GAO-22-104354, COVID-19: State Carried Out Historic Repatriation Effort but Should Strengthen Its Preparedness for Future Crises

Summary

A U.S. Government Accountability Office report to congressional addressees, GAO-22-104354, dated November 2, 2021, on the Department of State's COVID-19 repatriation effort. The report finds that from January to June 2020 State helped repatriate more than 100,000 individuals who were in 137 countries, compared with fewer than 6,000 people in the previous 5 years. It finds gaps in State's guidance and in its oversight of overseas posts' crisis preparedness, including that 17 of 30 posts did not submit updated emergency action plans on time in 2020. GAO makes six recommendations, and the highlights page states that State agreed with all of them. The report cites the CARES Act mandate, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, and includes appendixes on methodology, passenger survey responses and State's comments.

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United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Addressees

November 2021

COVID-19
State Carried Out
Historic Repatriation
Effort but Should
Strengthen Its
Preparedness for
Future Crises

GAO-22-104354


November 2021

COVID-19
State Carried Out Historic Repatriation Effort but
Should Strengthen Its Preparedness for Future Crises
Highlights of GAO-22-104354, a report to
congressional addressees

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Found

State provides repatriation assistance
to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents abroad during crises such
as the COVID-19 pandemic. State’s
Office of Crisis Management and
Strategy and Bureau of Consular
Affairs were primarily responsible for
State’s COVID-19 repatriation effort.

From January to June 2020, the Department of State carried out a historic effort
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, helping to repatriate more than 100,000
individuals who were in 137 countries. In the previous 5 years, State had
repatriated fewer than 6,000 people. Most responses to a GAO survey of
repatriated individuals expressed positive views of State’s communication,
among other things, though some expressed concerns about matters such as the
prices of repatriation flights. State reported learning several lessons from
challenges it faced, such as the importance of using social media and cell
phones to communicate with U.S. citizens.

The CARES Act includes a provision
for GAO to report on its ongoing
COVID-19 monitoring and oversight
efforts. In addition, GAO was asked
to examine State’s COVID-19
repatriation effort. This report
examines, among other things, (1)
the results of State’s repatriation
effort, including lessons State
reported learning from challenges it
faced; (2) the consistency of selected
aspects of State’s repatriation effort
with its policies and procedures; and
(3) State’s oversight of its overseas
posts’ crisis preparedness.
GAO reviewed relevant State
documents, such as cables and
guidance. GAO also interviewed
State officials in Washington, D.C.,
and in Ghana, Honduras, India,
Morocco, and Peru. In addition,
GAO surveyed a generalizable
sample of passengers repatriated on
State-chartered flights.

What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations
to improve State’s preparedness to
repatriate U.S. citizens during
crises—including three
recommendations to improve
agencywide preparedness and three
to improve State’s oversight of posts’
preparedness. State agreed with all
of the recommendations.
View GAO-22-104354. For more information,
contact Jason Bair at (202) 512-6881 or
bairj@gao.gov.

State Personnel Assisting with Repatriations in Tanzania (Left) and Montenegro (right)

Despite acting swiftly to assist Americans abroad, State did not follow some of its
policies and lacked guidance for certain aspects of its repatriation effort. For
example, as of May 2021, an interagency group State established to coordinate
plans to evacuate U.S. citizens abroad in emergencies had not met since April
2019, hampering interagency communication early in the crisis. Also, incomplete
guidance for calculating and documenting actual costs of State-chartered flights
led to missing or inconsistent documentation and limited State’s ability to show
that the prices it charged passengers complied with its fare policy.
Additionally, while State requires overseas posts to take steps to prepare for
crises, its oversight of their preparedness has gaps.
• State requires posts to update emergency action plans but does not ensure
timely submission of those plans. In the 20 countries from which State helped
repatriate the largest numbers of people, 17 of 30 posts did not submit their
updated plans for certification within required time frames in 2020.
• State requires posts to complete annual emergency preparedness drills, but
does not ensure completion of the drills. In 2019, 16 of the 30 posts failed to
complete all the drills within the required time frames.
• State lacks a mechanism for assessing posts’ crisis preparedness. Though
State encourages posts to assess their own preparedness annually, data from
these assessments are not current or complete.
As a result of these gaps, State lacks assurance that posts will be prepared to
respond to a future global crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

United States Government Accountability Office


Contents

Letter

1
Background
State Carried Out Historic Repatriation Effort during COVID-19
Pandemic
State Reported Numerous Challenges and Lessons Learned in
Repatriating U.S. Citizens during COVID-19 Pandemic
State Had Global Crisis-Preparedness and -Response
Mechanisms, but Implementation and Guidance Were
Incomplete
State Requires Posts to Prepare for Crises but Does Not Conduct
Systematic Oversight of Their Preparedness
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments

4

34
41
42
43

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

47

Appendix II

Responses to Selected Questions from Our Survey of Passengers
Repatriated on State-Funded Charter Flights

52

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

59

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

61

9
20
25

Tables
Table 1: Types of Repatriation Flights and Numbers of
Passengers, by Flight Type, Jan. 29–June 5, 2020
Table 2: State Department Repatriation Loans Billed and
Outstanding, Fiscal Years 2015–2021
Table 3: State Department Repatriation Promissory Notes Billed
and Outstanding, Fiscal Years 2015–2021
Table 4: Reported Challenges Faced by State Department
Officials in Repatriating U.S. Citizens during COVID-19
Pandemic and Reported Steps Taken and Lessons
Learned in Addressing These Challenges

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9
15
15

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Table 5: Numbers of Crisis Management Exercises Conducted in
Fiscal Years 2017–2020, Including Exercises Addressing
Repatriation and Evacuation and Exercises Addressing
Pandemics and Epidemics
Table 6: Did you register with the State Department’s Smart
Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP)? (Question 2)
Table 7: How useful was the State Department’s (travel.state.gov)
website for obtaining information about the
pandemic/situation in your host country (that is, the
country you were repatriated from)? (Question 3)
Table 8: How useful was the U.S. Embassy’s website for obtaining
information about the pandemic/situation in your host
country (that is, the country you were repatriated from)?
(Question 4)
Table 9: Did you call the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in your host
country to obtain repatriation information? (Question 5)
Table 10: Did you e-mail the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in your
host country to obtain repatriation information? (Question
6)
Table 11: Did you call the State Department’s 24x7 emergency
hotline to obtain repatriation information? (Question 7)
Table 12: Did anyone (for example, your family) who resides in the
U.S. attempt to use the State Department’s 24x7
emergency hotline to obtain information related to your
repatriation? (Question 8)
Table 13: Did you sign paperwork agreeing to reimburse the State
Department for the cost of your State-funded repatriation
flight? (Question 9)
Table 14: Leading up to your flight, did the State Department
inform you about the flight costs associated with your
State Department–funded repatriation flight? (Question
10)
Table 15: Leading up to your flight, did the State Department
inform you about the repayment process for your State
Department–funded repatriation flight? (Question 11)
Table 16: Once your repatriation flight was confirmed, did the
State Department provide you information regarding next
steps to proceed with the repatriation on the day of your
flight? (Question 12)

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53

53
54
55
55

56
56

56
57

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Table 17: Since your return to the U.S., has State Department
sent you any information regarding how to repay the cost
of your State Department-funded repatriation flight?
(Question 13)
Table 18: Have you received a bill for the cost of your State
Department-funded repatriation flight? (Question 14)
Table 19: Have you received a notice that your repayment is late?
(Question 15)

57
58
58

Figures
Figure 1: Department of State Organization Chart Showing Key
Entities with Responsibilities for Crisis Preparedness and
Response
Figure 2: State Personnel Overseeing a Military Flight in Honduras
(left) and a Charter Flight in Montenegro (right)
Figure 3: Number of Passengers on Repatriation Flights, Jan. 29–
June 5, 2020
Figure 4: Numbers of Passengers on Repatriation Flights from
Regions Represented by State’s Six Geographic
Bureaus, Jan. 29–June 5, 2020
Figure 5: Timeline of Events Related to State Department COVID19 Repatriation Efforts, Dec. 2019–June 5, 2020
Figure 6: Examples of State Department Repatriation Activities
Figure 7: State Personnel Greeting Passengers and Collecting
Information before Repatriation Flights in India

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11
12
13
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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Abbreviations
ACS
A/LM
CA
CCPS
CGFS
CMS
COVID-19
DHS
DOD
DS
FAH
FAM
FSI
HHS
MASCOT
MED
OCS
OPMED
STEP
State
WLG

Office of American Citizens Services and Crisis
Management
Office of Logistics Management
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Consular Crisis Preparedness Scorecard
Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services
Office of Crisis Management and Strategy
Coronavirus Disease 2019
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Foreign Affairs Handbook
Foreign Affairs Manual
Foreign Service Institute
Department of Health and Human Services
Message Alert System for Citizens Overseas Tool
Bureau of Medical Services
Directorate of Overseas Citizens Services
Directorate of Operational Medicine
Smart Traveler Enrollment Program
Department of State
Washington Liaison Group

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Letter

441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

November 2, 2021
Congressional Addressees
According to the Department of State (State), the U.S. government has
no higher priority than protecting American citizens. In 2020, the
repatriation of U.S. citizens and other individuals 1 in response to the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic formed a major
element of State’s efforts to support this priority. 2
State’s COVID-19 repatriation effort began in late January, 3 after State
called for the departure of all nonemergency U.S. personnel from Hubei
Province, China—the location of the city of Wuhan—and issued a Level 4
travel advisory. 4 State’s overseas posts around the globe began providing
information about commercially available flights, assisted with organizing
commercially provided flights in countries that had closed their airspace,
1For the purposes of this report, “repatriation” generally refers to a broad range of actions

taken by State during the COVID-19 pandemic, to include the evacuation of U.S.
government personnel; U.S. citizens; U.S. lawful permanent residents; and, in some
cases, third-country nationals, out of foreign countries and the facilitation of commercial
flights for the return of these individuals to the United States. “Repatriation” does not refer
specifically to State’s repatriation loan program.

2Under 22 U.S.C. § 4802(b), the Secretary of State is required to develop and implement

policies and programs to provide for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. government
personnel, their dependents, and private citizens when their lives are endangered.
Expenditures for evacuations of U.S. private citizens must be made on a reimbursable
basis to the maximum extent practicable. 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(A). In addition, the
Secretary of State may make loans to destitute U.S. citizens to provide for their return to
the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(B).

3State began its repatriation effort in response to the spread of COVID-19. State’s initial
actions included coordinating, in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the emergency repatriation of approximately 1,100 U.S. citizens from
Wuhan, China and the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship, docked in Yokohama, Japan. HHS
quarantined these individuals domestically to prevent the spread of COVID-19. This effort
concluded on March 2, 2020, following the completion of the quarantine and the
documented transmission of COVID-19 in the United States. The World Health
Organization officially characterized the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic on March 11,
2020. In April 2021, we reported on HHS’s repatriation efforts; see GAO, COVID-19: HHS
Should Clarify Agency Roles for Emergency Return of U.S. Citizens during a Pandemic,
GAO-21-334 (Washington, D.C., Apr. 19, 2021).
4The Level 4 travel advisory for Hubei Provence, China, advised U.S. citizens not to travel

to the region. State issues travel advisories for every country to inform U.S. citizens about
travel risks. Each advisory ranks relative risk in the country from Level 1 to Level 4, with
Level 4 signifying the greatest likelihood of life-threatening risks.

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and organized and funded charter flights when no commercial options
were available. 5 Posts continued these services even after many Foreign
Service staff had the opportunity to leave the posts under a global
authorized departure order issued on March 15, 2020. State initiated the
first repatriation flight from Wuhan, China, on January 29, 2020, and
tracked repatriation flights to the United States through June 5, 2020. 6
The CARES Act includes a provision for us to report on our ongoing
monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. 7 In
addition, we were asked to review State’s repatriation efforts during the
COVID-19 pandemic. This report examines (1) the results of State’s
repatriation efforts from January 29 through June 5, 2020; (2) the lessons
State reported learning from challenges it faced; (3) the consistency of
selected aspects of State’s repatriation efforts with its policies and
procedures; and (4) State’s oversight of its overseas posts’ crisis
preparedness.
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State documents,
such as policy and procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and
Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH) pertaining to crisis management,
emergency preparedness, and training. We also reviewed State
repatriation data from January 29 through June 5, 2020, including the
number of individuals repatriated, the countries they were repatriated
from, the repatriation date, and the types of repatriation flights. In
addition, we conducted a content analysis of 33 lessons-learned cables
that 28 overseas posts submitted to State regarding their repatriation

5State’s overseas posts consist of U.S. embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic posts

in foreign countries.

