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Home Court filings East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr Court-Ordered Supplemental Brief on Nationwide Injunction — East Bay Sanctuary v. Barr (N.D. Cal.)

Court filing

Court-Ordered Supplemental Brief on Nationwide Injunction — East Bay Sanctuary v. Barr (N.D. Cal.)

Filed August 22, 2019 in East Bay Sanctuary v. Barr; one of 69 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
Filed2019-08-22

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · No. 3:19-cv-04073-JST · Doc. 63 · 2019-08-22 · Docket on CourtListener

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Katrina Eiland (SBN 275701) 
Cody Wofsy (SBN 294179) 
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069) 
Julie Veroff (SBN 310161) 
ACLU FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T: (415) 343-0770 
F: (415) 395-0950 
keiland@aclu.org 
cwofsy@aclu.org  
samdur@aclu.org 
jveroff@aclu.org  
 
Lee Gelernt* 
Omar C. Jadwat* 
Anand Balakrishnan* 
ACLU FOUNDATION 
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
T: (212) 549-2660 
F: (212) 549-2654 
lgelernt@aclu.org 
ojadwat@aclu.org 
abalakrishnan@aclu.org 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
(Additional counsel listed on following page)   
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant; Al Otro Lado; 
Innovation Law Lab; and Central American 
Resource Center in Los Angeles, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
William Barr, Attorney General, in his official 
capacity; U.S. Department of Justice; James 
McHenry, Director of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, in his official capacity; the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review; Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in his official capacity; U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; Ken Cuccinelli, Acting 
Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, in his official capacity; U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services; John Sanders, 
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, in his official capacity; U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection; Matthew Albence, Acting 
Director of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, in his official capacity; Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073-JST 
 
COURT-ORDERED 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ 
EMERGENCY MOTION TO 
RESTORE THE NATIONWIDE 
SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION  
  
 
Case 3:19-cv-04073-JST   Document 63   Filed 08/22/19   Page 1 of 19

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Melissa Crow* 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 
1101 17th Street, NW Suite 705 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
T: (202) 355-4471 
F: (404) 221-5857 
melissa.crow@splcenter.org 
 
Mary Bauer* 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 
1000 Preston Avenue 
Charlottesville, VA  22903 
T:  (470) 606-9307 
F:  (404) 221-5857 
mary.bauer@splcenter.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
*Admitted Pro hac vice  
**Pro hac vice application forthcoming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baher Azmy** 
Angelo Guisado** 
Ghita Schwarz** 
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
666 Broadway, 7th Floor 
New York, NY 10012 
T: (212) 614-6464 
F: (212) 614-6499 
bazmy@ccrjustice.org 
aguisado@ccrjustice.org 
gschwarz@ccrjustice.org 
 
Christine P. Sun (SBN 218701) 
Vasudha Talla (SBN 316219) 
Angélica Salceda (SBN 296152) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA, INC. 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T: (415) 621-2493 
F: (415) 255-8437 
csun@aclunc.org 
vtalla@aclunc.org 
asalceda@aclunc.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:19-cv-04073-JST   Document 63   Filed 08/22/19   Page 2 of 19

