GAO-21-364, COVID-19: TSA Could Better Monitor Its Efforts to Reduce Infectious Disease Spread at Checkpoints

Report — GAO-21-364, COVID-19: TSA Could Better Monitor Its Efforts to Reduce Infectious Disease Spread at Checkpoints, dated 2020-03-01, issued by Government Accountability Office.

Full text

COVID-19
TSA Could Better
Monitor Its Efforts to
Reduce Infectious
Disease Spread at
Checkpoints

Report to Congressional Committees
June 2021

GAO-21-364

United States Government Accountability Office

 United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-21-364, a report to
congressional committees

June 2021
COVID-19
TSA Could Better Monitor Its Efforts to Reduce
Infectious Disease Spread at Checkpoints
What GAO Found
To reduce the spread of COVID-19 at passenger checkpoints, Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) officials issued amended safety measures to
require that Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) use surgical masks and face
shields, change gloves after pat-downs, and physically distance themselves from
coworkers and passengers as practicable. TSA also adjusted some screening
procedures, such as asking passengers to remove more items from carry-on
baggage to reduce the potential for alarms that require bag searches. In addition,
TSA modified the use of certain checkpoint screening technologies, and granted
TSOs additional paid leave. In January 2021, TSA began an employee
vaccination program, and is in the process of vaccinating TSA employees,
including TSOs.
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and Passengers at an Airport
Screening Checkpoint during the COVID-19 Pandemic

TSA’s monitoring and analysis of its measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19
is limited. For example, supervisors’ operational checklists do not specifically
include the revised COVID-19 procedures, and the data that TSO monitors
collect (e.g., on whether TSOs are properly wearing masks or changing gloves)
reflect implementation at a point in time rather than throughout a shift.
Conducting more complete monitoring would help TSA ensure that its TSOs are
properly implementing COVID-19 procedures. In addition, TSA field leadership
analyzes available monitoring data for different subsets of airports to understand
how COVID-19 procedures are being implemented. However, TSA headquarters
officials said they had no plans at the time of our review to analyze this data
across all airports nationwide to identify common implementation problems, such
as incorrectly wearing face shields and challenges with maintaining physical
distance. Analyzing monitoring data across all airports would help TSA identify
and address any system-wide deficiencies in implementing COVID-19
procedures, so that it may better protect its workforce and the traveling public.
View GAO-21-364 For more information,
contact Triana McNeil at (202) 512-8777 or
mcneilt@gao.gov.
Why GAO Did This Study
Within TSA, approximately 46,000
TSOs stationed across the nation's
commercial airports perform screening
and other activities that often require
close interaction with passengers. As a
result, both passengers and TSOs may
be at an increased risk of infection
during pandemics such as COVID-19.
The CARES Act included a provision
for GAO to conduct monitoring and
oversight of the federal government’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
This report identifies 1) what steps
TSA has taken to reduce the spread of
COVID-19 at passenger screening
checkpoints; and 2) how TSA is
monitoring TSOs’ implementation of
amended safety and screening
procedures, among other objectives.
GAO analyzed TSA data on TSOs’ use
of paid leave, reviewed documentation
on policies and procedures, and
interviewed TSA officials at
headquarters and eight U.S. airports.
We selected these airports to reflect
diversity in the number of COVID-19
cases among TSOs, airport size, and
geographic region. In addition, for six
of these airports, GAO reviewed closed
circuit television footage to observe
how TSOs were implementing COVID-
19 procedural changes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that TSA 1)
take steps to strengthen monitoring of
measures to reduce the spread of
infectious diseases at passenger
screening checkpoints and 2) analyze
available data to identify patterns of
success and failure in implementing
COVID-19 measures across airports
nationwide. TSA concurred with our
recommendations.

Page i
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Letter

1
Background
6
TSA Reported 5,456 COVID-19 Cases among TSOs from March
2020 through January 2021
12
TSA Has Taken Various Steps to Reduce the Spread of COVID-
19
16
TSA’s Monitoring and Analysis of Its Measures to Reduce the
Spread of COVID-19 Is Limited
34
TSA Has Coordinated with Various Stakeholders to Identify
Additional Ways to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19
42
Conclusions
52
Recommendations for Executive Action
53
Agency Comments and Our Analysis
53
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
57

Appendix II
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Actions in
Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic
66

Appendix III
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
71

Appendix IV
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
75

Table
Table 1. Examples of Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Requirements and Recommended Practices to
Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 at Checkpoints that
GAO Examined in Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
Footage from Six Sample Airports
63

Contents

Page ii
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figures
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Weekly
Average Airport Passenger Screening Checkpoint
Throughput, March 2019 through January 2020 and
March 2020 through January 2021
7
Figure 2: Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Geographic Regions
9
Figure 3: Percentage of Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Transportation Security Officers Diagnosed with
COVID-19 by Pay Period, March 1, 2020 through
January 31, 2021, Compared to Peaks in Newly
Reported Cases Nationwide
13
Figure 4: Percentage of Transportation Security Officers Newly
Diagnosed with COVID-19 by Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Geographic Region and Pay Period,
March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021
15
Figure 5: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Key
Changes to Checkpoint Screening to Reduce the Spread
of COVID-19
18
Figure 6: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Changes
to Personal Protective Equipment Requirements for
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in 2020
20
Figure 7: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Guidance
Issued in Response to COVID-19 in 2020
22
Figure 8: Passengers Physical Distancing at a Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) Commercial Airport
Checkpoint, August 2020
26
Figure 9: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Credential
Authentication Technology Machine Deployed at a
Passenger Screening Checkpoint
28
Figure 10: Percent of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Hours
Charged to Weather and Safety Leave and the Number
of TSOs Doing So, March 2020 through January 2021
30
Figure 11: Percent of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Hours
Charged to Telework and the Number of TSOs
Teleworking, March 2020 through January 2021
32
Figure 12: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
Department of Homeland Security’s Science and
Technology Directorate Research and Development
Initiatives to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 at
Screening Checkpointsa
47

Page iii
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 13. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Piloting
Standalone Ultraviolet Light Bin Disinfection Systems
49
Figure 14. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Computed Tomography Checkpoint Screening Machine
51
Figure 15: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic
Milestones and Key Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Management Actions and Guidance
Changes, January 2020 to February 2021
67
Figure 16: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic
Milestones and Key Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Management Actions and Human
Capital Policy Changes, January 2020 to January 2021
69

Abbreviations

CCTV
closed circuit television
CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
COVID-19
Coronavirus Disease 2019
DHS

Department of Homeland Security
FSD

Federal Security Director
ICM

infection control monitor
OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PPE

personal protective equipment
R&D

research and development
S&T

DHS Science and Technology Directorate
TSA

Transportation Security Administration
TSO

Transportation Security Officer

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Page 1
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
June 14, 2021
Congressional Committees
Since the outbreak of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
approximately 46,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSO) employed
by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have continued to
perform tasks such as screening passengers at checkpoints, which may
put them and the traveling public at increased risk of infection.1 COVID-19
has had catastrophic impacts in the U.S. As of April 24, 2021, there were
more than 31.8 million cumulative reported U.S. cases, and about
556,000 reported deaths, according to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC).2
TSA—the primary federal agency responsible for securing passenger air
travel—also seeks to ensure the health and safety of TSOs stationed
across the nation’s commercial airports.3 Early in the pandemic, the
federal government, in conjunction with state and local leaders, put in
place interventions aimed at slowing the rate of infections. These
interventions included travel restrictions, stay-at-home orders, and
physical-distancing guidelines recommending that people remain 6 feet
apart in public spaces. However, U.S. workers in certain sectors with
mission-critical roles—such as TSOs—could not be fully protected by

1The number of TSOs in March 2020 was more than 50,000. That number fell over the
course of the pandemic, and by January 31, 2021, there were approximately 46,000
TSOs.
2Data on COVID-19 cases in the U.S. are based on aggregate case reporting to the CDC
and include probable and confirmed cases as reported by states and jurisdictions. CDC’s
National Center for Health Statistics COVID-19 death counts in the U.S. are based on
provisional counts from death certificate data, which do not distinguish between
laboratory-confirmed and probable COVID-19 deaths. Provisional counts are incomplete
due to an average delay of 2 weeks (a range of 1–8 weeks or longer) for death certificate
processing. The data were accessed on April 27, 2021. Data include deaths occurring
from January 2020 through the week ending April 24, 2021.
3While TSA exercises more direct operational control over certain aspects of security,
such as the screening of passengers and property, it generally has no operational role in
securing other areas of airports, such as public areas, and works collaboratively with
airport operators and other stakeholders to respond to any security incidents. Subject to
TSA oversight, regulated entities—such as airport and aircraft operators—implement
access control measures and, in conjunction with state or local law enforcement agencies,
must be capable of responding to an incident at their airport—whether in an airport public
area or within an area for which access is controlled (i.e., a security-restricted area).
Letter

Page 2
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
these interventions because their job duties must be performed in person.
Therefore, throughout the pandemic, TSA has had responsibility for
identifying and implementing strategies to prevent TSOs from contracting
or spreading COVID-19 while they continue to screen passengers.
The CARES Act—signed in March 2020—includes a provision for us to
conduct monitoring and oversight of the federal government’s efforts to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.4 In
addition, we were asked to examine TSA’s efforts to reduce human-to-
human contact at airport passenger screening checkpoints in response to
COVID-19. This report assesses the following objectives:
1. How many TSOs have been diagnosed with COVID-19?
2. To what extent has TSA taken steps to reduce the spread of COVID-
19 at passenger screening checkpoints?
3. How is TSA monitoring TSOs’ implementation of the amended safety
and screening procedures intended to reduce the spread of COVID-
19 at passenger screening checkpoints?
4. How has TSA coordinated with other stakeholders to share and obtain
information on steps taken to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at
passenger screening checkpoints, and what have been the results?
Our review focused on those changes that were relevant to TSA’s TSO
employees, processes, and procedures in use at passenger screening
checkpoints for the roughly 440 commercial airports in the United States
from January 2020 through January 2021.5
To address our first objective, we analyzed data received from TSA for
the period March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021 showing the
percentage of confirmed positive COVID-19 cases among TSOs. We

4Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, 134 Stat. 281, 579. We regularly issue government-wide
reports on the federal response to COVID-19. For the latest report, see GAO, COVID-19:
Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year, GAO-21-387
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2021). Our next government-wide report will be issued in July
2021 and will be available on GAO’s website at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
5For purposes of this report, a commercial airport is any airport in the United States that
operates pursuant to a TSA-approved security program in accordance with 49 C.F.R. pt.
1542 and at which TSA performs or oversees the performance of screening services.
Additionally, for the purposes of this report, the term TSO includes private sector
screeners employed by companies contracted with TSA to provide screening services at
airports participating in TSA’s Screening Partnership Program. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920.

Page 3
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
used this data to examine COVID-19 cases over time, as well as the
distribution of cases across airports by security risk category and
geographic region.6 To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed
TSA documentation and electronically tested the data for missing
information and obvious errors, among other steps. We found these data
to be sufficiently reliable for describing the distribution of COVID-19 cases
among TSOs at the nation’s commercial airports.
To address our second objective, we reviewed key policies and
procedures TSA enacted to reduce the spread of COVID-19. We
reviewed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA
documentation of 1) procedural changes enacted and any new tools and
technologies employed at passenger screening checkpoints; 2) guidance
on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), such as surgical
masks and face shields; and 3) human capital policies and flexibilities,
such as amended leave policies. We evaluated the extent to which these
were consistent with federal guidance from DHS, TSA, the CDC, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). We also
reviewed TSA time and attendance data for its TSOs to understand the
use of expanded leave and telework options. To assess the reliability of
these data, we reviewed TSA documentation and electronically tested the
data for missing information and obvious errors, among other steps. We
found these data to be sufficiently reliable for describing TSO use of
different leave and time flexibilities during the pandemic.
Also to address our second objective, we conducted 21 interviews with
aviation stakeholders about their experience with TSA’s guidance and
other tools to reduce the spread of COVID-19. These stakeholders
included TSA Federal Security Directors (FSDs) who are responsible for
ensuring TSA policies and procedures are carried out locally at airports;
airport operator officials; and TSO union representatives at a non-
generalizable sample of eight out of approximately 440 commercial
airports.7 We chose airports to reflect variations in 1) number of confirmed

6TSA oversees security checkpoints at approximately 440 TSA-regulated airports
nationwide. TSA classifies airports into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, IV)
based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, and
other special security considerations. In general, category X airports have the highest
number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have the fewest.
7We did not interview officials from each group at all eight airports. Specifically, we
interviewed eight FSDs, six airport operators, and TSO union officials representing TSOs
at five of the airports.

