Court filing
Reply ISO Emergency Motion to Restore Nationwide Relief — East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr (N.D. Cal.)
Filed September 3, 2019 in East Bay Sanctuary v. Barr; one of 69 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court, N.D. California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2019-09-03 |
U.S. District Court, N.D. California · No. 4:19-cv-04073-JST · Doc. 67 · 2019-09-03 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
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Katrina Eiland (SBN 275701)
Cody Wofsy (SBN 294179)
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069)
Julie Veroff (SBN 310161)
ACLU FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 343-0770
F: (415) 395-0950
keiland@aclu.org
cwofsy@aclu.org
samdur@aclu.org
jveroff@aclu.org
Lee Gelernt*
Omar C. Jadwat*
Anand Balakrishnan*
ACLU FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
T: (212) 549-2660
F: (212) 549-2654
lgelernt@aclu.org
ojadwat@aclu.org
abalakrishnan@aclu.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
(Additional counsel listed on following page)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant; Al Otro Lado;
Innovation Law Lab; and Central American
Resource Center in Los Angeles,
Plaintiffs,
v.
William Barr, Attorney General, in his official
capacity; U.S. Department of Justice; James
McHenry, Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, in his official capacity; the
Executive Office for Immigration Review; Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Secretary of Homeland
Security, in his official capacity; U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Ken Cuccinelli, Acting
Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, in his official capacity; U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services; John Sanders,
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, in his official capacity; U.S. Customs
and Border Protection; Matthew Albence, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in his official capacity; Immigration
and Customs Enforcement,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073-JST
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY
MOTION TO RESTORE THE
NATIONWIDE SCOPE OF THE
INJUNCTION
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 1 of 22
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Melissa Crow*
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
1101 17th Street, NW Suite 705
Washington, D.C. 20036
T: (202) 355-4471
F: (404) 221-5857
melissa.crow@splcenter.org
Mary Bauer*
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
1000 Preston Avenue
Charlottesville, VA 22903
T: (470) 606-9307
F: (404) 221-5857
mary.bauer@splcenter.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
*Admitted Pro hac vice
**Pro hac vice application forthcoming
Baher Azmy**
Angelo Guisado**
Ghita Schwarz**
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
T: (212) 614-6464
F: (212) 614-6499
bazmy@ccrjustice.org
aguisado@ccrjustice.org
gschwarz@ccrjustice.org
Christine P. Sun (SBN 218701)
Vasudha Talla (SBN 316219)
Angélica Salceda (SBN 296152)
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN
CALIFORNIA, INC.
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 621-2493
F: (415) 255-8437
csun@aclunc.org
vtalla@aclunc.org
asalceda@aclunc.org
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 2 of 22
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
NATIONWIDE RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE. .............................. 1
A. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary to Remedy Plaintiffs’ Specific Harms. ..................... 1
1. The Limited Injunction Does Not Provide Plaintiffs Complete Relief. .............. 1
2. The Narrowed Injunction Also Causes Confusion and Allows the Government to
Circumvent Its Application. .............................................................................. 6
3. An Injunction Limited to Plaintiffs and Their Retained Clients Would Not Fully
Remedy Plaintiffs’ Injuries and Would Be Unworkable. ................................. 8
B. The Types of Violations at Issue Here Further Support a Nationwide Injunction. ...... 9
C The Equities Are Relevant to and Tip Sharply in Favor of Nationwide Relief. ........ 11
II.
THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RESTORE THE NATIONWIDE SCOPE OF
THE INJUNCTION. ...................................................................................................... 11
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 15
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 3 of 22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................ 10
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Block,
655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................................... 10
Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware Cty., Ltd.,
95 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................................ 12
Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen,
279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) .............................................................................................. 3
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co.,
363 U.S. 528 (1960) ........................................................................................................................ 11
Cal. Communities Against Toxics v. U.S. E.P.A.,
688 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................................... 10
City & County of San Francisco v. Trump,
897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................ 13
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,
349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .......................................................................................... 8, 9
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,
354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .......................................................................... 8, 12, 14, 15
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,
932 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................ 8, 9
Friery v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.,
448 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................................ 12
Gulliver v. Dalsheim,
739 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1984)............................................................................................................ 12
Harmon v. Thornburgh,
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .................................................................................................... 9, 10
Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt,
58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................... 10
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation,
2013 WL 6055079 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2013) ............................................................................... 15
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 4 of 22
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iii
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
847 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1988).......................................................................................................... 14
Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co.,
840 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................................................................................... 12, 15
Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................................ 14
N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton,
503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007) .......................................................................................................... 11
N. Mariana Islands v. United States,
686 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2009) .................................................................................................... 10
NAACP v. Trump,
315 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018) ................................................................................................ 10
Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. S.W. Marine, Inc.,
242 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 12, 15
Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange,
182 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2016)........................................................................................... 15
Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ........................................................................................................ 9
O.A. v. Trump,
2019 WL 3536334 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2019) ..................................................................................... 10
Pennsylvania v. President United States,
930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019).............................................................................................................. 3
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS,
809 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................................ 9
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. DHS,
279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .......................................................................................... 10
Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles,
891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................................... 12
San Francisco Aesthetics & Laser Med. Inc. v. Presidio Trust,
2010 WL 4226696 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010)................................................................................. 14
Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................................ 3
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 5 of 22
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iv
Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant,
139 S. Ct. 782 (2018) ........................................................................................................................ 8
United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................ 13
United States v. Phelps,
283 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................... 12
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 706 ....................................................................................................................................... 9
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) ......................................................................................................... 7
Other Authorities
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Detention Statistics,
https://www.ice.gov/detention-management (last updated Aug. 30, 2019) ...................................... 7
Wright & Miller, Retained Jurisdiction, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3937.1 (3d ed.) ................... 12
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 6 of 22
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
I.