6According to State officials, State stopped tracking repatriation flights on June 5, when its

Repatriation Task Force moved to “on-call” status. According to State guidance, the task
force moved to on-call status when, among other things, no dedicated U.S. governmentfunded repatriation flights were planned or dedicated repatriation flights were ad hoc in
nature and when there were no large pockets of U.S. citizens to whom State was
providing repatriation assistance and demand was largely managed via commercial
options.
7See Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, 134 Stat. 281, 579–81 (Mar. 27, 2020). We have

issued eight recurring reports on the federal response to COVID-19 as mandated by the
CARES Act. For the latest report, see GAO, COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response, GAO-21-105051
(Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2021). Our next government-wide report will be issued in
January 2022 and will be available on GAO’s website at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.

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experiences, to identify challenges and lessons learned from the
pandemic and steps State is taking to address them in the future.
Moreover, we interviewed officials in several State offices and bureaus in
Washington, D.C.—the Office of Crisis Management and Strategy (CMS)
within the Executive Secretariat, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), and
the Office of Logistics Management (A/LM) within the Bureau of
Administration—that were involved in repatriation-related activities. We
also interviewed officials of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which
is responsible for post security and emergency preparedness.
Additionally, we interviewed officials on the Emergency Action Committee
and in the CA and DS sections at posts in Ghana, Honduras, India,
Morocco, and Peru to obtain their perspectives about those posts’
preparedness to address the crisis. We selected those posts because
they were among the 20 posts that repatriated the largest numbers of
people and because they represented the three regions from which the
largest numbers were repatriated—the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and
South Central Asia.
Further, from February 2021 to April 2021, we administered a web-based
survey of a random sample of 474 passengers on State-chartered
repatriation flights. The survey consisted of a variety of closed- and openended questions about State’s provision of repatriation-related
information and its communication with passengers before and after their
repatriation to the United States. The survey had a response rate of 40
percent, with 189 passengers responding. All survey results are
generalizable to the greater population of passengers repatriated on
State-chartered flights. 8
We conducted this performance audit from June 2020 to November 2021
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

8Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from this survey have a margin of error of plus or

minus 10 percentage points or less at the 95 percent confidence level.

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Background

Key State Entities with
Responsibilities for Crisis
Preparedness and
Response

Several State offices and bureaus have responsibilities related to
preparing for, and responding to, crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic
and for conducting repatriation-related activities.
Office of Crisis Management and Strategy (CMS). CMS, in the
Executive Secretariat’s Operations Center, coordinates crisis response
across the department and with other federal agencies. CMS is
responsible for department-wide crisis preparedness and response
activities, including monitoring potential crises and convening and
supporting task forces. CMS also manages the day-to-day operations of
the Washington Liaison Group (WLG), an interagency body established
to, among other things, coordinate the preparation and implementation of
plans for emergency evacuations abroad. 9
Office of Logistics Management (A/LM). A/LM, in the Bureau of
Administration, develops and implements logistics policies and
procedures and the delivery of travel services for State, including charter
flights during crises. A/LM also determines the amount to charge
passengers for State-funded repatriation charter flights.
Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services (CGFS).
CGFS oversees financial management activities for State, including the
collection of debts such as repatriation loans. According to CGFS
officials, they use information from CA and A/LM to bill passengers who
traveled on State-funded repatriation charter flights.
Bureau of Budget and Planning. The Bureau of Budget and Planning
plans and allocates resources under State’s policies, objectives, and
applicable laws and regulations, among other things. The bureau
maintains a daily cost projection regarding repatriation-related expenses.
Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA). CA provides consular and other
services to U.S. citizens overseas, including during crises, and manages
communication to U.S. citizens overseas through the Smart Traveler
Enrollment Program (STEP) and other means. At overseas posts,
consular staff coordinate State’s repatriation efforts. Consular staff’s roles
include supporting and engaging with U.S. citizens abroad, providing
9According to the WLG’s charter, the group has basic responsibility for the coordination

and implementation of plans for the protection and evacuation in emergencies of persons
abroad for whom the Secretaries of State or Defense are responsible.

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repatriation-related loans, and creating repatriation flight manifests. CA
includes the following components:
•

Directorate of Overseas Citizens Services (OCS). OCS protects
and provides services to U.S. citizens abroad.

•

Office of American Citizens Services and Crisis Management
(ACS). ACS, within OCS, provides emergency and routine services to
U.S. citizens. ACS also prepares for, and provides assistance during,
major crises. ACS desk officers serve as information conduits
between posts and headquarters.

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). DS oversees security at overseas
posts and is responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for
the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. DS also manages regional security
officers at posts. Regional security officers execute post security drills at
the direction of the Emergency Action Committee chair and develop the
security portion of each post’s Emergency Action Plan, as directed by the
chief of mission or principal officer. 10
Bureau of Medical Services (MED). The bureau’s Directorate of
Operational Medicine (OPMED) executes State’s operational medicine
program, which includes planning and executing medical contingency
plans. During the COVID-19 pandemic, OPMED operated medical
evacuation flights, among other activities.
Foreign Service Institute (FSI). The Foreign Service Institute’s Crisis
Management Training Division conducts training and crisis management
exercises at all diplomatic facilities abroad.
Regional Bureaus. The department’s regional bureaus oversee the U.S.
embassies and consulates and coordinate U.S. foreign relations in their
respective geographic areas.
Figure 1 shows State offices and bureaus with responsibilities for crisis
preparedness and response.

10The chair of the post’s Emergency Action Committee is responsible for ensuring the
Emergency Action Plan is updated.

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Figure 1: Department of State Organization Chart Showing Key Entities with Responsibilities for Crisis Preparedness and
Response

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State’s Role in
Repatriations

State may work with other federal agencies in repatriation efforts. For
example, State is responsible for planning and initiating repatriation
activities overseas, while the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) provides assistance after individuals return to the United States. 11
State initiates the repatriation of U.S. personnel, their dependents, and
other individuals to the United States from abroad when their lives are
endangered. State’s policy is to use commercial carriers before
government-provided options. 12 State is also authorized to use
government funds to procure repatriation flights to evacuate individuals
during crises. In such instances, State seeks reimbursement from
passengers for the cost of the repatriation flight. 13
According to State officials, State may use the following means, among
others, to help repatriate individuals during a crisis: 14
•

Commercial rescue flights. State may work with commercial airlines
to facilitate flights or to organize flights specifically for repatriation. In
such cases, passengers pay the airline directly.

•

Private charter flights. Private charter flights include charters
facilitated by State but paid for by passengers directly. Private charter

11HHS, through its component agency the Administration for Children and Families,
operates the U.S. Repatriation Program, which provides temporary assistance to U.S.
citizens and their dependents who are repatriated by State and are without available
resources. Temporary assistance provided by the U.S. Repatriation Program includes
monetary payments, medical care, temporary billeting, transportation, and other goods
and services (e.g., counseling) necessary for the health or welfare of individuals provided
upon their arrival in the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1313(c) and 45 C.F.R. § 212.3 (2019).
12See 12 FAH-1 Annex K 2. U.S. law also established a preference and specific
requirements for executive branch agencies to acquire commercial services and products
that meet an agency’s needs. See 41 U.S.C. § 3307.
13Under 22 U.S.C. § 4802(b), the Secretary of State is required to develop and implement
policies and programs to provide for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. government
personnel, their dependents, and private citizens—including U.S. citizens and thirdcountry nationals—when their lives are endangered. State’s expenditures for evacuations
of private citizens must be made on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent
practicable. 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(A). In addition, the Secretary of State may make loans
to destitute U.S. citizens to provide for their return to the United States. 22 U.S.C. §
2671(b)(2)(B).
14DOD may provide repatriation flights using military aircraft. No such DOD flights were

used during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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flights also include those organized by private organizations, such as
commercial companies or religious organizations.
•

State-funded charter flights. In some cases, State may organize
and pay for charter flights. State is required to seek reimbursement
from passengers for the cost of those flights. 15 State may work with
the Department of Defense (DOD) to organize State-funded charter
flights. OPMED also charters medical evacuation charter flights.

•

DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spaceavailable flights. Space-available flights include DOD or DHS flights
operated for nonrepatriation purposes, with seats available to return
U.S. citizens to the United States.

•

Other flights. State may utilize flights operated by State’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs as well as flights
operated or arranged by foreign governments.

Figure 2 shows examples of State personnel overseeing repatriation
flights during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 2: State Personnel Overseeing a Military Flight in Honduras (left) and a
Charter Flight in Montenegro (right)

15This requirement does not apply to passengers who are U.S. government employees or
their dependents. 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(A).

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State Carried Out
Historic Repatriation
Effort during COVID19 Pandemic
State Repatriated
Unprecedented Numbers
of People from January to
June 2020

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, State’s recent repatriation efforts were
relatively infrequent and small in scale. In the 5 years before the
pandemic, State repatriated a total of 5,839 individuals—an average of
1,168 per year—who were in 28 countries. 16 In contrast, from January 29
to June 5, 2020, State assisted in repatriating more than 100,000
individuals who were in 139 countries. 17
As table 1 shows, the majority (54 percent) of passengers on repatriation
flights during the COVID-19 pandemic traveled on commercial rescue
flights. Thirty-five percent of passengers traveled on privately chartered
flights or State-funded chartered flights, and the remaining 11 percent
traveled on OPMED, DOD, or DHS flights.

Table 1: Types of Repatriation Flights and Numbers of Passengers, by Flight Type, Jan. 29–June 5, 2020
Number of passengers

Percentage of all
passengers on repatriation flights

Commercial rescuea

59,103

54.2

Private and State charterb

37,807

34.7

State Department Bureau of Operational Medicinec

6,592

6.0

Department of Defensed

4,209

3.9

Department of Homeland Securitye

Flight type

1,101

1.0

Otherf

160

.1

Total

108,972

100

Source: Department of State (State) Office of Crisis Management and Strategy (CMS) data. | GAO-22-104354

Note: Passengers on repatriation flights included U.S. government employees and their dependents,
U.S. private citizens and lawful permanent residents, and, in some cases, third-country nationals.
CMS maintained a database of repatriation flights that State organized or facilitated during the
COVID-19 pandemic. According to CMS officials, they did not consistently verify information in the

16State repatriated 1,056 U.S. citizens in 2015; 1,141 in 2016; 1,285 in 2017; 1,261 in
2018; and 1,096 in 2019. State carried out these repatriations in response to 13 events of
civil unrest, 11 natural disasters, and seven bombings and attacks, among other crises
requiring evacuations of U.S. citizens.
17The 139 countries include two territories, the West Bank and Gaza.

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database because of the fast-paced nature of COVID-19 repatriations. We did not assess the
reliability of CMS’s database.
Numbers in columns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
Passengers on commercial rescue flights paid the carriers directly for their tickets on a by-seat basis,
with no additional U.S. government expenditure.
a

b
Passengers on private chartered flights paid the operator directly. Passengers on State-funded
chartered flights signed a promissory note agreeing to repay State for the cost of the flight.
c
Passengers on Bureau of Operational Medicine flights signed a promissory note agreeing to pay
State for the cost of the flight.
d
Passengers on Department of Defense flights comprised 3,523 U.S. citizens who traveled on flights
arranged by the U.S. Transportation Command and funded by the State department, and 686 who
traveled on military space-available flights. Passengers on State-funded flights arranged by the U.S.
Transportation Command signed a promissory note agreeing to repay State for the cost of the flight.
e
Department of Homeland Security flights were operated by U.S. Immigrations Customs and
Enforcement.

”Other” includes feeder flights operated by State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs and flights operated or arranged by foreign governments, among others.

f

As figure 3 shows, the majority of passengers on repatriation flights
traveled in March and April 2020, with the numbers decreasing in May
and June. 18 In addition, from January to May 2020, the number of
international flights arriving in and departing from the United States
decreased from approximately 129,000 to 7,838, while the number of
passengers arriving in and departing from the United States fell from 18.9
million 369,000. 19

18According to State officials, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the

administration issued a variety of proclamations, suspending entry into the United States
of foreign nationals from specific countries. A nationwide travel ban from China was
issued on January 31, 2020, encouraging those in China to depart through commercial
means. On February 29, 2020, the administration announced the suspension of entry of
foreign nationals traveling from Iran. On March 11, 2020, the United States restricted the
entry of foreign nationals who had been present in the Schengen Area in the past 14 days.
19By contrast, in 2019, an average of 135,000 flights, carrying a total of 20.1 million
passengers, arrived in and departed from the United States each month.