Page 4
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
cases of COVID-19 among TSOs (including two airports with very few
COVID-19 cases); 2) airport category; and 3) geographic region.8 In
addition, we interviewed officials from two private companies that perform
screening at airports within our sample as part of TSA’s Screening
Partnership Program, a TSA program that uses private sector screeners
to perform screening activities at airports.9 We also reviewed closed-
circuit television (CCTV) footage from six of the sample airports to
observe TSOs implementing the amended safety and screening
procedures.10 While our interview results and footage from selected
airports are not representative, they do provide important context and
illustrative examples. For example, interviews provided important insight
into field employees’ views of how TSA leadership communicated policy
and procedural changes and the challenges that TSA field employees
and airport operators faced as they implemented these changes.
To address our third objective, we reviewed TSA internal and published
plans to assess the implementation of checkpoint screening procedures
to reduce the spread of COVID-19. For example, we reviewed the
monitoring checklist provided to field employees, as well as associated
training materials regarding its use. We also interviewed TSA
headquarters officials about any challenges associated with monitoring
the implementation and effectiveness of these procedures. As discussed
above, we spoke with FSDs, airport operator officials, and union
representatives from a non-generalizable sample of airports to
understand any local airport monitoring efforts, among other topics. Also,

8TSA organizes airports into a hub and spoke system. Hubs are generally the larger
category X or I airports, and many hubs are associated with one or more spokes that are
generally smaller category II, III, and IV airports. We chose some airports that had smaller
spoke airports that had experienced cases of COVID-19 to obtain FSD perspectives about
how smaller airports implemented procedural changes to reduce the spread of the
disease. For example, one of our sample airports was Orlando International Airport
(category X), and its FSD also discussed experiences from its spoke, Orlando Sanford
(category II).
9Specifically, one of the private companies conducted screening at one of our sample
airports, and the other conducted screening at a smaller spoke airport associated with one
of our sample airports. In 2001, the Screening Partnership Program was established in
federal law, originally as a pilot program and then on a permanent basis, to allow
commercial airports to use TSA-approved qualified private-screening contractors to
screen passengers and property. 49 U.S.C. § 44920. As of April 2021, contractors
performed passenger and baggage screening services at 22 airports across the country.
10We requested and reviewed CCTV footage from the initial set of six airports we
interviewed. These were the airports in our sample with the most TSO cases of COVID-
19.

Page 5
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
we reviewed CCTV footage from six of our sample airports to observe
how field staff were implementing the TSA-instituted changes to policies
and procedures and any associated challenges. We assessed the extent
to which TSA’s monitoring efforts are consistent with TSA guidance and
the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for Program
Management.11 In addition, the information and communication
component of internal controls was significant to this objective, along with
its related principle that management should use quality information to
achieve its objectives.12 Specifically, we assessed the extent to which
TSA’s monitoring efforts reflected this principle. Although the results from
our review of airport footage are not representative, they do provide
important context and illustrative examples, such as allowing us to
understand the utility of CCTV footage as a monitoring tool that TSA
leadership could leverage.
To address our fourth objective, we reviewed TSA’s efforts to share and
obtain information with aviation stakeholders on any new policies,
procedures, tools, and technologies to reduce the spread of COVID-19
that could be implemented at U.S. airports’ passenger screening
checkpoints. Specifically, we spoke to 1) aviation industry groups, such
as Airlines for America and Airports Council International; 2) TSA’s
federal partners, such as DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T); 3) the non-generalizable sample of FSDs, airport operators, and
union officials described previously; and 4) officials representing
organizations that engage with TSA’s international partners, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization, and a non-generalizable sample
of four TSA Representatives who engage with foreign governments within

11Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management, Fourth
Edition, 2017.
12GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

Page 6
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
their areas of responsibility.13 See appendix I for more information about
our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2020 to June 2021 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Domestic passenger air travel decreased significantly in response to
COVID-19, with a nearly 96 percent drop at its lowest point. Since April
2020, passenger volumes have been generally increasing, but remain
about 65 percent below the volume one year ago, as of January 2021
(see fig. 1).

13Airlines for America is a trade association that works with member airlines, labor,
Congress, and other groups to improve the aviation industry. Airports Council International
advocates for policies and provides services for more than 300 local, regional, and state
commercial airport owners and operators in the United States and Canada. The
International Civil Aviation Organization is an organization that is funded and directed by
193 national governments to support their diplomacy and cooperation in air transport.
Transportation Security Administration Representatives are TSA officials who are posted
at US embassies and consulates abroad. They serve as TSA’s interlocutors to foreign
governments and advisors to Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission on aviation security
issues. They engage with counterparts, including foreign airports, and facilitate information
exchange and dialogue.
Background
Impact of COVID-19 on
Passenger Domestic Air
Travel

Page 7
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Weekly Average Airport Passenger Screening Checkpoint
Throughput, March 2019 through January 2020 and March 2020 through January 2021

Note: These data show the 7-day weekly average number of passengers screened by TSA. Data
show passenger throughput in the current year (2020 and 2021) versus the year prior (2019 and
2020). Data for previous year (dotted line) were adjusted to match data for current year (solid line), so
that all data shown reflect weekly data groupings of Sundays through Saturdays.

TSA management of checkpoints. TSA oversees security checkpoints
at approximately 440 commercial airports nationwide, with its national
operations divided into seven geographic regions across the country (see
fig. 2).14 TSA classifies airports into one of five security risk categories (X,
I, II, III, IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs
and landings annually, and other special security considerations. In
general, category X airports have the highest number of passenger
boardings and category IV airports have the fewest. To ensure its policies

14In March 2021, TSA officials told us that TSA had recently revised its field structure by
reducing its geographic regions from seven to five. For the purposes of this report, we use
the previous seven-region structure since that is how TSA provided data to us.
TSA Roles and
Responsibilities for
Passenger Screening at
Checkpoints

Page 8
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
and procedures are implemented locally at airports, TSA employs FSDs.
Typically, TSA locates FSDs at larger (category X or I) airports, some of
which also serve as hubs for smaller airports (categories II through IV)
within a geographic area. These smaller airports are considered spokes
of the larger hub airport. In such cases, FSDs are responsible for
ensuring that TSA policies and procedures are carried out at both the
larger hub and smaller spoke airports.

Page 9
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 2: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Geographic Regions

Note: In March 2021, TSA officials told us that TSA had recently revised its field structure by reducing
its geographic regions from seven to five. In the new structure, TSA combined regions 2 and 7. It also
divided some states from region 5 and 3 across other regions, moving Washington, Oregon, and
Idaho to region 6, and Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and the Dakotas to region 4. For the
purposes of this report, we use the previous seven-region structure since that is how TSA provided
data to us.

Checkpoint screening operations. The checkpoint screening process,
as set forth in TSA’s procedures, is intended to deter and prevent
passengers from carrying any unauthorized or prohibited items into the
airport’s sterile area and on board an aircraft.15 The screening process, as
performed by TSOs, involves a variety of duties, including checking travel
documentation for authenticity, as well as screening and (in some cases)

15Sterile areas are security-restricted areas that, in general, provide passengers access to
boarding an aircraft and to which TSA controls access through the screening of persons
and property.

Page 10
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
searching passengers and their carry-on baggage for items prohibited on
aircraft.
The checkpoint screening process begins when passengers enter the
airport terminal security checkpoint and provide TSOs working as travel
document checkers their boarding passes and identification for review.
TSOs are to examine and scan boarding passes and identification
documents to determine they are authentic and represent the passenger
who is in front of them. To assist travel document checkers, TSA is in the
process of deploying credential authentication technology at checkpoint
entrances nationwide. The technology allows TSOs to scan passenger
identification documents (such as a driver’s license or passport) to
confirm the authenticity of these documents and to help verify a
passenger’s identity.
After scanning and reviewing a passenger’s boarding pass, TSOs serving
as travel document checkers are to direct passengers to designated
areas for standard, enhanced, or expedited screening. Before this
screening takes place, TSOs serving as divestiture officers assist
passengers with removing items from their persons (such as shoes) and
within carry-on luggage and placing these items into bins. Most
passengers receive standard screening. This typically includes being
screened by advanced imaging technology, which identifies objects
concealed on the person, and using X-ray equipment to screen the
passenger’s accessible property.16 In the event that any of these
screening devices identify a potential item of concern, TSOs are to take
additional security measures as part of the alarm resolution process.
These measures may include pat-downs or explosives trace detection
searches, which involve using a device to detect explosive particles.17

16When advanced imaging technology is not available, TSA uses walk-through metal
detectors. Advanced imaging technology provides additional capability compared to walk-
through metal detectors to identify prohibited items on a passenger.
17Enhanced screening is generally required for passengers TSA identifies as high risk,
such as those that have been matched to federal government lists of known or suspected
terrorists. Enhanced screening involves the same procedures applied during a typical
standard screening experience, as well as a pat-down and an explosives trace detection
search or physical search of the interior of the passenger’s accessible property,
electronics, and footwear. Expedited screening is allowed for passengers TSA believes to
be low risk. One group of passengers who routinely receive expedited screening are those
enrolled in TSA’s Pre✓®—a program through which individuals vetted and approved by
TSA are eligible for this level of screening. Expedited screening includes walk-through
metal detector screening and X-ray screening of the passenger’s accessible property, and
passengers do not have to remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear.

Page 11
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Prior to the pandemic, TSOs were required to wear gloves for some
activities, such as passenger pat-downs or searches of personal property.
TSA’s ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been informed
by internal and external pandemic-related guidance, including guidance
from TSA, DHS, CDC, and OSHA.
TSA pandemic-related base plan. TSA has a plan to identify required
management activities in the event of a pandemic. In 2017, as part of its
Incident Management Framework, TSA issued its Chemical/Biological
and Pandemic Base Plan (base plan).18 The document includes
requirements to conduct risk assessments, guidance on possible policy
and procedure changes (such as leave flexibilities and changes to
passenger processing) in response to a pandemic, provision for supplies
and equipment (such as PPE), and other activities TSA should implement
to limit the spread of a virus during a pandemic.19
CDC guidance. The CDC, within the Department of Health and Human
Services, has a mission to protect Americans from health, safety, and
security threats, both foreign and in the U.S. In response to the COVID-19
pandemic, the CDC created a website for airports and their workers that
contains links to guidance on limiting the spread of COVID-19.20
OSHA guidance. OSHA, within the Department of Labor, helps ensure
safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women by
setting and enforcing standards and providing training, outreach,
education and assistance. OSHA has provided general guidance
(Preparing the Workplace for COVID-19) and more specific COVID-19
guidance (Border Security and Transportation Security Workers and

18Transportation Security Administration Incident Management Framework,
Chemical/Biological and Pandemic Base Plan, July 2017.
19TSA developed its plan in response to requirements in the DHS 2016 Pandemic and
Emerging Infectious Diseases Workforce Protection Plan. Specifically, among other
things, the DHS plan required that component agencies develop a pandemic response
plan that contained specific elements to assist the component in protecting its workforce
during a pandemic.
20For example, the website includes links to Interim Guidance for Businesses and
Employers Responding to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). See
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/worker-safety-support/airports.htm
l.
Pandemic Guidance

Page 12
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Employers).21 These publications provide recommendations for cleaning
and disinfecting the workplace and the need for PPE for different
occupations based on the risk to the employee.
Between March 1, 2020 and January 31, 2021, TSA reported that 5,456
out of approximately 48,000 TSOs (more than 11 percent) were
diagnosed with COVID-19. TSA cannot confirm whether TSOs contracted
COVID-19 while at work, because TSA’s contact tracing process does not
consider TSO activities and contacts outside of work.22 Moreover, TSA
does not provide access to testing for its employees. However, TSA does
require local TSA management to report confirmed cases of COVID-19 in
their workforce.23 TSO infections increased as nationwide cases
increased, and generally, the peaks in newly reported COVID-19 cases
among TSOs are consistent with nationwide peaks in new cases on April
12, 2020, July 23, 2020, and January 11, 2021 (see fig. 3).

21See Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, OSHA 3990-03 2020, and
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/control-prevention/border-protection-transportation-
security, respectively.
22Upon receiving notification from an employee that their healthcare provider believes they
have COVID-19, or the employee has received a positive test result, TSA staff are to alert
local public health authorities, who may then conduct additional contact tracing.
23Specifically, local TSA management is required to report confirmed cases of COVID-19
in their workforce by entering incident information into the electronic WebEOC system.
The system allows for two types of confirmation: 1) that the employee has signs and
symptoms clinically compatible as identified by a healthcare provider, but the employee
was not tested; or was tested and the result is pending; 2) that the employee received a
laboratory-confirmed positive result. The system does not require management to indicate
what type of testing was performed to determine the diagnosis. According to TSA
guidance, employees must submit medical documentation within 14 days of COVID-19
diagnosis. Acceptable documentation must be from a local public health official or a
healthcare provider who works in coordination with a public health official, and it must
indicate when the employee was diagnosed as having COVID-19.
TSA Reported 5,456
COVID-19 Cases
among TSOs from
March 2020 through
January 2021

Page 13
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 3: Percentage of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Transportation Security Officers Diagnosed with
COVID-19 by Pay Period, March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021, Compared to Peaks in Newly Reported Cases Nationwide

Note: This figure shows newly reported cases of COVID-19 reported to TSA by Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs). It includes both (a) employees who have signs and symptoms clinically
compatible as identified by a healthcare provider, but the employee was not tested, or was tested and
the result is pending and (b) employees who received a laboratory-confirmed positive result. TSA
cannot confirm whether TSOs contracted COVID-19 on the job. This graphic does not present data
for January 31, 2021, as that was the first day of a new pay period. According to TSA data, there
were 16 newly reported cases of COVID-19 on that day.
National case lines represent the highest 7-day moving average of cases in the United States from
March through May 2020, June through August 2020, and December 2020 through February 2021.
CDC COVID-19 counts are subject to change due to delays or updates in reported data from states
and territories. We calculated the relative difference between the average of new cases in the 14-day
windows around the peaks in the spring of 2020, summer of 2020, and the winter of 2020-21, as of
data available from the CDC Data Tracker on February 25, 2021.