NATIONWIDE RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE.
Contrary to the government’s suggestion, the motions panel was clear: a nationwide
injunction of the Rule could well be appropriate. The barrier to sustaining this Court’s grant of
nationwide relief was simply that, in the panel majority’s view, the connection between Plaintiffs’
injuries and the need for nationwide relief had not been drawn clearly enough. The motions panel
therefore remanded for further factual findings and further explanation of why nationwide relief is
necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ harms. As supplemented, the record shows that nationwide relief “is
necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ alleged harms.” Order 5, 6.
A. Nationwide Relief Is Necessary to Remedy Plaintiffs’ Specific Harms.
The limited injunction, even as the government claims it will be applied, does not provide
complete relief to Plaintiffs. And an injunction limited to Plaintiffs’ clients would prove even more
unworkable.
1. The Limited Injunction Does Not Provide Plaintiffs Complete Relief.
Notably, the government does not contest any of the facts in Plaintiffs’ evidence. Instead, the
government argues only that Plaintiffs’ evidence is not sufficient to warrant nationwide relief. But
Plaintiffs have now provided more than ample evidence of nationwide harm.
Innovation Law Lab (“Law Lab”): Law Lab maintains seven offices in California, Missouri,
Georgia, Oregon, and Texas. ECF No. 57-2 (Supp. Manning Decl.) ¶ 4. It provides diverse support
to asylum seekers, including through direct asylum representation, pro bono case placement and
attorney mentoring, pro se workshops, and the creation and distribution of technology and training
materials used by advocates and asylum seekers. Law Lab provides these services across the United
States and in Mexico. Many of the individuals Law Lab serves through its broad operations will be
subject to the Rule. Anything less than a nationwide injunction will result in Law Lab being forced
to divert significant resources in each of these areas.
Defendants contend that Law Lab has failed to show that it directly represents asylum
seekers affected by the Rule. See ECF No. 64 (Opp.) 15. But the evidence makes clear that Law Lab
provides direct representation to individuals both inside and outside the Ninth Circuit, and that those
it represents outside the Ninth Circuit will likely be subject to the Rule under the limited injunction.
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 7 of 22
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
See Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 5, 15. Without a nationwide injunction, these individuals outside the
Ninth Circuit will be ineligible for asylum under the Rule, and representing them will thus impose
significant additional burdens on the organization. See id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 15 (explaining that withholding
and Convention Against Torture (CAT) cases are significantly more resource intensive).1
Defendants also overlook the fact that Law Lab provides critical services to individuals
subject to the Rule who are not retained clients.2 These operations take place across the country and
in Mexico, so the harms to them will persist under a limited injunction, and can only be remedied
fully by nationwide relief.
For instance, Law Lab places asylum seekers’ cases with pro bono attorneys and provides the
attorneys with “legal, technical, and strategic assistance in the preparation and presentation of claims
in Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, and Oregon, with expansion underway to New
Mexico and California.” Id. ¶ 5. Under an injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit, the Rule will apply
in most of these areas, meaning that a “significant percentage” of Law Lab’s new pro bono
placement cases will be “a great deal more complicated,” due to the higher burden imposed to secure
withholding and CAT relief and the lack of derivative applications. See ECF No. 3-4 (Manning
Decl.) ¶ 17; Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 14, 20. Law Lab will therefore have to conduct additional legal
research for each case, hold “multiple strategy meetings with pro bono counsel,” and “shift a
1 It is not necessary, contrary to the government’s claim, for Plaintiffs to “identif[y] bona fide clients
they represent outside the Ninth Circuit” in order for this Court to order nationwide relief. Opp. 12.
The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court refused to stay the nationwide injunction in the first asylum
ban case even though Plaintiffs there also did not identify specific individuals. Indeed, the
government fails to identify a single case so holding. Plaintiffs’ evidence is more than enough: it
makes clear that they serve asylum seekers inside and outside the Ninth Circuit; explains how they
serve those individuals; and specifies the proportion of those who will be affected by the Rule. See
Manning Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 9, 19; ECF No. 3-3 (Pinheiro Decl.) ¶ 13; ECF
No. 57-4 (Ramos Decl.) ¶¶ 5-6; ECF No. 3-5 (Sharp Decl.) ¶ 6; ECF No. 57-5 (Alvarez Decl.) ¶ 5;
ECF No. 3-2 (Smith Decl.) ¶ 15; ECF No. 57-3 (Supp. Smith Decl.) ¶ 5. That is sufficient.
