Response in Opposition re 311 Motion to Stay Individual — In re BofA Unemployment Litigation (Dkt. 321)

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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 321 · 2024-08-23 · Docket on CourtListener

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OPP. TO INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ MOT. TO STAY 
 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tel.: +1 202 346 4000 
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
Attorneys for Defendant  
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
[ADDITIONAL COUNSEL LISTED IN SIGNATURE BLOCK] 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 
OPPOSITION TO INDIVIDUAL 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STAY 
PROCEEDINGS PENDING 
RESOLUTION OF RELATED 
CLASS ACTION 
CERTIFICATION 
 
Date:   
September 9, 2024      
Time:  
2:30 p.m.       
Ctrm:   
2D – 2nd Floor      
Judge:  
Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel      
 
Filed/Lodged Concurrently with: 
  1.  Declaration of Laura Brys 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 321     Filed 08/23/24     PageID.4140     Page 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
II. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................. 2 
A. 
IT HAS BEEN CLEAR SINCE JULY 2021 THAT 
INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ CASES WERE MOVING 
FORWARD WITH THE CLASS CASE. ............................................. 2 
B. 
SINCE JULY 2021, INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR 
COUNSEL HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY LITIGATING THEIR 
CASES AGAINST BANA. .................................................................. 3 
C. 
DISCOVERY IS NEARLY COMPLETE. ........................................... 5 
III. 
LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................... 6 
IV. 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 7 
A. 
BANA WOULD SUFFER UNDUE PREJUDICE IF 
INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ CASES ARE STAYED NOW, 
WHEN DISCOVERY IS NEARLY COMPLETE. .............................. 7 
B. 
SITTING FOR DEPOSITION IS NOT A “HARDSHIP” OR 
“INEQUITY” FOR INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS OR THEIR 
COUNSEL. ......................................................................................... 10 
C. 
STAYING THE INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ CASES, AT 
THIS LATE DATE, WILL BE INEFFICIENT AND 
NEEDLESSLY PROLONG THIS CASE INDEFINITELY. ............ 13 
D. 
CLASS PLAINTIFFS’ UNTIMELY BRIEF IS IMPROPER 
AND UNAVAILING. ......................................................................... 17 
V. 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 19 
 
 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
No. CIV-13-876-D, 2014 WL 819385 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2014) ................... 14 
Antoninetti v. Chipotle, Inc., 
No. 06cv2671-BTM, 2011 WL 2003292 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) ........... 16, 18 
Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U.S. 681 (1997) ........................................................................................... 10 
CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 
300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) ................................................................................ 7 
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800 (1976) ........................................................................................... 14 
I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 
793 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986) .......................................................................... 14 
In JoshCo Tech, LLC v. MJJ&L Holdings, LLC, 
No. 2:20-cv-00428-APG-NJK, 2020 WL 8254262 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 
2020) ................................................................................................................. 7, 8 
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 
299 U.S. 248 (1936) ................................................................................... 6, 7, 10 
Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 
398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 6, 10 
Mackey v. Board of Educ. For Arlington Central School Dist., 
112 Fed. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2004) ...................................................................... 14 
Mas v. Cumulus Media, Inc., 
No. C-10-1396 EMC, 2010 WL 4916402 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010) ......... 16, 18 
McDaniels v. Stewart, 
No. 3:15-CV-05943-BHS-DWC, 2017 WL 132454 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 13, 2017) ...................................................................................................... 13 
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Mendez v. Optio Solutions, LLC, 
239 F. Supp. 3d 1229 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2017) ............................................. 9, 10 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 
559 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................... 14 
Aleman on behalf of Ryder Sys., Inc. v. Sancez, 
No. 21-cv-20539-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes, 2021 WL 917969 (S.D. 
Fla. Mar. 10, 2021) ............................................................................................. 14 
Omnitracs, LLC v. Platform Sci., Inc., 
No. 20-CV-0958-JLS-MDD, 2021 WL 857005 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 
2021) ................................................................................................................. 7, 8 
P.Y.M.T. v. City of Fresno, 
No. 1:15-CV-710-JAM-BAM, 2016 WL 2930539 (E.D. Cal. May 
19, 2016) ............................................................................................................. 10 
Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 
291 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 10 
Richard K. v. United Behavioral Health, 
No. 18-CV-6318 (GHW) (BCM), 2019 WL 3083019 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 28, 2019) ..................................................................................................... 13 
Ross-Nash v. Almond, 
No. 2:19-cv-00957-APG, NJK, 2020 WL 11036016 (D. Nev. Feb. 
18, 2020) ............................................................................................................... 8 
Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 
No. 13cv2169 AJB (MDD), 2016 WL 9503735 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 
2016) ......................................................................................................... 6, 7, 8, 9 
Taunton Gardens Co. v. Hills, 
557 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977) .............................................................................. 14 
Walker v. Long Island R.R., Inc., 
No. 79 Civ. 5429, 1982 WL 180 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1982) ............................... 14 
Other Authorities 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 ..................................................................................................... 17 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 ................................................................................................. 8, 18 
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CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Individual Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF 311, “Motion”) is replete with revisionist 
history and strawman arguments.  It is clear that Individual Plaintiffs seek a stay for 
one purpose only: to avoid having to sit for deposition in this action that has been 
pending for more than three years. 
After class actions were filed across the state, Individual Plaintiffs filed suit 
against Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) in their individual capacities.  The parties 
have been actively engaged in discovery since June 2023, including discovery 
regarding both the class action claims and Individual Plaintiffs’ claims.  BANA 
collected and produced approximately 3,700 documents—including transaction 
histories, account histories, claims documents, and call logs—for more than 200 
Individual Plaintiffs.  BANA and Individual Plaintiffs’ counsel (“Individual 
Counsel”) have had at least 24 meet and confers, exchanged at least 18 discovery 
letters, and five Individual Plaintiffs’ depositions have been successfully taken. 
Fact discovery will soon close on December 12, 2024, pursuant to a stipulated 
schedule agreed to by all parties.  In an effort to complete discovery by the court-
ordered deadline, BANA noticed the depositions of the remaining Individual 
Plaintiffs in July, in order to have sufficient time to complete the depositions before 
December.  Only now, in the twilight of discovery when faced with the reality that 
they must meet their impending discovery obligations, do Individual Plaintiffs hastily 
seek a stay, offering the Court a parade of horribles regarding their purported inability 
to meaningfully participate in this case.  The undisputed facts do not support 
Individual Plaintiffs’ version of events. 
Discovery is a two-way street.  BANA has met its obligations in good faith 
and at great expense.  It is now time for Individual Plaintiffs to meet their own 
obligations.  The Court should deny the Motion. 
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II. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. 
It Has Been Clear Since July 2021 that Individual Plaintiffs’ Cases 
Were Moving Forward with the Class Case. 
Over three years ago, at the outset of the MDL, the Court considered whether 
the Class Plaintiffs’ case and Individual Plaintiffs’ cases would proceed together, or 
independently.  At the July 19, 2021 Status Conference, Judge Burns questioned 
whether there should be one consolidated complaint, including both Class and 
Individual Plaintiffs’ allegations, and heard argument from counsel on this issue.  See 
ECF 55, Transcript of Status Conference.  Individual Counsel had the opportunity to 
request that Individual Plaintiffs’ cases be stayed pending resolution of common class 
issues—they made no such argument or request.  Instead, Individual Counsel told the 
Court there was “urgency” in moving Individual Plaintiffs’ cases forward, because 
Individual Plaintiffs “want to settle these cases.  We don’t want to be part of a class 
action.”  Id. at 44:24-25 (emphasis added).   
Judge Burns decided that it would be most efficient for the Class and 
Individual Plaintiffs’ cases to move forward together, and ordered the filing of a 
master consolidated complaint.  See ECF 48, July 20, 2021 Order RE: Case 
Management (“Case Management Order”) at 2.  Individual Counsel admits that in 
the three years since the Case Management Order was issued, they have never 
contested the terms of the Order (Mot. at 10), nor have they raised any objection—
formal or informal—to the Order or expressed any desire to stay the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ cases.1     
 
