Court filing
Motion for Acquittal (Rule 29, FRCP) by Alexandra Acosta. Responses due by 8/9/2024 — USA v. Alexandra Acosta (Dkt. 99, S.D. Fla.)
Filed July 26, 2024 in USA v. Alexandra Acosta; one of 136 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2024-07-26 |
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60170-RNS · Doc. 99 · 2024-07-26 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
CASE NO. 23-cr-60170-RNS
)
)
ALEXANDRA ACOSTA,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_______________________________)
MOTION JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
COMES NOW, the Defendant, ALEXANDRA ACOSTA (“Acosta”), by and
through the undersigned attorney, and respectfully motions this Court to enter a
judgment of acquittal on counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In support thereof, Acosta states:
KEY
AH
=
Transcript of Althea Harris, SBA [DN-91]
SB
=
Transcript of Sammi Beechan, Cross River Bank [DN-92]
TJ
=
Transcript of Special Agent Tonya Johnson, FRB-OIG [DN-93]
AA
=
Transcript of Alexandra Acosta [DN-97, 98]
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 1 of 21
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.
On March 14, 2024, a superseding indictment was filed that charged
Acosta with the following offenses [DN-23]:
Count 1:
Conspiracy to Defraud the United States
18 U.S.C. § 371
For allegedly conspiring with VILSAINT ST. LOUIS (“St.
Louis”) to submit a fraudulent PPP loan application and a
fraudulent forgiveness application to the SBA to defraud the
United States.
Count 2:
False Statements to the SBA
18 USC § 645(a)
For allegedly making false statements to the SBA in an initial
PPP loan application.
Count 3:
False Statements to the SBA
18 USC § 645(a)
For allegedly making false statements to the SBA in a PPP loan
forgiveness application.
Count 4:
Wire Fraud
18 USC § 1343
For using a fraudulent initial PPP loan application to cause Cross
River Bank to transfer $20,180 in loan proceeds via interstate
wire to Acosta’s account at SunTrust Bank.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 2 of 21
2.
On June 3, 2024, trial commenced on the superseding indictment. At
the close of the government’s case, Acosta made a first motion for judgment of
acquittal. That motion was denied. The Defense then put on a case, Acosta testified,
and Defense evidence was admitted. At the close of all evidence, Acosta made a
second motion for judgment of acquittal, however the Court reserved ruling on that
motion. At the end of trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. The
Court then gave the Defendant an initial deadline of July 19, 2024 to file post-trial
motions, including the instant one, however that deadline was later extended to July
26, 2024. The instant motion follows. A separate motion for new trial is being filed
contemporaneously as well.
SUMMARY OF THE GOVERNMENT’S ALLEGATIONS
3.
This case concerns allegations of Paycheck Protection Program
(“PPP”) fraud. At trial, the government accused Acosta of conspiring with her tax
preparer, VILSAINT ST. LOUIS (“St. Louis”), to obtain a $20,800 PPP loan by
fraud to pay an estimated IRS tax liability of approximately $18,000 that Acosta
incurred due to errors St. Louis made on her taxes.
4.
The government’s case concerned two SBA applications: 1) an initial
PPP loan application and 2) a PPP loan forgiveness application. Both were admitted
into evidence at trial. Exhibit 1 (Loan Application), Exhibit 2 (Forgiveness
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 3 of 21
Application) The superseding indictment accused Acosta of submitting false
statements in both applications.
5.
On February 3, 2021, an initial loan application was submitted with
the SBA that falsely claimed Acosta paid an average monthly payroll of $8,072. That
application was also fraudulently substantiated with doctored tax documents that
overstated Acosta’s business income. Based on these false claims, Acosta’s loan
application was approved and Cross River bank loan Acosta $20,180 that was wired
from Cross River to Acosta’s account at SunTrust.
6.
On April 21, 2021, a forgiveness application was filed with the SBA in
Acosta’s name seeking forgiveness of Acosta’s PPP loan. That application falsely
stated that Acosta used 100% of the loan proceeds to pay payroll when that was not
true. As a result of these false claims, Acosta’s forgiveness application was approved
and the United States paid off Acosta’s loan with Cross River.
BASIS FOR RELIEF
COUNT 1: Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371)
COUNT 3: False Statements to the SBA (18 USC § 645(a))
7.
To understand why relief should be granted in this case, it is first
necessary to understand the distinct roles that the initial loan application and the
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 4 of 21
forgiveness application played in each count. As will be explained below, Counts 1
and 3 are connected in that they both ultimately hinge on the forgiveness application;
whereas, Counts 2 and 4 are connected in that they both ultimately hinge on the
initial loan application.