2 The government asserts that to justify nationwide relief, Plaintiffs must “demonstrate[] that they
will represent individuals affected by the Rule outside the Ninth Circuit.” Opp. 16 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 14-15. There is also no requirement that Plaintiffs “represent,” rather than serve in
other capacities, individuals affected by the Rule. In any event, as already discussed, Law Lab meets
the government’s proffered test because it will represent individuals subject to the Rule if it is not
enjoined nationwide.
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 8 of 22
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
significant portion of [its] resources towards mentoring pro bono attorneys on complicated appeals
before the Board of Immigration Appeals and the circuit courts.” Manning Decl. ¶ 17.
Law Lab also creates “materials for pro bono attorneys and asylum applicants, including
printed guides, worksheets, training videos, self-help videos, and other resources that are used
around the country.” Id. ¶ 19; Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, 14. Absent nationwide relief, Law Lab
“would have to substantially revise its materials across programs, and create bifurcated resources
going forward.” Supp. Manning Decl. ¶ 14; see also id. (explaining that Law Lab will have to scrap
an educational video that has been in the works for months because it does not address the Rule’s bar
on asylum). This overhaul “would represent such a substantial burden that it could cause Law Lab to
cease most of its pro bono activities.” Manning Decl. ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
In addition, Law Lab operates pro se asylum workshops in Atlanta, Georgia; Kansas City,
Missouri; Portland, Oregon; and in Tijuana, Mexico, and, pursuant to a recent expansion, Ciudad
Juarez. Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13.3 The workshops require staff to spend “many hours training
volunteers on law, process, and [Law Lab’s] materials; preparing technology for use in the
workshops; and preparing individual clients and client applications,” and, to date, have relied on “a
centralized set of training materials and technology—all of which are designed around a uniform
application of the asylum regulations.” Id. ¶ 10. The Rule and the limited injunction both require
Law Lab to divert its resources to re-do its workshop programming to account for the application of
the Rule. Id. Providing information and advice at the workshops Law Lab conducts at these sites in
Mexico will also be especially difficult under a limited injunction, given that Law Lab does not
know in advance where the attendees will cross into the United States or be detained. Id. ¶ 12; see
also id. ¶ 13 (explaining that Law Lab not cannot simply “replicate” at sites in Ciudad Juarez the
3 Without citing any case, the government suggests that Plaintiffs must show that they operate across
every inch of the country to warrant nationwide relief. Opp. 14-15. That is wrong. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court refused to stay the nationwide injunction in the first asylum ban case
without such evidence. It is enough that Plaintiffs’ operations and the mobile individuals they serve
transcend neat geographic boundaries and extend to numerous jurisdictions across the country. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 F.3d 543, 576 (3d Cir. 2019); Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437-38
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
materials it created to launch its Tijuana workshops, threatening its planned “program expansion”
there).
Further, the majority of individuals served at the workshops Law Lab holds outside the Ninth
Circuit will be subject to the Rule. Id. ¶ 9. As a result, Law Lab must “spend additional time
developing the facts and legal theories for” withholding and CAT claims, and must retrain
volunteers on how to screen for applicability of the Rule and on the new standards. Id.
Law Lab provides other critical services to asylum seekers, such as creating and updating a
technology platform used by advocates nationwide to represent asylum seekers. Absent nationwide
relief, Law Lab will be forced “to deploy expensive and limited engineering resources to recode its
software to create new analytical modeling” to address the Rule’s impact. Manning Decl. ¶ 19.
Critically, the record reflects that a significant proportion of the asylum seekers Law Lab
serves in these many capacities are subject to the Rule. See Supp. Manning Decl. ¶ 9 (“The majority
of persons served at these workshops are Central American asylum seekers who would be subject to
the asylum transit ban.”); Manning Decl. ¶¶ 16, 18. Defendants have pointed to nothing suggesting
that there has been or will be a marked shift in the population Law Lab serves. It is therefore not
speculative or “conjectural,” Opp. 15, to conclude that a significant portion of the people Law Lab
serves will be subject to the Rule if the injunction is limited to the Ninth Circuit. The record also
reflects that the significant burden required to overhaul all of Law Lab’s programming, materials,
and technology, which have been designed around uniform application of the asylum rules, directly
results from a limited injunction, and will persist absent nationwide relief. Contra Opp. 17-18. The
government has no answer to how these harms can be remedied absent a nationwide injunction.4
4 Defendants wrongly suggest that Plaintiffs’ supplemental evidence does not go beyond the initial
declarations. Opp. 13. Law Lab’s supplemental declaration, for example, offers additional
information about the locations in which the organization operates, compare Manning Decl. ¶ 3, with
Supp. Manning Decl. ¶ 4; explains that Law Lab provides direct asylum representation to individuals
outside the Ninth Circuit, see Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10; discusses how Law Lab’s model uses
collaborative operations and synchronized materials across program sites, id. ¶ 7; and clarifies the
locations of Law Lab’s BorderX program, id. ¶ 19, and the nature and locations of Law Lab’s work
related to the Migrant Protection Protocols, id. ¶ 18. The additional evidence also more thoroughly
addresses why nationwide relief is necessary to fully remedy the frustration of mission and diversion
harms Law Lab will suffer because of the Rule. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8-11, 13-14.