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i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 
I. NATIONWIDE RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE. ............................. 2 
A. Nationwide Relief is Necessary to Remedy Plaintiffs’ Specific Harms. ........... 3 
B. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary and Appropriate Given the Violations  
Shown. ........................................................................................................ 9 
C. Nationwide Relief Is Appropriate Given the Need for Uniformity in the 
Immigration Context. ................................................................................ 10 
D. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary to Avoid Serious Administrability  
Problems. .................................................................................................. 11 
E. The Equities Tip Sharply in Favor of Nationwide Relief................................. 12 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ii 
 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen,  
279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ............................................................................................ 11  
Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp.,  
822 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................................................... 2 
Califano v. Yamasaki,  
422 U.S. 682 (1979) .......................................................................................................................... 9 
California v. Azar, 
 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................................................... 2, 8 
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 
 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................. 1, 3, 8 
Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton,  
626 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................................................ 2 
Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck,  
490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................... 9, 10 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,  
349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .............................................................................................. 9 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 
 2018 WL 8807133 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018) ............................................................................. passim 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,  
354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ........................................................................................ 1, 8 
Harmon v. Thornburgh,  
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .......................................................................................................... 9 
Hawaii v. Trump,  
878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) .......................................................................................................... 10 
Inland Steel Co. v. United States,  
306 U.S. 153 (1939) ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Kansas v. Nebraska,  
135 S.Ct. 1042 (2015) ..................................................................................................................... 12 
Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 
 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................................... 13 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,  
411 U.S. 192 (1973) .......................................................................................................................... 2 
Milliken v. Bradley,  
433 U.S. 267 (1977) .......................................................................................................................... 9 
Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s,  
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 9, 10 
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,  
656 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................................................... 10 
Pa. v. President United States,  
930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019)................................................................................................ 2, 8, 9, 12 
Pa. v. Trump,  
351 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2019) ........................................................................................ 10, 12 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS,  
908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................ 8, 9, 10, 11 
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iii 
 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS,  
279 F.3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ..................................................................................................... 11 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,  
555 U.S. 488 (2009) ........................................................................................................................ 10 
Texas v. United States,  
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................... 10, 11 
Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant,  
139 S.Ct. 782 (2018) ......................................................................................................................... 8 
Washington v. Trump,  
847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................................ 10 
 
Statutes 
5 U.S.C. § 706 ....................................................................................................................................... 9 
 
Other Authorities 
Wright & Miller, Retained Jurisdiction, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3937.1 (3d ed.) ...................... 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every consideration relevant to whether nationwide injunctive relief is necessary and 
appropriate—the scope of Plaintiffs’ harms, the nature and extent of the legal violations, the need for 
uniformity in the immigration context, administrability, and the equities—weighs strongly in favor 
of nationwide relief in this case.  This Court correctly issued a nationwide preliminary injunction in 
the first instance and, now with the additional benefit of a supplemented record regarding Plaintiffs’ 
harms,  should restore the nationwide scope of that injunction.1  
BACKGROUND 
This Court issued an order preliminarily enjoining the challenged Interim Final Rule 
nationwide on July 24, 2019.  See ECF No. 42 (Preliminary Injunction Order).  The government 
sought an administrative stay and a stay pending appeal from the Ninth Circuit.  See No. 19-16487 
(9th Cir.), Dkt. 3-1.  The Ninth Circuit motions panel denied the government’s request for an 
administrative stay that same day.  See id., Dkt. 19.  On August 16, 2019, the motions panel denied 
the government’s request for a stay “insofar as the injunction applies within the Ninth Circuit.”  Id., 
Dkt. 30 (Stay Order) at 3.   
The motions panel did not disturb this Court’s conclusions about Plaintiffs’ likelihood of 
success on the merits or the equities, and agreed that the government has “not made the required 
‘strong showing’ that they are likely to succeed on the merits on [the notice-and-comment] issue.”  
                                                 