1 The Motion’s reference to Abila v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 21-cv-01766, as an 
example of a case that has been stayed (Mot. at 5), is misleading and inapposite.  
Abila was filed after the MDL consolidation, and has been stayed since October 2021 
pursuant to the Case Management Order.  See Case Management Order at 2.  The 
same counsel represents both Individual Plaintiffs and the Abila plaintiffs.  
Declaration of Laura Brys (“Brys Decl.”) ¶ 12.  Individual Counsel has therefore 
known, since mid-2021, that a stay was possible, because Counsel was 
simultaneously representing over 200 Abila plaintiffs whose claims were stayed.  
And yet, for three years, Individual Counsel never asked for a stay for Individual 
Plaintiffs (until now). 
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In the Case Management Order, Judge Burns set forth an organizational 
structure for plaintiffs’ counsel in this MDL, including the roles and responsibilities 
of Class Counsel and Individual Counsel.  See Case Management Order at 2–3.  
Contrary to the characterization in the Motion, the Order does not “bar” (Mot. at 10) 
or “preclude” (id. at 11) Individual Plaintiffs from participating in discovery.  Indeed, 
the very line of the Order that Individual Plaintiffs cite in the Motion repeatedly (see, 
e.g., Mot. at 4, 9, 13), invites Individual Plaintiffs to participate in discovery, 
provided that Individual Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are funneled through Class 
Counsel:  “No plaintiff may make any request for or response to discovery . . . except 
through [Class Counsel].”  Case Management Order at 3.  The Order did not 
“restrict[]” (Mot. at 9) Individual Counsel.  It simply provided an organizational 
structure such that requests to BANA and information from BANA would be 
funneled through Class Counsel, so that BANA could respond to a single set of 
requests, rather than multiple, likely overlapping, requests from each of the dozen 
plaintiffs’ firms involved in this MDL, and so that BANA could provide its discovery 
responses to Class Counsel, and rely on the plaintiffs’ firms to distribute that 
information as appropriate.  See Case Management Order at 3 (discovery requests 
should go “through [Class Counsel]”) and 4 (Individual Counsel should “distribut[e] 
to counsel, as appropriate . . . discovery . . . from [BANA]”).   
B. 
Since July 2021, Individual Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Have Been 
Actively Litigating Their Cases Against BANA. 
Individual Counsel’s conduct over the last three years has been consistent with 
moving Individual Plaintiffs’ claims forward—as was their stated desire at the 
July 19, 2021 conference.  Contrary to their assertion that they have been “barred” 
from “participating in any meaningful way” (Mot. at 10) in discovery, on August 22, 
2023, Individual Counsel demanded that BANA collect and produce each Individual 
Plaintiffs’ “complete file, consistent with the discovery served through class 
counsel.”  Brys Decl. ¶ 26, Ex. A.  BANA did so, producing for each of the 241 
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Individual Plaintiffs named in the First Amended Master Consolidated Complaint 
(“FAMCC”) that BANA was able to identify, account histories, transaction histories, 
claims documents, and call logs, which production BANA substantially completed 
on February 2, 2024.  Brys Decl. ¶ 30.2  In total, BANA produced more than 3,700 
documents related to the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims.3 
Despite Judge Burns’ Case Management Order directing Class Counsel to 
coordinate with Individual Counsel, and making it the responsibility of plaintiffs’ 
counsel to “distribut[e] . . . discovery” from BANA (Case Management Order at 4), 
when Individual Counsel expressed concern about obtaining documents related to 
the Individual Plaintiffs, it was BANA that provided Individual Counsel with a 
spreadsheet identifying each document produced by BANA pertaining specifically 
to the remaining Individual Plaintiffs.  See Brys Decl. ¶ 34, Ex. D.  For each 
document, the spreadsheet identified the Individual Plaintiff to whom the document 
related, the document’s Bate’s range, and the date on which the document was 
produced by BANA.  See id.  In response to concerns expressed by Individual 
Counsel about the timing of receiving documents from Class Counsel, BANA also 
provided certain Individual Plaintiff documents directly to Individual Counsel.  See 
Brys Decl. ¶ 32.   
Since discovery began in earnest in June 2023, Individual Counsel and BANA 
met and conferred at least 24 times, and exchanged at least 18 formal meet and confer 
letters regarding the Individual Plaintiffs’ cases, discovery, and depositions (to say 
 