A slightly higher percentage of TSOs stationed at category X airports
were diagnosed with COVID-19 from March 2020 through January 2021,
compared to TSOs at smaller airports. Specifically, 13.1 percent of TSOs
working at category X airports were diagnosed with COVID-19. In
comparison, between 8 and 10 percent of TSOs working at each of the

Page 14
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
other airport categories were diagnosed with COVID-19.24 TSA officials
stated that category X airports are typically located in dense urban areas,
and this may contribute to the higher proportion of infections among
workers at these airports.
According to our analysis, the region with the highest percentage of cases
varied throughout the pandemic. Generally, the region that had the
highest cases among TSOs in each time period was the same as the U.S.
region that had the highest cases among adults overall. In the early
weeks of the pandemic, the highest percentage of cases among TSOs
occurred in the northeast region, where Boston and New York City area
airports are located. In July and part of August, the highest number of
cases occurred in the southeast region, where Atlanta and Florida
airports are located. In December and part of January, the highest
number of cases occurred in the west region, where California airports
are located (see fig. 4).

24Specifically, category I airports had 9.8 percent of TSOs report cases of COVID-19,
while category II had 8.9 percent, category III had 8.0 percent, and category IV had 9.6
percent.

Page 15
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 4: Percentage of Transportation Security Officers Newly Diagnosed with COVID-19 by Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Geographic Region and Pay Period, March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021

Note: This figure shows newly reported cases of COVID-19. It includes both (a) employees who have
signs and symptoms clinically compatible as identified by a healthcare provider, but the employee
was not tested, or was tested and the result is pending and (b) employees who received a laboratory-
confirmed positive result. TSA cannot confirm whether Transportation Security Officers contracted
COVID-19 on the job. This graphic does not present data for January 31, 2021, as that was the first

Page 16
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
day of a new pay period. According to TSA data, there were a total of 16 newly reported cases of
COVID-19 on that day.

Starting in January 2020, TSA began providing COVID-19-related
guidance to TSOs and other TSA staff at airports and initiated its agency-
wide response upon the declaration of a global pandemic 2 months later.
For example, TSA began issuing employee bulletins, responses to
frequently asked questions, and other COVID-19-related guidance to
educate TSOs about prevention strategies throughout January, February,
and early March 2020. According to TSA, this information was consistent
with CDC guidance. TSA has continued to provide information and
guidance to staff into 2021. In addition, according to TSA’s base plan,
TSA is to initiate formal management response activities (such as the
formation of a management group to coordinate response activities) upon
the declaration of a pandemic. Therefore, about a week before the World
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic in March 2020, TSA
began to implement the activities delineated within its base plan to
oversee the development of workplace and administrative controls to
reduce workforce illness and absenteeism due to COVID-19.
TSA implemented two key base plan activities early in the pandemic—
assessing TSOs’ risk of contracting COVID-19, and developing
recommendations (based on OSHA and CDC guidance) to address it.
Specifically, TSA’s Office of Occupational Safety, Health, and
Environment performed risk assessments (first in March 2020 and again
in July 2020) to gauge the risk COVID-19 posed to TSA employees,
including TSOs. According to TSA, the DHS Office of Human Capital
determined these assessments were consistent with the DHS Workforce
Protection Plan. According to DHS, the TSA plan is evaluated for
consistency with CDC and OSHA guidance. The TSA risk assessments
resulted in, among other things, recommendations for PPE. For example,
TSA’s March 2020 risk assessment recommended that TSOs wear nitrile
gloves, but surgical mask and N95 respirator use were voluntary at the
checkpoint. We discuss these and other PPE changes later in this report.
TSA Has Taken
Various Steps to
Reduce the Spread of
COVID-19
TSA’s Initial Actions
Included Conducting
COVID-19 Risk
Assessments and
Implementing Its
Pandemic Response Base
Plan

Page 17
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Other key activities TSA implemented from its base plan included
reviewing existing policies and procedures to identify opportunities to
reduce virus transmission. Specifically, these involved reviews of
•
TSA’s checkpoint procedures to identify opportunities to reduce
transmission of COVID-19 at checkpoints, consistent with CDC and
OSHA guidelines;
•
TSA’s human capital leave policies to determine how they might be
used to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at the checkpoint; and
•
TSA’s acquisition and procurement policies. According to TSA, it
streamlined opportunities to acquire necessary consumables, such as
PPE, acrylic shield barriers (commonly known as plexiglass), and
other tools TSA determined that passenger checkpoints needed to
reduce the spread of COVID-19.
See appendix II for more information on TSA’s management actions and
procedural changes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
TSA made numerous changes to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at
airport checkpoints. These included increasing its PPE requirements,
revising screening procedures, modifying existing screening technology,
and amending its human capital policies. FSDs, airport operators, union
officials, and screening contractors we spoke with were generally pleased
with the changes TSA had made. Some groups identified areas for
improvement, such as the supply and quality of PPE, physical distancing
requirements, and contact tracing, which TSA headquarters officials have
been working to address. Figure 5 provides an overview of the key
measures TSA has implemented at airport checkpoints in response to
COVID-19.
Throughout the Pandemic,
TSA Revised its PPE
Requirements, Screening
Procedures, Use of
Technologies, and Human
Capital Policies

Page 18
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 5: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Key Changes to Checkpoint Screening to Reduce the Spread of
COVID-19

Note: TSA made changes to its screening process to limit the spread of COVID-19. That screening
process begins when passengers enter the airport terminal security checkpoint and provide TSOs
their boarding passes and identification for review. Screening typically includes passing through either
a walk-through metal detector or advanced imaging technology machine (the latter of which identifies

Page 19
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
objects concealed on the person) and using X-ray equipment to screen the passenger’s accessible
property. In the event that any of these screening devices identify a potential item of concern, TSA
conducts additional security measures, which may include pat-downs and bag searches.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, TSA increased its TSO PPE
allowances and requirements to ensure consistency with OSHA and CDC
guidance. These ranged from allowing TSOs to use surgical masks and
N95 respirators voluntarily in January and March 2020, respectively, to
requiring that TSOs wear surgical masks and eye protection or face
shields in May and July 2020, respectively.25 Figure 6 shows the changes
TSA implemented for TSO use of PPE in 2020.
In February 2021, TSA also began enforcing requirements for the use of
masks among travelers related to an executive order to promote COVID-
19 safety at domestic airport passenger screening checkpoints.26 The
order, and subsequent Emergency Amendment by TSA, requires
travelers aged 2 years or above to wear masks when they are in airports
and while on passenger aircraft. According to TSA officials, TSOs who
work as travel document checkers are to enforce this requirement at the
entrance to the checkpoint.27

25By letter dated June 18, 2020, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel referred for
investigation a whistleblower disclosure alleging that TSA did not take appropriate
measures to protect its frontline workforce against the spread of the novel coronavirus
(COVID-19), among other things. TSA’s Investigations Division conducted an investigation
into the allegations, and issued a report. As of March 2021, the U.S. Office of Special
Counsel is reviewing the report.
26Executive Order, 13998, Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and International
Travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205, (Jan. 26, 2021). The mask order, which was due to expire May
11, 2021, was extended by TSA Emergency Amendment until September 13, 2021. TSA
Emergency Amendment 1546-21-01A (April 30, 2021).
27According to TSA, passengers who refuse to wear a mask will not be permitted to enter
the screening process and will be denied entry to the secure area of the airport, which
includes the terminal and gate area. Depending on the circumstances, those who refuse
to wear a mask may be subject to a civil penalty for attempting to circumvent screening
requirements, interfering with screening personnel, or a combination of those offenses.
See Transportation Security Administration Mask Mandate Security Notice (Part Nine),
February 1, 2021.
Changes in PPE Requirements
and Stakeholder Views

Page 20
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 6: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Changes to Personal Protective Equipment Requirements for
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in 2020

aSurgical masks are loosely fitting masks that help block large particle droplets and splatter from
reaching the wearer’s nose and mouth and that reduce the exposure of others to the wearer’s saliva
and secretions.
bN95 respirators are tight fitting face pieces that require a proper seal, which forces inhaled air to be
pulled through the respirator’s filter material. They are used to filter smaller airborne contaminants.

Stakeholder views on changes to PPE requirements. FSDs, union
officials, and screening contractors we spoke with were generally satisfied
with PPE changes, but expressed concerns with the availability and
quality of some PPE early in the pandemic. Specifically, FSDs from six of
eight of our sample airports expressed concerns about the quality and
availability of PPE, such as gloves, masks, and face shields, in the early
months of the pandemic—a period when PPE availability throughout the
U.S. was lacking. All FSDs who indicated there were problems with PPE
early in the pandemic said the situation generally improved throughout
2020. We interviewed union officials representing screening staff at five of
our sample airports. All five of them expressed concerns about PPE
availability, and four said the situation with PPE had not improved at the
time of our interviews in fall 2020.28 Officials from one of the two
Screening Partnership Program contractors we spoke to said they
prevented PPE shortages at their airport by proactively procuring PPE
beginning in January—well before the pandemic was declared.

28Our sixth airport is part of TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, and therefore does not
have a TSO union representative.

Page 21
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that obtaining the needed
supplies of PPE was challenging for TSA early in the pandemic, and said
the agency has taken steps to address shortages. For example, starting
in August 2020, to address potential glove shortages, TSA allowed TSOs
to sanitize rather than change gloves in certain circumstances, such as
when duties do not involve passenger pat-downs. Also in August 2020,
according to TSA officials, TSA began to acquire a 60-day stockpile of
PPE. Consequently, TSA officials explained that since mid-fall 2020, the
agency typically has had a 2 to 3-month stockpile of PPE, in addition to a
60-day inventory of PPE sufficient to meet requirements for 100 percent
of security screening operations.
In addition to PPE changes, TSA revised its checkpoint screening
standard operating procedures and introduced new processes, such as
contact tracing, and other best practices to address COVID-19.29 To
implement these changes, TSA issued new standard operating
procedures for screening at checkpoints, new procedures for contact
tracing when FSDs learn of confirmed or possible cases of COVID-19
among TSA staff or contract staff at airports, and other guidance on
cleaning and best practices for protecting TSOs and passengers at the
checkpoint. Figure 7 lists new procedures and guidance TSA issued in
response to COVID-19.

29TSA assessed all proposed changes to TSA’s standard operating procedures to ensure
none would have a negative impact on security. As a result of its assessment, it did not
implement two of the proposed changes because it determined they would pose a
significant risk to security. One of these changes involved TSOs’ handling of passenger
identification and another involved performing pat-downs.
Changes to Screening
Processes and Stakeholder
Views

Page 22
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 7: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Guidance Issued in Response to COVID-19 in 2020

aThe guidance when issued defined close contact as being within 6 feet for 10 minutes or more
(cumulative) with the employee while the employee had any symptoms. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention has since updated its close contact definition. According to this guidance as
of March 2021, a close contact is someone who was within 2 meters of an infected person for at least
15 minutes within a 24-hour period starting from 2 days before illness onset (or, for asymptomatic
cases 2 days prior to positive specimen collection) until the time the patient is isolated.
bExplosives trace detection technology uses a swab to test for the presence of explosive residue or
vapors. TSA uses the technology on passengers and their belongings.

Stakeholder views on changes to screening procedures. Most FSDs
that we spoke with reflected positively on TSA’s COVID-19-related
procedures. Specifically, FSDs representing seven of the eight airports
we contacted made positive comments about TSA’s new COVID-19

Page 23
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
procedures or TSA’s efforts to support their implementation. For example,
one FSD said TSA’s procedures were timely and adequate. Another FSD
said that TSA was in constant communication about the measures it was
taking, which was reassuring.
FSDs and airport operators were less positive about implementing
guidance and procedural changes as passenger volumes begin
increasing from the lowest pandemic levels. Specifically, all eight FSDs
and five of the six airport operators we spoke with said that physical
distancing will be a challenge going forward once passenger volumes
increase due to limited space at airports and the need to distance
passengers throughout checkpoints. For example, the FSD and operator
at one airport commented that physical distancing requirements at pre-
pandemic passenger levels would result in lines that would stretch from
the checkpoint into the airport parking lot.
In addition, FSDs expressed concerns about the potential for COVID-19
screening procedures to increase passenger wait times at checkpoints as
passenger volumes increase, and TSA headquarters officials agreed.
According to TSA, at the start of the pandemic, TSA headquarters
officials encouraged FSDs in conference calls to ensure that checkpoint
wait times should not exceed 10 minutes to limit passenger and TSO
exposure to one another at the checkpoints. However, five of eight FSDs
told us that if physical distancing requirements remain and passenger
volumes continue increasing, a 10-minute wait time for passengers at
screening checkpoints will not be possible. TSA’s own research has
confirmed these concerns. In summer and fall of 2020, TSA conducted
two rounds of data collection activities to assess the impacts of COVID-19
procedures on checkpoint operations. At the time, passenger volume was
50 percent or less than it was the previous year. According to TSA, these
assessments indicated a reduction in the rate of passenger throughput
(i.e., passengers processed through checkpoints) of about 30 percent to
more than 50 percent. TSA will conduct a third round of data collection
beginning in April and continuing through August of 2021. In December
2020, TSA told us that to mitigate the impact of social distancing on

Page 24
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
passengers’ queues and wait times, they directed FSDs to open
checkpoint lanes at lower passenger throughput rates.30
Stakeholder views on contact tracing and cleaning. None of the FSDs
we interviewed reported any difficulties implementing contact tracing and
cleaning guidance. With respect to cleaning guidance, all FSDs reported
that enhanced cleaning is performed by contractors or airport employees.
In addition, two FSDs reported that additional cleaning is conducted when
a positive COVID-19 case is confirmed, and one official representing a
screening contractor at an airport staffed by private sector screeners said
it created teams that went around the airport cleaning checkpoints
continuously.31
With respect to contact tracing, six of the eight FSDs we spoke with
discussed their efforts to conduct contact tracing to reduce the spread of
the virus and keep employees safe.32 FSDs from our sample airports
reported using methods such as interviews and reviews of closed circuit
television (CCTV) footage to identify close contacts among TSA
employees while they were at work during the days leading up to their
positive diagnosis.33 In all cases, these FSDs reported conducting the
contact tracing themselves, or in collaboration with local TSA or airport
management or human resources staff. For example, the FSD at one
airport reported creating a surge workforce of mission support and human
resources staff, inspectors, terminal operators, and payroll employees to
assist with contact tracing during a period when many staff at the airport
had been diagnosed with the virus.

