Presentation  (BANA_EDD_MDL-
00884193). 
30. DX 59, D.D. Additional Fraud Review PowerPoint Presentation (BANA_EDD_MDL-
00884004). 
31. DX 62, K.S. Additional Fraud Review PowerPoint Presentation (BANA_EDD_MDL-
0084006). 
32. Email from Christine Channels to William Fox, Faiz Ahmad and Paul Simpson dated 
October 6, 2020 (BANA_EDD_MDL-00120424). 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 659-8     Filed 02/05/26     PageID.57256 
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