2 Individual Plaintiffs’ statement that BANA’s “production of the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ records continues to be incomplete” (Mot. at 10) is inaccurate.  In many 
instances, documents Individual Counsel identified as purportedly “missing” have 
either been produced or do not exist.  See Brys Decl. ¶¶ 29, 31.  To the extent 
Individual Counsel’s concern relates to call recordings, the parties have agreed that, 
due to the substantial burden of collecting and producing call recordings, BANA will 
only produce such recordings for Individual Plaintiffs who agreed to appear for 
deposition.  See Brys Decl. ¶ 28. 
3 After BANA incurred the cost and burden of collecting documents for more than 
200 FAMCC Individual Plaintiffs, nearly half of the Individual Plaintiffs elected not 
to prosecute their actions against BANA, and voluntarily dismissed their cases.  See, 
e.g., Orders of Dismissal, ECF 240, 254, 265. 
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nothing of the countless additional informal email exchanges and phone requests).  
Brys Decl. ¶¶ 22–23.  As recently as August 14, 2024, Individual Counsel represented 
to BANA that approximately seven of the Individual Plaintiffs were available to have 
their depositions taken in-person in Los Angeles during the week of September 16, 
2024, and as recently as August 20, 2024, Individual Counsel offered to identify three 
additional Individual Plaintiffs who could also be deposed in September.  Brys Decl. 
¶¶ 61, 65.   
Individual Counsel further demanded, on March 19, 2024, to take a Rule 
30(b)(6) deposition of a BANA representative who could explain the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ documents.  Brys Decl. ¶ 46, Ex. E.  BANA agreed, and began preparing 
a witness to so testify.  Id. ¶ 47. 
Individual Counsel made their discovery demands to BANA on top of the 
massive efforts BANA undertook to comply with Class Counsel’s discovery 
demands on behalf of both the Class and Individual Plaintiffs.  Brys Decl. ¶ 13.  To 
date, BANA has expended over $7.9 million in vendor costs alone, and incurred fees 
for thousands of hours of attorney time.  Brys Decl. ¶¶ 14–15.  BANA has reviewed 
over one million documents, and produced over 277,000 documents to Plaintiffs—
documents which, pursuant to the Case Management Order, Class Counsel is to 
provide to Individual Counsel.  Brys Decl. ¶ 16; see Case Management Order at 3. 
C. 
Discovery Is Nearly Complete. 
Fact discovery in this MDL is nearly complete, and set to close on December 
12, 2024.  ECF 302, June 27, 2024 Order Issuing Amended Scheduling Order 
(“Scheduling Order”) at 2.  In order to allow sufficient time to schedule the 
depositions in advance of the discovery deadline, BANA served Individual Counsel 
with a deposition notice on July 11, 2024.4  Brys Decl. ¶ 56.  BANA has been, and 
 
4 Individual Plaintiffs misrepresent when the depositions were noticed.  (See Mot. at 
2.)  BANA served the deposition notice in July, not August.  Brys Decl. ¶ 56.  BANA 
furthermore proposed having the depositions take place over a two-week, not two-
month, period.  Id.  BANA served a revised deposition notice on August 12, 2024, 
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continues to be, willing to work with Individual Counsel to schedule these 
depositions prior to the fact discovery cutoff date.  See Brys Decl. ¶ 60.   
Rather than respond to BANA’s deposition notice, however, Individual 
Plaintiffs moved on August 13, 2024 to stay their cases “until the common issues of 
law and fact are adjudicated in the consolidated Class Case.”  Mot. at 4.  On August 
22, 2024—more than a week after the court-directed deadline for Individual Plaintiffs 
to file their opening brief and the day before BANA’s deadline to respond—without 
seeking leave of the Court or the parties, Class Plaintiffs filed an untimely opening 
brief of their own on this issue (ECF 320, “Class Brief”).  
III. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
It is well established that “[a] district court has discretionary power to stay 
proceedings in its own court.”  Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).  “A court’s power 
to stay proceedings is incidental to the inherent power to control the disposition of 
its cases in the interests of efficiency and fairness to the court, counsel, and litigants.”  
Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., No. 13cv2169 AJB (MDD), 2016 WL 
9503735, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016).  A party seeking a stay “must make out a 
clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a 
fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.”  
Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.   
In the Ninth Circuit, the propriety of a “Landis Stay” requires the court to 
“weigh . . . . the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal 
to grant a stay.”  Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110 (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 
265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)).  These competing interests include “the possible damage 
resulting from granting a stay, the hardship or inequity a party may suffer if required 
to go forward, and the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of 
 