1 The Ninth Circuit’s Stay Order specifically instructs that “[w]hile this appeal proceeds, the district 
court retains jurisdiction to further develop the record in support of a preliminary injunction 
extending beyond the Ninth Circuit.”  Stay Order at 8-9.; see also id. at 9 (“Because the record is 
insufficiently developed as to the question of the national scope of the injunction, we vacate the 
injunction to the extent that it applies outside California and remand to the district court for a more 
searching inquiry into whether this case justifies the breadth of the injunction imposed.”) (quoting 
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018)).  Accordingly, there is 
no question the Court has authority to make factual findings and revise the scope of the injunction 
while the remainder of the case is on appeal.  See Wright & Miller, Retained Jurisdiction, 16 Fed. 
Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3937.1 (3d ed.) (explaining that “the courts of appeals often have retained 
jurisdiction while making a limited remand for additional findings or explanations”); East Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1105 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (noting a district 
court’s authority to “assist the court of appeals in the exercise of its jurisdiction, such as by fil[ing] 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the preliminary injunction order on 
appeal”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 
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2 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
Id.  However, the motions panel limited the scope of the injunction to the Ninth Circuit.  Id.  
Critically, though, the panel recognized that a nationwide injunction of the Rule could well be 
appropriate.  But before it would uphold nationwide relief in this case, the panel required further 
record evidence and findings by this Court connecting that scope of relief to Plaintiffs’ injuries.  Id. 
at 3-6.  Accordingly, the motions panel provided that “[w]hile [the preliminary injunction] appeal 
proceeds, the district court retains jurisdiction to further develop the record in support of a 
preliminary injunction extending beyond the Ninth Circuit.”  Id. at 8-9. 
Consistent with that express permission from the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs filed an emergency 
motion on August 19, 2019, respectfully requesting that the Court consider additional evidence in 
support of a nationwide injunction, and, based on supplemental findings of fact, restore the 
nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction.  See ECF No. 57-1 (Mot.).  This Court then issued a 
Scheduling Order, and “invite[d] the Plaintiffs to file an amended brief in support of their motion” 
that contained additional “legal briefing . . . on the legal framework for the issuance of a nationwide 
injunction.”  ECF No. 59.2   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NATIONWIDE RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE. 
A district court’s authority to issue equitable nationwide relief is undisputed.  See Pa. v. 
President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 575 (3d Cir. 2019).  “In shaping equity decrees, the trial court 
is vested with broad discretionary power.”  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (plurality 
opinion).  That is so because “equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is 
fair, and what is workable.”  Id.  See also Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (“District courts have broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to 
remedy an established wrong.”) (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 475 (9th Cir. 
2010)).  Accordingly, “[t]he scope of the preliminary injunction, such as its nationwide effect, is . . . 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2018).  
                                                 
2 For the convenience of the Court and parties, Plaintiffs have incorporated the arguments from their 
initial brief into this brief. 
 
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3 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have articulated several considerations that are 
relevant to determining the appropriate scope of an injunction.  Every single one favors nationwide 
relief here.   
A. Nationwide Relief is Necessary to Remedy Plaintiffs’ Specific Harms. 
As the Ninth Circuit motions panel explained, a nationwide injunction is appropriate when 
that scope of relief is “necessary to remedy a plaintiff’s harm.”  Stay Order at 4.  The original 
declarations filed in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, see ECF Nos. 3-
2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, and the supplemental declarations in support of Plaintiffs’ recent emergency motion, 
see ECF Nos. 57-2 (Supp. Manning Decl.), 57-3 (Supp. Smith Decl.), 57-4 (Ramos Decl.), 57-5 
(Alvarez Decl.), 57-6 (Reichlin-Melnick Decl.), amply demonstrate that the injunction in this case 
must be nationwide “to remedy the specific harm shown” to Plaintiffs, Stay Order at 4 (quoting City 
& Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1243-45 (9th Cir. 2018)).  See also East Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (“East Bay II”), 2018 WL 8807133, at *24 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2018) 
(holding that a nationwide injunction of the first asylum ban was “necessary to provide the 
plaintiffs”—the same four organizations that are Plaintiffs here—“with complete redress”) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
As set forth below, Plaintiffs have specific reasons why a nationwide injunction is necessary 
to remedy the harms to their organizations.   
Innovation Law Lab: Law Lab’s operations are not limited to the Ninth Circuit.  In addition 
to its work in the Ninth Circuit, Law Lab has offices in Georgia, Missouri, and Texas; operates pro 
bono representation projects in Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, and North Carolina, with expansion 
underway to New Mexico; and provides direct representation to persons applying for asylum outside 
the Ninth Circuit.  See Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.  And six of the seven detention centers at which 
Law Lab regularly works are outside the Ninth Circuit.  Id. ¶ 19.  Given Law Lab’s national scope, 
an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit would not fully remedy the harm to the organization. 
First, because Law Lab provides training, materials, and overall legal assistance to other 
organizations and asylum seekers throughout the country, the harm to Law Lab will not be remedied 
by an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit.  Among other things, Law Lab currently uses 
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4 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
synchronized templates and materials across its program sites.  A geographically limited injunction 
will force it to abandon this practice, and will require it to meaningfully restructure its operations to 
effectively serve persons who are subject to the transit ban as well as persons who are not.  Id. ¶¶ 7-
8, 13-14, 20.   
Second, the fact that Law Lab directly represents individuals outside the Ninth Circuit means 
that an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit is insufficient.  Id. ¶ 15. 
Moreover, providing legal guidance and assistance to persons subject to the Rule will be a 
significant burden on Law Lab employees’ time and program operations, as these persons will now 
only be eligible for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  
Those forms of relief are more time consuming than asylum to pursue, as they involve higher 
burdens of proof than asylum and require the development of distinct and more in-depth legal 
analyses.  They also do not permit derivative applications to be filed on behalf of family members.  
In addition, Law Lab will have to retrain its volunteers on these forms of relief and adjust how it 
screens individuals for relief.  Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.   
And, importantly, because asylum seekers often move between different locations—and 
between judicial circuits—during their proceedings, Law Lab’s ability to provide legal assistance 
workshops will be hindered.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 16.  For instance, at Law Lab’s workshops in Tijuana for 
individuals about to seek asylum in the United States, Law Lab will not always know where they 
will cross or where their asylum proceedings will be conducted, and therefore will have difficulty 
properly advising them.  Indeed, the number of asylum seekers Law Lab serves in Tijuana who end 
up in detention centers in Louisiana and Mississippi after entering in the Ninth Circuit has been 
increasing significantly.  Id. ¶ 12.  See also Reichlin-Melnick Decl. (discussing movement of asylum 
seekers across jurisdictions).3  As a result, it will now be impossible simply to provide all of these 
asylum seekers and their legal representatives with one set of guidelines. 
                                                 