30According to TSA, it has traditionally staffed airports to avoid wait times in excess of 20
minutes but with the advent of COVID-19, it has been working to keep wait times to less
than 10 minutes. To support this change, passenger throughput used in staffing models
were reduced by 20 percent (150 passengers per lane reduced to 120 passengers per
lane).
31It is TSA’s policy after a COVID-19 case is confirmed to notify the airport authority or
building management and to ensure the area is cleaned consistent with CDC and local
health department guidance.
32The other two FSDs did not discuss contact tracing in response to our general question
about their experiences implementing TSA’s policies and procedures.
33The guidance advises FSDs to identify close contacts by looking at the employee’s
schedule and work location, and speaking with the employee about where he or she had
been in the workplace (e.g., break room).

Page 25
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Some TSO union officials we interviewed reported that TSOs at their
airports were confused by the contact tracing process. Specifically, we
spoke with union officials at five airports, and officials from two of these
airports stated that some TSOs believed they had interacted with infected
colleagues, but had not been identified for quarantine through the FSD’s
contact tracing.34 Union officials at one of these airports told us that TSOs
reported taking steps to get tested, despite not being identified through
contact tracing. TSA has not pursued a program to facilitate testing for
TSOs who believe they have been exposed to COVID-19, because,
according to TSA, TSOs may use their healthcare provider and public
health offices for testing. In addition, TSA implemented a vaccination
program, which we discuss later in this report.35
Stakeholder views on other guidance. All eight of the FSDs that we
spoke to reported taking steps identified in TSA’s COVID-19 Playbook to
encourage distancing, such as by installing plexiglass, placing social
distance markers on the floor, adding signage encouraging distancing,
and removing seats from or otherwise reconfiguring employee break
rooms. However, union officials representing TSOs at all five of our
sample airports with TSOs reported concerns with management’s
implementation of COVID-19 Playbook practices. For example, union
officials at one airport said that the decals on the floor had degraded over
time due to heavy foot traffic, and have either been removed or were now
illegible. In addition, union officials at three airports told us they see
employee break rooms as too small to allow appropriate distancing, and
that TSOs should be allowed to take breaks and meals at alternate
locations.

34The guidance, which aligns with guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, was updated in April 2020 and defines close contact as being (1) within 6 feet
for 10 minutes or more (cumulative) with the employee with laboratory-confirmed or
suspected COVID-19 or (2) being directly coughed on in the face by the employee with
laboratory-confirmed or suspected COVID-19. Additionally, the close contact must occur
while the employee with laboratory-confirmed or suspected COVID-19 had any symptoms,
or during the previous 48 hours before symptom onset. TSA requires its management (or
screening contractors) at airports to report confirmed cases of COVID-19 in their
workforce by entering incident information into the electronic WebEOC system.
35According to the DHS Chief Human Capital Office, DHS awarded a contract for the
provision of COVID-19 testing in November 2020. The decision to facilitate testing is to be
made by each DHS component (such as TSA) in conjunction with the component’s
medical officer, and as of March 2021, TSA has not participated in this program.

Page 26
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 8 shows passengers physical distancing at a TSA commercial
airport checkpoint during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Figure 8: Passengers Physical Distancing at a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Commercial Airport Checkpoint,
August 2020

FSDs, union officials, and screener contractors from five of eight of our
sample airports described practices implemented locally at their airports
that could address some of the concerns union officials identified to us.
For example, officials from two airports reported that TSOs were
organized into teams, and sent on breaks together in order to minimize
the number of coworkers that each would come in contact with throughout
the workday. In another example, officials from one airport told us that
employees are encouraged to social distance in empty terminals or to eat
lunch outside rather than use the break room. Officials at two airports told
us that to limit employees’ exposure to others, TSOs were allowed to park

Page 27
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
closer to the airport terminals in which they work, so they would not have
to ride airport shuttles.
According to TSA’s COVID-19 Playbook, TSA is to periodically update
this guidance as the agency develops new procedures. TSA
headquarters officials responsible for updating the guidance told us they
hold regular meetings with field health and safety officials and FSDs to
share best practices and other locally implemented measures to prevent
the spread of COVID-19 like the ones we heard about in our interviews
with FSDs. Moreover, TSA has updated its COVID-19 Playbook three
times since its release on June 20, 2020, to reflect its evolving
understanding of COVID-19 and additional mitigation strategies being
implemented by FSDs.
In addition to revising procedures, TSA also adjusted checkpoint
technologies to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Specifically,
•
To reduce TSO contact with passengers, TSA permitted FSDs to
rotate credential authentication technology machines (used to validate
passenger identification documents prior to entering the checkpoint)
toward passengers to permit their self-scanning of documents. As of
January 2021, TSA had deployed 1,053 credential authentication
machines across 119 commercial airports. TSA plans to deploy 1,520
units by the end of calendar year 2021, starting with large airports
(categories X and I).
•
TSA made changes to the detection algorithms used by the advanced
imaging technology machines to reduce the number of false alarms of
passengers and baggage identified as needing additional screening.36
This was intended to reduce the amount of close physical contact
between passengers and TSOs, and limited the need for TSOs to
touch passengers’ personal belongings.
•
For the walk-through metal detector, TSA directed TSOs to use a
handheld metal detector to pinpoint alarms on passengers, so that
they could conduct briefer, more targeted pat-downs to resolve
alarms.

36TSA assessed all proposed changes to TSA’s standard operating procedures to ensure
none would have a negative impact on security.
Changes to Existing
Technologies

Page 28
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 9 shows a TSA credential authentication technology machine
deployed at a passenger screening checkpoint.
Figure 9: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Credential Authentication
Technology Machine Deployed at a Passenger Screening Checkpoint

TSA also implemented new human capital policies to stem the spread of
COVID-19. Beginning in March 2020, TSA began introducing new human
capital policies that allowed TSA managers to grant TSA employees
additional paid leave and to maximize telework when possible. With
respect to TSOs, these policies allowed FSDs to grant telework or use
weather and safety leave for TSOs who needed to quarantine due to
close contact with someone with COVID-19, and to limit the number of
TSOs at the checkpoint when screening activities were not needed due to
Changes in Human Capital
Policies and Stakeholder
Views

Page 29
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
decreased passenger volume.37 In addition, TSA permitted TSOs to self-
designate as high risk, which allowed these TSOs to be placed on
extended weather and safety leave.38
Data show that FSDs used weather and safety leave more extensively
during the pandemic to manage their TSOs at the checkpoint.39
Specifically, TSA records indicate that FSDs permitted between 17,000
and 48,000 TSOs to use weather and safety leave per pay period from
mid-March 2020 through January 30, 2021.40 Over that period, FSDs
used weather and safety leave the most from mid-March through early
July 2020. Specifically, over that period, weather and safety leave
accounted for between 16 and 62 percent of total time charges for TSOs.
For example, at two of our sample airports, charges to weather and safety
leave exceeded 70 percent of TSO time charges in at least one pay
period. FSDs use of weather and safety leave decreased sharply
between the pay period ending June 20 and the pay period ending July 4,
falling from about 46 percent to 29 percent of hours charged. TSO
charges to weather and safety leave continued to fall over the year to
about 5 percent of hours charged by the end of December 2020, before
rising to over 10 percent through January 2021 (see fig. 10).

37An agency may approve weather and safety leave, a form of paid leave, if an employee
(or a group of employees) is prevented from safely traveling to or performing work at an
approved location. Employees may use weather and safety leave without the loss of leave
to which they are otherwise entitled or a reduction in the pay of the employee or
employees. TSA’s COVID-19 human capital policies allowed FSDs to grant weather and
safety leave due to reduced operational needs resulting from reduced passenger volume,
among other things. In addition, TSA issued a Human Capital Advisory Memo on March
12, 2020 stating that an employee with a positive COVID-19 diagnosis would be placed on
administrative leave/excused absence for a period not to exceed 14 calendar days.
38TSA’s COVID-19 human capital policies define “high risk” as adults 65 and older and
people with serious medical conditions like heart and lung disease, diabetes, high blood
pressure, and compromised immune systems. Pregnant women and women who are
breastfeeding are also considered at risk. Employees granted weather and safety leave
are provided a notice that details the reason for the weather and safety leave.
39TSA also allowed TSOs to take weather and safety leave to attend to personal affairs
related to the pandemic. TSA is not able report how much weather and safety leave has
been used for each of the various reasons permitted by TSA’s human capital policies.
TSA issues a notice to employees identifying the reason for weather and safety leave—
e.g., quarantine, reduced staffing requirements, etc.—but all use of weather and safety
leave is coded the same in TSA’s time and attendance system.
40These employee counts are for the number of employees using weather and safety
leave each pay period. The same employee may use weather and safety leave in multiple
pay periods.

Page 30
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 10: Percent of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Hours Charged to Weather and Safety Leave and the Number of
TSOs Doing So, March 2020 through January 2021

According to TSA, the use of weather and safety leave decreased for
several reasons. First, passenger volume increased. TSA data show
passenger volume increased six-fold from its low point on April 12 to
September 30 (from fewer than 100,000 daily passengers nationwide to
more than 600,000). In addition, TSA added an infection control monitor
position, a new position using TSOs to monitor implementation of
pandemic-related procedures and guidance, which added to staffing
requirements.41 Also, as previously discussed, in an effort to reduce
passenger wait times, TSA asked FSDs to open additional checkpoint
lanes, which required more staff. Finally, TSA eliminated the use of
extended weather and safety leave for high risk TSOs on July 5, 2020,
because, according to TSA officials, the agency was confident that its
measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 were able to mitigate
exposure risks and made the workplace safer for all employees. TSA

41TSA’s COVID-19 Playbook recommends at least one ICM for every 10 TSOs.

Page 31
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
officials said that use of weather and safety leave dropped in late
December and increased in January because staff took other leave
around the end of year.
FSDs also increased their use of TSA’s expanded telework flexibilities to
address the pandemic, though they did not use it as extensively as
weather and safety leave. TSA has a telework policy for its employees
that states that TSOs are generally not allowed to telework due to the
nature of the position and the requirement to be at an airport to screen
passengers and baggage.42 This limited FSDs’ ability to use telework to
manage TSOs during the pandemic. Specifically, TSA data show that
fewer than 350 of TSA’s approximately 48,000 TSOs used telework each
pay period from mid-March 2020 through January 2021 (see fig. 11).43
While FSDs used telework much less than weather and safety leave to
manage TSOs, they still permitted TSOs to perform more telework during
the pandemic than prior to it. For example, for the first pay period in
March—prior to the introduction of TSA’s pandemic flexibilities—39 TSOs
charged time as telework. According to TSA headquarters officials, in
order to allow TSOs to use telework, TSA created the Skills Advancement
Initiative, which placed 90 TSOs in developmental opportunities that could
be performed while teleworking, lasting from 1 month up to 1 year, in
support of TSA headquarters program offices. In addition, TSA officials
also told us that TSA took part in a 90-day interagency agreement with
the Small Business Administration that allowed 330 teleworking TSOs to
support call center operations assisting small businesses with obtaining
COVID-19 relief.

42TSA Management Directive No. 1100.30.5 Telework Program.
43These employee counts are for the number of employees who teleworked each pay
period. The same employee may telework in multiple pay periods.

Page 32
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 11: Percent of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Hours Charged to Telework and the Number of TSOs Teleworking,
March 2020 through January 2021

In addition to leave flexibilities, TSA issued new human capital policies in
December 2020 and January 2021 to further assist and protect its
workforce—specifically programs addressing worker’s compensation and
vaccinations for TSA employees.44 In December 2020, TSA issued a new
version of the COVID-19 human capital policy, which included information
regarding workers’ compensation. The updated policy directed employees
on leave resulting from a positive COVID-19 test or a clinical diagnosis of
COVID-19 who believe they may have contracted COVID-19 in the
workplace to refer to TSA’s workers’ compensation management directive
for more information about benefits that may be available to them under

44We did not solicit stakeholder views on these policies because they were issued after we
conducted our interviews.

Page 33
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.45 As of January 2021, 91
claims for workers’ compensation have been filed by TSOs who believe
they contracted COVID-19 on the job.46
Furthermore, TSA issued a new human capital policy in January 2021
announcing the establishment of a COVID-19 vaccination program in
coordination with DHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs. This DHS
program is ongoing and currently offers vaccinations at 22 Veterans
Health Administration sites. As of April 20, 2021, almost 16,000 TSA
employees had received their first dose of the vaccine, and more than
9,600 had received the second.
Stakeholder views on human capital policies. FSDs and TSO union
officials we spoke with said they were generally pleased with the human
capital policy flexibilities TSA offered in response to COVID-19.47
Specifically, all eight FSDs we spoke with were supportive of the use of
weather and safety leave. Two of eight said it helped improve employee
morale and another said it made physical distancing easier because
fewer TSOs were at airports. However, union officials at four of five
airports also said they believe FSDs at their airports should have allowed
them to use weather and safety leave more, because, at the time we
spoke with them, passenger volumes were still not approaching pre-
pandemic levels. As discussed earlier in this report, TSA decreased its
use of weather and safety leave in July 2020 because agency leadership
was confident that the measures TSA put in place had mitigated exposure
risks and made the workplace safer for all.