with dates certain, because Individual Counsel insisted that BANA do so.  Brys Decl. 
¶¶ 56, 60.   
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law that could result from a stay.”  CMAX, Inc., 300 F.2d at 268. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
BANA Would Suffer Undue Prejudice if Individual Plaintiffs’ 
Cases Are Stayed Now, When Discovery Is Nearly Complete. 
A stay is not appropriate here, where there is more than “a fair possibility” that 
a stay will prejudice BANA.  See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.  First, where significant 
effort and considerable resources have been expended in completing discovery, 
courts have found prejudice to the non-moving party by a stay late in the proceedings.  
For example, in Seufert, the district court was faced with a similar request by 
individual plaintiffs to stay their cases in favor of an MDL, despite that the cases 
were already far along and had been litigated for years.  2016 WL 9503735, at *1.  
Like this action, in Seufert, individual plaintiffs asserted separate claims against the 
same defendants named in a class action MDL.  Id.  In both proceedings, defendants 
asserted an affirmative defense of conflict preemption.  Id.  Defendants moved for 
summary judgment in the MDL based on the conflict preemption issue, which motion 
was granted in late 2015.  Id.  The MDL plaintiffs appealed.  Id.  A few months later, 
in February 2016, defendants filed a similar conflict preemption-based motion for 
summary judgment in the individual plaintiffs’ case.  Id.  The individual plaintiffs 
moved to stay consideration of defendants’ summary judgment motion pending the 
outcome of the MDL appeal.  Id.  In denying the motion to stay, the court noted the 
“inherent inequity and prejudice to Defendants” given the “significant resources 
exhausted in undertaking and completing discovery” in the individual plaintiffs’ case 
to date.  Id., at *2.  The court further found that delaying resolution of the preemption-
based summary judgment motion after nearly two years of discovery “is not efficient 
for the parties or the Court.”  Id., at *2–3.   
Other courts have also found that when “discovery is nearing completion,” that 
weighs against a stay.  Omnitracs, LLC v. Platform Sci., Inc., No. 20-CV-0958-JLS-
MDD, 2021 WL 857005, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2021).  In JoshCo Tech, LLC v. 
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MJJ&L Holdings, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-00428-APG-NJK, 2020 WL 8254262, at *1–2 
(D. Nev. Sept. 2, 2020), the district court denied a stay where the moving party had 
waited until there was little more than a month remaining in the discovery period.  As 
the moving party had participated in the discovery process up until that point, the 
court found that “it does not advance the objectives in [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 1 to stay 
discovery at this late juncture.”  Id., at *1–2, 2 n.3; see also Ross-Nash v. Almond, 
No. 2:19-cv-00957-APG, NJK, 2020 WL 11036016, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 18, 2020) 
(denying stay where discovery cutoff was “fast approaching and stalling discovery at 
this late stage does not promote the goals in Rule 1”). 
BANA has a real and substantial interest in moving the discovery phase of this 
MDL to conclusion.  It has already spent nearly $8 million in discovery costs alone, 
including to produce over 277,000 documents, 3,700 of which relate to the Individual 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  Brys Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16.  And it is already in the process of preparing 
for the depositions that would bring fact discovery to a close.5  See Brys Decl. ¶ 56, 
60.  In short, BANA has expended significant time and resources to complete fact 
discovery before the parties’ agreed-upon (and court-ordered) deadline, and would 
be prejudiced by a stay at this late date, where discovery is “near[] completion.”  
Omnitracs, 2021 WL 857005, at *3. 
Second, while there is a “general policy favoring stays of short, or at least 
reasonable, duration,” a stay is inappropriate if indefinite in nature.  Seufert, 
2016 WL 9503735, at *3 (citing Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. 
Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2007)).  The stay Individual Plaintiffs seek—
“until common issues of law and fact are determined in the Class Case” (Mot. at 10, 
 
