Court filing

Order on Motions to Dismiss and Summary Judgment — Wall v. CDC

Filed December 18, 2021 in Wall v. CDC; one of 35 filings from this case.

Record facts

Court	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Filed	2021-12-18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · No. 6:21-cv-00975-PGB-DCI · Doc. 187 · 2021-12-18 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

LUCAS WALL,

Plaintiff,

v.
Case No: 6:21-cv-975-PGB-DCI

CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, JOSEPH
R. BIDEN, JR. , GREATER
ORLANDO AVIATION
AUTHORITY and CENTRAL
FLORIDA REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY,

Defendants.

/
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on the following filings:
1.
Defendant Greater Orlando Aviation Authority’s (“GOAA”) Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 49), Plaintiff Lucas Wall’s response in opposition (Doc.
100), and Defendant GOAA’s reply thereto (Doc. 129);
2.
Defendant Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority’s
(“LYNX”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 82), Plaintiff’s response in
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opposition (Doc. 101), and Defendant LYNX’s reply thereto (Doc.
146);
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), Department of Health
and
Human
Services
(“HHS”),
Transportation
Security
Administration
(“TSA”),
Department
of
Homeland
Security
(“DHS”), Department of Transportation (“DOT”), and Joseph Biden,
Jr. (the “President”) (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”)
(Doc. 83), the Federal Defendants’ response in opposition (Doc. 125),
and Plaintiff’s reply thereto (Doc. 130);
4.
The Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 83), Plaintiff’s response in opposition
(Doc. 130), and the Federal Defendants’ reply thereto (Doc. 147); and
5.
Magistrate Judge Daniel Irick’s Report and Recommendation as to
these filings (Doc. 155 (“Report”)), Plaintiff’s Objection thereto (Doc.
171), and Defendants’ responses in opposition (Docs. 172, 179, 180).
The Report recommends that the Court dismiss the claims against the DHS, the
TSA, the DOT, the President, the GOAA, and LYNX with prejudice. (Doc. 155). The
Report further recommends that the Court dismiss the claims against the CDC and
HHS without prejudice and deny the Motions for Summary Judgment as moot.
(Id.). The Court finds that the Report is due to be adopted in part.

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I.
BACKGROUND
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the President directed agencies with
relevant regulatory authority to “immediately take action, to the extent appropriate
and consistent with applicable law, to require masks to be worn in or on . . . all
forms of public transportation,” including airports and commercial aircraft. Exec.
Order 13,998, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,205 (Jan. 21, 2021) (the “Executive Order”). The
Executive Order further stated, “To the extent permitted by applicable law, the
heads of agencies shall ensure that any action taken to implement this section does
not preempt State, local, Tribal, and territorial laws or rules imposing public health
measures that are more protective of public health than those required by the
heads of agencies.” Id. at 7,205–06. Subsequently, the CDC promulgated two
orders to effectuate the President’s Executive Order.
The first is the federal transportation mask mandate (“FTMM”), which
requires individuals traveling via public transportation to wear a mask.
Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at
Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,025 (Feb. 3, 2021). In support of the CDC’s
mandate, the TSA issued security directives (the “Security Directives”) and an
emergency amendment (the “Emergency Amendment”), applying the FTMM
to airport operators, domestic aircraft operators, surface transportation systems,
and foreign air carriers, respectively, and invoking its authority under 49 U.S.C. §
114 and Part A of that title as the statutory basis for these regulatory actions.
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., SD 1542-21-01, SD 1544-21-02, SD 1582/84-21-01, SECURITY
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MEASURES—MASK REQUIREMENTS (2021); TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., EA 1546-21-01,
SECURITY MEASURES—MASK REQUIREMENTS (2021).
The second CDC order is the international traveler testing requirement
(“ITTR”), which requires international travelers to obtain a negative COVID-19
test prior to departure to the United States from a foreign country. Requirement
for Negative Pre-Departure COVID-19 Test Result or Documentation of Recovery
From COVID-19 for all Airline or Other Aircraft Passengers Arriving Into the
United States From Any Foreign Country, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,387 (Jan. 28, 2021). The
CDC has since amended the ITTR twice.
The second version of the ITTR imposed more stringent COVID-19 testing
parameters on unvaccinated individuals, explicitly invoked the good cause
exception to the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) rulemaking procedure,
and provided supplemental data on COVID-19. 86 Fed. Reg. 61,252 (Nov. 5, 2021).
The third, and most recent, version of the ITTR eliminates the distinction between
vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals in terms of qualifying COVID-19 tests. 86
Fed. Reg. 69256 (Dec. 7, 2021).
In the interim, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis issued an executive order
that: suspended “all local COVID-19 restrictions and mandates on individuals and
businesses”; “eliminate[d] and supersede[d] any existing emergency order or
ordinance issued by a county or municipality that imposes restrictions or mandates
upon business or individuals due to the COVID-19 emergency”; prohibited any
“county or municipality” from “renew[ing] or enact[ing] an emergency order or
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ordinance, using a local state of emergency or using emergency enactment
procedures under [Florida law] that imposes restrictions or mandates upon
businesses or individuals due to the COVID-19 emergency”; and clarified that “a
political subdivision . . . [could] enact[] ordinances pursuant to regular enactment
procedures to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its population.” STATE OF
FLA. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, EXEC. ORD. NO. 21-102: SUSPENDING ALL REMAINING
LOC. GOV’T MANDATES & RESTRICTIONS BASED ON THE COVID-19 STATE OF
EMERGENCY (2021) (the “Florida Executive Order”). Notably, the Florida
Executive Order is silent as to whether it confers a private right of action, but it
references FLA. STAT. § 768.38, a law designed to protect certain entities from
liability for COVID-19-related claims. Id.
After the issuance of these orders and rules, on May 31, 2021, Plaintiff
scheduled several domestic and international flights and applied for a medical
exemption to the FTMM. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–19). Two days later, Plaintiff arrived at the
Orlando International Airport for the first of these flights, a trip to Fort
Lauderdale, without a mask and without a decision on his FTMM medical
exemption application, passing the notices posted by the GOAA regarding its
enforcement of the FTMM. (Id.).
At the security checkpoint, Plaintiff informed GOAA and TSA officials that
he could not wear a mask due to his anxiety and that he had received the COVID-
19 vaccine. (Id.). Although the GOAA agents permitted Plaintiff to proceed into the
terminal, TSA agents refused to let him pass because he did not have a documented
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medical exemption to the FTMM. (Id.). Plaintiff left the facility immediately
afterwards and attempted to board a bus, but a LYNX employee refused to let
Plaintiff ride without a mask, also citing the FTMM. (Id. at pp. 19–20).
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 7, 2021, alleging the following causes
of action:
o
HHS and the CDC’s enactment of the FTMM and the ITTR
violates the APA (Counts 1–4, 19–22).