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
CARECEN: CARECEN’s injuries are also not fully remedied by the limited injunction.
Contra Opp. 18. At least 60% of CARECEN’s asylum-seeking clients entered the United States
outside the Ninth Circuit after transiting through another country without seeking asylum there.
Alvarez Decl. ¶ 5. If an asylum seeker enters, is apprehended, and given a credible fear interview
outside of the Ninth Circuit—as is the case for a sizable portion of CARECEN’s clients, see id.—
then that person likely will never make it to CARECEN. Indeed, the Rule will cause the asylum
seeker to fail her credible fear interview and, as a result, she may be quickly removed.5 Thus, an
injunction limited to the Ninth Circuit, even as the government has agreed to implement it, would
still prevent a significant portion of CARECEN’s client base from ever reaching them. Absent
nationwide relief, then, CARECEN’s mission of serving Central American asylum seekers
regardless of where or how they entered the United States will be frustrated, see id. ¶ 5, and their
programs and per-case funding will be threated, see, e.g., Sharp Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.
Al Otro Lado: The limited injunction also cannot fully remedy Al Otro Lado’s injuries. Like
CARECEN, Al Otro Lado serves asylum seekers who do not enter the United States in the Ninth
Circuit. See Ramos Decl. ¶ 5. Unless those individuals are able to make their way back to the Ninth
Circuit, which many will not, see id. ¶ 6, they will not be covered by the limited injunction. As a
result, Al Otro Lado remains injured by the Rule, which frustrates its mission of “assist[ing]
migrants who wish to seek asylum in the United States.” Pinheiro Decl. ¶ 14. Moreover, to serve
those individuals still affected by the Rule without yet knowing to whom the Rule will apply, Al
Otro Lado will have to “overhaul” its training materials for volunteers and pro bono attorneys, and
its “service delivery model.” Id. ¶ 12. See also Ramos Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.
5 It would be possible for such an individual to reach CARECEN only if she satisfied the heightened
screening standard for withholding of removal and/or CAT and was permitted by the government to
travel to the Ninth Circuit—a series of unlikely events given the government’s detention power and
unclear “guidance” regarding the limited injunction. See Part I.A.2 infra. Even then, the government
would have to permit the individual to apply for asylum despite her having already failed the asylum
screening.
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Reply in Support of Emergency Mot. to Restore Nationwide Relief
Case No.: 3:19-cv-04073
2. The Narrowed Injunction Also Causes Confusion and Allows the Government to
Circumvent Its Application.
The government states that, according to agency guidance, the limited injunction will cover
those who “are initially apprehended in the Ninth Circuit, are detained in the Ninth Circuit at the
time of adjudication, who after apprehension in the Ninth Circuit are transferred elsewhere, or whose
adjudications and proceedings occur in the Ninth [C]ircuit . . . .” Opp. 13 (emphasis added); but see
also Opp. 2 (describing the injunction as covering individuals whose “interview or adjudication”
occurs in the Ninth Circuit) (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed above, even if this guidance
were clear and administrable, nationwide relief would still be necessary. But the fact that the cryptic
email “guidance” to the agencies charged with implementing the Rule lacks the details or consistent
terminology necessary to understand the government’s application of an injunction limited to the
Ninth Circuit provides an additional reason for nationwide relief.
For example, the guidance fails to make clear how the injunction applies to an asylum seeker
who enters and has her threshold fear screening interview outside the Ninth Circuit. The individual
would be subject to the Rule and, accordingly, denied credible fear and instead be required to meet
the higher reasonable fear standard for withholding and/or CAT. If that individual (1) were able to
meet the higher standard and was placed into regular removal proceedings to apply for withholding
and/or CAT, and (2) her removal proceedings were moved to the Ninth Circuit, it is unclear whether
the immigration judge could override the fact that the Rule was initially applied to her and allow her
nonetheless to apply for asylum. The government does not spell this out. It states only that those
“whose adjudications and proceedings” Opp. 13 (emphasis added), and whose “interview or
adjudication,” Opp. 2, occur in the Ninth Circuit are subject to the injunction, without explaining
what that means.6 This uncertainty is significant, as Plaintiffs frequently serve individuals who enter
6 The government’s brief uses the term “proceedings,” Opp. 13, but that term does not appear in the
actual guidance, creating further confusion. For instance, “interview” and “adjudication,” Opp. 2,
could refer to USCIS’s adjudications of credible fear screenings and affirmative asylum applications,
while “proceedings,” Opp. 13, could refer to the location where a defensive asylum application takes
place, leaving unprotected individuals like those described above. Beyond the differing descriptions
provided in the government’s brief, the government’s exhibits contain different formulations of who
is covered by the injunction and do not use consistent terminology, compounding the uncertainty.
Compare ECF No. 65-1 (EOIR guidance referring to “interview or adjudication”), with ECF No. 65-
3 (ICE guidance referring to “adjudication of the asylum application” but making no mention of
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and have a credible fear adjudication outside of the Ninth Circuit, but who then apply for asylum in
the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Alvarez Decl. ¶ 6.