5 The Individual Plaintiffs’ argument that the depositions are an “end-run around the 
presumptive 10 deposition limits in the Class Case” (Mot. at 13) is nonsensical.  Each 
Individual Plaintiff has sued BANA in his or her individual capacity; it is beyond 
dispute that BANA is entitled to take their depositions.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1).  
As recently as at the August 20, 2024 Informal Discovery Conference, Magistrate 
Judge Berg acknowledged BANA’s right to the depositions of these Individual 
Plaintiffs and tentatively ordered that BANA may proceed with another 10 Individual 
Plaintiff depositions in-person pending the Court’s ruling on this Motion.  Brys Decl. 
¶ 63.    
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15)—is nebulous.  Individual Plaintiffs offer no suggestion whatsoever for when 
individual discovery would conceivably pick up again, should a stay be issued.  Even 
assuming class certification briefing is completed by November 21, 2024, as 
provided in the Scheduling Order (at 1), no motion hearing date has been set, and the 
hearing could conceivably take place in 2025, after which it may take some time 
before an order on class certification issues.  Moreover, “common issues of law and 
fact” in the Individual and Class cases would certainly be the subject of summary 
judgment motions, which are not set to be filed until April 14, 2025 (id. at 3), which 
motions present the same timing uncertainties for hearing and decision as the class 
certification motion.  The stay Individual Plaintiffs propose would last considerably 
longer if either the class certification or summary judgment order is appealed.  See 
Mendez v. Optio Solutions, LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1233 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2017) 
(rejecting premise that final result is imminent where appeal is likely).  And these 
delays say nothing about the “common issues” that may be decided at trial of the 
Class Claims.  It is quite likely that the stay Individual Plaintiffs request would push 
out the completion of individual fact discovery until 2026.  See Scheduling Order at 
6 (setting final Pretrial Conference for August 15, 2025).  Given the uncertainty of 
the length of the stay Individual Plaintiffs request, it would be undeniably prejudicial 
to BANA to stay the individual actions.   
Finally, a stay at this late stage in the litigation is prejudicial and “would 
undoubtedly jeopardize [both] parties’ interests in prompt adjudication.”  See Seufert, 
2016 WL 9503735, at *3; see also Mendez, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 1235 (stay has 
potential for prejudice where discovery will be delayed).  Indeed, Individual Counsel 
has highlighted for the Court not only their desire to move Individual Plaintiffs’ 
claims to adjudication, but also that there is an “urgency” to do so.  ECF 55 at 44:24-
25; see Seufert, 2016 WL 9503735, at *3 (stay was inappropriate where “on 
Plaintiffs’ side, the actual alleged victims, urgency has always been a concern to the 
Court . . . . And the defense has much the same concern in terms of getting to an 
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adjudication at the earliest practical opportunity”).6  It is in the parties’ best interests 
to promptly adjudicate the claims, as delaying discovery has the “likely and severe” 
potential of prejudice resulting from loss of evidence, the risk of witnesses’ memories 
fading or witnesses relocating or otherwise becoming unavailable, and evidence 
becoming stale or dissipating—dangers which only increase with the passage of 
time.  Mendez, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 1235; see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707–
08 (1997); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 
B. 
Sitting for Deposition Is Not a “Hardship” or “Inequity” for 
Individual Plaintiffs or Their Counsel. 
Because there is more than “a fair possibility” of damage to BANA if the 
Individual Plaintiffs’ cases are stayed, the Individual Plaintiffs are required to 
demonstrate a “clear case of hardship or inequity” in moving forward.  Landis, 
299 U.S. at 255.  Individual Plaintiffs have not—and cannot—meet this standard. 
Individual Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any undue hardship or exceptional 
or compelling circumstances justifying a stay, based on the depositions noticed.  See, 
e.g., Mendez, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 1234–1235, (no hardship in moving forward with 
“inevitable discovery and motion practice”); Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112 (“[B]eing 
required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship 
or inequity’ within the meaning of Landis.”).  Notably, Individual Plaintiffs cite to 
no authority whatsoever that sitting for a deposition constitutes a hardship or inequity 
justifying a stay.  Indeed, generally “plaintiffs are required make themselves 
available for examination in the district in which the suit was brought, because the 
plaintiffs selected the forum.”  P.Y.M.T. v. City of Fresno, No. 1:15-CV-710-JAM-
BAM, 2016 WL 2930539, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016).  In an effort at 
compromise, BANA noticed the Individual Plaintiffs’ depositions to take place at a 
 
6 Again, the fact that some individuals, such as the Abila plaintiffs, are stayed, is 
irrelevant.  See, infra, fn. 1.  BANA does not have the same interests in moving 
forward in the Abila litigation as it does here because BANA has not had to conduct 
any discovery on the Abila plaintiffs. 
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central place within the California judicial district where each Individual Plaintiff 
lives, with deposition locations proposed in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
and Bakersfield.  Brys Decl. ¶ 60.  The Individual Plaintiffs have not carried their 
burden of establishing that there are circumstances preventing them from appearing 
at the properly-noticed depositions, that the choice of deposition forum is 
unreasonable, or that they are otherwise unavailable during the time frame noticed 
for the depositions.  At the Informal Discovery Conference on whether Individual 
Plaintiff depositions should be taken in person or remotely, on August 20, 2024, 
Judge Berg rejected Individual Plaintiff’s non-specific claims of hardship, and 
ordered ten Individual Plaintiff depositions to go forward in person pending the 
Court’s resolution of this Motion.  Brys Decl. ¶ 64.   
The Motion, instead, argues that it would be unfair to require Individual 
Plaintiffs to participate in discovery now because they have purportedly been 
prevented from meaningfully participating in the discovery that has occurred so far.  
Mot. at 13–14.  The undisputed facts reveal otherwise.  First, the contention that 
Individual Counsel would have to “scramble” to conduct discovery in the next three 
months (Mot. at 14) is confounding, as the Individual Plaintiffs have been conducting 
discovery.7  Individual Counsel has already defended five Individual Plaintiff 
depositions, without any complaint about having not reviewed the “nearly a million 
pages” that BANA produced in response to Class Counsel’s demands.  Mot. at 4–5; 
see Brys Decl. ¶ 40, 42–45.  If Individual Counsel had elected to review the 
documents produced or the written discovery responses in the Class Case, they would 
understand that this discovery is largely irrelevant to the Individual Plaintiffs’ 
depositions.  Put plainly, the Individual Plaintiff depositions do not concern BANA’s 
 