45TSA Management Directive 1100.00-6, Workers’ Compensation Program. The Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act program assists federal civilian employees who have
sustained work-related injuries or disease by providing appropriate monetary and medical
benefits and help in returning to work.
46At the time of this review, 42 of the 91 claims had been accepted, 33 were still being
adjudicated, and 1 was denied, among other outcomes, according to TSA officials.
47We interviewed TSO union officials at five of our eight sample airports, each of whom
indicated they were pleased with TSA’s use of human capital policies.

Page 34
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

TSA monitors TSO implementation of procedures intended to reduce the
spread of COVID-19 at the checkpoint through TSO supervisors and a
new position called an infection control monitor (ICM)—a best practice
recommended by TSA headquarters that FSDs may use to supplement
monitoring conducted by TSO supervisors. However, TSA’s monitoring
efforts have been unsystematic and incomplete.
The Project Management Institute’s The Standard for Program
Management states that program quality control activities, such as quality
reviews performed throughout the duration of a program, ensure that
quality programs are implemented.48 For example, outputs of quality
reviews could include completed checklists and inspection reports, as
well as measurement results. Moreover, they state that program
management should ensure that proper risk policies and procedures are
being followed throughout program delivery. Similarly, Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management
should establish and operate activities to monitor the internal control
system and management should use quality information to achieve its
objectives.49
At individual commercial airports, TSO supervisors typically conduct
monitoring of TSOs’ implementation of required TSA safety procedures,
including some measures that are important for reducing the spread of
COVID-19. TSO supervisors are responsible for completing checklists at
the beginning of each shift to document that the checkpoint is prepared to
screen passengers. They also complete checklists at the end of each shift
to document that all safety procedures were followed throughout the shift.
However, these checklists do not include items specific to the revised
COVID-19 safety procedures, and thus TSO supervisors are not
systematically collecting data about their implementation as they do with
other safety procedures. TSA headquarters officials said they ensure that

48The Standard for Program Management, Fourth Edition.
49GAO-14-704G.
TSA’s Monitoring and
Analysis of Its
Measures to Reduce
the Spread of COVID-
19 Is Limited
TSA Conducts Limited
Monitoring of TSO
Implementation of COVID-
19 Measures

Page 35
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
TSO supervisors are monitoring COVID-19 and other safety procedures
through regular calls with field officials, including FSDs, Designated
Occupational Safety and Health Officials, and Collateral Duty Safety
Officers. In these calls, TSA headquarters officials said they discuss the
implementation of COVID-19 and other safety procedures and any
concerns airport officials may have, based on their interactions with TSO
supervisors at individual airports. However, because the TSO supervisors
who conduct monitoring do not systematically record specific information
within checklists about their observations on the extent to which TSOs are
properly implementing COVID-19 procedures, headquarters officials have
limited assurance that the information they hear on calls with FSDs and
Designated Occupational Safety and Health Officials is complete.
To supplement monitoring by TSO supervisors, TSA established the ICM
position in June 2020 for trained TSA employees at the airport; however,
the position also does not provide TSA complete information on the
implementation of COVID-19 procedures.50 According to TSA, Lead
TSOs typically perform ICM duties.51 These duties include 1) providing
TSA employees and passengers at the screening checkpoint with
reminders about appropriate physical distancing and wearing of PPE,
among other COVID-19 measures, and 2) ensuring that PPE, cleaning
supplies, and staff are prepared at the beginning of every shift. ICMs are
also to complete a headquarters-provided checklist at the beginning of
each shift that asks them to identify and document whether each of 16
procedures identified on the checklist is being implemented correctly, and
if not, to list the corrective actions taken during the shift. ICMs are to then
to submit completed checklist information into an electronic database
each day for TSA headquarters review.
While the ICM position may be a helpful resource for airports attempting
to ensure COVID-19 procedures are being implemented correctly, ICMs
do not provide complete information on the extent to which COVID-19
procedures are being implemented correctly. This is because TSA
headquarters does not require FSDs to assign ICMs and submit checklist
data, and not all FSDs have done so for the airports they oversee.

50TSA guidance recommends TSA field leadership at the airport assign one ICM for every
10 TSA employees on duty.
51A Lead TSO leads a staff of TSOs, distributes and adjusts workload and tasks among
employees, and oversees the security screening team on a daily basis. The Lead TSO is
also to implement security procedures and provide coaching and guidance to TSOs in
performing screening duties, among other things.

Page 36
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Specifically, TSA officials said they created the ICM position as a best
practice that FSDs may choose to implement if they have the necessary
TSO resources and desire to do so. According to TSA data, TSA officials
at about half of commercial airports have chosen to deploy ICMs and
submit electronic checklist data as of December 31, 2020.52
Moreover, TSA headquarters officials who created the position said that
when they did so they had expected ICMs to observe TSO behavior and
provide ongoing feedback throughout their shifts. However, the ICM
checklist instructs ICMs to fill it out at the beginning of their shift, before
they have spent a meaningful amount of time observing whether TSOs
are properly implementing ongoing COVID-19 procedures, such as
correctly wearing PPE throughout the shift, changing gloves after every
pat-down, or maintaining physical distance from coworkers and
passengers. As a result, the checklist data that has been submitted is
incomplete because it is unlikely to reflect the execution of procedures
throughout a shift.
Using its current monitoring activities, TSA headquarters and FSDs are
not in a position to understand the extent to which airports are
experiencing challenges implementing COVID-19 procedures like the
ones we observed. Specifically, we reviewed a selection of CCTV footage
from a sample of six airports, and we observed examples of TSOs
wearing PPE, such as surgical masks and face shields, both correctly and
incorrectly at times throughout the time periods we reviewed. Specifically,
we observed:
•
TSOs serving as divestiture officers who were initially wearing their
surgical mask properly, but would then pull them down and uncover
their mouth in order to converse with a passenger that needed
assistance.53
•
TSOs serving at an advanced imaging technology machine wearing
their face shield properly, but then lifting up the shield to talk with
coworkers.

52TSA data indicate that 230 of 413 (56 percent) commercial airports with nonzero
passenger throughput in December 2020 had submitted data from at least one completed
ICM checklist as of the end of December 2020.
53TSOs serving as divestiture officers assist passengers with divesting items from their
property, such as carry-on luggage, shoes, and other removable items, into bins for X-ray
screening prior to the advanced imaging technology or walk-through metal detector
screening.

Page 37
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
•
TSOs who were not working near passengers initially, and thus not
required to wear a face shield, but who then did not don their face
shields when they approached passengers.
TSA headquarters officials said that they did not make the ICM position a
requirement because they believed doing so would introduce an
additional administrative burden on TSA staff in the field—e.g., time spent
filling out the checklist and completing data entry. Officials said that even
adding items to monitor COVID-19 procedures to the checkpoint opening
and closing checklists that TSO supervisors complete would constitute an
additional administrative burden. Officials also said they did not want to
establish a monitoring process that was punitive at what was already a
difficult time for TSOs.
However, TSA’s efforts to collect monitoring information could focus on
key activities, so that its monitoring resources target the most important
procedures. For example, TSA could focus on correctly wearing PPE or
social distancing by TSOs and passengers—and ensure information is
collected on the continued performance of these activities throughout the
shift. TSA could collect this information either through its existing
monitoring activities (TSO supervisors or ICMs) or through another
mechanism, without requiring punitive measures for TSOs who do not
follow procedures.
Without systematically collecting complete information, TSA headquarters
does not have full visibility on the extent to which TSOs at commercial
airports are implementing key measures intended to reduce the spread of
COVID-19 at the screening checkpoint. By taking steps to make its
monitoring more systematic and the data collected more complete, TSA
could help ensure its TSOs are doing so properly and also identify and
address any recurring implementation problems.
Through our review of CCTV footage at six of our sample airports, we
found evidence of challenges implementing some COVID-19 policies and
procedures across these six airports. However, TSA does not have plans
to conduct system-wide analysis of the implementation of its COVID-19
procedures to determine the extent to which these and other challenges
exist across all domestic commercial airports. For example,
•
We observed examples across all six airports of TSOs not maintaining
physical distance from coworkers and passengers, as required by
TSA’s standard operating procedure. For example, in some cases, a
high number of passengers remained in the recomposure area to
TSA Does Not Leverage
Available Data to Identify
the Extent TSOs Properly
Implement COVID-19
Procedures across
Airports

Page 38
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
gather their belongings after screening, and this prevented TSOs from
distancing from passengers. We also observed some examples where
a queue of passengers would develop between the travel document
checker and the advanced imaging technology machine and walk-
through metal detectors. Consequently, we observed the TSOs
stationed as travel document checkers did not have room to distance
themselves. We also observed examples where TSOs would distance
from one another while passengers were present, but they would
congregate and socialize once there were no passengers to screen.
•
With respect to plexiglass, we observed TSOs at all our sample
airports that were meant to carry out duties from behind the protection
of plexiglass do so incorrectly. For example, we observed divestiture
officers and travel document checkers who chose to operate in front
of or to the side of the plexiglass installed at their stations.
•
Finally, we observed examples at all of our sample airports where
TSOs did not use face shields and gloves properly. For example, one
common occurrence across all our airports was that TSOs would lift
their face shields like a visor so that it covered their foreheads rather
than their eyes or face, which does not afford the additional protection
TSA intended. We also observed TSOs at all our sample airports
conduct multiple pat-downs of passengers without changing their
gloves.
According to TSA’s pandemic response base plan, after the pandemic is
declared, TSA is to initiate a comprehensive after-action report process
that reviews the effectiveness of its disease prevention workplace
controls. As part of such a review, it is to identify patterns of successes
and failures in steps taken in the field to address the pandemic. The
results of the effort are to help TSA identify the response activities that it
will include in future iterations of its pandemic response base plan.
Furthermore, the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for
Program Management states program management should (1) ensure
that proper risk policies and procedures are being followed throughout
program delivery, and (2) use analysis to support program management
decisions that respond to identified risks.54 Similarly, Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management
should establish and operate activities to monitor the internal control

54The Standard for Program Management, Fourth Edition.

Page 39
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
system and management should use quality information to achieve its
objectives.55
TSA officials described a number of activities they have undertaken that
they believe will provide information to help them assess trends in their
implementation of COVID-19 procedures across airports. However, we
found that these efforts were not comprehensive or did not involve a
system-wide analysis of implementation data. For example, TSA
headquarters officials said they have created a report based on the ICM
data that FSDs at each hub airport and regional directors can produce
and review. They said the report provides summary information based on
ICM data for the hub (larger) airport and their associated spoke (smaller)
airports. According to TSA headquarters officials, FSDs and regional
directors can review these reports and provide them to headquarters
leadership to help identify and communicate local challenges at an
individual airport or at a hub airport and its spokes. While these reports
may provide useful insight, especially at the local level, these reports
include analysis for only a subset of airports.
TSA headquarters officials also described other outreach efforts that
provide information on COVID-19 procedures; however, they do not
involve an analysis of system-wide data. For example, they said
headquarters has ongoing informal dialogues with FSDs and their staff
about COVID-19 procedures. They also noted that in December 2020
they held a conference call with Designated Occupational Safety and
Health Officials in the field to discuss questions and concerns about the
ICM checklist. While such outreach may have provided TSA headquarters
with useful information about field perspectives, they are, as officials
described, informal, and do not involve analyzing data across airports. In
addition, TSA officials said they conducted a survey of Designated
Occupational Safety and Health Officials stationed at the 74 hub airports
from December 21, 2020 through January 8, 2021. Officials from
approximately half (49 percent) of these airports responded to the survey,
according to TSA analysis, which included a few questions about these
officials’ experiences with the ICM position and their efforts to reduce the
spread of COVID-19 at checkpoints. For example, the survey asked
officials whether they believed the ICM program at their airport is effective
and what their escalation process is for ICM checklist responses that
require further action. While such a survey may have resulted in useful
information, officials from half of airports responded and the results are

55GAO-14-704G.

Page 40
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
not generalizable across all airports. Moreover, the questions included do
not ask about TSOs’ implementation of COVID-19 related procedures
other than physical distancing in areas outside of public view. Therefore,
the survey does not provide data to support a system-wide analysis of the
implementation of COVID-19 procedures.
TSA routinely collects data on TSOs’ performance of security screening
requirements and analyzes this data to identify vulnerabilities and
workforce training needs across airports. For example, TSA conducts
regular covert testing at a selection of airport screening checkpoints, and
testing teams report the results to TSA executive leadership to inform
them about potential vulnerabilities to new and evolving threats.56
Through our analysis, we identified data sources that would allow TSA to
similarly assess, across all airports, the extent to which TSA is
implementing procedures to reduce the spread of COVID-19. These data
reflect first-hand observations of how TSOs are performing required
procedures, and therefore could be used to support a system-wide
analysis to identify trends in implementation. Specifically, these data
sources include 1) completed ICM checklists, which, as we discussed
earlier, TSA field staff at about half of the commercial airports regularly
provide to TSA headquarters; 2) results of contact tracing, which FSDs or
their delegates perform according to TSA guidance when a TSO reports
laboratory-confirmed or suspected COVID-19; and 3) CCTV footage,
which airport operators collect and make available to TSA upon request.
For example,
•
ICM checklists. TSA could use the data that ICMs are expected to
submit daily to assess implementation trends, such as PPE usage
and physical distancing across airports. Officials told us the agency
does not have plans as of March 2021 to conduct analysis to identify
trends across all airports, but that they could use ICM data to assess
broader implementation trends if a larger number of airports submitted
data. As discussed earlier, TSA does not have ICM data covering all
commercial airports, but could leverage the data it has and
supplement with other data, such as those described below, to ensure
a more complete picture of implementation successes and challenges
nationwide.

