Response in Opposition by USA as to Alexandra Acosta — USA v. Alexandra Acosta (Dkt. 112, S.D. Fla.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60170-RNS · Doc. 112 · 2024-08-09 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 23-60170-CR-SCOLA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALEXANDRA ACOSTA, 
 
 
 
       Defendant. 
                                    / 
 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN  
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS  
FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AND NEW TRIAL 
 
Introduction 
 
This Court should deny Defendant Alexandra Acosta’s (“Acosta”) Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal (“JOA”) and Motion for New Trial, ECF Nos. 99–100, 
because the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence and this Court’s rulings 
in limine and during trial regarding the admissibility of the IRS Audit Evidence 
(GX 203–203h), BSO Policy Evidence (GXs 301–306), and the nature of Acosta’s 
employment as a law enforcement officer were correct. See ECF No. 58 (Omnibus 
Order).  
Summary of Facts Proved at Trial 
 
Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Acosta guilty 
of four counts in connection with the $20,180 Paycheck Protection Program 
(“PPP”) loan she received in her name. ECF No. 70. Contrary to defense counsel’s 
argument in the Motion for JOA, Count 1 (18 U.S.C. § 371 general conspiracy), 
related to the entire conspiracy to make false statements to the Small Business 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 1 of 17

2 
 
Administration (“SBA”), including the loan application and forgiveness, ECF No. 
23 at ¶¶ 18–26 (Superseding Indictment), Counts 2 and 3 (15 U.S.C. § 645(a) 
false statement to SBA), applied to the loan application and forgiveness 
application (respectively), and Count 4 (18 U.S.C. § 1343 wire fraud) applied to 
the loan application. The Government’s admitted Exhibits are filed with the 
Court. ECF No. 81. The Court’s instructions to the jury are not at issue. ECF No. 
68.  
As summarized below, substantial evidence presented during the 
government’s case-in-chief proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Acosta had 
knowingly, and with the intent to defraud as to the wire fraud count, submitted 
or caused to be submitted the PPP loan application and forgiveness application 
that contained false information about her 2019 gross income for real estate 
side-work and her use of the loan proceeds. The defense’s case did not change 
this. Indeed, the defense’s case consisted of Acosta’s self-serving testimony that 
she had “no idea” what her coconspirator, Vilsaint St Louis, had done regarding 
the loan and loan forgiveness. ECF No. 107 at 24 (Acosta). Twelve jurors did not 
believe her—and for good reason.  
 
The evidence admitted during the United States’ case-in-chief showed that 
Acosta was a full-time Broward County Deputy Sheriff (GX 300) during the 
relevant period with $13,904 income as a real estate broker in 2019 (GXs 201, 
400–01), $0 as a real estate broker in 2020 (GX 202; ECF No. 108 at 14 (Crevier)), 
and no income as a real estate broker prior in 2021 prior to applying for the loan 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 2 of 17

3 
 
in February 2021 and its forgiveness in April 2021 (ECF No. 108 at 15–16; GX 
402). Her wife and mother both worked under the same real estate firm, Valordog 
LLC. ECF No. 108 at 8–9, 14–15. This Court admitted the BSO Off-Duty 
Employment Policy that required all BSO employees to seek and receive BSO’s 
approval for any off-duty employment, including self-employment. GX 301–03. 
The off-duty employment approval “sunset” every year and employees had to 
seek reapproval. Id. Acosta completed the forms for 2016, 2017, and 2018, but 
not for 2019, 2020, or 2021. GX 304–306; ECF No. 109 at 20–21 (Hely). 
 
This Court also admitted Acosta’s Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax 
Returns for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and the IRS Audit Evidence. (GXs 200-
203h). And a witness from the IRS provided testimony about these records. 
Acosta objects to the IRS Audit Evidence.   
 