7 In addition to engaging with Individual Plaintiffs’ own discovery, since June 2023, 
Individual Counsel has participated in at least 22 status and discovery conferences 
with Magistrate Judge Berg, attended each one of the five Rule 30(b)(6) depositions 
of BANA witnesses, and served nearly 150 third-party subpoenas to Individual 
Plaintiffs’ telephone service providers.  Brys Decl. ¶¶ 24, 48–49, 50–54.  Individual 
Counsel has not been excluded.   
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policies and procedures.  Rather, the Individual Plaintiff depositions that have been 
noticed—like the five depositions that have already been successfully taken—will be 
about the facts underlying Individual Plaintiffs’ own cases.  BANA’s production of 
documents concerning the Individual Plaintiffs has been substantially complete since 
at least February 2, 2024.  Brys Decl. ¶ 30.         
Second, despite all of the noise that Individual Plaintiffs make about their 
supposed inability to participate in discovery, there are no arguments, or even 
examples, about what exactly it is that Individual Plaintiffs or their counsel need, that 
they do not have, such that they should be granted a stay at this late stage.  There is 
no suggestion or proffer of any interrogatory, document request, or deposition that 
Individual Plaintiffs wanted, but were prevented, from propounding or taking.8  This 
alone reveals that Individual Plaintiffs’ motion is merely a sideshow and an attempt 
to skirt the discovery deadline. 
Finally, if Individual Counsel has been stymied in their ability to participate in 
discovery, that is due entirely to the relationship between Individual Counsel and  
Class Counsel, not BANA.  Individual and Class Counsel’s apparent inability to work 
cooperatively together cannot justify the prejudice BANA would face if forced to 
indefinitely delay the close of fact discovery in this MDL.  Contrary to the Motion’s 
characterization, Judge Burns’ Case Management Order did not exclude Individual 
Plaintiffs from discovery; it merely stated that all discovery and other litigation 
conduct must go through Class Counsel.  See Case Management Order at 2–3.    
Pursuant to the Case Management Order, BANA produced documents to Class 
Counsel (and, later, in a show of cooperation, provided certain Individual Plaintiff 
documents directly to Individual Counsel).  Likewise, pursuant to the rules, BANA 
made witnesses available for depositions for seven hours each—depositions which 
 
8 The Individual Plaintiffs say that, absent a stay, they will be scrambling to propound 
written discovery.  See Mot. at 14.  Not so.  The written discovery deadline passed, 
on January 15, 2024.  See ECF 139.  In any event, the written discovery that Class 
Counsel served applied to Individual Plaintiffs, as well, and BANA has already 
responded to that discovery. 
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OPP. TO INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ MOT. TO STAY 
 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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Individual Counsel attended, yet failed to ask any questions.  Brys Decl. ¶ 50–54.9  
BANA is entitled to presume that plaintiffs will work out amongst themselves who 
will review documents, and who will take the depositions.  If there were problems 
within the plaintiffs’ counsel group with respect to sharing of information, that is not 
BANA’s concern.     
C. 
Staying the Individual Plaintiffs’ Cases, at This Late Date, Will be 
Inefficient and Needlessly Prolong This Case Indefinitely. 
Staying Individual Plaintiffs’ cases at this point would not be in the interest of 
judicial economy or efficiency.  Indeed, Judge Burns previously considered and 
determined this to be true three years ago, when he issued the Case Management 
Order.  See ECF 55, 36:2-15, 38:1-13.  Since then, the equities have only dramatically 
moved against a stay. 
At base, the reason Individual Plaintiffs are seeking a stay is because they want 
to avoid deposition.  Where discovery is not only well underway, but nearly 
complete, Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases discussing the discovery-related efficiencies 
of a stay is unavailing, as these cases are inapposite.  For example, Individual 
Plaintiffs cite McDaniels v. Stewart, No. 3:15-CV-05943-BHS-DWC, 2017 WL 
132454, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2017) for the proposition that staying an 
individual case during pendency of a class action promotes “judicial economy.”  Mot. 
at 15.  But the stay in McDaniels was granted when the individual case was still in 
its early pleading stage, and the class case was already much further along, with a 
decision on the class certification motion imminent.  McDaniels, 2017 WL 132454, 
at *2.  Other of Individual Plaintiffs’ cases also rely on the fact that the class action 
at issue was nearing completion, compared to an early-stage individual action.  See, 
e.g., Richard K. v. United Behavioral Health, No. 18-CV-6318 (GHW) (BCM), 2019 
WL 3083019, at *1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2019) (class case sufficiently advanced 
that individual was presumptive member of class that had already been certified); 
 
9 To be clear, BANA did not prevent Individual Counsel from asking questions. 
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Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CIV-13-876-D, 2014 WL 819385, at *1 (W.D. 
Okla. Mar. 3, 2014) (class case was pending conclusion of settlement proceedings).  
None of these cases help Individual Plaintiffs here, where the Individual Plaintiffs’ 
cases and the Class case have been litigated in parallel for three years and are 
currently in the exact same procedural posture. 
Individual Plaintiffs also cite other, out-of-circuit, cases that are plainly 
distinguishable from the circumstances here.  In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. 
v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009), the court found 
a stay was appropriate pending an appellate decision that was likely to have a 
substantial or controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case.  In Colo. 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), the Court 
discussed stays in the context of state-federal concurrent jurisdiction.  In Taunton 
Gardens Co. v. Hills, 557 F.2d 877, 879 (1st Cir. 1977), the court ordered a stay 
where the other pending suit presented “issues of ‘public moment’” involving the 
administration of a “major federal program” to administer and distribute “a 
significant amount of federal money,” and where implementation of the entire 
program was already stayed by the Supreme Court.  Finally, in Aleman on behalf of 
Ryder Sys., Inc. v. Sancez, No. 21-cv-20539-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes, 2021 WL 
917969, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2021), the parties had jointly moved for a stay.  
None of these cases help Individual Plaintiffs either, because the circumstances of 
the stays were plainly distinct from what Individual Plaintiffs are asking for here.10 
 