3 The Reichlin-Melnick declaration analyzes recent statistics from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review demonstrating that asylum seekers 
frequently move throughout the country during the asylum process, either by their choice or because 
DHS transfers detained asylum seekers from one detention center to another.  This data reveals that 
 
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5 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
Finally, an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit not only will frustrate Law Lab’s 
operations outside the Ninth Circuit, but will adversely impact its programs within the Ninth Circuit 
as well.  Because serving individuals affected by the Rule’s categorical ban is so time consuming, 
Law Lab will have to direct significant resources towards their representation, which will negatively 
affect clients in the Ninth Circuit and may force Law Lab to serve fewer people overall.  Supp. 
Manning Decl. ¶ 17.  
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (EBSC): The harms caused to EBSC by the Rule, see ECF No. 
3-2, will persist if the Rule is allowed to go into effect everywhere other than the Ninth Circuit, see 
Supp. Smith Decl. ¶ 4.  Part of EBSC’s mission is to serve clients in affirmative asylum cases 
regardless of where they entered the United States.  Accordingly, EBSC serves clients who enter the 
United States anywhere in the country, not just the Ninth Circuit.  A sizable portion of EBSC’s 
clients enter the United States outside the Ninth Circuit’s geographic boundaries and then end up in 
California, where they apply for asylum.  More than 22% of the affirmative asylum applications 
EBSC filed in 2019 were on behalf of clients who transited through Mexico without applying for 
protection there and then entered the United States in Texas or New Mexico, i.e., outside the Ninth 
Circuit.  If the organization is unable to serve a sizable portion of its client base in affirmative 
asylum cases, its mission will be frustrated, and a core part of its operations will be undermined.  Id. 
¶¶ 5, 7.  
For the same reason, an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit also jeopardizes EBSC’s 
funding streams.  Pursuant to a grant from the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), 
EBSC receives $2,000 for every affirmative asylum case it files.  If, because of the Rule, EBSC is no 
longer able to handle affirmative asylum cases for individuals who transit through a third country en 
route to the southern border and enter outside the Ninth Circuit, the organization likely will face a 
marked decrease in its budget.  Indeed, if the Rule is allowed to remain in effect outside the Ninth 
Circuit, EBSC estimates that it could lose up to $50,000 under the terms of its CDSS grant during 
the rest of 2019 and up to $100,000 in 2020.  Id. ¶ 8.  
                                                 
there is almost no connection between asylum seekers’ place of entry and ultimate destination.  
Reichlin-Melnick Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 14-15. 
 