The confusion and workability concerns stemming from the geographically limited
injunction are compounded by the reality that, in many cases, neither the agency nor the asylum
seeker knows exactly where the asylum seeker entered the United States. See id. ¶ 11. Indeed, some
Notices to Appear show an asylum seeker’s location of entry as “unknown.” And even if the
government could possibly keep track of who remains eligible for asylum based on the complicated
patchwork set out in the guidance emails, having to do so would still impose serious burdens on
Plaintiffs. It will be difficult for them to determine whether the Rule applies to potential clients who
seek services, see id., and, because they cannot know ex ante whether a given individual will
ultimately be subject to the Rule, Plaintiffs will still have to provide advice to asylum seekers
through workshops, training materials, and other services that accounts for the Rule applying and not
applying, see Ramos Decl. ¶¶ 5-9, Supp. Manning Decl. ¶ 12.
Critically, moreover, the government elides that it will have significant control over who is
and is not subject to the Rule under the limited injunction. The government initially detains all
asylum seekers who are placed in expedited removal proceedings through at least their fear
screening interviews. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Even if they pass the screening and are
placed in regular removal proceedings, many asylum seekers are detained for the duration of those
proceedings, as are many asylum seekers who are placed directly into regular removal proceedings.7
The government therefore can prevent any asylum seekers who are apprehended outside the Ninth
Circuit from ever reaching the Ninth Circuit by simply detaining them outside its jurisdiction and
denying them parole or bond. See ECF No. 57-6 (Reichlin-Melnick Decl.) ¶ 13 (discussing
government’s power to detain and transfer asylum seekers, and noting that the vast majority of ICE
detention centers are located outside the Ninth Circuit).
credible fear or an “interview”).
7 For example, on July 31, 2019, there were nearly 9,000 individuals in ICE custody who had passed
their fear screening interviews. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Detention
Statistics, https://www.ice.gov/detention-management (last updated Aug. 30, 2019).
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3. An Injunction Limited to Plaintiffs and Their Retained Clients Would Not Fully
Remedy Plaintiffs’ Injuries and Would Be Unworkable.
The Ninth Circuit already declined the government’s request that the injunction be limited to
Plaintiffs’ clients. See No. 19-16487, Dkt. 3-1 at 22 (9th Cir.) (government stay brief requesting that
injunction be limited to “Plaintiffs’ identified clients”). This Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the
Supreme Court also rejected the same request in the context of the first asylum ban. See East Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838, 866-67 & n.21 (N.D. Cal. 2018); East Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2018); East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018); Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139
S. Ct. 782 (2018) (denying stay). Yet even though the Ninth Circuit motions panel remanded the
issue of relief to this Court to determine whether a broader injunction was warranted, the
government again suggests that the injunction should be narrowed to run only to Plaintiffs and the
individuals they “identify as actual clients in the United States who are otherwise subject to the
rule.” Opp. 1. Such a limited injunction would not provide complete relief to Plaintiffs and would be
unworkable.
First, as explained above, Plaintiffs not only provide direct representation to clients all over
the United States, but also routinely serve a broad swath of asylum seekers through written and
digital materials, support to pro bono attorney networks, community education initiatives, and in-
person trainings, many of which are conducted in Mexico. See Supp. Manning Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7-10, 12-
14, 18-19; Pinheiro Decl. ¶¶ 4-7; Sharp Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Many, if not most, of the individuals served by
these programs are not “actual clients” with retainers. Indeed, these programs are not intended only
for the limited number of individuals the organizations can actually represent. The assistance
Plaintiffs provide to these individuals is an integral part of Plaintiffs’ missions and work. See East
Bay, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (Plaintiffs’ “harms are not limited to their ability to provide services to
their current clients, but extend to their ability to pursue their programs writ large”). And for
desperate individuals trying to understand the asylum process, these services are critical.
Second, an injunction limited to Plaintiffs’ clients would be unworkable in many respects. To
start, Plaintiffs cannot know in advance which of these individuals will ultimately become an “actual
client[] in the United States.” Opp. 1. And the individuals Plaintiffs directly represent and serve in
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other ways are a large and constantly evolving group.8 Further, an injunction limited to the
individuals Plaintiffs directly represent would create an unworkable dynamic, as every potential
asylum seeker would seek representation from the four Plaintiffs, thereby disrupting existing legal
service networks and overwhelming the operations of these relatively small and underfunded
organizations.9
B. The Types of Violations at Issue Here Further Support a Nationwide Injunction.
As shown above, Plaintiffs’ harms will not be remedied by anything less than a nationwide
injunction. For that reason, a nationwide injunction is appropriate. But the types of violations at issue
here provide additional support in favor of a nationwide injunction. See East Bay, 932 F.3d at 779.