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Figure 3: Number of Passengers on Repatriation Flights, Jan. 29–June 5, 2020

Figure 4 shows the numbers of passengers on repatriation flights from the
six regions represented by State’s six geographic bureaus from January
29 through June 5, 2020, according to State data. 20 As figure 4 indicates,
more than half of the passengers on these flights departed from Western
Hemisphere countries such as those in Central and South America.

20State’s six geographic bureaus are the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, the Bureau
of South and Central Asian Affairs, the Bureau of African Affairs, and the Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs.

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Figure 4: Numbers of Passengers on Repatriation Flights from Regions Represented by State’s Six Geographic Bureaus, Jan.
29–June 5, 2020

Figure 5 shows a timeline of State’s repatriation effort and key related
events from December 1, 2019 through June 5, 2020.

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Figure 5: Timeline of Events Related to State Department COVID-19 Repatriation
Efforts, Dec. 2019–June 5, 2020

State tracked repatriation flights through June 5, 2020.

a

The 139 countries include two territories, the West Bank and Gaza.

b

State Established Several
Task Forces to Facilitate
COVID-19 Repatriations

State convenes task forces to facilitate State and interagency
communication and coordination related to specific crises. During their
operation, task forces serve as points of contact related to those crises. 21
From January to March 2020, State established three task forces to
facilitate repatriations:
•

Wuhan Evacuation Task Force. State constituted the Wuhan
Evacuation Task Force on January 24, 2020, to facilitate the ordered
departure of U.S. government employees from Wuhan, China. The
first repatriation flight arrived in the United States from Wuhan on
January 29, 2020. State transitioned the Wuhan Evacuation Task
Force into the Coronavirus Global Response Coordination Unit 2
weeks later, on February 13, 2020, after assisting in the repatriation of
more than 800 U.S. citizens.

21In addition, task forces provide decision makers with the most current information
available and communicate policy makers’ decisions to ensure the appropriate offices are
aware of relevant requirements.

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State Provided Thousands
of COVID-19 Repatriation
Loans and Promissory
Notes

•

Diamond Princess Response Task Force. From February 15
through February 25, 2020, the Diamond Princess Response Task
Force facilitated the repatriation of U.S. citizens from the Diamond
Princess cruise ship while it was docked in Japan.

•

Repatriation Task Force. The Repatriation Task Force coordinated
and provided repatriation support during the COVID-19 pandemic. 22
The task force facilitated repatriations from March 19 through June 5,
2020, when it moved to on-call status.

During the pandemic, State provided more than 3,000 repatriation loans 23
and issued more than 26,000 repatriation promissory notes to U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents who needed assistance to return
to the United States. 24 According to State data, 90 percent of the
repatriation loans billed in fiscal year 2020 were for travel during the
COVID-19 pandemic. As table 2 shows, the volume and total value of
repatriation loans increased significantly from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2020.

22In addition to the Repatriation Task Force, the Coronavirus Global Response
Coordination Unit, established February 13, 2020, led State’s engagement with other U.S.
government agencies, state and local governments, and Congress. The unit addressed
matters including the provision of outbreak updates, public health preparedness, and
supply chains. Because the unit was not repatriation specific and because the
Repatriation Task Force—a component of the unit—focused on repatriation, we did not
include the Coronavirus Global Response Coordination Unit in our review. State
transferred the unit’s responsibilities to several other State offices on May 21, 2021.
23State may issue loans in currency for transportation and other reasonable expenses to
individuals seeking to return to the United States. Individuals receiving these loans must
sign a promissory note and repayment agreement—form DS-3072, Repatriation and
Emergency Medical and Dietary Assistance Loan Application—agreeing to repay the U.S.
government. We refer to these loans as repatriation loans.
24State may pay the cost of transportation, such as flights, for individuals seeking to return

to the United States. Individuals receiving these services must sign a promissory note and
repayment agreement—form DS-5528, Evacuee Manifest and Promissory Note—
agreeing to repay the U.S. government. We refer to these promissory notes as repatriation
promissory notes.

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Table 2: State Department Repatriation Loans Billed and Outstanding, Fiscal Years 2015–2021
Number of
loans billed

Total amount
billed (dollars)

Total amount
outstanding (dollars)

Percentage of total
billed amount repaid

Percentage of total
billed amount
outstanding

2015

1,310

1,376,667

525,402

62

38

2016

1,741

1,574,359

866,440

45

55

2017

1,692

1,681,018

697,047

59

41

2018

1,459

1,844,191

940,829

49

51

2019

1,023

1,468,658

649,242

56

44

2020

3,105

4,701,868

2,671,843

43

57

2021a

323

530,564

454,298

14

86

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information. | GAO-22-104354

Note: The data shown are as of June 1, 2021.
The data for fiscal year 2021 cover October 1, 2020, through June 1, 2021.

a

As table 3 shows, the volume and total value of repatriation promissory
notes billed also increased significantly in fiscal year 2020, as did the
percentage of the total billed amount repaid.
Table 3: State Department Repatriation Promissory Notes Billed and Outstanding, Fiscal Years 2015–2021

Fiscal year
2015a

Number of
notes billed

Total amount billed
(dollars)

Total amount
outstanding (dollars)

Percentage of total
billed amount repaid

Percentage of total
billed amount
outstanding

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

2016

53

65,629

801

99

1

2017

1,128

590,839

19,724

97

3

2018

15

41,385

27,420

34

66

2019

25

161,885

106,171

34

66

2020

26,758

45,417,831

13,239,477

71

29

2021b

70

135,304

45,445

66

34

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information. | GAO-22-104354

Note: The data shown are as of June 1, 2021.
There were no evacuations in fiscal year 2015.

a

The data for fiscal year 2021 cover October 1, 2020, through June 1, 2021.

b

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State Used Various
Mechanisms to
Communicate with U.S.
Citizens during the
Pandemic

Most Respondents to Our
Survey Reported State
Provided Useful and
Timely RepatriationRelated Information and
Communication

State used various mechanisms to communicate with the public regarding
repatriation during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example:
•

State posted information on embassy and consulate websites.

•

State sent out alerts through the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program
(STEP). 25

•

State provided information on Travel.State.Gov, its website for U.S
citizen travelers, including “COVID-19 Frequently Asked Questions for
U.S. Citizens” (posted on March 15, 2020, according to agency
officials) and “What the Department of State Can and Can’t Do in a
Crisis” (last updated on April 7, 2020). 26 The documents address
topics such as (1) whether government-assisted repatriation flights
are free, (2) use of the military to provide flights for repatriation, and
(3) the availability of emergency financial assistance in the form of
loans to those in need.

•

State used social media such as Facebook and Twitter to update
travel safety and information.

•

State set up a 24-hour call center to provide answers to U.S. citizens’
questions about repatriation during the pandemic. As of June 10,
2020, the center had answered more than 75,000 calls, according to
State officials.

To learn about U.S. citizens’ experiences with State-funded repatriation
charter flights, we surveyed a generalizable sample of 474 passengers on
these flights during the period from January 29 to June 5, 2020. The
survey included a number of closed-ended questions related to State’s
communication of repatriation-related information as well as two openended questions—”What worked well?” and “What did not go well?”—
about the passengers’ repatriation experiences. (See app. II for
responses to selected survey questions.)
Our analysis of responses to the survey’s closed-ended questions about
State’s responsiveness to passengers’ repatriation-related inquiries
25STEP is a database that State’s Message Alert System for Citizens Overseas Tool (also

known as MASCOT) uses to communicate via email with U.S. travelers who wish to
receive security updates from U.S. embassies and consulates.

26Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Travel: Emergencies,
accessed July 9, 2020, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/internationaltravel/emergencies.html.

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indicated that the majority of passengers on repatriation flights found
State to be extremely or very responsive. Our analysis of survey results
related to the timeliness and usefulness of information that State provided
about repatriation indicated that the majority of passengers found the
information to be at least somewhat timely and useful. 27 For example:
•

Among passengers who indicated they had called the U.S. embassy
or consulate in their host country to obtain repatriation information and
were able to speak with someone, an estimated 70 percent reported
that State was extremely or very responsive to their repatriationrelated questions. 28

•

Among passengers on repatriation flights who indicated they had
registered with STEP, an estimated 52 percent reported that STEP
notifications related to repatriation were extremely or very timely. 29

•

An estimated 52 percent of passengers on these flights indicated that
State had informed them of the flight costs associated with their State
-funded repatriation flight. 30 Additionally, an estimated 57 percent of
passengers on these flights indicated that State had informed them
about the repayment process for the flight.

•

Survey respondents also provided written comments indicating that
State provided highly useful responses to their repatriation-related emails. In addition, respondents’ written comments indicated that
State’s website, travel.state.gov, as well as U.S. embassy websites
provided useful information about the pandemic and the situation in
their host countries.

Moreover, respondents to the open-ended question “What worked well?”
expressed positive views of State’s repatriation effort, including its

27The survey used the following response scale: Extremely responsive (or Extremely

timely or Extremely useful), Very responsive, Moderately responsive, Somewhat
responsive, Not at all responsive, and No opinion.

28This estimate’s 95 percent confidence interval has a lower limit of 56 and an upper limit
of 83. Eighty-six percent of passengers we surveyed indicated that they had called the
U.S. embassy or consulate in their host country to obtain repatriation information and were
able to speak with someone.
29Seventy-eight percent of passengers on these flights indicated that they had registered

with STEP.

30This estimate’s 95 percent confidence interval has a lower limit of 40 and an upper limit
of 63.

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professionalism and communication, the quality of the information State
provided, and the repatriation flights. For example:
•

One respondent said, “Multiple calls were made to us to make sure
we had the right information.”

•

Another respondent said, “A member of the consulate was very
helpful in getting our flight arranged. He convinced us that the
situation was deteriorating very quickly and that we should take the
State Department plane.”

•

A third respondent said, “The embassy staff answering emails were
phenomenally helpful…. We always received timely and helpful email
responses. They were well prepared, warm, and reassuring. The
whole repatriation was incredibly well-executed.”

Respondents to the open-ended question “What did not go well?”
expressed concerns ranging from issues such as flight costs and State’s
billing process to the general repatriation process. For example:
•

One respondent wrote, “The one way flight ticket from Chennai, India,
to San Francisco, California, cost US $3009. It was way too high for
any standards and even during a pandemic. My wife and I traveled
back to the U.S. and paid $6018 one way.”

•

Another respondent stated that “it was hard to have to be ready to go
at a moment’s notice, as well as having to rely on email and internet
to communicate when there was unreliable internet.”

Figure 6 shows various repatriation-related activities undertaken by State
during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Figure 6: Examples of State Department Repatriation Activities

State personnel explaining repatriation procedures to travelers in Wuhan, China (top left); State
personnel assisting passengers outside the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship in Yokohama, Japan (top
right); State personnel checking a passenger’s temperature in Cameroon (bottom left); State
personnel briefing passengers being transported to a repatriation flight in Peru (bottom right).

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State Reported
Numerous
Challenges and
Lessons Learned in
Repatriating U.S.
Citizens during
COVID-19 Pandemic
State Identified
Challenges Faced and
Lessons Learned in Its
Repatriation Effort

As table 4 shows, in September 2020 we reported that State had
identified several common challenges that officials faced in repatriating
U.S. citizens and had also identified steps taken and lessons learned in
addressing these challenges. 31

Table 4: Reported Challenges Faced by State Department Officials in Repatriating U.S. Citizens during COVID-19 Pandemic
and Reported Steps Taken and Lessons Learned in Addressing These Challenges
Challenge faced

Steps taken and lessons learned

Identifying, locating, and communicating with individuals who
wanted to be repatriated

State collaborated with other U.S. government partners, mounting
an outreach campaign via traditional and social media to enroll
U.S. citizens overseas in State’s Smart Traveler Enrollment
Program. State and overseas posts also made extensive use of
their Internet presence, social media, email, and cell phones to
publicize State’s repatriation efforts and, as necessary,
established direct contact with individual citizens seeking
repatriation options.

Responding to restrictions placed by foreign governments on
internal and international travel, including border closures,
curfews, quarantine requirements, and requirements for
nonstandard documentation or other extraordinary exit
requirements such as medical certifications and testing

State engaged foreign governments through traditional diplomacy
and new strategies.