 The IRS audit of Acosta’s 2018 and 2019 tax returns showed that the IRS 
contacted Acosta in December 2020 about the issues with her 2018 and 2019 
tax returns. Acosta was interviewed on December 17, 2020, via telephone. GX 
203b. The IRS records reflect that Acosta said she makes an appointment with 
St Louis as her tax preparer and that she takes him her tax forms and some 
receipts for purchases, credit card statements, gas receipts, supplies for her 
home office, etc. for the Schedule C expenses. Id. Acosta stated that she and St 
Louis figured out the expenses together. Id. Acosta stated that St Louis analyzed 
it pretty well because she is there for a while. Id. Acosta added that the figure 
she puts on the Schedule C is “pretty close to what she has in her head” and 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 3 of 17

4 
 
that she sat with St Louis for 2018 and 2019 returns. Id. She also said that St 
Louis went over the returns with her each year. Id. After Acosta explained some 
expenses on her 2018 Schedule C, she reiterated that all figures and expenses 
on the Schedule C were information that she and St Louis came up with 
together—Acosta did not leave it all to him. Id.   
 
On January 21, 2021—about 11 days before the PPP loan application was 
started—the IRS mailed a letter to Acosta and St Louis with an Examination 
Change Report that reflected $12,675.55 and $5,816.00 in taxes and penalties 
($18,491.55 total) owed by Acosta for overreporting business expenses in 2018 
and 2019 respectively. GX 203c–d. During the audit, the IRS interacted with 
both Acosta and St Louis as Acosta’s limited power of attorney to discuss those 
tax years. GX 203a.  
 
On February 1, 2021, Acosta and St Louis jointly spoke to the examiner 
about the issues with Acosta’s 2018 and 2019 tax returns. GX 203a. That same 
day, around 12 pm, Acosta and St Louis created the online application for a PPP 
loan. The application was created electronically using Acosta’s Gmail account 
and signed through a DocuSign link sent to Acosta’s Gmail account (GX 601, 
603–05). IP records confirm that the application was created on February 1, 
2021, at Victory Taxes (GXs 100, 601, 602, 603).  
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 4 of 17

5 
 
 
On February 3, 2021, Acosta and St Louis finalized the application for the 
$20,180 loan amount for a sole-proprietor under the PPP using materially1 false 
information about Acosta’s average monthly payroll for real estate in 2019, i.e., 
$8072 per month, and fraudulent representations about the purpose of the loan, 
i.e., payroll costs, rent/mortgage interest, utilities, covered operations 
expenditures, covered property damage, covered supplier costs, and covered 
worker protection expenditures (GXs 100, 604–05). They also submitted a false 
2019 Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income listing $103,255 in nonemployee 
compensation from payer Valordog, LLC, and a false 2019 IRS Form Schedule 
C-Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Proprietorship) listing a business name of 
Valordog, LLC with purported gross income of $103,255. GX 101.  
 
Copies of the loan application and promissory note, containing the false 
statements, i.e., evidence of fraud, were contemporaneously provided to Acosta’s 
Gmail account (GX 604). As a result of the fraudulent representations in the 
application, the SBA and its approved lender approved and funded the $20,180 
forgivable loan under the PPP program. 
 
The same day that the money hit her bank account, Acosta tried to execute 
a $19,000 transfer of the loan proceeds into her Robinhood Markets Inc. trading 
account (GX 504–508)—a round number that is coincidentally just above her 
outstanding liability to the IRS at time of $18,491.55. Ultimately, $10,000 
 
1 Materiality was only required to prove only Count 4—wire fraud. Counts 1–3 
did not require materiality of the false statement. 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 5 of 17

6 
 
cleared on February 10 (GXs 506, 508) and it was immediately used to purchase 
$8,000 in shares of one publicly traded stock. (GX 506, 508). The rest of the 
funds were used on general personal expenses, including paying off credit card 
debt. (GX 500a). 
 