The government dismisses the import of the APA’s language that unlawful agency action be
“set aside,” 5 U.S.C. § 706, see Opp. 20, but this Court has already held that such language is
relevant when determining relief in a preliminary injunction posture. See East Bay, 349 F. Supp. 3d
at 867; see also East Bay, 932 F.3d at 779 (noting, in the context of a decision denying a stay of a
TRO, that enjoining an unlawful policy on a universal basis is “commonplace in APA cases”)
(quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 809 F.3d 476, 512 (9th Cir. 2018)). And Plaintiffs
never claimed that vacatur “is the only remedy,” Opp. 20; rather, under well-established case law,
vacatur is the “ordinary result,” Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399,
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21
8 Requiring Plaintiffs to provide a running list of individuals they serve to the government and the
Court to facilitate enforcement of a plaintiff-specific injunction would be an impossible undertaking,
given the large number of asylum seekers Plaintiffs serve, e.g., through workshops and pro bono
networks across the country, and through materials used by non-plaintiff organizations. See East Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, Tr. Prelim. In. Hr’g 7:3-13 (THE COURT: “What if the Court
entered a preliminary injunction and there were a future client of one of the organizations who is not
presently in the United States but crossed into the United States three months from now while this
case was pending and the preliminary injunction were in effect?” [GOVERNMENT]: “I think we’d
have to see the plaintiffs identify that person, Your Honor, and bring them within the scope of the
injunction. . . . .” THE COURT: “How many future proceedings do you anticipate the Court would
hold to amend the injunction? Would it be a weekly roundup? I mean, how would that work?”).
9 See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, Tr. TRO Hr’g, 56:4-8 (THE COURT: “I’d make these
organizations the most popular lawfirms at the border if I did that, wouldn’t I? This rule doesn’t
apply to you or your clients, but it applies to every other law firm that might be trying to help
asylum-seekers? How’s that going to work?”).
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(D.C. Cir. 1989)). See also Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“Ordinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the APA, the regulation is
invalid.”) (emphasis added); Cal. Communities Against Toxics v. U.S. E.P.A., 688 F.3d 989, 994 (9th
Cir. 2012). The government, moreover, has not argued that the factors typically used to assess
whether remand without vacatur is appropriate are present here. See Cal. Communities Against
Toxics, 688 F. 3d at 992 (explaining that the decision whether to remand without vacatur “depends
on how serious the agency’s errors are ‘and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that
may itself be changed’”) (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d
146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).10
Likewise, circuit law is clear that uniformity in the immigration context is a relevant, even if
not dispositive, factor when determining the appropriate scope of relief. See ECF No. 63 (Supp. Br.)
10 (collecting cases). Nothing in the motions panel’s Order forecloses taking this factor into account.
Finally, contrary to the government’s contention, a limited injunction is not necessary to
allow other challenges to the Rule to proceed. District courts can and often do issue parallel or, as
this case makes plain, differing decisions. See Opp. 22 (noting that the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia denied a TRO in a similar challenge to the Rule); see also, e.g., Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d
457 (D.D.C. 2018). The existence of a nationwide injunction thus in no way eliminates the
opportunity for other litigants to obtain a separate, appealable merits determination. See, e.g., O.A. v.
Trump, 2019 WL 3536334, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment in a case challenging the first asylum ban, which this Court had already enjoined
nationwide on a preliminary injunction motion).
10 The government offers the cursory assertion that “[t]he possibility of remand without vacatur has
particular force in this case” because violations of the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures “can
be remedied even while the Rule is left in place.” Opp. 21 (quotation marks omitted). That is
mistaken. “[T]he damage done by [the agencies’] violation of the APA cannot be fully cured by later
remedial action” because the agencies are “far less likely to be receptive to comments” now that the
Rule is in effect. N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18 (D.D.C. 2009). See also
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And neither
the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court narrowed the injunction in the earlier asylum ban case.
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C. The Equities Are Relevant to and Tip Sharply in Favor of Nationwide Relief.
Courts, including the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, frequently take account of the
equities and the public interest when determining the appropriate scope of injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Supp. Br. 12 (collecting cases); Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528,
531-32 (1960); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When injunctive
relief is appropriate, the court must balance the equities between the parties and give due regard to
the public interest. Sometimes a full injunction is appropriate. But at other times, the equities
demand a partial injunction.”) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs’ argument is not, as the government suggests, see Opp. 23, that the mere fact that
the balance of the equities in this case tips sharply in their favor means that nationwide relief is
automatically warranted. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the particular equities involved as they relate
to the scope of relief counsel in favor of a nationwide injunction given that asylum seekers will face
grave harm if wrongly returned to their persecutors.11 See Supp. Br. 12-13 (explaining that the
Rule’s harms are immediate, nationwide, and irreparable, such that nationwide relief is the equitable
result). And as to those particular equities, the government has no response.
II.
THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RESTORE THE NATIONWIDE
SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION.
Appellate courts have the inherent authority to retain jurisdiction over an appeal while
remanding for further proceedings on a particular issue. That is exactly what the Ninth Circuit has
done here. The motions panel expressly retained jurisdiction over the preliminary injunction appeal
while ordering a limited remand to this Court on the question of the injunction’s nationwide scope.
The government does not dispute that the Ninth Circuit has authority to do so, Opp. 7-8, but contests
only that the Ninth Circuit did so here. Indeed, the cases the government cites are not to the contrary.