Securing options for cruise ships that encountered difficulties in
docking, refueling and resupplying, or disembarking passengers
and crew in ports around the world

Overseas posts worked closely with the cruise lines, engaging
foreign governments and locating ports willing to accept the ships.
State also convened a team of officials from across the
department to provide oversight and coordination.

Answering incoming-call volume that outstripped embassies’ and
consulates’ capacity to respond

State used its National Passport Information Center to create a
24-hour call center to answer repatriation and other emergency
questions. Many posts also forwarded their switchboards to the
call center, facilitating faster response times.

31GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted

Actions, GAO-20-701 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2020).

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Challenge faced

Steps taken and lessons learned

Providing diplomatic intervention to help air carriers obtain timely
landing permissions in each country where evacuation or
repatriation occurred and obtain timely overflight permits for each
country along the flight paths

State’s Repatriation Task Force maintained operations and
communications with State regional offices 24 hours per day and 7
days per week, contracted airlines regarding the flights, and
coordinated flight clearance requirements. Additionally, the
Directorate of Operational Medicine maintained a 24-hour task
force to monitor the progress of the directorate’s flight planning
and missions.a

Source: GAO interview with Department of State officials. | GAO-22-104354
a
State’s Directorate of Operational Medicine provided 61 repatriation missions from January 29
through June 5, 2020, according to State officials.

During our virtual site visits at posts in five countries, post officials
provided examples of the challenging circumstances the posts faced in
their repatriation efforts. For example, Morocco—one of the first countries
to close its airspace during the pandemic—gave the United States just 4
days to evacuate citizens, according to post officials. Honduras closed
four of its five airports and required flights to use the only airport they
could access without a specially trained pilot, which created an air traffic
bottleneck, according to post officials. 32 Post officials in Ghana noted that
repatriation required working with local authorities to obtain permission to
transit to the airport and that passengers were not always comfortable
with the arrangement, potentially missing flights.
In addition, we analyzed 33 cables that 28 posts submitted to State from
April 2 through November 4, 2020, identifying lessons learned from
challenges that affected their repatriation efforts, such as restrictions on
internal and international travel, early difficulties in communicating with
U.S. citizens, and flight-related problems. The cables described various
factors—including working with foreign governments, using social media,
coordinating with other posts, and drawing on local knowledge—that
helped the posts address such challenges and facilitate repatriations.
Working with host governments. Twenty-six of the 33 cables indicated
the importance of working with host governments to support repatriation
efforts. For example, two cables, from posts in Nepal and Peru, reported
the following:
•

In Nepal, post staff organized a rescue operation using two postowned buses to help Americans stranded in Pokhara, one of the
country’s main tourist hubs. Three days before the first evacuation

32Because of Honduras’s mountainous terrain, pilots flying into the country require special
training to land at all but one of Honduras’s five airports, according to State officials.

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flight, a consular officer traveled to Pokhara and accompanied 40
people back to Kathmandu. Because the government of Nepal had
banned all air and road travel, post staff requested and received
special permission from the government to carry out the operation.
•

In Peru, post staff worked with contacts in the Peruvian government to
develop procedures to move U.S. citizens to departure points for
repatriation flights. The contacts enabled the post staff to reach
Peruvian decision makers and troubleshoot issues quickly, such as
when travelers were stopped by police at roadblocks in remote
regions or when underage minors traveling without a guardian needed
clearance from immigration authorities to board a repatriation flight.

Using social media. Twenty-four of the 33 cables indicated the
importance of using social media to communicate with U.S. citizens. For
example, two cables, from posts in Rwanda and Laos, reported the
following:
•

In Rwanda, the post publicized opportunities to depart the country
using the Message Alert System for Citizens Overseas Tool
(MASCOT) as well as the embassy’s Facebook page and website and
the Ambassador’s Twitter feed. 33 Post staff also placed hundreds of
phone calls, wrote direct emails, and sent text messages via
WhatsApp to those who contacted the embassy to inquire about the
special flights.

•

In Laos, post staff conducted outreach through MASCOT and the
embassy website in addition to Facebook, where they posted
information in Lao. After posting the information in Lao, post staff
noticed a significant uptick in responses.

Coordinating with other posts. Seventeen of the 33 cables indicated
the importance of coordination between posts, in part to address flightrelated problems. For example, two cables, from posts in Djibouti and
Armenia, reported the following:
•

In Djibouti, post staff coordinated with Embassy Addis Ababa, in
Ethiopia, to obtain flight clearances and landing permissions.

33MASCOT is an application that allows consular staff to send alerts, routine messages,

and travel advisories to travelers who enrolled a trip in STEP or within a particular
consular district.

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•

In Armenia, post staff received assistance from Embassy Doha, in
Qatar, in processing last-minute flight clearances and the passenger
manifest with host-country authorities.

Drawing on local knowledge. A small number of cables reported that
post staff’s local knowledge was helpful in the repatriation effort. The
importance of local knowledge was also noted during our interviews with
staff at posts in five countries that helped repatriate U.S. citizens during
the pandemic. For example, two cables, from posts in Morocco and Peru,
reported the following:
•

In Morocco, post staff drew on existing local knowledge to navigate
airports and around the country during the pandemic.

•

In Peru, post staff used their local knowledge to determine how to get
U.S. citizens from the jungle to the airport using land transportation.

In March 2021, State expanded lessons learned requirements. Some
posts voluntarily provided lessons-learned cables related to their
repatriation experiences. Other posts provided such cables after an
authorized departure was declared during the COVID-19 pandemic but
before the March 2021 requirement was implemented. 34 CMS remains
responsible for collecting and disseminating lessons learned and shares
documents, cables, and reports on its internal website.

State CA Issued a Cable
Assessing Lessons
Learned from the
Pandemic

In July 2021, CA issued a cable identifying lessons learned from
challenges encountered during the pandemic. 35 The effort was intended
to identify and document successful CA innovations and workarounds as
well as areas where CA processes and tools fell short during State’s
repatriation effort.
The cable identifies goals in four areas—policy and procedures, crisis
organization, crisis communication, and technology and systems—as well
as issues and tasks associated with each goal. For example:

34Before State issued the March 2021 requirement, posts voluntarily submitted the 33

cables we reviewed. In a forthcoming report, we will examine adjustments in State’s
overseas operations during the pandemic and, to obtain insights relevant to State’s
operating posture in the pandemic more broadly, may review cables that posts submitted
in response to the authorized or ordered departure.
35Department of State, “Bureau of Consular Affairs COVID-19 Lessons Learned Project:

Identifying Challenges and Tasks,” MRN 21 State 73804 (July 15, 2021).

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State Conducted an
Interim Review of Its
Repatriation Effort

•

Regarding policy and procedures, the cable observes that some posts
worked with host governments to allow commercial rescue flights
even after the countries’ airspace had closed and states this type of
bilateral cooperation should become the norm. The cable identifies
tasks such as implementing changes to posts’ EAPs to improve
standing agreements with host governments and developing standard
procedures for commercial rescue flights, including best practices for
securing host-country permission.

•

Regarding technology and systems, the cable notes that STEP—
State’s primary means of communicating consular messages to U.S.
citizens overseas—had limitations and that many people relied
instead on social media. To develop a better way to message
segments of overseas travelers appropriately, the cable identifies
tasks such as determining whether STEP (or a similar travelerregistration system) or a commercially available over-the-counter
product can better achieve CA objectives.

In fall 2020, State initiated an interim review of its response to the COVID19 pandemic. The review was intended to capture lessons learned during
the pandemic’s first year, from December 2019 through December 2020;
identify challenges and best practices; and recommend changes to
improve the department’s response to the pandemic and future crises.
The review included
•

surveying 11,377 State employees,

•

analyzing 55 lessons-learned cables related to the pandemic, 36

•

conducting 48 focus groups and interviews with individual posts and
domestic offices,

•

collecting data from 50 bureau and 23 post questionnaires responses
from a representative sample of posts, 37 and

•

conducting over 100 interviews with senior leaders.

36These lessons-learned cables relate to repatriation, authorized and ordered departures,
and consular affairs and management, according to State officials.
37State’s selection of posts was purposeful but nongeneralizable. Officials considered
local health care and posts’ size, among other things, when selecting posts to receive the
questionnaire.

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In June 2021, State issued a comprehensive report of the results of the
interim review. 38 The report provides recommendations in four
substantive areas: crisis planning and response coordination, workforce
management and safety, supporting U.S. citizens, and advancing U.S.
foreign policy. Further, the report proposes creating a process and
structure for acting upon its recommendations and tracking progress in
their implementation. State officials told us they are studying the report
with a view to deciding on next steps.

State Had Global
Crisis-Preparedness
and -Response
Mechanisms, but
Implementation and
Guidance Were
Incomplete
State Established
Interagency Group to
Coordinate Repatriation
but Has Not Convened It
since April 2019

Although State established an interagency group—the WLG—to ensure
coordination for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens abroad,
State did not sustain the regular quarterly WLG meetings, which may
have contributed to gaps in interagency communication during the global
repatriation effort. State and DOD established the WLG in 1998, with
State as the lead agency, to coordinate and implement plans for the
evacuation of persons abroad during emergencies, and according to
State officials, State formalized WLG’s charter in 2018. 39 The charter
states that the WLG is expected to meet quarterly. CMS—which is
responsible for department-wide crisis preparedness and response
activities—manages the WLG’s day-to-day operations, including

38Department of State, CIR, COVID-19 Interim Review: Lessons Learned from the
Department of State’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, December 2019–December
2020 (June 2021).
39WLG members include DOD, DHS, and HHS, among other agencies, as well as a
number of State bureaus. Specifically, State WLG members include CA, DS, the Bureau
of Administration, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, the Office of the Legal Advisor, and
regional bureaus.

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scheduling meetings. 40 However, as of May 2021, CMS officials told us
that they had not convened the group since April 2019.
According to CMS officials, after the WLG last met in April 2019 and
before the pandemic began, members of the group questioned the
purpose of further meetings. CMS officials told us that, in response, they
offered to schedule future meetings on request or if the need arose.
According to the officials, in February 2021, interagency WLG members
expressed interest in CMS reconvening the WLG to discuss information
sharing about repatriation across and among the task forces. However,
CMS delayed reconvening the WLG in part because of limited capacity
within CMS to manage the group while also playing an active role in
managing State’s international response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
according to CMS officials.
State documents and comments by CMS officials suggest that the lack of
WLG meetings before and during the pandemic may have contributed to
gaps related to interagency communication. In internal documents, State
identified a number of gaps related to interagency communication during
the pandemic, such as a lack of knowledge of how to communicate with
other agencies, lack of guidance about points of contact at other
agencies, and lack of clarity about U.S. government policy on repatriation.
Comments by State officials indicated that such gaps led to challenges in
communicating with the correct offices at interagency partners and
coordinating repatriation efforts with interagency partners in the absence
of clear, established policy. For example, CMS officials told us that
regular meetings of the WLG would have facilitated interagency
communication at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, because such
communication would have reduced the effort required to identify the
correct contacts in other agencies.
In part because CMS did not convene quarterly WLG meetings in
accordance with the group’s charter, State’s ability to coordinate with
other agencies to respond to the pandemic and carry out repatriation
activities was diminished. In addition to the requirement for the WLG to
meet quarterly, leading practices for interagency coordination based on
our prior work call for agencies to consider how to sustain leadership of
interagency groups over the long term—such as by meeting regularly—in
40CMS also leads State’s Crisis Management Council, which brings together crisis
management practitioners and stakeholders from throughout the department to promote
innovation and collaboration, among other activities.

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order to maintain the group’s effectiveness. 41 CMS officials told us in May
2021 that they planned to reconvene the WLG in the future but did not
know when that would occur. Convening quarterly meetings of the WLG
would enhance State’s ability to coordinate repatriation activities with
other agencies in any future global crisis.