56TSA selects airports where they run covert tests using a random process so that the
results of their tests can be applied to screening activities at airports nationwide. The
principles of inferential statistics require that samples be selected using a process that
incorporates randomization, in order to make statements (i.e., to generalize) about a
larger population based on analysis information collected from that sample.

Page 41
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
•
Contact tracing data. TSA could also use information FSDs collect
as part of their contact tracing procedures to better understand how
well TSOs are practicing physical distancing. One FSD we spoke to
reported tracking contact tracing data over time to measure the extent
to which TSOs at one airport were maintaining physical distance from
their coworkers while at work. Specifically, that FSD said they track
the number of close contacts—as defined by the CDC—at work for
each employee with suspected or laboratory-confirmed COVID-19.
The FSD said that number, on average, has meaningfully declined
since earlier in the pandemic. The steps the contact tracer is to
perform, according to TSA guidance, allow FSDs to identify the
number of coworkers who meet the CDC criteria of a close contact.
Therefore, contact tracing results provide information on the extent to
which TSOs are maintaining appropriate physical distance from
coworkers while at work.
•
CCTV footage. CCTV footage could also be used to assess TSOs’
implementation of pandemic-related checkpoint screening procedures
and identify examples of how TSOs are implementing procedures
correctly. For instance, in our review of CCTV footage from six
airports, we found many examples of TSOs correctly and incorrectly
implementing some COVID-19-related procedures. Currently, FSDs
review CCTV footage as part of their contact tracing process, so these
officials are already familiar with what these video files can show
regarding TSO interaction and other behaviors.
To use these data sources for a system-wide analysis, TSA could, for
example, review CCTV data across a selection of airports, as we did, to
directly observe examples of how TSOs are implementing COVID-19
screening procedures. TSA could then follow up by reviewing ICM
checklist data to discover whether and how ICMs and field management
responded to common deficiencies and develop additional training,
guidance, or other mitigating interventions to help ensure correct
nationwide implementation. Moreover, when its systemic analysis
identifies successful implementation of procedures, TSA could likewise
follow up to understand how airports supported these successes.
Conducting a system-wide analysis of monitoring and other
implementation data to identify trends in implementing COVID-19
procedures would allow TSA to identify and address implementation
challenges that are common across airports. Furthermore, all of this
analysis could lead to meaningful lessons learned that might be applied
against the spread of infectious diseases and future pandemics.

Page 42
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

TSA has used existing communication channels to obtain and share
information on potentially useful approaches to reducing the spread of
COVID-19 at airport checkpoints—including tools, technologies,
processes, and ongoing research and development (R&D). Specifically,
TSA headquarters has engaged with a variety of aviation stakeholders—
including TSA field staff at domestic airports, representatives from
domestic aviation industry groups, partners at international airports, and
other federal partners.
To obtain and share information on approaches to reduce the spread of
COVID-19, TSA headquarters increased its outreach to FSDs and other
TSA field staff to identify best practices and to encourage FSDs to
implement guidance in a way that made sense locally. For example, in
addition to the written guidance TSA headquarters provided to the field
starting in January 2020, TSA shared information through town halls.
Specifically, since March 2020, the TSA Administrator has held more than
20 virtual town hall meetings with TSA staff via live web stream from
various airports and other TSA locations to provide updates on the
agency’s efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19.57
In addition to town hall meetings, in May 2020, TSA headquarters
established an Advisory Panel composed of approximately 10 FSDs who
meet at least biweekly to provide feedback on the implementation of new
COVID-19-related procedures and guidance and share any innovative
measures they had implemented to reduce the spread of the virus. This
forum allowed, for example, an FSD in Michigan to share his airport’s
practice of rotating the credential authentication technology machine at

57TSA held these virtual town hall meetings from five airports (Boston Logan International
Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Chicago O’Hare International
Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport),
the agency’s headquarters, and the TSA Transportation Security Operations Center.
TSA Has Coordinated
with Various
Stakeholders to
Identify Additional
Ways to Reduce the
Spread of COVID-19
TSA Used Existing
Communication Channels
with Various Stakeholders
to Obtain and Share
Information on
Approaches to Reducing
the Spread of COVID-19
TSA Field Staff

Page 43
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
the screening checkpoint toward passengers—a practice that the agency
later included in its COVID-19 Playbook guidance.
TSA regularly consults with its aviation industry partners on a range of
issues, including the COVID-19 pandemic. These industry partners
include TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee, as well as individual
industry groups such as Airlines for America and the Airports Council
International.58 Representatives we spoke with from these groups
reported a satisfactory level of communication with TSA management
during the pandemic. For example, officials from Airlines for America
reported TSA had been transparent with industry partners about both the
measures they would implement to address the pandemic and the
challenges to protecting their workforce.
Officials from these groups also reported that TSA management
consistently engaged with them to identify best practices for limiting
human-to-human contact throughout the aviation travel process and on
new technologies to help reduce the spread of COVID-19. Cleaning and
sanitization have been consistent areas of interest during conversations
between TSA and these groups. For example, Airlines for America
officials reported that they have regular discussions with TSA about
efforts to routinely clean areas around checkpoints and better sanitization
processes for the bins used by passengers going through the security
checkpoints.
According to TSA headquarters officials, they have exchanged
information on approaches to reducing the spread of COVID-19 with
international stakeholders throughout the pandemic. These efforts have
included TSA Representatives who engage with foreign governments,
and the agency’s International and Interagency COVID-19 Working
Group. According to TSA headquarters officials, TSA Representatives
stationed abroad have provided information to internal stakeholders in
charge of capability development within TSA’s Office of Requirements
and Capabilities Analysis on strategies to reduce the spread of COVID-19

58The Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which is composed of individuals
representing private sector organizations affected by aviation security requirements,
advises TSA leadership on aviation security matters, including the development and
implementation of policies, programs, rulemaking, and security directives pertaining to
aviation security. Airlines for America is a trade association that works with member
airlines, labor, Congress, and other groups to improve the aviation industry. Airports
Council International advocates for policies and provides services for more than 300 local,
regional, and state commercial airport owners and operators in the United States and
Canada.
Aviation Industry Groups
International Aviation
Stakeholders

Page 44
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
that they have observed at the foreign airports within regions where they
are posted. For example, one TSA Representative shared information
about various technologies to clean airport surfaces with ultraviolet
radiation in use at an airport within her region with officials from TSA’s
office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis. According to the
Representative, her airport’s positive outcomes using ultraviolet radiation
influenced TSA’s decision to continue pursuing this technology at U.S.
airports. Another TSA Representative provided information on the local
airport authority’s decision to increase the limit allowed for passenger
hand sanitizer from 3.4 to 12 fluid ounces. This information helped TSA
implement a similar change at domestic airports.
TSA Representatives abroad whom we interviewed also indicated that
having pre-existing information-sharing agreements helped facilitate the
exchange of information on COVID-19-related issues. According to TSA
officials, the agency established these agreements to allow for the
exchange of sensitive or classified information between aviation
stakeholders abroad and government officials.59 For example, one TSA
Representative we interviewed said that having the information-sharing
tools already in place allowed for faster exchange about countries’
pandemic response plans and another emphasized that the agreements
helped ensure that countries’ security standards remained aligned.
In addition, TSA created the International and Interagency COVID-19
Working Group in May 2020 to monitor mitigation solutions under
development and other research by different foreign partners. According
to TSA, this working group has conducted outreach with more than 20
foreign aviation sector partners to exchange COVID-19-related mitigation
solutions and has documented similarities and differences among these
solutions. For example, TSA found that most of its international partners
are pursuing social distance queuing (e.g., floor decals and signage) as
their main checkpoint design change. Conversely, TSA also noted that
none of its international counterparts have chosen to adopt a safety
officer position similar to its ICM position.60 According to TSA, the

59TSA headquarters officials noted, however, that much of the COVID-19-related
information shared with foreign partners was not categorized as sensitive or classified.
60TSA officials said that although none of the international partners it consulted have
established the safety officer role within their airports, these partners continue to modify
and evolve their COVID-19 mitigation strategies. TSA officials have noted that some of
their international partners have expressed interest in TSA’s requirements, training, and
responsibilities for its ICM position.

Page 45
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
information collected through these efforts is provided to internal TSA
stakeholders to help prioritize R&D activities. In addition, TSA officials
reported representing the U.S. Government in an international effort to
develop high-level guidance for governments and industry to begin
restarting international air transport and recovery from COVID-19.61
TSA headquarters officials explained they have worked most closely with
staff from the DHS Science and Technology directorate (S&T) to obtain
information on COVID-19-related R&D, but they are also monitoring
research by other federal entities that may be useful.62 In the past, TSA
has partnered with DHS S&T on researching new technologies to improve
passenger screening at airport checkpoints. Officials from DHS S&T
stated that they began discussions with TSA on specific COVID-19-
related research projects for airport checkpoints in May 2020. In
particular, DHS S&T officials said their long-standing partnership with
TSA on R&D for other checkpoint technologies helped the two agencies
negotiate research priorities that could be accomplished faster than other
agencies that were less familiar with DHS S&T. For example, they said
that DHS S&T was able to append quickly TSA-specific requests onto its
existing COVID-19-related R&D. Consequently, TSA is coordinating with
DHS S&T on several R&D projects related to reducing the spread of
COVID-19 at the checkpoint, which we discuss later in this report.
In addition, DHS S&T officials told us that they have created a master
question list regarding COVID-19 research that they have been updating
since January 2020. The list is shared with DHS components including
TSA and is derived from a range of sources (such as reports and articles
found in scientific and technical journals) and serves as a repository for
information on COVID-19-related R&D across the federal government.
Since May 2020, TSA has partnered with DHS S&T on five R&D projects
to limit the spread of COVID-19 at the checkpoint, and is also working to
fast-track technology upgrades planned prior to the pandemic for
technologies that may have the collateral benefit of limiting the spread of
COVID-19 at checkpoints.

61This guidance was developed under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, an organization that is funded and directed by 193 national governments to
support their diplomacy and cooperation in air transport.
62Within DHS, S&T is responsible for coordinating and integrating R&D activities across
the department. DHS components may also conduct R&D to support their respective
missions.
Federal Partners
TSA Is Pursuing Five R&D
Initiatives and Has Fast-
Tracked Planned
Technology Upgrades

Page 46
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
TSA is coordinating with DHS S&T on five R&D efforts to reduce the
spread of COVID-19 at the checkpoint for possible implementation (see
fig.12).
R&D Initiatives

Page 47
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 12: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology
Directorate Research and Development Initiatives to Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 at Screening Checkpointsa

aIn addition to these five research projects, TSA and DHS Science & Technology have collaborated
on a sixth project related to Aircraft Airflow Modeling to characterize viral particle movement on
airplanes. We did not include this study in our list of research and development projects because it
does not address checkpoint operations.

Page 48
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
bExplosives trace detection technology uses a swab to test for the presence of explosive particles.
TSA uses the technology on passengers and their belongings if initial x-ray or advanced imaging
technology identify a possible threat item. Per the new COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures,
TSOs are to change explosives trace detection swabs after each screening.

According to TSA officials, DHS S&T has provided preliminary results for
four of the five measures and a final report for the fifth measure related to
the effectiveness of TSA-approved cleaning solutions in disinfecting
security checkpoints. These officials told us that they do not intend to
delay moving these measures to the next phase of implementation if
preliminary results support moving forward with additional pilot tests
rather than waiting for the final reports from DHS S&T. For example, they
are currently testing ultraviolet light bin disinfection in the field despite the
final report not being complete, and officials are planning to utilize these
tests to inform subsequent risk assessments for this technology.63
With regard to ultraviolet light technology, preliminary results showed that
short-wave ultraviolet light proved effective at inactivating the virus on
passenger screening bins.64 TSA selected three ultraviolet light
standalone bin disinfection systems from two unique vendors, and in
March 2021, began pilot testing two of the three systems at airports (see
fig.13).65 Additionally, TSA is also exploring integrated ultraviolet light
systems that could be incorporated into pre-existing screening lane tray
return systems (i.e., the trays travel back to the next passenger after
security screening is completed). According to TSA officials, they have
begun to evaluate the effectiveness of these integrated solutions and plan
to pilot these systems to determine whether they can progress through an
expedited acquisition review process.

63TSA expects to receive results from the remaining four workflows from DHS S&T in late
spring 2021.
64The ultraviolet light spectrum can be broken down into three categories: short-wave,
middle-wave, and long-wave. DHS S&T tested the effectiveness of short wave ultra violet
light in decontaminating passenger screening bins and found this method to be effective at
inactivating the COVID-19 virus.
65According to TSA, all three ultraviolet light solutions underwent safety evaluations to
determine whether each system could efficiently kill the COVID-19 virus, as determined by
DHS S&T and TSA. As a result of these tests, two of the three systems were chosen for
live pilot testing at screening checkpoints.