10 Individual Plaintiffs’ remaining cited cases did not grant a stay at all.  See, e.g., I.A. 
Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding district court abused its discretion in dismissing the instant case, despite 
having “broad discretion in determining whether to stay or dismiss litigation to avoid 
duplicating a proceeding already pending in another federal court,” as the two suits 
at issue “differ[ed] significantly and were not duplicative”); Mackey v. Board of 
Educ. For Arlington Central School Dist., 112 Fed. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (not 
a decision on a motion to stay, rather, summarily affirming dismissal of plaintiff 
parents’ claims, without further analysis); Walker v. Long Island R.R., Inc., No. 79 
Civ. 5429, 1982 WL 180 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1982) (dismissing suit, against plaintiff’s 
wishes, where plaintiff would receive the same relief as a member of the plaintiff 
class and could pursue his rights as part of that action instead). 
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It is patently inefficient for the parties to pause discovery now, when the end 
is in sight, and restart another discovery period—likely beginning in 2026 or after—
after spending considerable time and resources to nearly complete this current 
discovery round.  It cannot seriously be disputed that it would be more efficient to 
simply complete the depositions that have been noticed.  In contrast, Individual 
Plaintiffs’ ideas for how a stay would create efficiencies either lack any support, or 
are entirely nonsensical.  For example, Individual Plaintiffs would have the Court 
believe that the MDL and individual cases can be “streamlin[ed],” but do not 
articulate how.  See, e.g., Mot. at 15–16.  They also propose “sequenc[ing]” Class 
and Individual Plaintiffs’ cases, likewise without any suggestion of the mechanics of 
this approach.  Id. at 15.  As explained above, the “sequenc[e]” Individual Plaintiffs 
seem to be proposing would push out the completion of discovery potentially for 
years, when all that is left to be done is the depositions of the remaining Individual 
Plaintiffs.   
Individual Plaintiffs also propose a “compromise” that the parties not use the 
depositions of Individual Plaintiffs in connection with class certification.  Mot. at 13.  
As an instant matter, Individual Plaintiffs’ position misunderstands and 
misrepresents Magistrate Judge Berg’s informal order regarding the sequencing of 
this case.  See Brys Decl. ¶¶ 39, 41.  Judge Berg’s order that BANA could take ten 
plaintiff depositions prior to the filing of the class certification motion, which was 
then due on March 15, 2024, was in response to Class Counsel’s expressed concern—
based on the schedule in place at that time—that preparing for and attending plaintiff 
depositions would distract Class Counsel from devoting time and resources to their 
class certification motion.  Brys Decl. ¶ 39.  It was in response to this expressed 
concern that Judge Berg ordered that any additional plaintiff depositions beyond the 
first ten were not to begin until more than two weeks after the class certification 
motion filing deadline.  Brys Decl. ¶ 39.  Since that informal order was issued in 
February 2024, the class certification motion deadline has been extended twice, first 
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CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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by two months, from March to May, and then by three more months, from May to 
August, giving Class Plaintiffs a total of five extra months to prepare their class 
certification motion.  And BANA nonetheless noticed the depositions to begin more 
than two weeks after the extended class certification motion filing deadline.  Brys 
Decl. ¶ 56.   
In any event, Individual Plaintiffs’ so-called “compromise” does nothing to 
promote judicial economy and efficiency.  The entire premise of the stay Individual 
Plaintiffs seek is that “[m]any of the Individual Plaintiffs are absent class members,” 
who “may choose to become part of the class action.”  Mot. at 16.  If this is true, 
those individuals are class members (absent or not), and therefore their depositions 
are directly relevant to class certification.  See, e.g., Antoninetti v. Chipotle, Inc., No. 
06cv2671-BTM (WMc), 2011 WL 2003292, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) 
(“appropriately focused” deposition testimony from absent class members was 
“clearly relevant to the claims and defenses in the instant case” where such plaintiffs 
“injected themselves into the litigation”); Mas v. Cumulus Media, Inc., No. C-10-
1396 EMC, 2010 WL 4916402, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010) (noting “there is 
no blanket rule barring discovery with respect to absent class members,” and ordering 
such discovery where plaintiffs at issue had already affirmatively participated in the 
action).  And if, instead, there are other individuals “who choose to opt out of the 
Class,” (Mot. at 16), their arguments for a stay hold even less water. 
Finally, the contention that denying a stay would require Individual Plaintiffs 
to conduct “extensive discovery” (Mot. at 18) lacks logic.  As discussed, the Motion 
proceeds on the false assumption that Individual Plaintiffs have not been included in 
discovery and that a stay would preserve the status quo by insulating them from 
having to begin discovery.  None of this is accurate.  Individual Plaintiffs have been 
conducting discovery already, through Class Counsel as well as on their own behalf; 
written discovery is closed, and discovery is nearly complete.  The only effect of 
denying a stay is that Individual Plaintiffs will be required to sit for depositions in a 
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CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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case they filed more than three years ago and have been actively litigating since then. 
D. 
Class Plaintiffs’ Untimely Brief Is Improper and Unavailing. 
Nothing in Class Plaintiffs’ untimely opening brief on the stay issue changes 
anything.  Procedurally, the Class Brief is untimely and improper.  Substantively, it 
adds nothing to Individual Plaintiffs’ arguments, which fail for all the reasons 
discussed above. 
First, the Class Brief is untimely.11  During a status conference on August 6, 
2024, which Class Counsel attended, Magistrate Judge Berg ordered Individual 
Counsel to file their stay motion on or before August 13, 2024.  Brys Decl. ¶ 59.  On 
that date, BANA and Individual Plaintiffs filed a stipulated expedited briefing 
schedule requiring responding briefs to be filed by August 23, 2024 (ECF 313), 
which the Court so-ordered the next day, on August 14, 2024 (ECF 315).  At no point 
did Class Plaintiffs request an extension to file an opening brief or otherwise indicate 
they would participate in this motion.  Class Plaintiffs filed their brief on August 22, 
2024—more than a week after the court-directed deadline for opening briefs, and the 
day before BANA was due to respond.  Class Plaintiffs offer no good cause—indeed 
they offer no reason at all—for their delay, and the Court therefore need not consider 
the late arguments.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).  The Class Brief is also procedurally 
improper.  The Motion concerns only the depositions of Individual Plaintiffs 
represented by other lawyers, not Class Counsel.  Class Plaintiffs nowhere explain 
their interest in this issue.  The Court should ignore both the Class Brief and any reply 
brief Class Plaintiffs attempt to file on this issue. 
Second, Class Plaintiffs’ arguments also fail substantively, for all the same 
reasons that Individual Plaintiffs’ arguments fail.  (Class Plaintiffs claim that the 
Brief raises “two additional points,” (Class Br. at 2), but it does not.)  The first point 
raised by Class Plaintiffs is the same judicial efficiency argument made by Individual 
 
