Objections to Sanctions Order — Wall v. CDC

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Orlando Division) · No. 6:21-cv-00975-PGB-DCI · Doc. 214 · 2022-01-23 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
ORLANDO DIVISION 
 
 
LUCAS WALL,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
Case No. 6:21-cv-975-PGB-DCI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
District Judge Paul Byron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE   
 
 
 
: 
Magistrate Judge Daniel Irick 
CONTROL & PREVENTION et al.,    
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
Defendants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO SANCTIONS ORDER (DOC. 211) 
 
 
COMES NOW plaintiff, pro se, and submits the following objections to the 
Court’s Sanctions Order issued Jan. 18. Doc. 211. 
1. I object to the statement that “Plaintiff Lucas Wall has exhibited a pattern of 
disrespect for this Court throughout this litigation.” Id. at 1. In reality, the 
Court has exhibited from the beginning of this case a pattern of disrespect 
for me as a disabled pro se litigant fighting for my rights to be free of dis-
crimination and ultra vires government mandates. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Mo-
tion to Disqualify Magistrate Judge Daniel Irick, filed June 25, 2021 – only 
18 days after the Complaint was submitted. Doc. 61. Asking for emergency 
or time-sensitive relief – or merely requesting a ruling by a certain date – in 
no way shows “disrespect” for the Court. Any attorney would do the same as 
part of his duty to represent his client’s best interests. The Court instead 
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shows its animus toward me because I can’t afford a lawyer and takes action 
against a pro se plaintiff in a way it would never do against a member of the 
Bar for strongly advocating for his client.  
2. The Court’s bizarre stance that a plaintiff asking for prompt action on a mo-
tion for preliminary injunction – which by its very definition is a remedy that 
is of an urgent nature – is somehow “disrespectful” is contradicted by the 
numerous cases from other federal courts around the nation dealing with 
COVID-19 mandates that I have cited in my briefs and Notices of Supple-
mental Authority. In each case, the plaintiff(s) not only asked for emergency 
or time-sensitive relief, the judges in those matters promptly issued prelim-
inary injunctions or stays. See, e.g., Docs. 44-45, 99, 149, 175-178, 185, 195, 
200, 206, 208, and ___ (Notice of Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden, filed 
Jan. 22). The only difference in all these cases versus this one? Plaintiffs in 
all the cited cases are represented by counsel. I am proceeding pro se. 
3. Each and every time I have sought urgent action by this Court is because 
there is a date-certain event triggering such a request. 
4. I object to the Court’s finding that “Despite the Court’s admonition, on Jan-
uary 10, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of International Flight Rebook-
ing, in which he requests the Court to rule on the Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction ‘no later than’ January 21, 2022, so that he can fly to Germany. 
(Doc. 203). While not designated as ‘time-sensitive’ or an “emergency,” the 
explicit demand for immediate attention amounts to such a label…” Doc. 211 
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at 1-2. Stating that a ruling is requested no later than Jan. 21 so I could take 
my Jan. 23 flight did not violate any prior order of the Court. The notice at 
issue (Doc. 203) was not labeled “Emergency” or “Time-Sensitive,” as the 
Court itself noted (even though the matter plainly is “time sensitive” since it 
involves a flight booked on a specific date, a flight that would be taken were 
it not for the government mandates challenged in this litigation). 
5. I object to the Court’s statement that it “cannot continually excuse Plaintiff’s 
tiresome attempts to find loopholes to its Local Rules and impertinent dis-
regard for the Court’s busy docket.” Doc. 211 at 2. I have made no attempt to 
“find loopholes” to the Local Rules. Notably the Court’s Sanctions Order 
does not reference a single rule that has been violated. And the rule regulat-
ing urgent motions does not clearly define what is considered an “emer-
gency” or “time-sensitive”: “If a party moves for emergency or time-sensitive 
relief, the title of the motion must include ‘emergency’ or ‘time-sensitive,’ 
and the motion must include an introductory paragraph that explains the 
nature of the exigency and states the day by which a ruling is re-
quested.” Local Rule 3.01(e) (emphasis added). I have complied with this 
rule. Conspicuously the rule instructs a party to state the day by which a rul-
ing is requested – precisely the conduct I have been sanctioned for by asking 
for a ruling by a specific date in my Jan. 10 Notice of International Flight 
Rebooking (Doc. 203). I object to the Court sanctioning me for following the 
Local Rules. 
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6. Given the Local Rules’ lack of articulating what is an “emergency” and what 
is “time sensitive,” I have relied on the rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 11th Circuit. An emergency motion is one if “The motion will be moot 
unless a ruling is obtained within seven days…” 11th Cir. R. 27-1(b). “Motions 
that do not meet [this] condition[] but in which a ruling is required by a date 
certain may be treated as ‘time sensitive’ motions.” Id. I object to the Court 
sanctioning me for following the rules of its appellate circuit.  
7. I have shown no “impertinent disregard for the Court’s busy docket.” The 
Court’s docket is not of concern to me. My case is of concern to me. Obtain-
ing urgent relief so I may visit my family abroad is of concern to me. The 
Court is, of course, within its authority to refuse to rule by my requested 
date. But asking the Court to do so because I need immediate relief does not 
show any “impertinent disregard” nor does it violate any rule. If the Court 
chooses to ignore my request, that is its prerogative. But the Court does not 
have the authority to belittle me because I am a pro se litigant who doesn’t 
have the money to hire a lawyer. I represent my interests and will continue 
to express those to the Court – as any competent attorney would do for his 
clients. 
8. I object to order that “the Court hereby REVOKES Plaintiff’s electronic fil-
ing privileges and NOTIFIES Plaintiff that future violations of the Court’s 
Orders and Local Rules will result in monetary sanctions.” Doc. 211 (empha-
sis original). Not only is issuing a sanction against a pro se litigant fighting 
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for his civil rights – who has not violated any order or Local Rule – inappro-
priate, the actual sanction itself is perplexing as it has no relation to the sup-
posedly offensive conduct. And the revocation of my electronic filing access 
likely harms the clerk’s office and defense counsel more than it does me. In-
stead of my filings being automatically docketed by the Electronic Case Fil-
ing (“ECF”) system, the clerk’s staff will now have to manually docket every-
thing I submit using the Court’s pro se filing website, creating more work for 
Court personnel. Defense counsel, instead of having their filings automati-
cally e-mailed to me by ECF, will now have to separately e-mail or postal-
mail me their papers. Court staff likewise will have to mail me any future 
orders, costing the Court unnecessary time of its staff, unnecessary trash in 
paper and envelopes, and unnecessary taxpayer dollars in postage. And of 
course I won’t receive anything mailed to me in a timely fashion since the 
Court is well aware I have been stranded away from my home for 7½ months 
solely because of the challenged Federal Transportation Mask Mandate and 
International Traveler Testing Requirement that have blocked me from fly-
ing and using any other mode of public transportation.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Any observer can clearly perceive that the Court’s Sanctions Order was issued 
not by any logic – as there is no rule against requesting relief by a certain date and 
the revocation of ECF access probably harms the Court itself and defense counsel 
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more than it does myself – but instead by a bias against the disabled, litigants who 
can’t afford counsel, and/or those fighting against mask mandates. The Court has 
shown hostility toward me almost from the day this case began (as well is in the 
companion case Wall v. Southwest Airlines, No. 6:21-cv-1008). 
 