The evidence also showed that Acosta herself linked the audit with the PPP 
loan in an email to St Louis on February 16, 2021, wherein she stated: “St Louis, 
Please do not bring up anything about my IRS case or the loan to my wife. She 
does not know about it and I don’t want to stress her out. Thanks!” GX 608a. 
That was the same day that Acosta’s wife signed her income tax return for the 
year 2020 using Victory Taxes—i.e., her wife planned to have her taxes done by 
the same person who purportedly screwed up on Acosta’s tax returns for two 
years, but Acosta did not want to warn her wife of this potential pitfall. ECF No. 
107 at 42–44. 
The evidence showed that following the Acosta and St Louis’s joint call 
with the IRS on February 1, 2021, the same day they began the application for 
the PPP loan, the IRS kept the case open and Acosta continued to try to lower 
her liability even up until March 29, 2021, when she sent a letter to the IRS 
switching her story and pushing the blame on Defendant St Louis. GX 203g. 
This led to a corrected report, signed by Defendant Acosta on April 13, 2021, 
that removed the penalties and finalized the amount owed to $14,038.69. GX 
203h. Of course, Acosta had spent most of the PPP funds by this time. 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 6 of 17

7 
 
 
In continuation of the conspiracy, on April 21, 2021, one month after her 
March 29, 2021 letter to the IRS stating that St Louis effectively went rogue on 
her prior tax returns and included misinformation without her knowledge (GX 
203g), Acosta freely provided St Louis with her personal Gmail login credentials 
to access the loan servicer’s online portal to apply for her PPP loan forgiveness 
(GX 611). The forgiveness application included a false affirmation that Acosta 
used the loan on the eligible expenses under the PPP (GX 150)—of course they 
were not because (1) you can’t spend something on qualified expenses that you 
weren’t entitled to have in the first place; and (2) the funds were invested in the 
stock market or used to pay off personal credit debt. On June 11, 2021, the SBA 
forgave the loan totaling $20,180 plus interest. GX 154. 
 
Acosta’s Testimony 
Acosta testified that she did not know her PPP loan application, and the 
accompanying documents, contained false information. Acosta’s credibility was 
impeached by, among other things, that (1) she withheld the existence of the tax 
audit during her post-charging proffer with the United States and testified that 
it was not relevant information; (2) she maintained that she did not have any 
reason not to trust St Louis—despite the ongoing audit that was front and center 
in her life at the time of the PPP loan application; (3) she compared withholding 
information about the audit and the PPP loan from her wife to not telling her 
about her energy drink purchases; and (4) she could not explain why her tax 
preparer would commit a felony for her without any financial or other benefit, 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 7 of 17

8 
 
and have the evidence of that crime sent directly to Acosta (a sworn law 
enforcement officer).  
Argument 
I. 
Motion for JOA 
Acosta accurately represents the standard of review for a Rule 29 motion 
as stated in United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009)—
i.e., reviewing the evidence de novo in a light most favorable to the United States, 
resolving all conflicts for the United States, drawing all reasonable inferences 
that tend to support the prosecutions case, and assuming that the jury’s 
credibility determinations support the verdict. Id. Pursuant to Rule 29, if a court 
reserves ruling on a motion for JOA, “it must decide the motion on the basis of 
the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b). Here, 
that is after the defense’s case. 
A. 
Counts 1 through 3—Conspiracy to Violate 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) (Loan 
Application and Forgiveness Application)  
 
Acosta argues, incorrectly, that Count 1 omits the false statement to the 
SBA in the loan application. However, the general conspiracy allegations are for 
violating 15 U.S.C. § 645(a)—false statements to the SBA—as clearly described 
in the Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 23 at ¶¶ 18–26, and the allegations 
contained therein are expressly related to both the loan application and the 
forgiveness application. Both applications were submitted using SBA forms, 
under an SBA program that had to utilize third party lenders to facilitate the 
relief. GXs 100, 150; ECF No. 104 at 7, 24–25 (Harris). And to the extent there 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 8 of 17