8.
When the initial loan application was approved, the lender, Cross River
Bank, was the party who was defrauded because they were the party who loaned
Acosta the money – not the United States. [AH, pp.6, line 26 and p.7, lines 1-4] At
that juncture, the United States was merely a guarantor of Acosta’s loan. [AH, p.8,
lines 1-4]. The United States was not defrauded until the SBA approved the
fraudulent forgiveness application and the United States paid off Acosta’s loan.
9.
Thus, Cross River Bank was defrauded by the initial loan application
whereas the United States was defrauded by the forgiveness application. Since Count
1 narrowly accuses Acosta of only defrauding the United States, Count 1 hinges on
the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence concerning the forgiveness
application. Count 3 obviously hinges on that as well.
10.
As will be explained below, this is a fatal problem because the evidence
admitted at trial to prove Acosta knew of the fraudulent components of the
forgiveness application or that she was the person who signed and submitted it to the
SBA was so insufficient that a reasonable jury would find that the evidence failed to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 5 of 21
Exculpatory Evidence Admitted at Trial
11.
Defense Exhibit B, admitted at trial, is an email dated April 21, 2021,
timestamped 2:34 PM EDT, sent from Acosta’s personal Gmail account to St. Louis
at victorytaxes@gmail.com. [AA, p. 37, line 4] Exhibit 3 (Defense Trial Exhibit
B) In this email, Acosta gave St. Louis her Gmail login credentials (login name and
password) so that he could prepare and submit her forgiveness application. Id. The
next page in Exhibit B contains a screenshot that St. Louis texted to Acosta showing
he submitted her forgiveness application to the SBA on her behalf. Id. Following
that screenshot is an email St. Louis sent from victorytaxes@gmail.com to Acosta’s
personal Gmail dated April 21, 2021, timestamped 3:47 PM EDT, forwarding an
email that shows he had successfully submitted her forgiveness application to the
SBA on her behalf. Id. [See also AA, p. 46 line 24 – p. 48, line 7] Acosta received
no other documents or information from St. Louis regarding the forgiveness
application.
12.
Cross River Bank’s representative, SAMMI BEECHAN (“Beechan”),
testified that every single forgiveness application submitted to the SBA or through a
private lender was authenticated using Docusign or another service. [SB, p. 38, line
19-25, p. 39, lines 1-3] Her cross-examination revealed that the signature on the
forgiveness application was not Docusigned and lacked any indicia that it was
authenticated by any signature authentication service. [SB, pp. 38 – 43] The
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 6 of 21
signature on the forgiveness application looked like someone merely typed Acosta’s
name into the application using a cursive font. Frankly, it looked amateurish.
13.
When Beechan was shown a copy of the initial loan application, she
was able to successfully identify and explain the various authenticators marked on
that document when it was Docusigned. [SB, pp. 26-27 and pp. 39-43] Beechan was
able to identify and discuss the Docusign envelope ID number, the distinct Docusign
signature which appears logo-like, and the Docusign certificate. Id. She also testified
that she uses Docusign personally and is familiar with it. Id.
14.
However, when Beechan was presented with the copy of Acosta’s
forgiveness application, she agreed that it was devoid of any identifiers that would
indicate the signature and two sets of initials found on the application were
authenticated using Docusign or another service. [SB, p. 39-43] The forgiveness
application was missing a Docusign style signature, did not have a Docusign
envelope ID number on any page, and had no Docusign certificate – or any other
indicia that would indicate the signature on the forgiveness application was
authentic.
15.
Illustrated below is a simple visual comparison of the signatures found
on the initial loan application, the forgiveness application, and the signature card
from Acosta’s checking account at SunTrust. Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Exhibit 4 (Acosta’s Real
Signature)
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 7 of 21
Initial Loan Application
Forgiveness Application
Acosta’s Real Signature
16.
At the culmination of Ms. Beechan’s cross-examination, the
undersigned showed her the signature contained in the forgiveness application
admitted by the government and the following exchange was had:
Counsel:
How do you know this is Ms. Acosta’s
signature, that she has put there?
How do you know she is the one who
signed this?
Beechan:
I don’t.
SB, p. 43, lines 6-10
17.
During her testimony, Acosta denied any knowledge of the fraudulent
statements in her PPP applications and explained that St. Louis prepared and
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 8 of 21
submitted everything on his own. [AA, p. 48-49] She denied any knowledge of the
false claims he made and said she had no reason to question his honesty or suspect
that he would submit fraudulent information given their near 10-year history as
customer and tax preparer. Id.
Significance of an Unauthenticated Signature
18.