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6 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
Because of the strain imposed on EBSC if the Rule remains in effect outside of the Ninth 
Circuit, EBSC will either have to significantly cut its affirmative asylum program and staff, or 
overhaul its program to provide types of assistance it is not currently equipped or trained to provide.  
Id. ¶ 9.  Notably, EBSC does not currently have sufficient capacity or expertise to handle 
applications for humanitarian relief in the removal context.  Yet to continue serving clients affected 
by the Rule, EBSC will have to shift to representing those individuals in removal cases.  Doing so 
would be extremely resource intensive for EBSC.  Id. ¶ 10.  EBSC will also be burdened by having 
to provide different services to those subject to the Rule and those not subject to the Rule.  Id. ¶¶ 12-
13.  
CARECEN: The injuries inflicted on CARECEN by the Rule, see ECF No. 3-5, will persist 
if the Rule is not enjoined nationwide, see Alvarez Decl. ¶ 4.  CARECEN represents Central 
American asylum seekers regardless of where they enter the United States.  Nearly all of 
CARECEN’s current asylum clients entered through the southern border after transiting through a 
third country without applying for protection there, and at least 60% of those individuals entered 
outside of the Ninth Circuit.  Id. ¶ 5. Thus, the majority of CARECEN’s asylum clients could still be 
subject to the Rule’s categorical bar on asylum under an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit.  Id.    
CARECEN would be forced to divert significant resources to serve these clients, as they would only 
be eligible for far more resource-intensive forms of relief, such as withholding and CAT protection.  
Id. ¶¶ 8-9.  Despite having to devote significantly increased resources to such applications, 
CARECEN’s main source of funding for its asylum work pays a fixed amount per case.  This will 
significantly strain the organization’s budget.  Id. ¶ 9. 
In addition, CARECEN will have to undertake time consuming screening efforts to 
determine whether a prospective client is subject to the Rule under a geographically limited 
injunction.  Prospective clients who call CARECEN’s offices for representation frequently do not 
have paperwork showing where they entered the country or other geographical information that may 
be relevant to the applicability of the Rule.  Id. ¶ 11.  CARECEN staff therefore will have to do 
additional investigation and screening to determine whether the Rule is likely to apply.  Id.  It will 
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7 
 
Supp. Brief in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief 
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073 
 
also have to bifurcate its operations to provide different services to those subject to the Rule and 
those not subject to it.  Id. ¶¶ 10-11.  
Al Otro Lado: Al Otro Lado will continue to suffer injuries if the Rule is enjoined only in the 
Ninth Circuit.  See ECF No. 3-3; Ramos Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.  Of the thousands of noncitizens Al Otro Lado 
serves through its offices in Tijuana, Mexico, not all cross the border in the Ninth Circuit.  Rather, 
some ultimately enter the United States elsewhere, including Texas and New Mexico.  Id. ¶ 5.  It is 
impossible for Al Otro Lado to know with certainty ex ante where a given asylum seeker whom they 
serve ultimately will enter the United States.  Id. ¶¶ 5-8.4   As a result, they will now have to provide 
burdensome additional guidance to ensure that individuals understand the Rule’s impact in different 
parts of the United States.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 
Likewise, Al Otro Lado serves individuals who end up outside the Ninth Circuit for their 
asylum proceedings.  Al Otro Lado clients who entered the United States along the southern border 
in California have ended up in Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin.  Id. ¶ 6.  This cross-circuit movement happens because of where a given asylum seeker 
goes to live after entry or release from detention.  Importantly, moreover, this cross-circuit 
movement also happens because the government chooses where to detain a given asylum seeker, and 
thus the government will have critical control over the benefits of a circuit-wide injunction.  Id.  See 
also Reichlin-Melnick Decl.  In Al Otro Lado’s experience, this cross-circuit movement is quite 
common, particularly for unaccompanied minors.  Ramos Decl. ¶ 7.  As with the uncertainty about 
ultimate border-crossing locations, it is impossible for Al Otro Lado to know for certain where an 
individual they advise will end up following their arrival in the United States.  Id. ¶ 8.  
As a result, if the Rule is only enjoined in certain parts of the country, rather than nationwide, 
Al Otro Lado will have to advise asylum seekers without knowing whether they will ultimately be 
subject to the Rule’s categorical asylum bar or not.  To fulfill their professional obligations, Al Otro 
Lado will have to account for all possibilities in giving advice.  Having to do so will require Al Otro 
                                                 
4 Law Lab’s declaration makes the same point that the organization does not know in advance where 
asylum seekers it serves in Mexico will enter the United States or where they will travel around the 
country during the asylum process.  Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16. 
 