State’s Guidance for Crisis
Response Has Several
Gaps
State’s Guidance for
Establishing Task Forces Does
Not Reflect Its Policy or
Practices

Although State convened several task forces to carry out its repatriation
efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic, State’s internal guidance for
establishing crisis-response task forces does not reflect the agency’s
policy and actual practices. Specifically, although CMS’s internal
guidance requires the completion of certain documentation for task
forces, State officials told us that the guidance differs from their actual
practices. Standards for internal control in the federal government require
that management incorporate risks and organizational goals into internal
control systems and document those systems. 42
In 2018, CMS—which is responsible for recommending whether State
should establish a task force and for supporting task force operations—
identified a need to redesign and modernize its task force model.
Specifically, CMS identified challenges related to establishing task forces
under its existing model, including delays resulting from identifying and
training staff, difficulty in using available tools and technology, and
confusion about task force structure, roles, and responsibilities.
Subsequently, CMS developed a new policy for establishing task forces,
including a risk-based approach to determine the appropriate level of
crisis response using a five-tier classification system. 43 State finalized the
41GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).
Interagency groups should define their leadership model, including roles and
responsibilities, and sustain leadership. Leadership for collaborative efforts can be
strengthened by top-level commitment from the President, Congress, or other high-level
officials.

42GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

43The five-tier classification system ranges from a limited, bureau-led response that does
not require a task force (tier 1), to various levels of State and interagency task forces (tiers
2 to 4), to coordination units to manage protracted crises (tier 5). See 1 FAM 022.2-3.

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policy in April 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic began and after State
initiated the three repatriation-related task forces. CMS also developed
internal guidance for initiating task forces that reflects selected leading
practices for interagency collaboration. Specifically, the guidance includes
a detailed checklist that outlines procedures and templates for identifying
and documenting the scope, participants and their roles and
responsibilities, and expected outcomes and reporting of the task force. 44
However, CMS’s internal guidance for initiating task forces does not fully
reflect State’s policy or practices. For example, the guidance does not
discuss the five-tier classification system or include steps to determine,
document, and communicate a task force’s classification to internal and
external stakeholders. Additionally, although the guidance includes a step
for CMS staff initiating a task force to document a number of details, CMS
officials told us that such documentation is not always appropriate.
According to those officials, the need for such documentation depends on
the underlying crises, timelines, and expected resource requirements.
The officials told us that they did not document the Wuhan Evacuation or
Diamond Princess Response Task Forces as the guidance requires.
However, the officials said that they followed the guidance for the
Repatriation Task Force, found the practice helpful, and expected it would
be useful for future task forces. They also said that guidance and
instructions related to the tier system, such as guidance regarding the
documentation required for various tiers of task forces, would be helpful in
future crises.
CMS officials told us that they planned to revise the internal guidance for
initiating task forces to align with State’s policy and practices. However,
they did not define a timeline for doing so. Revising the guidance will help
State ensure that any task forces it convenes in response to a future
crisis are established according to its policy and practices.

State Lacked Guidance for
Creating Consistent Flight
Manifests

State’s guidance on documentation for State-funded repatriation flights
does not specify the types of information that should be included on flight
manifests or include instructions for formatting them, which led to
difficulties and delays in creating and processing the manifests and billing
passengers on repatriation flights. As our survey found, dissatisfaction
with State’s billing process was a concern shared by some passengers on
44GAO-12-1022. These selected practices include defining outcomes and tracking
accountability and clarifying roles and responsibilities.

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repatriation flights. Standards for internal control in the federal
government state that management should identify the information
requirements needed to achieve the agency’s objectives; ensure that data
are appropriate, complete, accurate, and provided on a timely basis; and
ensure that data meet identified information requirements. 45
Several State bureaus collect and use information related to State-funded
repatriation flights:
•

Consular personnel at overseas posts are responsible for ensuring
that passengers complete promissory notes, which include both
passenger information and a promise to repay State for the cost of the
flight. 46 The consular personnel use passenger information when
building flight manifests and provide the manifests and completed
promissory notes to CGFS.

•

A/LM officials told us they use the number of passengers from the
manifest as part of the process to determine the amount to charge
passengers.

•

CGFS officials told us they use the manifests and promissory notes,
along with information provided by A/LM, to ensure they have
complete documentation for each flight and to bill passengers. 47

Figure 7 shows State personnel collecting information from passengers
prior to repatriation flights during the COVID-19 pandemic.

45GAO-14-704G.
46See Department of State, Form DS-5528: Evacuee Manifest and Promissory Note (June

2019). Passenger payments are due 30 days after State generates the bill.

47State assesses interest and administrative charges for bills that are not paid in full after

30 days. After 90 days, the bill is referred to the Department of the Treasury for collection,
which may include withholding tax returns or social security payments or garnishing
wages, among other measures. According to State officials, if a debtor is financially
unable to pay a debt in one lump sum, State may, at its discretion and on request, accept
payment in regular installments. Debtors who have signed and returned a written
agreement can continue to make payments to State on a recurring basis and their
accounts will not be referred to Treasury. If an account becomes past due and is in default
for 60 days, it will be transferred to Treasury for collection.

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Figure 7: State Personnel Greeting Passengers and Collecting Information before
Repatriation Flights in India

State officials at four posts told us they faced challenges related to
building flight manifests during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example,
officials at two posts said the process of developing flight manifests was
time consuming, and officials at one of these posts said that because of
differing airline requirements, they did not know which information to
collect. Officials at two additional posts said that they lacked State
guidance on building flights manifests and therefore used information
requirements provided by DOD or DHS to develop the manifests.
A/LM and CGFS officials reported facing challenges related to creating
and using data from flight manifests. For example, A/LM officials told us
that the manifests sometimes lacked necessary information or contained
inaccurate information, such as the names of individuals who were not on
the flight. Also, some manifests included U.S. government employees,
while other manifests excluded them. Additionally, CGFS officials told us
that because of the lack of State guidance for building flight manifests,
they received manifests with inconsistently formatted data, such as
inconsistently formatted names.
In part because of the lack of guidance and inconsistent formatting of
flight manifests, State officials told us they faced operational difficulties
and processing delays. Officials at two posts said the process of building
flight manifests was time consuming. According to A/LM officials, the
inconsistent formatting of flight manifests delayed calculations of the
actual per-passenger cost of flights; without clear identification of
passenger status, they could not perform the needed calculations or had
to repeat the calculations when they received additional information.
Moreover, according to CGFS officials, delays in A/LM’s determination of
the cost of flights slowed the billing of passengers. In addition, the officials

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said the inconsistent formatting of flight manifests delayed processing of
the manifests, because they had to identify certain data fields and
reformat data to be consistent with their procedures.
CA officials told us they were aware of the challenges that posts faced in
creating flight manifests and capturing information needed by A/LM,
CGFS, and others. The officials said they planned to develop new
guidance, in conjunction with stakeholders, to specify the types of
information that should be included on flight manifests as well as
instructions for formatting the manifests. However, they did not identify a
timeline for this effort. Developing such guidance will help State minimize
the risk of operational difficulties and processing delays in creating flight
manifests for repatriation flights during future crises.

State’s Guidance for Pricing
Flights Lacked Key Procedures
during the COVID-19
Repatriation Effort, but State
Recently Updated the
Guidance

State is required to seek reimbursement for repatriation flights it charters,
which is not to exceed the cost of a reasonable commercial airfare
immediately before the crisis requiring repatriation. 48 The guidance that
State used for determining the prices to charge passengers for seats on
State-funded charter flights during the COVID-19 repatriation effort lacked
procedures for documenting and calculating the prices. As a result,
documentation of costs charged to passengers was inconsistent and
processing of passenger billing was delayed. However, after receiving our
analysis, State updated its guidance in July 2021 to address deficiencies
we identified in the guidance it used during the COVID-19 pandemic.
A/LM guidance for supporting repatriations during crises includes
procedures for determining and tracking flight cost information. According
to the guidance, State will charge passengers the lower of two costs for
travel on a State-funded repatriation charter flight:
•

The fair market value of a comparable commercial fare (market
fare). State defines the market fare as a full-fare, nondiscounted, fully
refundable or changeable, last-minute, walk-up, one-way commercial
fare—sometimes known as a “Y” fare—on a comparable mode of
transportation immediately before an evacuation or as the evacuation
begins. Our review of the guidance that A/LM used during the COVID-

48This requirement applies when State uses funding under the authority provided by

section 2671 of title 22 of the United States Code. Specifically, the United States Code
authorizes State to use funds for the evacuation of private U.S. citizens or third-country
nationals “on a reimbursable basis to the maximum extent possible…except that no
reimbursement under this clause shall be paid that is greater than the amount the person
evacuated would have been charged for a reasonable commercial air fare immediately
prior to the events giving rise to the evacuation.” See 22 U.S.C. § 2671(b)(2)(A)(ii).

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19 pandemic identified several pieces of information needed to
determine a market fare: the repatriation flight’s origin and destination
(known as a flight route), the date used to determine the comparable
commercial fare, and the commercial fare’s code. In addition, A/LM
officials told us that they incorporate the commercial fare as well as
any applicable taxes when determining the amount to charge
passengers.
•

The actual per-passenger cost of the charter flight. The actual
per-passenger cost is determined by dividing the actual cost of the
flight to State by the number of passengers.

While the guidance that A/LM used during the COVID-19 repatriation
effort addressed how to determine the market fare, the guidance did not
include procedures for documenting the market fare’s basis. A/LM
officials told us that, although the guidance lacked such procedures, they
began documenting the market fare’s basis during the COVID-19
pandemic after CGFS requested that information.
Our review of A/LM’s documentation of the adult fares for 228 flight routes
during the COVID-19 pandemic found inconsistent documentation of the
four information components that we identified as necessary to determine
a market fare: 49 (1) the repatriation flight’s origin and destination, (2) the
date used to determine the comparable commercial fare, (3) the
commercial fare’s code, and (4) the commercial fare and applicable
taxes. Our analysis found the following:
•

Documentation for 40 market fares (about 18 percent) included all
four components.

•

Documentation for 63 market fares (about 28 percent) lacked three
components—the date used to determine the commercial fare, the
commercial fare code, and the commercial fare and applicable taxes.

•

Documentation for 125 market fares (about 55 percent) lacked at least
one component—the date of the commercial fare, the commercial fare
code, or the commercial fare and applicable taxes. 50

49The 228 flight routes represent the various routes of State-funded repatriation flights.
Where there were multiple flights with the same route, State used the same fare for each.
The data initially included 229 entries; however, one entry did not include a market fare.
We excluded this entry from our analysis.
50All entries identified the flight’s origin and departure.

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A/LM’s updated guidance addresses how to document the market fare’s
basis. Specifically, the guidance provides steps to capture a screenshot
of the market fare, which should include each of the four information
components we identified as necessary to determine a market fare. 51
Additionally, the guidance A/LM used during the COVID-19 repatriation
effort did not address querying and documenting adult, child, and infant
fares. State officials told us that after repatriation flights started during the
COVID-19 pandemic, they began querying and documenting commercial
airlines’ adult, child, and infant fares in order to charge passengers on the
basis of the relevant fare. Our review of available documentation for the
228 market fares found that documentation for 60 fares (about 26
percent) did not include records of the adult, child, and infant fares.
A/LM’s updated guidance addresses querying and documenting adult,
child and infant commercial rates. Specifically, the guidance includes
steps to determine and document the adult, child, and infant fares as part
of determining market fares, and includes steps to identify passengers
based on their age.
Finally, the guidance that A/LM used during the COVID-19 repatriation
effort did not include procedures for determining the actual number of
passengers on a flight, which A/LM uses to calculate the actual perpassenger cost of a State-funded charter flight. A/LM’s guidance stated
that A/LM should obtain the number of passengers on each flight and that
CA tracks this information. However, the guidance did not address how to
retrieve and process that information, such as which passengers to
include in the subsequent calculation of actual per-passenger costs. For
example, State officials told us that they include U.S. government
employees in the number of passengers used to calculate the perpassenger cost; however, the guidance did not address this. A/LM’s
updated guidance addresses procedures for determining the actual
number of passengers on a flight. Specifically, the updated guidance
provides steps to identify the number of passengers based on flight
manifests provided by CA and verified by CGFS. The updated guidance
also specifies that all passengers, including U.S. government employees
and foreign nationals, should be included when calculating the actual perpassenger cost.

51The updated guidance additionally requires documentation of the specific air carrier,
flight number, and class of service used to determine the market fare.