The signatures on the two applications are necessary because they are
a sworn affirmation by the person signing the applications that indicates the contents
of the application are true and correct. The Court is encouraged to review the fine
print contained above the signature. Because the signature in these applications is a
sworn affirmation that the claims made in the application were true, the signature
must be authentic to have any effect.
19.
Althea Harris agreed during her redirect when she stated that the
signature indicated “that they [the applicant] understood what they were doing, that
they filled out the form and certified that the numbers were right, and correct,
that they were eligible for the money. And, one of the bullets there on the form said
that, that they needed the money.” [AH, p. 61] Yet that is exactly where the
government’s case came short. However, the evidence admitted during trial failed to
establish that Acosta signed and submitted these applications. On the contrary, the
evidence proves that St. Louis is the one who signed and submitted them and is
therefore the person who actually attested to their veracity, not Acosta.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 9 of 21
20.
The evidence admitted at trial, such as the emails, only proved that
Acosta knew St. Louis submitted a forgiveness application on her behalf using her
Gmail login and password and that the application was later approved and her loan
was forgiven. There is no evidence that she knew the claims made in the applications
were false. There is no evidence that shows Acosta was the person who signed or
submitted the forgiveness application or that she authorized St. Louis to submit false
information on her behalf. Because Acosta’s purported signature on the forgiveness
application was never authenticated, the government failed to sufficiently prove that
she knew of or affirmed the false statements in the application.
21.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s
verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could not find that the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence establishing Acosta’s knowledge
of the fraud or her involvement in the preparation, signature and submission of the
fraudulent applications was totally insufficient and was also rebutted by credible
exculpatory evidence.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 10 of 21
COUNT 2: FALSE STATEMENTS TO THE SBA (18 USC § 645(a))
COUNT 4: WIRE FRAUD (18 USC § 1343)
22.
Counts 2 and 4 are connected in that they both focus on and concern
the initial loan application. Count 2 accused Acosta of making false statements in
the initial loan application only (it does not accuse of her of making false statements
in the forgiveness application). Per paragraph 32 of the superseding indictment,
Count 4 charged Acosta with wire fraud for causing the lender of her PPP loan (Cross
River Bank) to wire the loan proceeds, $20,180, to Acosta’s account at SunTrust. It
should be emphasized that Count 4 does not charge Acosta with wire fraud for
causing the United States to wire proceeds to Cross River Bank after approving the
forgiveness application. In other words, Count 4 is limited in scope to the initial loan
application.
23.
The evidence admitted at trial to prove Acosta made false statements in
her initial loan application or that she was responsible for the false statements in that
application that caused Cross River to wire money to her SunTrust account was so
insufficient that a reasonable jury would find that the evidence failed to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 11 of 21
ANALYSIS
Exculpatory Evidence Admitted at Trial
24.
At trial, the government called an SBA employee named ALTHEA
HARRIS (“Harris”) to testify. Through her testimony, the government admitted a
copy of Acosta’s initial PPP loan application. The admitted loan application
contained a Docusign certificate that was generated when the application was
Docusigned and submitted to the SBA. This certificate memorialized all the
authentication data that was recorded when the loan application was purportedly
Docusigned by Acosta. Ex. 1 Harris testified that this loan application was submitted
to the SBA and was ultimately approved. Once approved, the lender, Cross River
Bank, wired the loan proceeds, $20,180, to Acosta’s account at SunTrust.
25.
During cross-examination, the undersigned inspected the Docusign
evidence with Mrs. Harris. After a painstakingly long review of the loan application
before the jury, Mrs. Harris confirmed that the unique envelope ID number recorded
on the Docusign certificate matched the envelope ID number printed on every page
of the loan application. Mrs. Harris also confirmed that the Docusign certificate for
the loan application recorded 4 signatures and 12 initials, which correctly
corresponded to the number of signatures and initials in the SBA’s initial loan
application. Mrs. Harris also confirmed that the Docusign certificate indicated that
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 12 of 21
the loan application was signed by a user identifying as “Alexandra Acosta” from
alexacosta03@gmail.com using IP address 73.56.139.104.
26.
Mrs. Harris also testified that the certificate contained the following
timestamps:
Sent:
2/3/2021
6:32:22 AM
Viewed:
2/3/2021
6:32:39 AM
Signed:
2/3/2021
6:33:06 AM
According to these timestamps, the loan application was viewed and signed in less
than 44 seconds, which indicates whoever put the 4 signatures and 12 initials on this
multi-page, small print, single-spaced document did so without reading it first.
73.56.139.104 Belongs to St. Louis and
Proves He Docusigned Acosta’s Loan Application
27.