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Lado to expend significant organizational resources regarding training materials, staff time, and 
capacity, and will create a serious burden for the organization.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10.   
* * * 
 
Based on a very similar record, this Court and the Ninth Circuit enjoined the first asylum ban 
nationwide.  Judge Bybee, writing for the Ninth Circuit motions panel in that case, explained that 
enjoining the ban nationwide was “necessary to provide the plaintiffs . . . with complete redress.”  
East Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *24 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 908 F.3d 476, 
512 (9th Cir. 2018)).  The government asked the Supreme Court to vacate the stay in full, or in the 
alternative, to narrow the injunction, but the Supreme Court did not narrow the injunction’s 
nationwide scope.  See Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S.Ct. 782 (2018) (denying stay).  
The record of harm from the current asylum ban to Plaintiffs absent a nationwide injunction is even 
stronger than the record in that case.  This record of nationwide harm is also more developed than 
the records in Azar and City and County of San Francisco.  Cf. Pa. v. President United States, 930 
F.3d at 575 n.32 (affirming nationwide injunction in a similar challenge to that brought in Azar in 
part because “the record before us is substantially more developed”).  
 
Unlike the state and locality plaintiffs in Azar, 911 F.3d at 566, 569, and City and County of 
San Francisco, 897 F.3d at 1231, Plaintiffs here “do not operate in a fashion that permits neat 
geographic boundaries.”  East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1120-21 
(N.D. Cal. 2018).  As noted, Law Lab operates in various states all across the country, and Law Lab, 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, CARECEN, and Al Otro Lado all serve asylum seekers who enter the 
United States at various places along the southern border, not just within the Ninth Circuit.  In 
addition, individuals that Al Otro Lado and Law Lab serve ultimately enter and apply for asylum in 
various regions of the country, but the organizations cannot know which regions in advance.   
 
For these reasons and on this record, on the factor of remedying the harm to Plaintiffs alone, 
the Court would be well within its discretion to reinstate the nationwide scope of the preliminary 
injunction.  
 