Page 49
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 13. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Piloting Standalone
Ultraviolet Light Bin Disinfection Systems

In addition to the five DHS S&T R&D efforts, TSA is following, but not
actively pursuing, a number of ongoing R&D efforts by other federal
partners that may help reduce the spread of COVID-19 at checkpoints.
Specifically, TSA has a list of approximately 40 COVID-19 R&D efforts
that it is monitoring.66 The list includes a number of R&D projects
overseen by the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories, including
efforts to model virus transmission in closed spaces and rapid COVID-19
diagnostic tools. TSA officials also said the agency is following R&D being
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency to better understand
efforts to characterize long-term antimicrobial pesticide products for use
at high-touch areas.67
In addition to partnering on DHS S&T’s R&D, TSA has also fast-tracked
the planned implementation of technologies that have the potential to
further reduce touch points at checkpoints. For example, TSA officials
said that as of April 2021, there were 300 computed tomography (CT)

66The list also includes a number of private sector R&D efforts as well.n
67This effort will characterize the product’s effectiveness and durability based on time,
physical contact, and degradation susceptibility to routine cleaning solutions.
Planned Technology Upgrades

Page 50
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
systems deployed across 235 checkpoints and 4 labs.68 According to
TSA, CT has improved threat detection capabilities for carry-on baggage
at security checkpoints, which further reduces touch points (i.e., the
number of bag checks TSOs must perform) for TSOs (see fig. 14).69

68CT technology provides enhanced detection of threat items. TSA’s current screening
technology for carry-on bags uses two-dimensional images. The CT technology applies
sophisticated algorithms for the detection of explosives and other threats by creating a 3-D
image that can be viewed and rotated 360 degrees for a thorough analysis.
69According to TSA officials, TSA plans to increase deployment of these systems using
competitive awards. The Checkpoint Property Screening System program released the
first solicitation in November 2020, with an anticipated award for approximately 223 mid-
size systems in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021 and deployment beginning in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2022. According to TSA the planned procurement of these systems
has since changed, and the program now intends on procuring approximately 242 mid-
size systems.

Page 51
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 14. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Computed Tomography Checkpoint Screening Machine

TSA is also in the process of developing a new self-service credential
authentication technology device equipped with a camera that compares
a passenger’s live facial image against the image from their identity
document.70 As of March 2021, TSA was pilot testing these machines.71
According to TSA officials, these new models would be oriented toward

70As of December 2020, credential authentication machines deployed at checkpoints can
validate that the identity document presented by the passenger is authentic, but do not
have cameras. Only the units in the pilot program have cameras.
71According to TSA, formal field tests are being conducted with volunteer passengers at
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport, Indianapolis
International Airport, and Miami International Airport to evaluate the system’s performance
across diverse operational environments and demographics to identify, understand, and
mitigate variations in system performance. Following these field pilots, TSA plans to
acquire additional units to conduct extended field pilots before making a final deployment
decision.

Page 52
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
passengers, who will be able to scan their own identification rather than
physically handing it to a TSO. TSA officials believe that the credential
authentication technology units would further reduce the risk of
contracting COVID-19 at the checkpoint by limiting touch points and time
spent in close proximity between potentially contagious passengers and
TSOs.
Furthermore, TSA’s efforts to obtain and share information on COVID-19
mitigation strategies have led to its decision not to pursue certain
technologies. For example, TSA officials said the agency was not
pursuing approximately 40 tools and strategies to limit COVID-19, ranging
from tools to monitor passenger vital signs to mechanisms designed to
filter information on social media. In addition, TSA abandoned
temperature screenings at checkpoints for its TSO workforce and
individual passengers, based on guidance jointly developed by DHS and
the departments of Transportation and Health and Human Services. That
guidance states that temperature screenings are unable to detect
asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic people with COVID-19, those who are
ill but who do not have fever, and those who have treated their fever with
medication. Therefore, the guidance states temperature screenings
should not be relied upon as a standalone public health measure.72
The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly impacted the demand for air travel
and the people working in the air transportation industry. Thousands of
TSA’s staff, most of them TSOs who work at passenger checkpoints at
airports across the country, have contracted COVID-19. In January 2020,
when the U.S. experienced its first cases of the virus, TSA began
coordinating its response to the pandemic and implementing an array of
changes to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at airport checkpoints. These
changes included 1) requiring TSOs to use personal protective
equipment; 2) amending passenger screening procedures to reduce TSO
exposure to potentially infected passengers and other new procedural
guidance; 3) modifying existing screening technology; and 4) adding
human capital flexibilities that reduced TSO exposure at the checkpoint.
It is important to the safety of TSA employees, passengers, and the
function of the aviation sector that TSOs appropriately implement policies
and procedures to limit the spread of COVID-19. TSA has processes to
monitor the implementation of safety procedures, such as those intended

72Runway to Recovery: The United States Framework for Airlines and Airports to Mitigate
the Public Health Risks of Coronavirus Guidance Jointly issued by the U.S. Departments
of Transportation, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services, (July 2020).
Conclusions

Page 53
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
to stem the spread of COVID-19 at passenger screening checkpoints, but
its monitoring is not systematic or complete. Systematic and complete
monitoring would improve TSA’s assurance that its TSOs are
appropriately implementing the procedural changes it has developed to
reduce the spread of COVID-19. Moreover, we found that while TSA has
some efforts underway to identify implementation trends, they are not
leveraging available data to identify implementation trends across all
airports. We identified additional sources of data (e.g., CCTV footage)
that could be used to do such analysis, which would allow TSA to identify
common concerns, challenges, and successes related to COVID-19
procedures at the nation’s commercial airports. Using this information,
TSA could also follow up to discover how field staff supported such
successes, or respond to deficiencies with additional training, guidance,
or other corrective intervention to help ensure correct nationwide
implementation.
We are making the following two recommendations to TSA:
The TSA Administrator should take steps to ensure more complete
monitoring of TSO implementation of measures to reduce the spread of
infectious diseases at screening checkpoints. (Recommendation 1)
The TSA Administrator should take steps to analyze available data
related to the implementation of its COVID-19 measures to identify
patterns of successes and failures across all airports, and use its findings
to share lessons learned and remediate any deficiencies.
(Recommendation 2)
We provided a draft of this product to TSA for comment. In its comments,
reproduced in appendix III, TSA concurred with our recommendations.
TSA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation that TSA take steps to ensure
more complete monitoring of its measures to prevent the spread of
infectious disease, TSA said its Enterprise Support Office and TSA’s
Security and Administrative Services, in coordination with the agency’s
Chief Medical Officer and Security Operations, will update TSA’s COVID-
19 Standard Operating Procedures to require the implementation of the
ICM position and associated data collection. Among other things, TSA
said this effort will include updates to the ICM checklist to help verify that
TSOs are complying with TSA’s pandemic operating procedures,
including correctly wearing personal protective equipment and social
Recommendations for
Executive Action
Agency Comments
and Our Analysis

Page 54
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
distancing between TSOs and passengers; an evaluation of data
collection methods using the ICM checklist prior to system-wide
implementation; and a quarterly assessment of the COVID-19 threat and
whether TSA should continue or cease the ICM function. In addition,
some of TSA’s planned actions in response to this recommendation, such
as considering whether to add the ICM position to its base plan, would
enhance its preparation for future pandemics. TSA plans to complete
these activities by the end of October 2021. If implemented effectively,
these activities would address the intent of our recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation that TSA take steps to
analyze available data related to the implementation of COVID-19
measures to identify patterns of successes and failures across all
airports, TSA said its Enterprise Support Office will work with the Security
Operations, Performance Management Branch, to analyze available data,
focusing on information captured from ICM checklists. TSA plans to
complete these actions by the end of the December 2021, and will use
results to identify areas for improvement and best practices to reduce the
spread of infectious diseases at airport checkpoints. If implemented
effectively, these activities would address the intent of our
recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security and other interested
parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO
website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8777 or McNeilT@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
IV.

Triana McNeil
Director, Homeland Security and Justice

Page 55
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
List of Committees
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Mike Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chair
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chairwoman
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Page 56
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard Neal
Chair
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 57
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
The CARES Act—signed in March 2020—includes a provision for us to
conduct monitoring and oversight of the federal government’s efforts to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.1 In
addition, we were asked to examine the Transportation Security
Administration’s (TSA) efforts to reduce human-to-human contact at
airport passenger screening checkpoints in response to the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19). This report assesses the following objectives:
1. How many Transportation Security Officers (TSO) have been
diagnosed with COVID-19?
2. To what extent has TSA taken steps to reduce the spread of COVID-
19 at passenger screening checkpoints?
3. How is TSA monitoring TSOs’ implementation of the amended safety
and screening procedures intended to reduce the spread of COVID-
19 at passenger screening checkpoints?
4. How has TSA coordinated with other stakeholders to share and obtain
information on steps taken to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at
passenger screening checkpoints, and what have been the results?
Our review focused on those changes that were relevant to TSA’s TSO
employees, processes, and procedures in use at passenger screening
checkpoints for roughly 440 commercial airports in the United States from
January 2020 through January 2021.
In our background section, we analyzed publicly available TSA data on
the number of passengers screened by TSA through checkpoints from
March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021, as well as one calendar year
prior. To assess the reliability of these data, we electronically reviewed
the data for missing data and obvious errors. We found these data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing passenger throughput
during the pandemic.
To address our first objective, we analyzed data received from TSA for
the period March 1, 2020 through January 31, 2021 showing the number

1Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, 134 Stat. 281, 579.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 58
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
of reported positive COVID-19 cases among TSOs.2 This data included
information on the location (airport and region) where these employees
worked, as well as the pay period in which they reported their diagnosis to
TSA leadership. We used this data to calculate the rate of COVID-19
infections by pay period, that is, the number of newly reported COVID-19
cases divided by the total number of TSOs in that pay period. We also
used this data to explore the distribution of COVID-19 cases across
airports according to their 1) security risk categories and 2) geographical
regions.3 To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed
documentation from TSA’s relevant program offices regarding the
systems used to collect and store the data; questioned TSA officials from
relevant program offices regarding the reliability of the data received; and
electronically tested the data for missing data and obvious errors. We
found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing
the distribution of COVID-19 cases among TSOs at the nation’s airports.
To address our second objective, we reviewed key TSA policies and
procedures enacted to reduce the spread of COVID-19, including
reviewing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA
documentation of 1) procedural changes enacted and any new tools and
technologies employed at passenger screening checkpoints to reduce the
need for TSOs to come in contact with passengers and their belongings
and increase TSOs’ ability to physically distance themselves from
passengers and coworkers; 2) guidance on the use of personal protective
equipment, such as surgical masks and N95 respirators, nitrile gloves,
face shields, and acrylic barriers; and (3) human capital policies and

2TSA does not provide testing to its employees. However, it requires local TSA (or
contractor) management to report confirmed cases of COVID-19 in their workforce by
entering incident information into the electronic WebEOC system. The system allows for
two types of confirmation: 1) the employee has signs and symptoms clinically compatible
as identified by a healthcare provider, but employee was not tested; or was tested and the
result is pending; 2) the employee received a laboratory-confirmed positive result. The
system does not require management to indicate what type of testing was performed to
determine the diagnosis.
3TSA oversees security checkpoints at approximately 440 TSA-regulated airports
nationwide. TSA classifies airports into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, IV)
based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, and
other special security considerations. In general, category X airports have the highest
number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have the fewest.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 59
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
flexibilities, such as the addition of leave categories, amended leave
policies, and expanded telework opportunities.4
We evaluated the extent to which these policies, procedures, tools, and
technologies were consistent with TSA’s Incident Management
Framework: Chemical/Biological and Pandemic Base Plan (base plan)
and that TSA’s actions noted incorporation of guidance from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention and with guidance from the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration that provide standards for
cleaning and disinfecting the workplace and the need for PPE for different
occupations based on the risk to the employee.5 We did not assess the
extent to which these changes influenced the security effectiveness of
TSA’s screening procedures.6
Also to address our second objective, we reviewed TSA time and
attendance data to understand TSOs’ use of expanded leave and
telework flexibilities. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed
documentation from TSA’s relevant program offices regarding the
systems used to collect and store the data; questioned TSA officials from
relevant program offices regarding the reliability of the data received; and
electronically tested the data for missing data and obvious errors. We
found that the TSA time and attendance data was sufficiently reliable for
the purpose of describing TSO’s use of different leave and time charges
during the time period under study.