Evidence admitted at trial proves that IP address 73.56.139.104 belongs
to St. Louis. SA TONYA JOHNSON, the lead agent in the case, admitted that
herinvestigation revealed IP address 73.56.139.104 is associated with St. Louis. [TJ,
pp. 8-12] No evidence was admitted that associated 73.56.139.104 with Acosta.
28.
Not only did 73.56.139.104 appear in the Docusign certificate
generated when Acosta’s loan application was signed and submitted, but it also
appeared in a login record form a third-party loan servicer named Bluevine that was
admitted by the government at trial. Exhibit 5 (Bluevine Logs) During cross-
examination, Beechan successfully reviewed the portion of the logs that recorded St.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 13 of 21
Loui’s IP address, 73.56.139.104. [SB, p. 31 (line 19) – p. 33] In total, IP address
73.56.139.104 was recorded four different times during the initial loan application
process. No other IP address was ever recorded, including any IP address associated
with Acosta.
29.
SA Johnson further testified that Acosta, through the undersigned,
provided the government with a subpoena return obtained from Docusign. [TJ, p. 8,
line 14) – p. 13, line 11)] In its return, Docusign produced a Docusign certificate that
recorded a user identifying as “Vilsaint St. Louis” as having signed a document from
the SBA on December 10, 2020 (well before Acosta’s application was submitted)
from victorytaxes@gmail.com using IP address 73.56.139.104. Id. Exhibit 6 (St.
Louis Docusign) It is undisputed that St. Louis’ email address is
victorytaxes@gmail.com and that all the email exchanges he had with Acosta that
were admitted at trial clearly show his email address as victorytaxes@gmail.com.
Exhibit 7 (Defense Trial Exhibits B & D)
30.
Additionally, Acosta’s testimony that she gave her Gmail login
credentials to St. Louis so that he could prepare and submit the initial loan
application was substantiated by emails that she did the same thing when it came
time to submit the forgiveness application. Ex. 7 The fact that she gave him her
Gmail login credentials explains how he was able to Docusign and submit the initial
loan application using her personal email account. It explains how Acosta appears
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 14 of 21
to be the person responsible for signing and submitting the fraudulent loan
application when in fact it was St. Louis the whole time. A reasonable jury would
not disregard this conflict and would find that the government failed to prove its
allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
31.
In her testimony, Acosta explained that she knew St. Louis for almost 9
years as her tax preparer and that he had prepared her taxes every years since about
2012. [AA. p. 13, lines 11-16] She explained that she trusted him and no reason to
question his honest. [AA, p. 16 – 17] She also explained that he had handled her
personal financial information every year for many years to prepare her taxes and
never had a problem. Id.
32.
Acosta explained that she gave St. Louis her Gmail login credentials
two times. [AA, p. 26] The first time was on a sticky note so that St. Louis could
prepare and submit the initial loan application. Id. The second time was via email so
that St. Louis could prepare and submit the forgiveness application. Id. Ex. 7 There
was also a third email where Acosta shared her Home Depot login credentials with
St. Louis. Id. The Home Depot email is relevant to show a pattern and course of
conduct, namely that Acosta is telling the truth when she said she gave St. Louis
access to her Gmail account so that he could prepare and submit her PPP
applications.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 15 of 21
ARGUMENT
33.
While Acosta and St. Louis agreed that St. Louis would submit an initial
loan application and a forgiveness application on Acosta’s behalf, there was no
evidence of any agreement to submit fraudulent applications. Additionally, no
evidence was admitted that proves Acosta actually knew of the fraud that St. Louis
was committing or that she knowingly and voluntarily participated in his fraud.
On the contrary, the exculpatory evidence discussed above would inform a
reasonable jury that the government failed to prove these elements of conspiracy
beyond a reasonable doubt.
34.
To take the government’s side, the jury needed to unreasonably ignore
the IP address in the Docusign certificates and the Bluevine logs, the emails that
show Acosta gave her Gmail login credentials to St. Louis, and that he submitted the
forgiveness application. Ex. 1, Ex. 7
35.
Just like the forgiveness application in Counts 1 and 3 above, when an
applicant signs the initial loan application, they are in essence making a sworn
statement affirming the truthfulness of the application, its contents, supporting
documents, and their agreement to its terms and conditions.
36.
So long as there is a question about whether or not Acosta actually
signed and submitted those applications, it can never be said that she was the person
who attested to the veracity of their contents even though her name was used. If she
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 16 of 21
was not the person who attested to the veracity of their contents or submitted the
applications, then she is not the person liable for misleading the SBA.
37.
While Acosta may have generally consented to St. Louis preparing and
submitting the applications, there is simply insufficient evidence establishing that
she was aware of or consented to their false contents. As a result, a reasonable jury
would find that the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
38.