o
The FTMM violates the separation of powers doctrine, the
Fifth and Tenth Amendments, the right to travel, and the Air
Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (“ACAA”), asserted
against “all Federal Defendants” (Counts 5–8, 14).

o
The ITTR violates the separation of powers doctrine, asserted
against HHS, the CDC, and the President (Count 23).

o
The DHS and the TSA’s Security Directives and Emergency
Amendment violate the APA (Counts 9–12).

o
The DOT’s withholding of funds from state, regional, and local
authorities that fail to enforce the FTMM violates the
separation of powers doctrine (Count 13), the DOT “allow[s]
airlines and other transportation providers to illegally refuse
transport to any disabled customer unable to don a face
covering” in violation of the ACAA (Count 15), and the DOT’s
regulations requiring enforcement of the FTMM on railroads,
school buses, and other modes of transportation violates the
APA (Count 16).

o
The GOAA’s and LYNX’s enforcement of the FTMM violates
the Florida Executive Order (Counts 17–18).

(Id. at pp. 182–206). Thereafter, the parties filed a Notice of Agreement to Dismiss
Counts 2, 10, 13, 16, and 20 of the Complaint and, accordingly, those Counts are
dismissed and not addressed further in this Order. (Doc. 126).
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Meanwhile, the parties filed their respective Motions and response briefs,1
culminating in Magistrate Judge Irick’s Report on October 7, 2021. (Docs. 49, 82,
83, 100, 101, 125, 129, 130, 146, 147, 155). Plaintiff filed a 55-page Objection to the
Report on October 21, 2021 (Doc. 162), and the Court granted the Federal
Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Objection as a violation of the page limitations
established by the Local Rules, giving Plaintiff leave to refile, an extension of time
to do so, and an additional 10 pages (Docs. 163, 168, 169, 170). Plaintiff timely
refiled his Objection (Doc. 171), all Defendants responded in opposition (Docs. 172,
179, 180), and the Court gave Plaintiff leave to file a brief reply to a new argument
raised in the Federal Defendants’ response (Docs. 183, 184). The matters are now
ripe for review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s “recommended disposition”
and “proposed findings of fact,” the district court must “determine de novo any
part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