4Surgical masks are loosely fitting masks that help block large particle droplets and
splatter from reaching the wearer’s nose and mouth and that reduce the exposure of
other’s to the wearer’s saliva and secretions. N95 respirators are tight fitting face pieces
that requires a proper seal, which forces inhaled air to be pulled through the respirator’s
filter material. They are used to filter smaller airborne contaminants.
5For CDC guidance, See
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/worker-safety-support/airports.htm
l. For OSHA Guidance see Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, OSHA
3990-03 2020, and
https://www.osha.gov/coronavirus/control-prevention/border-protection-transportation-sec
urity, respectively.
6TSA assessed all proposed changes to TSA’s standard operating procedures to ensure
none would have a negative impact on security. As a result of its assessment, it did not
implement two of the proposed changes because it determined they would pose a
significant risk to security. These changes related to TSOs’ handling of passenger
identification and pat-downs.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 60
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
In addition, to address our second objective, we conducted 21 interviews
with aviation stakeholders about their experience with TSA’s guidance
and other tools to reduce the spread of COVID-19. These stakeholders
included TSA Federal Security Directors (FSDs), airport operator officials,
and TSO union representatives at a non-generalizable sample of
commercial airports. We chose 8 of 440 commercial airports that 1) had
variation in the number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 among TSOs or
contract screeners; 2) represented diverse geographic areas; and 3)
represented a variety of categories (an indicator of size).7 In addition, one
of our eight sample airports was a participant in TSA’s Screening
Partnership program.8 We spoke to FSDs at all eight of our sample
airports; officials from the airport operator at six, and union officials from
five.9
Additionally, for our Screening Partnership Program airport, we chose to
speak to officials from the private company that provides the airport’s

7TSA’s national operations are divided into seven geographic regions across the country.
TSA has recently revised its field structure by reducing its geographic regions from seven
to five. In the new structure, TSA combined regions 2 and 7. It also divided region 5 states
across other regions, moving Washington, Oregon, and Idaho to region 6, and Montana,
Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and the Dakotas to region 4. For the purposes of this report,
we use the previous seven-region structure since that is how TSA provided data to us.
FSDs represent a number of airports, including “hub” airports as well as their “spokes.”
Hubs are generally the larger category X or I airports, and many hubs have one or more
spokes that are generally smaller category II, III, and IV airports. We chose some airports
that had smaller spoke airports that had experienced cases of COVID-19. We wanted to
ensure that we heard from FSDs about how smaller airports implemented procedural
changes to reduce the spread of the disease. For example, one of our sample airports
was Orlando International Airport (category X), and its FSD also discussed experiences
from its spoke, Orlando Sanford (category II).
8Federal law established this program in 2001, originally as a pilot program and then on a
permanent basis, to allow commercial airports to use TSA-approved qualified private-
screening contractors to screen passengers and property. 49 U.S.C. § 44920. As of April
2021, contractors perform passenger and baggage screening services at 22 airports
across the country. At each of these airports, TSA continues to be responsible for
overseeing screening operations, and the contractors must adhere to TSA’s security
standards, procedures, and requirements.
9We originally selected a sample of six airports. Partway through the review, we selected
an additional two airports that had not experienced any cases of COVID-19 among its
TSOs to discover whether officials at these airports were taking markedly different
approaches to the pandemic. We spoke to the FSDs at these airports because FSDs are
the top ranking officials at airports implementing TSA policies to prevent COVID-19.
Based on these interviews, we found that the two airports were not pursuing markedly
different approaches to those we learned about; in addition, soon after we spoke to them,
these two airports had their first cases among TSOs. Given that these airports were not
substantially different than the others in our sample, we determined it was not necessary
to interview airport operators or union officials.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 61
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
screening services about their experiences working with TSA leadership
and how they implemented COVID-19 related changes at their
checkpoints. In order to ensure we heard more than one private company
perspective, we also spoke to the Screening Partnership Program
company operating at the spoke of one of our sample airports. While
results from these interviews are not representative, and therefore cannot
be used to make inferences about a population, they do provide important
context and illustrative examples. For example, interviews provided
important insight from the viewpoints of field employees about 1) how
TSA leadership communicated policy and procedural changes, 2) the
extent to which policies and procedural changes were being implemented
successfully in the field, and 3) the challenges that field employees and
airport operators faced as they implemented these changes.
To address our third objective, we reviewed TSA internal and published
plans to assess the implementation of and compliance with procedures to
reduce the spread of COVID-19 at airports’ passenger screening
checkpoints. For example, we reviewed the checklist provided to field
employees for tracking the availability of personal protective equipment
(PPE), the proper use of PPE, and TSO efforts to maintain physical
distance from passengers, among other checklist items. We examined
the extent to which this checklist was consistent with TSA’s policies and
procedural changes related to COVID-19. We also interviewed TSA
headquarters officials about any challenges associated with monitoring
the implementation and effectiveness of these procedures. As discussed
above, we spoke with FSDs, airport operator officials, and union
representatives from a non-generalizable sample of airports to
understand any local airport efforts to monitor compliance and to obtain
local officials’ views on TSA headquarters’ efforts to monitor compliance.
We assessed the extent to which TSA’s efforts to monitor the
implementation of these procedural changes are consistent with its base
plan and the Project Management Institute’s The Standard for Program
Management.10 This guidance, which is used worldwide, describes
principles, practices, and activities of program management that are
generally recognized to support good program management practices
and that are applicable to most programs, most of the time. In addition,
the information and communication component of internal controls was
significant to this objective, along with its related principle that

10Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management, Fourth
Edition.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 62
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
management should use quality information to achieve its objectives.11
We assessed the extent to which TSA’s monitoring efforts reflected this
principle.
Also to address our third objective, we observed CCTV footage from six
selected airports to observe whether these airports were properly
implementing the changes to policies and procedures that TSA
instituted.12 We requested files showing a variety of angles across the
screening checkpoint: 1) the travel document checker area, including
queueing areas; 2) divestment; 3) the walk-through metal detector and
advanced imaging technology machines, including angles showing pat-
downs and use of explosives trace detection machines for on-person
searches; 4) recomposure; and 5) the carry-on bag search area and use
of explosives trace detection machines for in-property searches. We
requested CCTV footage at two different time periods—the first set was
captured between July and August 2020 and the second in December
2020—in order to observe whether there were meaningful changes in
compliance over the course of the pandemic. We received more than 100
hours of footage from our sample airports. We selected and reviewed the
first ten minutes of footage showing each of the above-listed angles from
each airport.13 For each file, one analyst reviewed the footage and
captured the timestamps and details for one or more examples of TSA’s
required and recommended procedural changes being implemented
properly and improperly on an Excel spreadsheet. The changes the
analyst looked for are summarized in table 1.

11GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
12We requested CCTV footage from the original six sample airports, which had more
COVID-19 cases than the remaining two airports we spoke with.
13We did not request footage from specific days or times but believe the footage we
selected and reviewed was sufficiently reliable for our purposes of observing whether
airports were properly implementing the changes to policies and procedures TSA
implemented during the pandemic.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 63
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Table 1. Examples of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Requirements and Recommended Practices to Reduce the
Spread of COVID-19 at Checkpoints that GAO Examined in Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Footage from Six Sample
Airports
Reduced Touch Points
The credential authentication technology machine is rotated for passenger self-service
TSOs allow passengers who alarm to further divest and rescreen
Presence of Signage and Use of
Barriers
Floor decals emphasizing physical distancing recommendations throughout the checkpoint
Other signage visible related to COVID-19 precautions
Plexiglass installed to protect TSOs and passengers throughout the checkpoint
Evidence of Physical Distance Being
Maintained
Between passengers and TSOs throughout the checkpoint
Among TSOs throughout the checkpoint
TSO Use of Personal Protective
Equipment
Surgical masks
Face shields
Nitrile gloves
Changing gloves following on-person searches
Discarding explosives trace detection swabs after a single use
Source: GAO analysis. | GAO-21-364
Notes: We reviewed CCTV footage from six sample airports.

Once the analyst reviewed the footage and captured relevant timestamps,
a second analyst reviewed the footage and indicated whether they agreed
with the first analyst’s assessment (i.e., implemented properly vs
implemented improperly). If they did not initially agree, they discussed the
timestamp and came to an agreement. Although results from the review
of this footage from selected airports are not representative, and therefore
cannot be used to make inferences about a population, they do provide
important context and illustrative examples. For example, reviewing this
footage allowed us to observe 1) examples of how TSOs in the field were
implementing COVID-19 procedural changes; 2) examples of inconsistent
implementation across our sample airports; and 3) the utility of CCTV
footage as a monitoring tool that TSA leadership could leverage.
To address our fourth objective, we reviewed TSA documentation of its
efforts to share and obtain information with industry, federal, and
domestic and international airport stakeholders on any new policies,
procedures, tools, and technologies to reduce the spread of COVID-19
that could be employed at U.S. airports’ passenger screening
checkpoints. Specifically, we reviewed TSA documentation summarizing
its COVID-related international interagency coordination as well as
multiple TSA press releases outlining steps the agency is taking to help
mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on travelers and its workforce. To
understand how TSA is working with federal partners to share and obtain

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 64
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
information on technologies and tools to reduce the spread of COVID-19,
we interviewed officials from TSA’s Requirements and Capabilities
Analysis office and DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).14
To understand how TSA is working with aviation industry stakeholders,
we interviewed officials from the industry groups Airlines for America and
the Airports Council International to discuss how they have
communicated with TSA to share information about technologies or
procedures that their membership is using or planning to use to reduce
the spread of COVID-19.15 We selected these industry groups because
they are members of TSAs Aviation Security Advisory Committee and
represent the leading passenger and cargo carriers in the U.S. and more
than 300 airport owners and operators, respectively.
To understand how TSA is working with domestic airport stakeholders,
we interviewed FSDs, officials from airport operators, and union officials
at the non-generalizable sample of domestic airports described above.
Finally, to understand how TSA is working with foreign airport
stakeholders, we interviewed Transportation Security Administration
Representatives posted at a judgmentally selected sample of four
international regions.16 We selected these regions to obtain geographic
diversity among the airports with TSA Representatives. Although results
from these interviews cannot be generalized to all TSA Representatives
who serve internationally, they do provide important context and
illustrative examples. For example, interviews with officials
knowledgeable about operations at domestic and international airports
provided insight on TSA efforts to learn about promising practices,
technologies, or tools employed in the U.S. and abroad. Finally, to
determine the extent to which TSA has participated in the development of

14TSA’s Requirements and Capabilities Analysis office directly supports TSA’s mission by
assessing current state operations, conducting gap analyses, managing needs
identification, and developing requirements to generate new and improved security
capabilities in alignment with the future vision of aviation security.
15Airlines for America is a trade association that works with member airlines, labor,
Congress, and other groups to improve the aviation industry. Airports Council International
advocates for policies and provides services for more than 300 local, regional, and state
commercial airport owners and operators in the United States and Canada.
16Transportation Security Administration Representatives are TSA officials who are posted
at US embassies and consulates abroad. They serve as TSA’s interlocutors to foreign
governments and advisors to Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission on aviation security
issues. They engage with counterparts, including foreign airports, and facilitate information
exchange and dialogue.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Page 65
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
key international aviation sector guidance, we interviewed officials from
the International Civil Aviation Organization.
We conducted this performance audit from May 2020 to June 2021 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Page 66
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
TSA took steps to address the spread of COVID-19 among its
Transportation Security Officers (TSO) and travelers at checkpoints
through staff communication, management actions, and procedural and
human capital changes. The following figures show TSA’s key actions in
each of these areas relative to pandemic milestones.
Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Page 67
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 15: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic Milestones and Key Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Management Actions and Guidance Changes, January 2020 to February 2021

aPPE include masks, gloves, face shields and other equipment workers use to protect themselves
from the transmission of infectious diseases that could occur during the performance of activities.

Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Page 68
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
bA public health of emergency is declared to respond to a significant outbreak of an infectious
disease, bioterrorist attack, or other significant or catastrophic event.
cSurgical masks are loosely fitting masks that help block large particle droplets and splatter from
reaching the wearer’s nose and mouth and that reduce the exposure of others to the wearer’s saliva
and secretions.
dN95 respirators are tight fitting face pieces that require a proper seal, which forces inhaled air to be
pulled through the respirator’s filter material. They are used to filter smaller airborne contaminants.

Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Page 69
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Figure 16: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic Milestones and Key Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
Management Actions and Human Capital Policy Changes, January 2020 to January 2021

aA public health of emergency is declared to respond to a significant outbreak of an infectious
disease, bioterrorist attack, or other significant or catastrophic.

Appendix II: Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Actions in Response to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

Page 70
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
bTSA allows for the approval of weather and safety leave, a form of paid leave, if an employee (or a
group of employees) is prevented from safely traveling to or performing work at an approved location.
cFederal Security Directors (FSD) are responsible for ensuring TSA policies and procedures are
carried out locally at airports.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security

Page 71
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

Appendix III: Comments from the
Department of Homeland Security

Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security

Page 72
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security

Page 73
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security

Page 74
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

Page 75
GAO-21-364  COVID-19 and TSA Airport Checkpoints
Triana McNeil at (202) 512-8777 or McNeilT@gao.gov
In addition to the contact named above, Mona Nichols Blake (Assistant
Director), Anthony DeFrank (Analyst in Charge), Landis Lindsey, Sarah
Williamson, Mariel Alper, Paul Aussendorf, Benjamin Crossley, Elizabeth
Dretsch, David Hooper, Sara Ann Moessbauer, Moon Parks, Jasmine
Porter, and Adam Vogt made key contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff
Acknowledgments
(104290)

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative
arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the
federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public
funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government
is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is
through our website. Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence. You can also subscribe to
GAO’s email updates to receive notification of newly posted products.
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and
distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether
the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering
information is posted on GAO’s website, https://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard,
Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.
Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or Email Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at https://www.gao.gov.
Contact FraudNet:
Website: https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/fraudnet
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7700
Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, WilliamsO@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125,
Washington, DC 20548
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, DC 20548
Stephen J. Sanford, Acting Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814,
Washington, DC 20548
GAO’s Mission
Obtaining Copies of
GAO Reports and
Testimony
Order by Phone
Connect with GAO
To Report Fraud,
Waste, and Abuse in
Federal Programs
Congressional
Relations
Public Affairs
Strategic Planning and
External Liaison
Please Print on Recycled Paper.

File and source

File

21-364-covid-19-tsa-could-better-monitor-its.pdf

Size

5,527,447 bytes

SHA-256

27d44c8f30e43c7dfc485d6f5d6b2333ebc42e3d8cd3150d8a0b872bc05ecfcc

Our copy

21-364-covid-19-tsa-could-better-monitor-its.pdf

Original

www.gao.gov