They either stand for the uncontroversial proposition that ordinarily jurisdiction does not return to
11 In explaining that, “beyond examining the merits of a party’s arguments, a district court must
separately analyze whether nationwide relief is ‘necessary,’” the panel simply stated the obvious
proposition that success on the merits does not automatically warrant a nationwide injunction. Order
7. It did not, as the government suggests, Opp. 23, find that considerations relevant to the propriety
of issuing an injunction cannot also be relevant to the question of that injunction’s scope.
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the district court until the mandate issues absent a remand, Opp. 6, or address circumstances where
there is no explicit remand, Opp. 7.
1. The general principle that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of
jurisdiction “over the matters being appealed” is not truly jurisdictional. It is a “judge-made” rule,
Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. S.W. Marine, Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.
2001), that “is not absolute.” Instead, it is applied flexibly and “there are exceptions.” United States
v. Phelps, 283 F.3d 1176, 1181 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). “The purpose of the rule is to promote judicial
economy and avoid the confusion of having the same issues before two courts simultaneously.” Id.
“It should not be employed to defeat its purposes nor to induce needless paper shuffling.” Kern Oil
& Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks omitted). See
also Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the
divestiture principle “may be applied in a ‘less stern’ manner than true jurisdictional rules” and is
subject to exception); East Bay, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 n.3 (similar).
Because the divestiture principle is flexible and judge-made, the court of appeals of course
has power to retain jurisdiction over an appeal while simultaneously restoring the district court’s
authority over a particular issue. See Wright & Miller, Retained Jurisdiction, 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris. § 3937.1 (3d ed.) (“Power to deal with the issues presented on appeal inherently includes
authority to . . . regulate the course of further proceedings required to reach an effective decision.”);
id. (“[The use of retained jurisdiction] is a desirable [practice] . . . when there are special reasons to
facilitate a prompt return to the court of appeals.”); Friery v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 448
F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We therefore order a limited remand to the district court with
instructions to develop the factual record and to determine whether Friery has standing to bring
suit.”); Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware Cty., Ltd., 95 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
court of appeals has the power to direct further proceedings by the district court while retaining
jurisdiction of the appeal, even though the result is that both courts have for a short time
simultaneous jurisdiction . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted); Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 739 F.2d 104, 106
(2d Cir. 1984) (“The remand is a ‘limited’ one, . . . which requires the district court to find facts or
pass on issues while the court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the merits . . . .”) (quotation marks
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omitted); United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 803 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“We therefore make a limited remand for further proceedings in accord with this order, further
findings, conclusions and a further ruling on the jurisdictional issue . . . .”).
And, as a limited remand while the court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the appeal, no
mandate needs to—or even could—issue before the district court is free to undertake the proceeding
directed by the court of appeals. Contra Opp. 6.
Here, the Ninth Circuit invoked its power to issue a limited remand on the appropriate scope
of the injunction: “While this appeal proceeds, the district court retains jurisdiction to further
develop the record in support of a preliminary injunction extending beyond the Ninth Circuit.” Order
8-9. See also id. at 9 (“Because the record is insufficiently developed as to the question of the
national scope of the injunction, we vacate the injunction to the extent it applies outside California
and remand to the district court for a more searching inquiry into whether this case justifies the
breadth of the injunction imposed.”) (quoting City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d
1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018)); Dissent from Order 4 n.4 (describing Order as “remand[ing] the case to
the district court for a partial do-over” on the scope of relief).
In other words, rather than waiting for this Court to issue an indicative ruling—a device the
government agrees is available, see Opp. 9—the Ninth Circuit proactively gave the Court advance
permission to act regarding the scope of the injunction while it retained jurisdiction over the
preliminary injunction appeal. Notably, in its Stay Application filed with the Supreme Court, the
government agreed that the Ninth Circuit gave this Court jurisdiction to restore the nationwide scope
of the injunction: “The court stated that the district court retained jurisdiction to further develop the
record and to re-extend the injunction beyond the Ninth Circuit.” Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant, No. 19A230, Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 3 (Aug. 26, 2019) (emphasis
added).12 Yet in its opposition brief to this Court, the government has now taken the opposite
position, maintaining that “the Ninth Circuit contemplated further factual development from this
12 Available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19A230/113613/20190826132549423
_East%20Bay%20II%20Stay%20FINAL.pdf. Plaintiffs’ opposition to the government’s Supreme
Court Stay Application is actually due September 4, not September 3. Contra Opp. 5.
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Court, nothing more, during the pendency of the appeal.” Opp. 8. Putting aside the inconsistency, the
government fails to explain what purpose the Ninth Circuit’s limited remand would have if this
Court lacked power to take any action pending completion of the appeal, especially because district
courts already possess authority to issue additional findings notwithstanding a pending appeal.13 See,
e.g., East Bay, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 n.3 (noting a district court’s authority to “fil[e] written
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of” rulings on appeal) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). And the government’s cases about exceeding the scope of a remand are inapposite.
Opp. 8 (citing Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressing
situation where a party raised new issue on remand that was outside the scope of the questions
remanded for consideration after mandate); San Francisco Aesthetics & Laser Med. Inc. v. Presidio
Trust, 2010 WL 4226696, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) (ignoring party’s “waiver and release”
arguments where remand was for computation of amounts owed)).