Additionally, Althea Harris’ painstaking review of the loan application
and loan documents revealed that there was no clear indication to an applicant or
borrower regarding what exactly they were allowed to use the money for and what
exactly they were not allowed to use the money for. Additionally, there is no clear
indication to an applicant or borrower about the difference between an expenditure
of loan proceeds that would qualify/disqualify them from forgiveness versus an
expenditure of loan proceeds that would be criminal (other than the obvious illegal
use of any money). These distinctions are material because they go to Acosta’s state
of mind and her knowledge.
39.
Given that the offenses charged in this case required a finding of
knowledge and willfulness, the evidence proving Acosta did anything criminal in
how she spent the money is totally insufficient because there is no clear indication
that she fairly knew what she was permitted to spend the money on versus what she
was not permitted to spend the money on. The only evidence on the subject is
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 17 of 21
Acosta’s testimony that St. Louis advised her the money did not only have to be
spent on payroll and could be spent on other things.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
40.
“Whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a jury's
verdict in a criminal trial is reviewed de novo, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2009) citing United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000) A
court “is obliged to resolve any conflicts in favor of the Government, draw all
reasonable inferences that tend to support the prosecution's case, and assume that the
jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict.” Maxwell at 1299
citing United States v. Thompson, 473 F.3d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1079 (11th Cir. 1999) “Evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. citing United States v. Calhoon, 97
F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).
41.
“In rebutting the Government's evidence, ‘[i]t is not enough for a
defendant to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, because the issue is not
whether a jury reasonably could have acquitted but whether it reasonably could not
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. citing Thompson at 1142.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 18 of 21
42.
“For sufficiency purposes, the evidence need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the question is whether a reasonable trier
of fact, when choosing among reasonable constructions of the evidence, could have
found the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” U.S. v. Knowles, 66 F.3d
1146, 1154 (11th Cir. 1995) A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions
of the evidence. U.S. v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001
43.
In a conspiracy case, there must be “substantial evidence” connecting
an accused to a conspiracy. Alternative characterizations of the standard refer to the
“reasonably minded jury” test. See generally U.S. v. Clavis, 977 F.2d 538, 539 (11th
Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Baker, 432 F.3d
1189, 1231-1232 n.49 & n.50 (11th Cir. 2005).
44.
To sustain a conspiracy conviction the Court must conclude that a
reasonable fact-finder could determine that: 1) an agreement existed between two or
more persons; 2) that the defendant knew of the general purpose of the agreement;
and 3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the agreement.
U.S. v. High, 117 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1997)
45.
To prove the existence of a “scheme to defraud” the government had to
show that Acosta misrepresented or concealed a material fact. United States v.
Slaton, 801 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2015), See United States v. Maxwell, 579
F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) “A scheme to defraud ‘requires proof of material
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 19 of 21
misrepresentations, or the omission or concealment of material facts reasonably
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence.’” Maxwell at 1299
CONLCUSION
46.
The claim that Acosta knew of the fraudulent contents of these
applications has never been sufficiently proven with evidence. At the close of all
evidence, there was a MAJOR reasonable doubt as to whether or not Acosta actually
knew these applications contained false information or that she was the person who
prepared, signed, or submitted them, or that St. Louis did so with her actual
knowledge and approval. The evidence failed to establish that Acosta was the person
who affirmed the veracity of the applications with a signature when they were
submitted. The initial application fails because of the reasonable doubt created by
the IP address evidence and the emails proving Acosta shared her Gmail login
credentials. The forgiveness application fails because there is no evidence that
proved the signature on the application authentically Acosta’s or that it was placed
by another person at her direction. There is simply not enough evidence to establish
a sufficient connection between Acosta and the fraudulent components of the alleged
conspiracy (the most important part). Based on all of the foregoing, a reasonably
minded jury would have found that the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on all counts.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 99 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/26/2024 Page 20 of 21
WHEREFORE, the Defendant and the undersigned respectfully motion this
Court to enter a judgment of acquittal on all counts (Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4), forthwith.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Brian Silber
______________________________
Brian Silber, Esq.
Counsel for Alexandra Acosta
Florida Bar #: 0640646
916 South Andrews Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
954-462-3636 (ofc)
silberlaw@gmail.com
briansilberlaw.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of this document was served on the
following parties via CM/ECF on July 26, 2024.
SERVICE LIST
AUSA Trevor Jones
U.S. Attorney’s Office SDFL
500 E. Broward Blvd, 7th Floor
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33394
786-564-9109
trevor.jones@usdoj.gov
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