9 
 
were third parties involved in the lending and processing, the PPP loan was fully 
guaranteed by the SBA to the approved lenders. ECF No. 104 at 8. Acosta also 
ignores the substance of the jury instructions, including “General Conspiracy 
Charge” and “False Statements to the SBA.” ECF No. 68 at 10–12. Accordingly, 
Acosta’s first premise for JOA is flawed and this Court should reject her 
interpretation of Counts 1–3. 
As to Count 1, the jury was provided the standard instruction for 
conspiracy—an agreement of two or more people to commit an unlawful act. The 
Government did not have to prove that the members of the conspiracy planned 
together all of the details of the plan or the “overt acts.” The question is whether 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that Acosta knew the 
unlawful purpose of the plan and that she willfully joined in it.  
The jury had evidence of an established relationship between Acosta and 
St Louis, including dealings that resulted in not one, but two years of tax returns 
that had to be audited for substantial overreporting of expenses. They saw 
evidence of how quickly St Louis acquiesced to not telling Acosta’s wife about the 
tax case and the PPP loan. GX 608a. No hesitation in his response at all. This 
was evidence of two people that have an agreement—a conspiracy—and they had 
no issue hiding their secret even from the one person Acosta should trust the 
most. Furthermore, Acosta and St Louis were together on the day they spoke to 
the IRS about the tax lien and began the fraudulent PPP loan application. 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 9 of 17

10 
 
The jury was instructed that the element for false statements to the SBA 
were: “(1) the defendant knowingly made any false statement; and (2) the false 
statement was for the purpose of obtaining for herself or for any applicant any 
loan or for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the SBA.” 
The jury was also instructed that for “knowledge,” it is enough that the 
defendant was aware of a high probability that the fact existed, that is, she had 
every reason to know but deliberately closed her eyes. They were also instructed 
that negligence, carelessness, or foolishness is not enough to prove that Acosta 
knew about the scheme to defraud or the false statements. ECF No. 68 at 16.  
The jury was also instructed on aiding and abetting, i.e., any act a person 
can do may be done by directing another person to do it. ECF No. 68 at 17.  
The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict 
that Acosta knew that she wasn’t entitled to a $20,180, forgivable, Paycheck 
Protection Program loan and she used St Louis to do the dirty work. The jury 
also understood that when Acosta provided her Gmail login credentials to St 
Louis for the forgiveness application, it was all a continuation of the same plan 
to get the loan she was not entitled to and get it forgiven so she didn’t have to 
pay it back. Acosta was an employed, well-educated, law enforcement officer at 
the time she applied for the fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan. The 
jury did not believe her story that she thought it was a stimulus or that she had 
no idea what St Louis was doing for her. And this Court should weigh all 
credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.  
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 10 of 17

11 
 
B. 
Count 4—Wire Fraud (Loan Application) 
The jury was instructed on the following elements of wire fraud: 
 
(1) The Defendant knowingly devised or participated in a scheme 
to defraud someone by using false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises; 
(2) The false pretenses, representations, or promises were about a 
material fact; 
(3) The Defendant acted with intent to defraud; and 
(4) The Defendant transmitted or cause to be transmitted by wire 
some communication in interstate commerce to help carry out 
the scheme to defraud. 
 
Acosta does not dispute that a scheme to defraud existed as to the 
fraudulent PPP loan, that the false representations about earnings in the PPP 
loan were material, or that there was an interstate wire with the funds transfer 
to Acosta’s bank account (GX 001 Stipulation). She contends, instead, that St 
Louis had a scheme to defraud for her, without her knowledge, and for only her 
benefit—felony pure gratis. However, the circumstances of the loan application 
make it clear what took place, and the jury understood the evidence as argued 
during closing. Acosta’s theory of defense is nonsensical.  
As Acosta also argued to the jury, Acosta continues to cite the IP address 
as a basis for acquittal. But it was the Government that introduced the Docusign 
evidence with IP address information into evidence during its case-in-chief (GX 
602). This is because it is consistent with the conspiracy and the Government’s 
theory of the case. The IP address used for the loan application was linked to 
Victory Taxes, the place where Acosta was on the same day she was speaking 
with the IRS with St Louis about her tax liability; the same day on which they 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 11 of 17