2. Because the Ninth Circuit gave this Court permission to restore the scope of the injunction,
this Court need not rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) (previously Rule 62(c)), which
enables a district court to “suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction” even while an appeal of
an injunction is pending. Cf. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that Rule 62(d) applies “where the
consent of the court of appeals has not been obtained”). Nonetheless, should the Court additionally
wish to rely on Rule 62(d), it would be well within the Rule’s coverage.
13 The government wrongly implies that the Ninth Circuit motions panel knew the briefing schedule
on Plaintiffs’ emergency motion asking this Court to consider supplemental evidence and restore the
nationwide scope of the injunction when it set the briefing schedule on the preliminary injunction
appeal. See Opp. 9 (“[A]ccepting plaintiffs’ contention would create the anomalous result that the
Ninth Circuit sanctioned the authority of this Court to change the subject of the appeal, while
nonetheless insisting that the Government’s complete opening brief be due just 5 days after the
submission of this brief on ‘September 3, 2019.’”) (emphasis added). Of course, as Plaintiffs only
filed their emergency motion with this Court after the Ninth Circuit issued its Order authorizing the
limited remand, the Ninth Circuit could not have known what the briefing schedule in this Court
would be. And in fact, the Ninth Circuit motions panel extended the preliminary injunction briefing
schedule beyond the dates originally set, giving the government more time to file their opening brief.
Compare No. 19-16487, Dkt. 2 (setting deadline for government’s opening brief as Aug. 26, 2019),
with Order at 9 (extending deadline for government’s opening brief to Sept. 3, 2019).
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A district court may use Rule 62(d) “to preserve the status quo during the pendency of an
appeal.” NRDC, 242 F.3d at 1166. Contrary to the government’s assertions, see Opp. 7, for purposes
of the Rule 62(d) analysis, the status quo to be preserved is as of the time the appeal was taken. See,
e.g., NRDC, 242 F.3d at 1166; Nat’l Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State
Grange, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“The status quo is measured at the time the
appeal is filed.”); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 6055079, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 13, 2013) (same). Restoring the nationwide scope of the injunction thus would preserve,
not alter, the status quo at the time the government noticed its appeal of the preliminary injunction.
Rule 62(d) can also be used to issue a second injunction. See East Bay, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 n.3.
Contrary to the government’s suggestion, Opp. 7, restoring the scope of the injunction does
not present any of the concerns that could undermine the applicability of Rule 62(d). Indeed, there is
no concern that there will be “confusion” from having “the same issues before two courts
simultaneously” where the court of appeals itself considered the circumstances and expressly
directed the limited remand here. NRDC, 242 F.2d at 1166. And because the appeal in this case will
not be heard until the Ninth Circuit’s December calendar, there will be more than enough time for
the government to address the reinstated scope in supplemental briefing or its reply brief.
Alternatively, the government could take an appeal from any subsequent order this Court issues,
which would be consolidated with the pending appeal, as happened in the first asylum ban case. See
Case Nos. 18-17274 and 18-17436 (9th Cir.). This would obviate the need for a separate, additional
proceeding and appeal on the issue many months from now and thereby avoid “needless paper
shuffling.” Kern Oil, 840 F.2d at 734.
Finally, Plaintiffs agree with the government that the Court may use the indicative ruling
procedure under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. However, as that procedure is the flipside of
advance permission to undertake a limited remand, which the Ninth Circuit already gave, the Court
need not use it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion should be granted.
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Dated: September 3, 2019
Katrina Eiland (SBN 275701)
Cody Wofsy (SBN 294179)
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069)
Julie Veroff (SBN 310161)
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 343-1198
F: (415) 395-0950
keiland@aclu.org
cwofsy@aclu.org
samdur@aclu.org
jveroff@aclu.org
Melissa Crow*
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
1101 17th Street, NW Suite 705
Washington, D.C. 20036
T: (202) 355-4471
F: (404) 221-5857
melissa.crow@splcenter.org
Mary Bauer*
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
1000 Preston Avenue
Charlottesville, VA 22903
T: (470) 606-9307
F: (404) 221-5857
mary.bauer@splcenter.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
*Admitted Pro hac vice
** Pro hac vice application forthcoming
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Lee Gelernt
Lee Gelernt*
Omar Jadwat*
Anand Balakrishnan*
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT
125 Broad St., 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
T: (212) 549-2660
F: (212) 549-2654
lgelernt@aclu.org
ojadwat@aclu.org
abalakrishnan@aclu.org
Christine P. Sun (SBN 218701)
Vasudha Talla (SBN 316219)
Angélica Salceda (SBN 296152)
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 621-2493
F: (415) 255-8437
csun@aclunc.org
vtalla@aclunc.org
asalceda@aclunc.org
Baher Azmy**
Angelo Guisado**
Ghita Schwarz**
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Telephone: (212) 614-6464
Facsimile: (212) 614-6499
bazmy@ccrjustice.org
aguisado@ccrjustice.org
gschwarz@ccrjustice.org
Case 4:19-cv-04073-JST Document 67 Filed 09/03/19 Page 22 of 22File and source
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