 
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B. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary and Appropriate Given the Violations Shown. 
In addition, as the Ninth Circuit and this Court explained in the first East Bay case, “the 
scope of [a] remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the . . . violation,” and “not by the 
geographical extent of the plaintiff.”  East Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *24 (quoting Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 270 (1977) and Califano v. Yamasaki, 422 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)); East Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump (“East Bay I”), 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 866 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (same).  
This principle is “well-settled.”  Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281.   
This Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that the first asylum ban was likely unlawful on 
its face, and not merely in its application to specific plaintiffs, and so enjoined it nationwide.  See 
East Bay I, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 867 (“Because the Court here concludes as a preliminary matter that 
the Rule is unlawful because it conflicts with the INA, it is unlawful as applied to anyone.”); East 
Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *4, 17-23, 24.  As was true in that case, the Rule here is unlawful on 
its face, and not merely in its application to specific plaintiffs.   
Relatedly, “[a] ‘nationwide injunction . . . is [also] compelled by the text of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in relevant part: . . . The reviewing court shall . . . 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions of law found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’”  East Bay I, 
349 F. Supp. 3d at 867 (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706)) (emphasis and alterations in original).  Given the plain language of the APA, 
it is therefore “clear that ‘[w]hen a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, 
the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual 
petitioners is proscribed.’”  Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  See 
also Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 908 F.3d at 511 (same); Pa. v. President United States, 930 F.3d at 
575 (“[O]ur APA case law suggests that, at the merits stage, courts invalidate—without 
qualification—unlawful administrative rules as a matter of course, leaving their predecessors in 
place until the agencies can take further action.  Congress determined that rule-vacatur was not 
unnecessarily burdensome on agencies when it provided vacatur as a standard remedy for APA 
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violations.”) (citations omitted); Pa. v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 831 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“[T]he 
national character of an APA violation ‘ordinar[ily]’ demands a national remedy.”) (quoting Nat’l 
Min. Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1409), aff’d, 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019).  Courts accordingly have long 
vacated unlawful agency actions nationwide.  See, e.g., Nat’l Min. Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1409-10; 
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 656 F.3d 580, 589 (7th 
Cir. 2011); Earth Island Inst., 490 F.3d at 699, rev’d on other grounds, Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).   
Here, the Rule is unlawful under the APA as applied to everyone, not just Plaintiffs, and a 
nationwide injunction is the “ordinary” and proper result in such situations.  See Nat’l Min. Ass’n, 
145 F.3d at 1409; East Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *24 (explaining that nationwide relief “is 
commonplace in APA cases”) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 908 F.3d at 512).  
C. Nationwide Relief Is Appropriate Given the Need for Uniformity in the Immigration 
Context. 
As the Ninth Circuit also emphasized in the first asylum ban case: “In immigration matters, 
[the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] consistently recognized the authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful 
policies on a universal basis.”  East Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *24.  This “line of precedent” is 
“uncontroverted.”  Id.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 908 F.3d at 511 (“A final principle is also 
relevant: the need for uniformity in immigration policy.”); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (“Because this case implicates immigration policy, a nationwide injunction was necessary 
to give Plaintiffs a full expression of their rights.”), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018); 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] fragmented immigration policy 
would run afoul of the constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform immigration law and 
policy.”); see also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the 
government’s request that the injunction be confined to specific states because “the Constitution 
requires ‘an uniform Rule of Naturalization’; Congress has instructed that ‘the immigration laws of 
the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly’; and the Supreme Court has 
described immigration policy as ‘a comprehensive and unified system’”) (emphasis in original).  
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The Rule here works an immediate, nationwide change to immigration enforcement policy, 
altering a forty-year status quo.  The need for uniform application of immigration enforcement 
policies favors nationwide relief here.  Indeed, the need for a nationwide injunction is especially 
strong in this context, where the need to provide asylum seekers with guidance and assistance is so 
important, and where asylum seekers will not always know in advance what part of the United States 
they will enter, or, once inside the country, the circuit in which their case will proceed. 
D. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary to Avoid Serious Administrability Problems. 
An injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit will create serious administrability problems.  
Asylum seekers enter the United States at various points all across the southern border, not just in 
the Ninth Circuit, and as the declarations submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion 
explain, asylum seekers frequently move between circuits during the course of their asylum 
proceedings.  A geographically limited injunction cannot account for this reality and will “result in 
administrative confusion and simply provoke many thousands of individual lawsuits all over the 
country.”  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d 809 
F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018).  
Indeed, such cross-jurisdictional movement has been an important factor in other courts’ 
decisions to order nationwide injunctive relief.  In Texas, which addressed the Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program, the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the nationwide scope of a preliminary injunction in significant part because of the possibility that 
DAPA beneficiaries might move between states.  See Texas, 809 F.3d at 188 (“[T]here is a 
substantial likelihood that a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective because DAPA 
beneficiaries would be free to move among states.”).  Similarly, in one of the cases regarding the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, a district court concluded that a 
nationwide injunction was warranted because a more limited injunction “would be unworkable, 
partly in light of the simple fact that people move from state to state and job to job, and would likely 
create administrative problems . . . .”  Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018).  Likewise, the Third Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction of a rule exempting employers 
with religious and moral objections from the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive care requirements 
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as “necessary to provide . . . complete relief” to the plaintiff states, explaining that “[m]any 
individuals work in a state that is different from the one in which they reside” and that many college 
students have health insurance coverage from states other than the ones in which they attend school.  
Pa. v. President United States, 930 F.3d at 576.  “In light of the impact of these interstate activities,” 
the Third Circuit reasoned, “the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a 
nationwide injunction was necessary to afford the States complete relief.”  Id.  
Just as in those cases, an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit “fail[s] to account for the 
thousands of” asylum seekers who enter in one circuit and then move to another, or who otherwise 
move between circuits throughout their proceedings.  Pa. v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 833.  
E. The Equities Tip Sharply in Favor of Nationwide Relief.  
Finally, equitable considerations are relevant to the scope of injunctive relief.  See Kansas v. 
Nebraska, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015) (“When federal law is at issue and the public interest is 
involved, a federal court’s equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible character 
than when only a private controversy is at stake. . . . Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go 
much farther to give relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when 
only private interests are involved.  In exercising our jurisdiction, we may mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case and accord full justice to all parties.”) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939) (“[I]t is the duty of a 
court of equity granting injunctive relief to do so upon conditions that will protect all—including the 
public—whose interests the injunction may affect.”).  Here, the equities strongly favor a nationwide 
injunction.  Notably, the Ninth Circuit motions panel did not disturb this Court’s conclusions 
regarding the balance of harms and the public interest.    
This case does not involve a government policy that will be implemented slowly, or that will 
trigger only remote or reversible harms.  The Rule at issue went into effect immediately, without 
notice to the public or any opportunity for comment, and as a result, hundreds of thousands of 
asylum seekers are at imminent risk of removal to their countries of persecution.  See Preliminary 
Injunction Order at 42 (“[T]he Rule implicates to an even greater extent than the illegal entry rule [at 
issue in the first asylum ban case] ‘the public’s interest in ensuring that we do not deliver aliens into 
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the hands of their persecutors.’”) (quoting Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam)); id. at 42-43 (“[T]he Organizations have made a strong showing that the Rule contains 
insufficient safeguards to ensure that applicants do not suffer persecution in those third countries or 
will not be wrongfully returned to their original countries of persecution—as underscored by the 
unrefuted evidence regarding Mexico in particular.”).  These injuries cannot be remedied when the 
lawsuit ultimately concludes, which may be months or even years from now.  Nor can the harms to 
Plaintiffs themselves—including diverted resources, compromised and restructured programs, and 
lost funding—be remedied after the fact, as this is an APA case with no damages remedy available.  
See id. at 41.  
The Rule also upends a longstanding principle of asylum law—that mere transit through 
another country will not serve as a categorical bar to asylum in the United States—that had endured 
for nearly four decades.  See id. at 42 (“[A]n injunction would ‘restore[] the law to what it had been 
for many years prior to’ July 16, 2019 . . . .”) (quoting East Bay II, 2018 WL 8807133, at *24).  
Enjoining it nationwide thus merely restores the long extant status quo.  
Because the Rule will cause immediate and irreparable damage nationwide, and because the 
equities tip sharply in Plaintiffs’ favor, nationwide relief is both essential and equitable.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion should be granted.   
 