11 Class Plaintiffs call their filing a “Joinder,” but it is not.  It is an untimely opening 
brief advancing Class Plaintiffs’ own arguments.  
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Plaintiffs and addressed in Section C, above.  Class Plaintiffs add nothing new.  Their 
arguments about “the theory behind the MDL process,” Class Br. at 3, ring hollow at 
this point when the Class Plaintiffs’ and Individual Plaintiffs’ claims have been 
litigated in parallel for three years, discovery is nearly complete, and all that is left is 
Individual Plaintiff depositions.  Class Plaintiffs’ hysteria about “full-blown 
discovery” regarding the Individual Plaintiffs is a red herring:  discovery has been 
“full-blown” for more than a year, and is almost done; it cannot be seriously disputed 
that the most efficient option is to simply complete the depositions. 
Class Plaintiffs’ second point helps them even less.  Class Plaintiffs take issue 
with whether BANA is entitled to depose people who have sued BANA in their 
individual capacities.  See Class Br. at 4.  BANA is plainly entitled to these 
depositions under the federal rules, (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1)), which Judge Berg 
recently acknowledged.  Brys Decl. ¶ 64.  The fact that the Individual Plaintiffs are 
”non-class representative plaintiffs,” (Class Br. at 3), is irrelevant where by virtue of 
filing their own lawsuits against BANA, they have—without question—“injected 
themselves into the litigation.”  See, e.g. Antoninetti, 2011 WL 2003292, at *1–2; 
Mas, 2010 WL 4916402, at *3.  Class Plaintiffs say BANA has “still not explained,” 
(Class Br. at 2), why it needs to take these depositions now.  Wrong.  BANA has 
repeatedly told both Individual Counsel and Class Counsel that it wants to schedule 
these depositions now because fact discovery closes in December.  Finally, Class 
Counsel’s protestations that the Individual Plaintiff depositions will divert their 
resources “in the middle of class certification briefing and related expert discovery,” 
(Class Br. at 4), is specious.  Since BANA first requested dates for Individual Plaintiff 
depositions, Class Plaintiffs have received at least two extensions of their class 
certification motion deadline, providing Class Counsel with five additional months 
in which to complete their brief.  See Brys Decl. ¶ 39.  In any event, as stated, the 
noticed depositions would not begin until two weeks after Class Plaintiffs file their 
certification motion.  Finally, Class Counsel’s concern about their own ability to 
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“prepare for and participate in,” Class Br. at 4, the Individual Plaintiff depositions 
while awaiting BANA’s class certification opposition brief is curious.  Class Counsel 
attended nearly all of the previous Individual Plaintiff depositions, but elected to ask 
no questions of these witnesses.  Brys Decl. ¶¶ 40, 42–45. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, BANA respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Individual Plaintiffs’ motion to stay. 
 
 
Dated:   August 23, 2024 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
By: s/ Laura G. Brys 
 
  
JAMES W. MCGARRY (pro hac vice) 
JMcGarry@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
100 Northern Avenue 
Boston, MA  02210 
Tel.: +1 617 570 1000 
Fax: +1 617 523 1231 
 
THOMAS M. HEFFERON (pro hac vice) 
THefferon@goodwinlaw.com 
SABRINA M. ROSE-SMITH (pro hac vice) 
SRoseSmith@goodwinlaw.com 
MATTHEW L. RIFFEE (pro hac vice) 
MRiffee@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
1900 N St. NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
Tel: +1 202 346 4000  
Fax: +1 202 346 4444 
 
LAURA G. BRYS (SBN 242100) 
LBrys@goodwinlaw.com 
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP 
601 S Figueroa St., Suite 4100 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Tel.: +1 213 426 2500 
Fax: +1 617 346 4444 
 
YVONNE W. CHAN (pro hac vice) 
YChan@jonesday.com 
JONES DAY 
100 High Street 
Boston, MA  02110 
Tel.: +1 617 960 3939 
Fax: +1 617 449 6999 
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OPP. TO INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ MOT. TO STAY 
 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
 
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JANICE P. BROWN (SBN 114433) 
jbrown@myersnave.com 
MATTHEW B. NAZARETH (SBN 
278405) 
mnazareth@myersnave.com 
MEYERS NAVE 
600 B Street, Suite 1650 
San Diego, CA 92101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 321     Filed 08/23/24     PageID.4163     Page
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OPP. TO INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS’ MOT. TO STAY 
 
CASE NO. 21-MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the clerk of the 
court for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by 
using the CM/ECF system on August 23.  I further certify that all participants in the 
case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the 
CM/ECF system. I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
Executed: 
August 23, 2024 
s/ Laura G. Brys 
LAURA G. BRYS
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 321     Filed 08/23/24     PageID.4164     Page
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