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State Requires Posts
to Prepare for Crises
but Does Not
Conduct Systematic
Oversight of Their
Preparedness
State Requires Posts to
Prepare Emergency Action
Plans but Does Not
Ensure They Certify
Required Updates

Although State requires overseas posts to develop, maintain, and
annually certify an Emergency Action Plan (EAP), State has not ensured
that each post certifies its plan within the required time frames. State’s
FAH requires overseas posts’ emergency action committees to develop
an EAP, ensure it is kept current, and conduct a comprehensive review of
the plan within 12 months of its last certification. When certifying its plan,
each post is required to review the plan’s content to ensure its currency
and update, if necessary.
However, our analysis of State data found that 138 of the 236 posts
required to have an EAP in 2020 52 did not certify their updated plans
within 12 months of the previous certification, 53 98 of these posts certified
their updated plans at least 1 month late. 54 In addition, 17 of the 30 posts
representing the 20 countries from which the largest numbers of
individuals were repatriated did not certify their plans within 12 months of

52As of December 2020, 236 of State’s 276 overseas posts were required to have an
EAP; as of March 2021, 257 posts were required to have an EAP, according to State
officials. State officials told us that a November 2020 update to the FAH increased the
number of posts required to have an EAP. According to 12 FAH-1 H-030, “Each post (to
include all embassies, consulates, branch offices, American Presence Posts, and
American Institutes Taiwan, but excluding consular agencies) is required to prepare an
EAP.” According to State officials, the EAP records were added to the Post Emergency
Guidance and Authoring System (PEGASYS) in March 2021 with a due date of March
2022.
53According to State officials, EAP certification dates are unavailable for the years before

2019, because State replaced the system it had used to track EAP certifications, the Crisis
Emergency Planning Application, with PEGASYS in September 2018. Consequently, we
are unable to assess the timeliness of EAP certifications in 2019.

54A post may certify its updated plan up to 90 days before the end of the month when it is
due and at any time after the due date.

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the previous update. 55 Eleven of the 17 posts certified their plan at least a
month late. 56 As of June 2021, EAP annual reviews were overdue for 24
of the 257 posts required to have an EAP in 2021.
The FAH requires the chair of each post’s Emergency Action Committee
to certify the updated EAP each calendar year and submit the plan to DS
annually. 57 According to DS officials, the DS Office of Special Programs’
Emergency Planning Unit reviews individual sections as they are
submitted, conducts a review of the entire EAP when the post submits the
annual certification, and advises the post regarding the FAH
requirements. However, although the unit is responsible for reviewing and
approving the annual certification, it does not have authority to enforce
the certification requirements, according to DS officials. In addition, DS
and the regional bureaus’ post management officers receive a monthly list
of posts that are late in certifying their EAP, but according to State
officials, the regional bureaus also have no enforcement authority. 58
Ensuring that each post certifies annual required updates of its EAP
would strengthen State’s assurance that posts are prepared to respond to
crises.

State Requires Posts to
Include Pandemic Risk
Thresholds in Their EAPs

State’s FAH requires each post to include risk thresholds for pandemics,
among other health care–related risks, in its EAP. To support this
requirement, MED developed reference materials for posts, most recently
updated in October 2020, that include health care–related risk thresholds
to help each post’s Emergency Action Committee focus attention on
events or changes that could affect the post’s health, safety, and security.
According to State officials, MED maintains a Preparedness for Infectious
Disease Outbreaks intranet site and sends cables that contain guidance
for posts’ pandemic preparation and response. MED officials stated that
posts that diverge from or ignore MED’s guidance in preparing for
infectious disease outbreaks tend to develop plans that start too late,
emphasize the wrong things, and contain questionable guidance. The
reference materials MED developed also suggest actions to mitigate risk
55One of the 30 posts, the embassy in St. George’s, Grenada, was not required to submit
an EAP in 2020, according to State data.
56According to DS officials, several posts inquired about extensions during the pandemic,
but none ultimately applied for one.
5712 FAH-1 H-036.
58The regional bureaus provide policy and logistical crisis management guidance.

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once a risk threshold is met. Our review of the EAPs found that at least
one post in each of the five countries we visited virtually had included a
pandemic risk threshold in its plan.
Posts’ Use of EAPs during COVID-19
Pandemic
State officials at each of the five posts where
we conducted virtual site visits reported using
the post’s Emergency Action Plan (EAP)
during the COVID-19 pandemic repatriation
effort. Officials at four of the five posts
specifically mentioned Annex K on
Drawdowns and Evacuations as a relevant
section of the plan. Additionally, officials at
each of the five posts indicated that the crisis
management and repatriation procedures
they used during the pandemic included the
procedures outlined in the post’s EAP.
Source: Department of State officials. | GAO-22-104354

State Provides Crisis
Management Training to
Overseas Posts

According to State officials, before the COVID-19 pandemic some posts’
EAPs also included an optional pandemic annex with plans for
responding to pandemics. 59 These posts included several in Africa, such
as those in Yaounde, Lilongwe, and Djibouti, that had experienced the
Ebola crisis, according to State officials. State officials noted that posts
have the option to develop customized content or annexes, in conjunction
with MED, for pandemic and epidemic planning. According to State data,
122 of the 257 global diplomatic posts required to have an EAP had
pandemic annexes as of April 1, 2021. Of the five posts we visited
virtually, three posts (in Hyderabad and Mumbai, India, and in Lima, Peru)
had COVID-19 pandemic response plans.

The FSI Crisis Management Training Division conducts crisis
management exercises at posts. In fiscal years 2017 through 2020, FSI
conducted more than 469 crisis management exercises. As table 5
shows, some exercises addressed repatriation and evacuation and other
exercises addressed pandemics and epidemics. Our analysis of State
data found that all five posts where we held virtual site visits conducted
crisis management exercises in those fiscal years. 60

Table 5: Numbers of Crisis Management Exercises Conducted in Fiscal Years 2017–2020, Including Exercises Addressing
Repatriation and Evacuation and Exercises Addressing Pandemics and Epidemics
All crisis management exercises

Exercises addressing
repatriation and evacuation

Exercises addressing
pandemics and epidemics

2017

136

56

17

2018

132

60

5

2019

140

61

10

2020a

61

23

16b

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State (State) data. | GAO-22-104354

59State does not require posts to develop a specific pandemic annex, according to State

officials.

60Crisis management exercise scenarios are post specific and are drafted with input from

posts regarding the types of scenarios to be exercised, based on an analysis of probable
risks and threats in the area.

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a
When pandemic restrictions grounded State’s Crisis Management Training program in March 2020,
State initially offered posts virtual crisis-management exercises through digital video
conference. However, according to State officials, State paused that effort when it became clear that
posts’ ongoing, massive efforts to repatriate U.S. citizens left emergency action committees with no
capacity for training. During this period, State offered to provide ad hoc support to posts as
needed. State restarted formal overseas training in June 2020, basing it on posts’ capacity. State
delivered 21 virtual exercises from June through September 2020 and delivered 51 exercises from
October through December 2020 (i.e., the first quarter of fiscal year 2021).

The 16 exercises in fiscal year 2020 included 11 recovery-based exercises, conducted from June
through September 2020, that included a focus on managing the recovery and ongoing safety
procedures during the pandemic.

b

State Requires Posts to
Complete and Record
Annual Emergency
Preparedness Drills but
Does Not Ensure
Compliance

The American Citizen Services Crisis Management section in Consular
Affairs develops and implements tools, policies, and procedures to ensure
private U.S. citizens receive emergency services during overseas crises.
Repatriation of American citizens during a pandemic is one of several
suggested Consular Crisis Exercises, according to State officials.
Although State requires posts to complete, and record completion of,
emergency preparedness drills, it does not ensure that posts comply with
these requirements. 61 State’s FAH requires each post to conduct
emergency preparedness drills and record completion of the drills in the
Post Emergency Guidance and Authoring System (PEGASYS). We
reviewed PEGASYS data for 2019 through 2021 for 30 posts in the 20
countries from which State helped repatriate the largest numbers of
individuals. 62 Our analysis found that in 2019, only 14 of the 30 posts
recorded completion of all required drills within the required time frames.
In 2020, 20 of the 30 posts completed all required drills within the
required time frames. 63 As of March 26, 2021, 11 of the 30 posts had met
updated annual drilling requirements for the first half of 2021, in
accordance with revised FAH requirements.

61In 2017, we recommended that State take steps to ensure that overseas posts
complete, and report completion of, required drills within mandated time frames. In
response, State reported that PEGASYS, launched in September 2018, allowed it to track
posts’ completion of the drills. Nevertheless, posts have continued to complete, and
record completion of, the drills inconsistently. See GAO, Embassy Evacuations: State
Department Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency Preparedness, GAO-17-714
(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2017).
62State officials indicated that because of State’s migration to SharePoint Online in 2019,

the organizational structure of the drills database was lost, resulting in incomplete records
for fiscal year 2018 and the loss of data for fiscal year 2017.
63According to State officials, in 2020 posts were given flexibility during the COVID-19

pandemic.

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According to the policy, post leadership identifies personnel that are
responsible for coordinating drills and other crisis preparedness functions.
In addition, according to State officials, the committee’s chair is
responsible for tracking and certifying drills on an annual basis under the
FAH. State officials told us that post leadership is ultimately responsible
for ensuring drills are completed and recorded in PEGASYS.
Usefulness of Emergency Preparedness
Training at Posts during COVID-19
Pandemic
Officials at each of the five posts we visited
virtually indicated that “muscle memory” from
training and drills, as well as experience and
relationships with host government officials,
had aided their response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Training, including crisis
management exercises, prepared State staff
to act in response to unpredictable events.
Source: Department of State officials. | GAO-22-104354

According to DS officials, when a post submits its EAP to DS’s Office of
Special Programs Emergency Planning Unit for annual review, the post’s
Emergency Action Committee chair certifies that training, exercises, and
drills have been completed. However, the officials said the DS
Emergency Planning Unit does not have authority to ensure that the
Emergency Action Committee’s chair enforces the drilling requirements
and is not mandated to track preparedness activities other than EAP
certifications. 64 Moreover, although DS reviews drilling records at posts
during Post Security Program Reviews every 1 to 3 years, DS officials
said it is not uncommon to find during these reviews that post personnel
have not entered drilling records in PEGASYS. 65

64State officials noted that, although the Emergency Planning Unit is responsible for

reviewing posts’ certified EAPs, the unit’s mandated focus is the EAP and related
framework and excludes tracking compliance with requirements for other preparedness
activities, such as drills and exercises that are not considered security centric. According
to the officials, ensuring compliance with such requirements is not the responsibility of
regional security officers or DS.

65According to standard operating procedures for Post Security Program Reviews, the
review team provides a report to the deputy chief of mission and regional security officer
that documents noncompliant areas and makes recommendations to address them. The
regional security officer must respond to recommendations with a corrective action plan
within 45 days, and post officials must work with regional security officers to ensure that
corrective action has been taken at the post for each noncompliant item. Post Security
Program Review recommendations require a status update every 60 days, starting after
the initial regional security officer response date, until closure.

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Although the drills do not relate directly to crises such as the COVID-19
pandemic, officials at three of the five posts we visited reported that the
drills left them better prepared for the pandemic. For example, DS officials
in Ghana said that the post derived collateral benefits from portions of
various drills, particularly communication benefits. According to DS
officials, posts that do not complete the emergency preparedness drills
may be less prepared to respond, and less coordinated in their response,
to situations that the drills address. Ensuring that each post completes,
and records completion of, the required emergency preparedness drills
would strengthen State’s ability to identify posts whose crisis
preparedness has gaps.

State Encourages Posts to
Review Their Crisis
Preparedness but Lacks a
Mechanism to
Systematically Assess It

Although State encourages posts to review their crisis preparedness,
State lacks a mechanism that would allow it to systematically assess
posts’ preparedness. State provides the Consular Crisis Preparedness
Scorecard (CCPS) as a voluntary tool for the consular section at each
post to self-assess the post’s preparedness for crisis, providing a
snapshot of posts’ preparedness. The CCPS contains a standardized set
of 65 questions, and is divided into 10 sections spanning various areas of
post preparedness. 66 For example, posts are to respond to questions
such as the following:
•

What percent of all consular and non-consular staff that could perform
emergency consular services in the event of a crisis know how to
access consular crisis-related systems?

•

Does Post have a plan for the use of social media in the event of a
crisis?

•

What percent of all consular staff can readily access relevant sections
of the EAP at both office and home?

When the CCPS system was originally developed, a post’s response to
these questions would trigger a green, yellow, or red indicator
representing the post’s crisis preparedness in each category and a final
colored indicator representing the post’s overall preparedness for crisis.
According to the CCPS template, green indicators show areas in which
the post is prepared for crisis and yellow or red indicators show areas that
need attention. State encourages posts to use the CCPS to annually rate
their own crisis preparedness. According to State’s CCPS records from
66CCPS questions are grouped into 10 sections: “Emergency Action Plan,” “Training,”

“Equipment,” “Work Space,” “Communications,” “staffing,” “Admin Support,” “post specific,
“Consular Agency,” and “Systems Access and Technology.”