 
Dated: August 22, 2019 
 
Katrina Eiland (SBN 275701) 
Cody Wofsy (SBN 294179) 
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069) 
Julie Veroff (SBN 310161) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T:  (415) 343-1198 
F:  (415) 395-0950 
keiland@aclu.org 
cwofsy@aclu.org 
 
Respectfully submitted,  
 
/s/ Lee Gelernt  
Lee Gelernt* 
Omar Jadwat* 
Anand Balakrishnan* 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
125 Broad St., 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
T:  (212) 549-2660 
F:  (212) 549-2654 
lgelernt@aclu.org 
ojadwat@aclu.org 
 
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samdur@aclu.org 
jveroff@aclu.org 
 
Melissa Crow* 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 
1101 17th Street, NW Suite 705 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
T: (202) 355-4471 
F: (404) 221-5857 
melissa.crow@splcenter.org 
 
Mary Bauer* 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 
1000 Preston Avenue 
Charlottesville, VA  22903 
T: (470) 606-9307 
F: (404) 221-5857 
mary.bauer@splcenter.org 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
*Admitted Pro hac vice  
** Pro hac vice application forthcoming 
 
 
 
 
abalakrishnan@aclu.org 
 
Christine P. Sun (SBN 218701) 
Vasudha Talla (SBN 316219) 
Angélica Salceda (SBN 296152) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.  
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T: (415) 621-2493 
F: (415) 255-8437 
csun@aclunc.org 
vtalla@aclunc.org 
asalceda@aclunc.org 
 
Baher Azmy** 
Angelo Guisado** 
Ghita Schwarz** 
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
666 Broadway, 7th Floor 
New York, NY 10012 
Telephone: (212) 614-6464 
Facsimile: (212) 614-6499 
bazmy@ccrjustice.org 
aguisado@ccrjustice.org 
gschwarz@ccrjustice.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:19-cv-04073-JST   Document 63   Filed 08/22/19   Page 19 of 19

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