12 
 
applied for the loan. Acosta testified that she gave St Louis her personal email 
login credentials so he could do it all. The jury either did not believe this at all 
or determined that such behavior is indicative of Acosta’s criminal intent and 
knowledge that the application was illegal—that she was not entitled to a 
business loan to protect her paycheck. As argued during closing, Acosta’s theory 
is that St Louis made felony false representations in a loan application for Acosta, 
a sworn law enforcement officer, and have evidence of that crime sent directly to 
Acosta’s Gmail account. And he was doing this without her knowledge and with 
no financial or personal benefit. The jury correctly dismissed this defense and 
determined that Acosta perjured herself on the witness stand. This Court should 
weigh all credibility determinations in favor of the Verdict and this Court should 
deny the Motion for JOA because all the evidence, taken in a light most favorable 
to the Government, supports the Verdict.  
II. 
Motion for New Trial 
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers a district 
court to vacate a judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice requires. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The decision whether to grant or deny such a motion rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Cox, 995 F.2d 1041, 
1043 (11th Cir. 1993). “While the district court’s discretion is quite broad, there 
are limits to it. The court may not reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict 
simply because it feels some other result would be more reasonable. The evidence 
must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 12 of 17

13 
 
miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” Id. (quoting United States v. 
Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312–13). 
A. 
The IRS Audit Evidence was properly admitted as probative of 
Acosta’s knowledge, intent, motive, and opportunity, and its probative 
value was not outweighed by any unfair prejudice. 
 
 
The IRS Audit Evidence was properly admitted. The 2018–2019 tax returns 
at issue were relevant to the false statements about earnings in the loan 
application. These returns were prepared with the help of St Louis, the 
coconspirator, and person who also helped with the fraudulent PPP loan at issue. 
The audit was for the 2018 and 2019 tax years and resulted in a January 21, 
2021 Report of Income Tax Examination Changes reflecting that Acosta owed the 
IRS $18,491.55—just two weeks before Acosta fraudulently applied for the 
$20,180 PPP loan. Moreover, the audit records showed that Acosta and St Louis 
spoke with the auditor together about the $18,491.55 on the same day they 
started the application for the fraudulent loan. 
 
 The timing of the IRS audit of Acosta’s 2018 and 2019 tax returns, which 
were prepared with her co-conspirator St Louis, is such that it established a 
clear motive for the defendants to seek a fraudulent loan. Indeed, the amount 
Acosta was told she owed was incredibly close to the amount Acosta would now 
get through the PPP program. Acosta herself linked the two actions together in 
an email to St Louis on February 16, 2021, wherein she stated: “St Louis, Please 
do not bring up anything about my IRS case or the loan to my wife. She does 
not know about it and I don’t want to stress her out. Thanks!” GX 608a. That 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 13 of 17

14 
 
was the same day that Acosta’s wife signed her income tax return for the year 
2020 using Victory Taxes—i.e., her wife planned to have her taxes done by the 
same person who purportedly screwed up on Acosta’s tax returns for two years, 
but Acosta did not want to warn her wife of this potential pitfall. ECF No. 107 at 
42–44. Twelve jurors knew why. The jury knew that Acosta was complicit in 
everything and did not want her law enforcement wife to know.   
Furthermore, the IRS Audit Evidence cut against any potential good faith 
defense as to willfulness or intent to defraud of Counts 1 and 4 (respectively) 
because it strained credulity that during a period where Acosta was being 
audited for tax returns done with the help of St Louis, she would then blindly 
rely on St Louis on two more formal submissions to the United States regarding 
a $20,180 forgivable business loan with a promissory note.  
And though the existence of an IRS audit could be cast as prejudicial, here, 
the timing, impact, and parties involved in that audit were so probative of the 
motive, knowledge, opportunity, and intent that any prejudice does not 
substantially outweigh the probative value. Accordingly, this Court’s rulings as 
to admissibility of the evidence was correct and this Court should deny the 
Motion for New Trial. 
B. 
The BSO Policy Evidence was properly admitted as probative of 
Acosta’s knowledge and intent and its probative value was not 
outweighed by any unfair prejudice. 
 