I must express my concern that District Judge Paul Byron has now joined Mag-
istrate Judge Irick in conduct that violates the canons of judicial ethics. The Court 
is acting not as a neutral arbiter of the legal issues presented to it, but as an adver-
sary. No reasonable person could review this case and believe the Court is acting 
impartially. 
 
Every individual has the right to a neutral and impartial judge so that he can 
present his case “with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against 
him.” Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). As a matter of due process, a 
judge who fails the “appearance of impartiality” test may not sit as the judge in the 
case. Hurls v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 
Federal judges must abide by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
(“CCUSJ”), a set of ethical principles and guidelines adopted by the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States. “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a pro-
ceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, includ-
ing but not limited to instances in which: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prej-
udice concerning a party…” CCUSJ Canon 3(C)(1)(a). It is imperative that judges 
make decisions according to the law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of 
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interest. Moreover, the Due Process Clause has been construed to guarantee liti-
gants the right to a “neutral and detached” judge. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 
409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
 
It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must perceive them to be 
so. The CCUSJ therefore admonishes judges to “act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and 
to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”  
 
When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to dis-
qualify him from hearing further proceedings. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due-
process right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial 
bias is probable, due process requires disqualification. No judge may decide a case 
if he is biased for or against any party. Tunney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
 
A judge shall not hear a case if “the probability of actual bias on the part of the 
judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). In such cases, “the inquiry is an objective one. The 
Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the 
average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an uncon-
stitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Caperton. 
 
I am not opting at this time to file a motion for Judge Byron to recuse himself, 
although I reserve the right to do so if this misconduct were to continue. The 
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CCUSJ instructs judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety 
in all activities,” Canon 2, and specifically to “respect and comply with the law and 
[to] act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary.” Canon 2(A).  
 
“An appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge 
of all the relevant circumstances … would conclude that the judge’s honesty, im-
partiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired.” Commentary 
to Canon 2(A). The impartiality of judges, and the appearance of impartiality, are 
important for ensuring public confidence in our federal courts. A disabled pro se 
litigant going up against the might of the federal government can’t have any confi-
dence in the Court’s impartiality when it subjects him to rules that don’t exist and 
sanctions him for conduct that any reasonable attorney would engage in due to his 
ethical duty to advocate for his client’s best interests such as requesting a ruling on 
a preliminary injunction motion before a date-certain event. See Thomas v. 
Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002); Christo v. Padgett, 
223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 
An essential component of equal justice under the law is a neutral and detached 
judge to preside over court proceedings. Accordingly, it’s not the judge’s own be-
liefs, nor even the presence of actual bias that matters, but instead, the “objective 
risk of actual bias that required … recusal.” Caperton at 886. 
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“Once a judge whose impartiality toward a particular case may reasonably be 
questioned presides over that case, the damage to the integrity of the system is 
done.” Durhan v. Neopolitan, 875 F.2d 91, 97 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 
Notably Judge Byron’s temperament toward me violates his own standards. In 
written responses to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mr. Byron stressed that “a 
judge must be patient, considerate to the parties and litigants, demonstrate 
thoughtfulness, diligence, intellectual honesty… I would avoid any action which 
could convey even the appearance that all parties and their counsel are not re-
ceiving equal and impartial consideration from the court.” (emphasis added).  
 
I urge Judge Byron to remember his vow to the Senate during the confirmation 
process and rethink his actions in this case. 
 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January 2022.
Lucas Wall, plaintiff 
435 10th St., NE 
Washington, DC 20002 
Telephone: 202-351-1735 
E-Mail: Lucas.Wall@yahoo.com 
 
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