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May 2014 to January 2020, all 232 posts that responded to the CCPS
received an overall yellow or red indicator and no posts received an
overall green indicator.
However, although the CCPS can be a helpful tool for posts to assess
their crisis preparedness, CCPS data are not complete and cannot be
used for systematic oversight. As a result, according to State officials, the
CCPS is not useful for department-level management to comprehensively
assess State’s overall level of preparedness. State officials told us that
around or before 2014, CA set a performance goal for 100 percent of
posts to complete the CCPS by 2022. In late 2018, CA assessed
progress toward this goal and identified systematic problems with the
inputs on which the CCPS system was based. As a result, State dropped
the original performance goals and metrics but did not replace them.
State officials identified the following weaknesses of CCPS that prevent
CA from using CCPS data to systematically assess posts’ crisis
preparedness:
•

State officials told us that the database that serves as a foundation for
the CCPS was built without input from CA and does not accurately
identify posts with consular sections. As a result, some posts with
consular sections lack access to the CCPS, while other posts without
these sections have access. State officials indicated that because
several other State systems use the same database, they are unable
to give CCPS access to all posts with consular sections without
potentially affecting the operations of those other systems.

•

In addition, according to State officials, after recognizing the CCPS’s
systemic weaknesses, State decided to make completion of the
CCPS voluntary. Consequently, some posts with CCPS access may
choose not to complete the exercise, and those that complete it may
not do so annually. As a result, the CCPS may provide an inaccurate
snapshot of selected posts’ current level of preparedness, because
their responses may be outdated or the in-country conditions that
prompted their responses may have changed.

•

Further, State officials informed us that some CCPS preparedness
metrics are not suited for all posts. For example, the CCPS asks when
the post last tested its Citizen Liaison Volunteer network. According to
State’s FAM, posts are expected to test these networks annually. 67

67According to State’s FAM, posts are expected to test these networks annually. See 7
FAM 073—Post’s Management Role.

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Some posts that do not use the network to communicate with U.S.
citizens because of in-country conditions (e.g., unreliable
telecommunication networks) might indicate that they have not tested
their Citizen Liaison Volunteer network in more than a year. However,
because those posts may have other means of communicating with
U.S. citizens that are more appropriate for the conditions in their
country, their answer to the CCPS question would not provide an
accurate rating of their crisis preparedness. 68
State officials told us that, although CA regional desk officers are unable
to use CCPS for oversight purposes, CA has not developed another
mechanism for systematically assessing posts’ preparedness. According
to the FAM, State must maintain effective systems of management
controls that incorporate standards for internal control in the federal
government. 69 Those standards call for management to analyze identified
risks to estimate their significance, which provide a basis for responding
to the risk. 70 Establishing a mechanism to systematically assess each
post’s crisis preparedness would strengthen State’s assurance that posts
can protect U.S. citizens abroad during crises.

Conclusions

State carried out a historic effort in helping to repatriate more than
100,000 individuals during the first 6 months of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Most of the passengers who responded to our survey gave State high
marks for its communication and information related to repatriation. In
addition, State’s application of lessons learned from its COVID-19
repatriation effort will help it address future crises effectively.
However, although State took steps to prepare for a global crisis such as
the pandemic, addressing several gaps could improve State’s
preparedness to carry out future repatriations. Reconvening quarterly
meetings of the WLG, which has not met since April 2019, would ensure
better communication among the agencies involved in planning
emergency evacuations. Moreover, addressing gaps in guidance for
initiating task forces would help ensure greater efficiency and
68Although State does not require posts to complete the CCPS, State recognizes its
usefulness. For example, in 2020, State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that
Embassy Windhoek in Namibia did not complete the CCPS to identify and mitigate
country-specific risks to U.S. citizens. According to the report, the problem occurred
because the section had not focused on crisis-preparedness guidance. Failure to comply
with such guidance puts U.S. citizens and consular staff at risk in an emergency.
692 FAM 021.1—Policy and Scope.
70GAO-14-704G.

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


accountability in any future State repatriation effort. Additionally,
addressing a gap in guidance for developing and formatting the manifests
for State-funded charter flights would improve the efficiency and integrity
of this process.
Finally, ensuring that posts certify the required annual updates of their
EAPs, ensuring that they complete and document the required
emergency preparedness drills, and establishing a mechanism for
systematically assessing posts’ preparedness would strengthen State’s
assurance that they are ready for future crises.

Recommendations for
Executive Action

We are making the following six recommendations to State:
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Deputy Director for CMS
reconvenes quarterly meetings for the WLG, to maintain interagency
communication regarding crisis preparedness and response.
(Recommendation 1)
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Deputy Director for CMS
develops guidance for initiating task forces that is consistent with State’s
policies and practices. (Recommendation 2)
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Consular Affairs works with key stakeholders—including the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for A/LM and Deputy Controller for CGFS—to
develop guidance for systematically collecting information for, and
formatting, flight manifests. (Recommendation 3)
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Executive Secretary, the
Under Secretary for Management (M), and the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs work with the regional bureaus to develop a mechanism
for ensuring that each post certifies required annual updates of its EAP as
required by State policy. (Recommendation 4)
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Executive Secretary, the
Under Secretary for Management (M), and the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs work with the regional bureaus to develop a mechanism
for ensuring that each post completes, and documents completion of,
required emergency preparedness drills. (Recommendation 5)
The Secretary of State should ensure that the relevant bureaus and
offices establish a mechanism to systematically assess overseas posts’

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


preparedness to respond to crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
(Recommendation 6)

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment.
State’s comments on the draft are reprinted in appendix III. State
concurred with our recommendations and stated that it will take steps to
implement them.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report is available
at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
Jason Bair at 202-512-6881 or BairJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.

Jason Bair
Director, International Affairs and Trade

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List of Addressees
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Michael Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Robert Menendez
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Kyrsten Sinema
Chair
The Honorable James Lankford
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Government Operations and Border Management
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chair
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks
Chairman
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard E. Neal
Chairman
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

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The Honorable Jimmy Gomez
House of Representatives
The Honorable Norma J. Torres
House of Representatives

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

This report examines (1) the results of the Department of State’s (State)
repatriation efforts from January 29 through June 5, 2020; (2) the lessons
State reported learning from challenges it faced; (3) the consistency of
selected aspects of State’s repatriation efforts with its policies and
procedures; and (4) State’s oversight of its overseas posts’ crisis
preparedness.
To obtain information for all of our objectives, we reviewed State policy
and procedures related to crisis management, emergency preparedness,
emergency action committees, emergency action plans, evacuations and
repatriations, communication, manifests, repatriation loans, and training
as described in State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign Affairs
Handbook. We also interviewed State officials regarding the department’s
activities before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically State’s
repatriation efforts. We analyzed data on the number and types of
repatriation flights facilitated by State during the pandemic from January
29 through June 5, 2020, maintained by the Office of Crisis Management
and Strategy (CMS) and the Office of Logistics Management (A/LM). 1
We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing the data for internal
consistency, examining them for duplicate entries, gaps, and obvious
errors; comparing the data maintained by CMS and A/LM; and
interviewing CMS and A/LM officials about their data collection and
verification procedures. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for
our purpose of presenting summary data related to State’s repatriation
efforts and for selecting a sample of flights for a survey. We also reviewed
State’s data on the number and amount of repatriation loans and
repatriation promissory notes billed and outstanding in fiscal years 2015
to 2021. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purpose of
presenting historical loan data.
To examine State’s effort to repatriate U.S. citizens during the COVID-19
pandemic, we reviewed State’s historical repatriation data for fiscal years
2015 through 2019, which included some of the reasons for repatriation
as well as a number of countries where the repatriations occurred. We
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our purpose of presenting the
historical repatriation data. We also examined the creation of the three
1For the purposes of this report, “repatriation” generally refers to a broad range of actions

taken by State during the COVID-19 pandemic, to include the evacuation of U.S.
government personnel, U.S. citizens; U.S. lawful permanent residents; and, in some
cases, third-country nationals out of foreign countries and the facilitation of commercial
flights for the return of these individuals to the United States.

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

task forces established to facilitate repatriation during the pandemic. In
addition, we assessed various mechanisms State used to communicate
with U.S. citizens during the pandemic, including posting information on
embassy and consulate websites and on State’s website for U.S. citizen
travelers (https://travel.state.gov), such as “COVID-19 Frequently Asked
Questions for U.S. Citizens,” and sending updates to travelers registered
in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program.
Further, to examine experiences that selected passengers reported
regarding repatriation on State-sponsored charter flights, we administered
a web-based survey to a sample of 474 passengers (from a population of
31,105 passengers) on State-funded charter flights from January to June
2021. To select these passengers, we first selected a random sample of
35 of the 233 State-chartered flights reported by State, which we stratified
into four groups on the basis of the flights’ departure dates. We then
selected a random sample of private (i.e., non–U.S. government
employee) passengers from those flights. The survey comprised a variety
of closed- and open-ended questions about State’s provision of
repatriation-related information and communication with passengers
before and after their repatriation to the United States. The survey
response rate was 40 percent, with 189 passengers responding. 2 Each
sample element was weighted in the analysis to account statistically for
all members of the population, including those who were not selected. All
survey results are generalizable to the greater population of passengers
repatriated on State-chartered flights. Because our estimates represent a
generalizable sample, we express our confidence in the precision of our
particular estimates as 95 percent confidence intervals. 3 See appendix II
for an analysis of responses to the survey’s closed-ended questions.
To examine lessons State reported learning from challenges it faced
during the COVID-19 pandemic, we reviewed challenges State had
previously reported facing and steps it had reported taking to address

2 We calculated weights that adjust for the differential response likelihoods we observed

across examined characteristics. The nonresponse adjustment was calculated using a
weighting class adjustment where cells were based on quintiles of a predicted response
likelihood estimated by a logistic regression model that included geographic region and
the date range when the pandemic flight originated.

3Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from this survey have a margin of error of plus or

minus 10 percentage points or less.

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

them. 4 We also conducted a content analysis of 33 lessons-learned
cables submitted to State by 28 overseas posts. Two analysts
independently coded each cable to identify lessons learned, reconciled
any differences in their analysis through discussion, and summarized the
results. We further reviewed a Bureau of Consular Affairs cable reporting
lessons learned and challenges encountered during the pandemic as well
as associated goals, issues, and tasks to address them. 5 Moreover, we
interviewed members of State’s COVID-19 Interim Review team about its
review of State’s response to the pandemic during its first year. We also
reviewed the report that the team issued in June 2021, identifying
recommendations as well as actions State plans to take. 6
To assess the consistency of selected aspects of State’s repatriation
efforts with its policies and procedures, we first reviewed documentation
from relevant State bureaus and offices and interviewed officials to
identify repatriation-related mechanisms and policies State had
established. After identifying CMS, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA),
A/LM, and the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services
(CGFS) as the primary bureaus with repatriation-related responsibilities,
we interviewed officials from each bureau to identify their specific
repatriation-related responsibilities, mechanisms, and policy.
•

Because CMS is responsible for crisis preparedness and response,
we reviewed State’s policy regarding, and responsibilities related to,
the Washington Liaison Group (WLG), which CMS manages on behalf
of State, and repatriation-related task forces, which CMS supported
during the crisis. We also reviewed WLG’s charter and CMS’s
guidance on task forces, and we interviewed CMS officials about that
policy and guidance. 7

•

Because CA is responsible for responding to crises that affect U.S.
citizens abroad, we reviewed State’s policy on, and responsibilities
related to, repatriation. We also reviewed CA’s guidance related to
building flight manifests for repatriation flights, which A/LM and CGFS

4GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted

Actions, GAO-20-701 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2020).

5Department of State, “Bureau of Consular Affairs COVID-19 Lessons Learned Project:

Identifying Challenges and Tasks,” MRN 21 State 73804 (July 15, 2021).

6Department of State, CIR, COVID-19 Interim Review: Lessons Learned from the

Department of State’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, December 2019–December
2020 (June 2021).
7See 1 FAM 022.2-3.

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

use to determine the costs charged to passenger and to bill those
passengers. In addition, we interviewed CA, CGFS, A/LM, and post
staff who generate and use flight manifests.
•

Because A/LM is responsible for determining the amount to charge
passengers for State-sponsored repatriation flights, we reviewed
A/LM guidance on how to determine these amounts and interviewed
A/LM officials about that guidance. We also interviewed CGFS
officials who use A/LM’s cost determination to bill passengers, and we
analyzed A/LM documentation of the fair market value of repatriation
flights during the pandemic. This documentation included the origin
and destination of flights; the fair market value of a comparable
commercial fare for an adult, child, and infant passenger; and
documentation of the basis of that market fare.