The BSO Policy Evidence was not unduly prejudicial. Evidence of Acosta’s 
prior compliance and then cessation of reporting the employment was not offered 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 14 of 17

15 
 
to show that she violated a policy in 2019, 2020, or 2021, rather, it was relevant 
evidence that the Court admitted at trial because it is probative of whether 
Acosta could have believed that she was entitled to the $20,180 PPP loan for a 
sole proprietor when she did not consider her outside employment significant 
enough to report as she had previously done, i.e., knowledge and intent. 
The United States never argued that Acosta violated the BSO Off-Duty 
Employment Policy by not reporting off-duty employment for the year 2019, 
2020, or 2021; rather, the United States argued that Acosta did not report any 
off-duty employment to BSO for those years because Acosta knew that real estate 
side hustle was de minimis, i.e., not worth reporting as off-duty employment, and 
thus Acosta knew she was not entitled to a $20,180, forgivable PPP loan. See 
ECF No. 111 at 9 (Closings). 
Accordingly, this Court should deny the Motion for New Trial on this 
ground. 
C. 
Evidence of Acosta’s employment as a deputy sheriff was properly 
admitted because it was relevant to the false statement in the loan 
application, the context of the conspiracy, Acosta’s mens rea, and 
refutes Acosta’s defense that St Louis did it all without her 
knowledge.  
 
The Court should deny the motion as to evidence of Acosta’s employment 
as a law enforcement officer. The argument is spurious and remains 
unsupported by any case law. Acosta’s status as a deputy sheriff during the 
relevant period is probative of her knowledge and intent—i.e., it establishes her 
state of mind at the time of the alleged crimes and throughout the conspiracy 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 15 of 17

16 
 
and provides context to her decisions. The evidence is only prejudicial because 
any evidence of guilt is prejudicial to a defendant. Her position as a deputy sheriff 
is simply who she is and who she was at the time of the crime. Circumstances 
matter, especially in fraud cases where the elements involve getting into the 
defendant’s mind at the time of the crime. And parsing out Acosta’s employment 
from the presentation of the case, including the BSO Policy Evidence, income, 
and full-time employment, would have been incredibly confusing to a jury. This 
Court did not err.  
Conclusion 
 
This Court should deny Acosta’s Motions for JOA, ECF No. 99, and New 
Trial, ECF No. 100, because the evidence taken in a light most favorable to the 
United States supports the verdict and this Court’s evidentiary rulings were 
legally correct. Even if the Court’s prior rulings were legally incorrect (and they 
are not for all the reasons addressed above), they did not cumulatively inject 
unfair prejudice as to deprive Acosta a fair trial. In short, this is not a case where 
the evidence “preponderates heavily against the verdict” such that it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. Cox, 995 F.2d at 1043.  
Respectfully submitted, 
 
    
MARKENZY LAPOINTE 
  
 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
BY:    Trevor C. Jones 
TREVOR C. JONES 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Fla. Bar No. 0092793 
500 E. Broward Blvd., 7th Floor 
 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 16 of 17

17 
 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 
Tel: (786) 564-9109 
Trevor.Jones@usdoj.gov 
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS   Document 112   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/09/2024   Page 17 of 17

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.flsd.654235.112.0.pdf

Size

181,113 bytes

SHA-256

6324663cc1700e9e5f83672d2e8174222df2ca8dc08c2a9d043bb3df00aeb692

Our copy

gov.uscourts.flsd.654235.112.0.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)