To examine State’s oversight of overseas posts’ preparedness, we
conducted virtual site visits to five posts—in Honduras, Ghana, India,
Morocco, and Peru—that repatriated U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents during the pandemic. During these site visits, we interviewed
officials from each post’s Emergency Action Committee, CA section, and
DS section. We also reviewed documentation from the posts related to
their emergency preparedness, including their emergency action plans,
and discussed their communication and outreach to passengers
regarding repatriation flights. We selected these posts on the basis of
their being among the 20 posts that repatriated the largest numbers of
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents; representing the three
regions from which the largest numbers were repatriated—the Western
Hemisphere, Africa, and South Central Asia; and reflecting a mixture of
high, medium, and low ratios of repatriated U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents to total consular staff. In addition, we reviewed crisis
management training records for fiscal years 2017 through 2020 at the 20
posts that repatriated the largest numbers during the pandemic.
In addition, we examined posts’ compliance with State’s annual
emergency preparedness drilling requirements by reviewing State’s
emergency preparedness drilling records for calendar years 2019 through
2021 for 30 posts representing the 20 countries from which the largest
numbers of individuals were repatriated. We also reviewed Consular
Crisis Preparedness Scorecard (CCPS) ratings for posts that had
completed the exercise as of January 2020, and we interviewed
knowledgeable CA officials at State headquarters about the CCPS
program.

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Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from June 2020 to November 2021
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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Appendix II: Responses to Selected
Questions from Our Survey of Passengers
Repatriated on State-Funded Charter Flights
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

From February 2021 to April 2021, we administered a web-based survey
of a sample of 474 passengers who took repatriation charter flights
funded by the Department of State (State) from January 29 through June
5, 2020. 1 The survey consisted of closed- and open-ended questions
about State’s communication and provision of repatriation related
information before and after their flights to the United States, about flight
costs and repayment, and about any parts of State’s repatriation process
that worked well and did not work well. We obtained a survey response
rate of 40 percent, with 189 passengers responding.
All survey results are generalizable to the greater population of
passengers repatriated on State-chartered repatriation flights. Because
our estimates represent a generalizable sample, we express our
confidence in the precision of our particular estimates as 95 percent
confidence intervals. Tables 6 through 19 present selected closed-ended
questions and responses from our survey that are directly applicable to
the research objectives of this report. 2
Table 6: Did you register with the State Department’s Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP)? (Question 2)
Response
2. Did you register with State’s STEP?

2a. (If yes to question 2) Before
returning to the United States, did you
receive any notifications from STEP
related to repatriation?
2b. (If yes to question 2a) How useful
were the notifications from STEP
related to repatriation?a

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

78

70

86

No

18

9

27

NR

4

2

8

Yes

82

72

92

No

8

4

16

Unsure

9

4

19

NR

1

0

4

Highly useful

69

57

81

Useful

12

19

Not at all useful

1

0

7

NR

18

8

28

1For the purposes of this report, “repatriation” generally refers to a broad range of actions

taken by State during the COVID-19 pandemic, to include the evacuation of U.S.
government personnel, U.S. citizens; U.S. lawful permanent residents; and, in some
cases, third-country nationals out of foreign countries and the facilitation of commercial
flights for the return of these individuals to the United States.

2The survey included 18 questions, 14 of which appear in tables 6 through 19 and are

directly applicable to the research objectives of this report.

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Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

2c. (If yes to question 2a) How timely
were the notifications from STEP
related to repatriation?a

Response

Estimated
percentage

Very timely

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

52

43

62

Timely

26

17

34

Not at all timely

4

1

10

NR

18

8

28

Legend: State = Department of State, NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely useful (or Extremely
timely) and Very useful (or Very timely) into Highly useful (or Highly timely), and we combined the
categories Moderately useful (or Moderately timely) and Somewhat useful (or Somewhat timely) into
Useful (or Timely). The other survey response options for these questions were Not at all useful (or
Not at all timely) and No opinion.

Table 7: How useful was the State Department’s (travel.state.gov) website for obtaining information about the
pandemic/situation in your host country (that is, the country you were repatriated from)? (Question 3)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Highly usefula

43

37

49

Useful

26

19

33

Not at all useful

7

4

13

No opinion

3

1

8

Did not use the website

18

11

26

NR

3

1

7

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely useful and Very
useful into Highly useful, and we combined the response categories Moderately useful and
Somewhat useful into Useful. The other survey response options for these questions were Not at all
useful, No opinion, and Did not use the website.

Table 8: How useful was the U.S. Embassy’s website for obtaining information about the pandemic/situation in your host
country (that is, the country you were repatriated from)? (Question 4)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

46

38

55

24

13

35

Not at all useful

6

3

12

No opinion

1

0

3

Highly usefula
Useful

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Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

Estimated
percentage

Response

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Did not use the website

18

11

26

NR

4

1

14

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely useful and Very
useful into Highly useful, and we combined the categories Moderately useful and Somewhat useful
into Useful. The other survey response options for these questions were Not at all useful, No opinion,
and Did not use the website.

Table 9: Did you call the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in your host country to obtain repatriation information? (Question 5)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

5. Did you call the U.S. Embassy Yes
or Consulate in your host country No
to obtain repatriation
NR
information?

53

43

63

46

36

55

1

0

5

5a. (If yes to question 5) Were
you able to speak with someone
in the U.S. Embassy or
Consulate?

Yes

86

76

96

No

14

4

24

NR

–

–

–

5b. (If yes to question 5a) How
responsive was the U.S.
Embassy or consulate to your
repatriation- related questions?a

Highly responsive

70

56

83

Responsive

26

13

38

Not at all responsive

3

1

9

No opinion

2

0

10

5c. (If yes to question 5a) How
useful were the responses you
received from the U.S. Embassy
or Consulate to your repatriationrelated questions?a

NR

–

–

–

Highly useful

73

62

85

Useful

21

11

32

Not at all useful

2

0

10

No opinion

4

1

12

NR

–

–

–

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely responsive (or
Extremely useful) and Very responsive (or Very useful) into Highly responsive (or Highly useful), and
we combined the categories Moderately responsive (or Moderately useful) and Somewhat responsive
(or Somewhat useful) into Responsive (or Useful). The other two survey response options for these
questions were Not at all responsive (or Not at all useful) and No opinion.

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Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

Table 10: Did you e-mail the U.S. Embassy or Consulate in your host country to obtain repatriation information? (Question 6)
Estimated
percentage

Response

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

6. Did you e-mail the U.S.
Embassy or Consulate in your
host country to obtain
repatriation information?

Yes

69

59

78

No

30

21

39

NR

1

0

5

6a. (If yes to question 6) How
responsive was the U.S.
Embassy or Consulate to your
emailed repatriation-related
questions?

Highly responsive

72

60

84

Responsive

26

14

38

Not at all responsive

1

0

5

No opinion

1

0

6

NR
6b. (If yes to question 6) How
Highly useful
useful were the responses you Useful
received from the U.S. Embassy
Not at all useful
or Consulate to your emailed
repatriation-related questions?a No opinion
NR

–

–

–

68

52

84

29

14

44

2

1

8

1

0

6

–

–

–

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely responsive (or
Extremely useful) and Very responsive (or Very useful) into Highly responsive (or Highly useful), and
we combined the categories Moderately responsive (or Moderately useful) and Somewhat responsive
(or Somewhat useful) into Responsive (or Useful). The other two survey response options for these
questions were Not at all responsive (or Not at all useful) and No opinion.

Table 11: Did you call the State Department’s 24x7 emergency hotline to obtain repatriation information? (Question 7)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

11

6

16

No

77

70

84

Unsure

11

6

17

NR

0

0

0

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

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GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

Table 12: Did anyone (for example, your family) who resides in the U.S. attempt to use the State Department’s 24x7
emergency hotline to obtain information related to your repatriation? (Question 8)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

8. Did anyone (for example, your
family) who resides in the U.S.
attempt to use State’s 24x7
emergency hotline to obtain
information related to your
repatriation?

Yes

16

11

21

No

76

69

83

Unsure

7

4

12

NR

2

0

7

8a. (If yes to question 8) Were they
successful in obtaining information
related to your repatriation from
State’s 24x7 emergency hotline?

Yes

47

23

70

No

29

4

55

Unsure

24

7

42

NR

–

–

–

Legend: State = Department of State, NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Table 13: Did you sign paperwork agreeing to reimburse the State Department for the cost of your State-funded repatriation
flight? (Question 9)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

9. Did you sign paperwork agreeing to
reimburse State for the cost of your
State-funded repatriation flight?

Yes

93

88

96

No

2

1

7

NR

5

3

10

9a. (If yes to question 9) When you
signed the paperwork, were you aware
that the actual cost of your flight would
be determined at a later date?

Yes

79

73

86

No

20

13

27

NR

1

0

6

Legend: State = Department of State, NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Table 14: Leading up to your flight, did the State Department inform you about the flight costs associated with your State
Department–funded repatriation flight? (Question 10)
Estimated
percentage

Response

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

52

40

63

No

45

32

57

NR

4

2

8

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Page 56

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

Table 15: Leading up to your flight, did the State Department inform you about the repayment process for your State
Department–funded repatriation flight? (Question 11)
Estimated
percentage

Response
11. Leading up to your flight, did State
inform you about the repayment process
for your State-funded repatriation flight?

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

57

48

67

No

40

30

50

NR

3

1

8

Legend: State = Department of State, NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Table 16: Once your repatriation flight was confirmed, did the State Department provide you information regarding next steps
to proceed with the repatriation on the day of your flight? (Question 12)
Estimated
percentage

Response

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

12. Once your repatriation flight was
Yes
confirmed, did State provide you
No
information regarding next steps to
proceed with the repatriation on the day of NR
your flight?

86

80

92

11

5

16

3

1

8

12a. (If yes to question 12) How useful
was the information State provided you
regarding next steps to proceed with the
repatriation on the day of your flight?a

Highly useful

80

73

88

Useful

18

11

26

Not at all useful

1

0

7

NR

–

–

–

Legend: State = Department of State, NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354
a
For reporting purposes, we combined the survey response categories Extremely useful and Very
useful into Highly useful, and we combined the categories Moderately useful and Somewhat useful
into Useful. The other survey response options for these questions were Not at all useful and No
opinion.

Table 17: Since your return to the U.S., has State Department sent you any information regarding how to repay the cost of
your State Department-funded repatriation flight? (Question 13)
Response

Estimated
percentage

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

91

86

94

No

5

3

10

NR

4

2

8

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Page 57

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Our Survey of Passengers Repatriated on
State-Funded Charter Flights

Table 18: Have you received a bill for the cost of your State Department-funded repatriation flight? (Question 14)
Estimated
percentage

Response

95 percent confidence interval (percentage)
Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

93

88

96

No

4

1

9

NR

4

2

8

Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Table 19: Have you received a notice that your repayment is late? (Question 15)
95 percent confidence interval
(percentage)

Estimated
percentage

Lower bound

Upper bound

Yes

26

19

32

No

15

8

21

Not applicable (i.e. I paid my bill on
time, or the deadline for repayment
has not been exceeded)

59

51

67

NR

0

0

2

15a-1: (If yes to question 15) From
which agency have you received a
notice that your repayment is late?
(State Department)

Checked

28

13

4

NR

72

56

87

15a-2: Department of the Treasury

Checked

30

16

45

NR

70

55

84

Checked

48

36

60

NR

52

41

64

Question

Response

15. Have you received a notice that
your repayment is late?

15a-3: Unsure
Legend: NR = no response.
Source: GAO. | GAO-22-104354

Page 58

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix III: Comments from the
Department of State
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Page 59

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Page 60

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgements
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgements

GAO Contact

Jason Bair, (202) 512-6881, BairJ@gao.gov

Staff
Acknowledgements

In addition to the contact named above, Kim Frankena (Assistant
Director), Julie Hirshen (Analyst-in-Charge), Mason Thorpe Calhoun, and
Benjamin L. Sponholtz made key contributions to this report. Justin
Fisher, Christopher Keblitis, Jill Lacey, Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, and Sarah
Veale also contributed to this report.

(104354)

Page 61

GAO-22-104354 COVID-19


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