1
This case has an extensive procedural history. Over the course of this litigation, Plaintiff has:
filed an Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, which the Court denied (Docs.
8, 28); filed, and then abandoned, a request for preliminary injunctive relief (Docs. 33, 36, 48,
55, 56, 67); objected to the Court’s referral of this case to Magistrate Judge Irick for his
recommendations (Docs. 31, 46, 47); moved to disqualify Magistrate Judge Irick (Docs. 61,
98); contested several rulings related to the Court’s Local Rules (Docs. 2, 3, 33, 36, 55, 56, 67,
141, 144, 152, 159, 168); and filed appeals, which were thereafter dismissed, with the Eleventh
Circuit and with the Supreme Court (Docs. 58, 59, 60, 70, 74, 89, 91). Because this procedural
history is not relevant to the resolution of the instant matters, the Court simply notes that
these filings are available on its docket.
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magistrate judge. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district court must consider the record and
factual issues independent of the magistrate judge’s report, as de novo review is
essential to the constitutionality of § 636. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d
507, 512–13 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.
DISCUSION
The Report tackles the plethora of pending requests, responses, and replies
in two parts. First, the Report recommends that the Court dismiss the entire
Complaint without prejudice as a shotgun pleading. (Doc. 155). Second, the Report
recommends that the Court dismiss certain claims and parties with prejudice.
(Id.). The Court follows suit and divides its analysis below accordingly.
A.
Dismissal Without Prejudice
The Report correctly concludes that the Complaint is a shotgun pleading,
and, therefore, the Court must dismiss it, in its entirety, with leave to replead,
despite the leniency afforded to pro se litigants. (Doc. 155, pp. 5–10, 18–19). The
Report also draws attention to the ITTR claims and suggests repleader for lack of
standing, but, upon inspection, the Court believes Plaintiff satisfies the
constitutional requirements to bring these causes of action. (Id. at pp. 15–16). The
Court explains its findings below in detail.
i.
The Entire Complaint: Shotgun Pleading Doctrine
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10 require pleadings to contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”
and to “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
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practicable to a single set of circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 10(b). Shotgun
pleadings violate these established pleading principles. Weiland v. Palm Beach
Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). There are four
categories of shotgun pleadings:
The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint. The next most common
type . . . is a complaint that . . . is guilty of the venial sin of
being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The
third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of
not separating into a different count each cause of action or
claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare
sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim
is brought against. The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another,
and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests.

Id. at 1321–23. “When presented with a shotgun complaint, the district court
should order repleading sua sponte.” Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 F. App’x 253, 259 n.8
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)2 (citing Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464
F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Here, the Complaint spans 206 pages, and the 210 accompanying exhibits
cover 1,007 pages. (Docs. 1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13). The

2
“Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar as their
legal analysis warrants.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th
Cir. 2007).
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factual allegations, alone, total 176 pages, beginning with a cumbersome narrative
of the incident at issue that includes repetitive conversations between Plaintiff and
a variety of government and airline officials, hyperlinks to the videos Plaintiff
filmed during these interactions, Plaintiff’s musings during the event, and other
unnecessary embellishments such as the size of the crowd forming to watch the
scene. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–20). The rest of the factual allegations similarly flounder in
frill where succinct summaries would suffice, and some assertions are completely
tangential to the questions presented here. For example:
o
The Complaint uses almost 50 pages to describe the
President’s mask mandate for federal buildings and lands
(which the President has since lifted and, therefore, is not
even a subject of this action), the President’s issuance of the
FTMM and the ITTR and the other Federal Defendants’
actions in response to these mandates, the Federal
Defendants’ failure to consider “better options” than the
FTMM and the ITTR, the states’ imposition (or refusal to
impose) similar mandates, the decision by numerous
businesses to lift mask requirements for patrons, and the ways
in which the FTMM discriminates against disabled
individuals. (Id. at pp. 21–54, 70–79, 93–99).

o
The Complaint uses about 13 pages to provide histories of the
World Health Organization’s and the CDC’s respective mask
guidelines. (Id. at pp. 54–67).

o
The Complaint uses close to three pages to detail Congress’
reluctance to pass a mask mandate or an international
traveler testing requirement into law, commenting on
proposed legislation that failed to gain traction, statements by
members of both Houses on the propriety of masks, and the
“outright rebell[ion]” by members of the House of
Representatives against “muzzling themselves.” (Id. at pp.
67–70).

o
The Complaint uses over 75 pages for data (i.e., data showing
that states without mask mandates reported fewer COVID-19-
related deaths, general data on COVID-19 infection,
vaccination, and death rates, data “documenting how masks
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are totally ineffective in reducing COVID-19 infections,
hospitalizations, and deaths,” studies showing “scientists
have known for a long time that masks [are not] effective in
reducing transmission of respiratory viruses,” data on “the
serious health risks to human beings of forced muzzling,” data
showing that COVID-19 vaccinations are highly effective, data
on the natural immunity obtained by those who recover from
COVID-19, data on the unlikelihood of achieving herd
immunity to COVID-19, and the correlation between masks
and crime, racism, and damage to the environment). (Id. at
pp. 77–82, 99–158, 164–79).

o
The Complaint uses about 15 pages to recite stories of “unruly
behavior” and violence by airline passengers against airline
staffs’ enforcement of the FTMM, statements by airline
industry representatives about this “chaos,” a discussion
about the effect of alcohol on airline passenger agitation
regarding the FTMM, and the low risk posed by airplane
cabins for the spread of COVID-19. (Id. at pp. 82–93, 179–82).

o
The Complaint uses five pages to regurgitate “expert”
opinions that “forcing kids to wear masks” is tantamount to
“child abuse,” studies on the lower risk of COVID-19 in
children, and anecdotes of the effects of masks on child health,
such as an Oregon high school student’s collapse from
complete oxygen debt from wearing a mask during a track
competition. (Id. at pp. 159–64).

Consequently, the Complaint falls within the second category of shotgun pleading.
Far from a “short and plain statement,” the Complaint resembles a novel, both in
size and style. On repleader, Plaintiff must omit superfluous stories and cumulative
information, condense allegations to those at the heart of this dispute, and curb
the urge to use pleading as an opportunity to soliloquize at length. Brevity is a
virtue.

The Complaint also falls within the first category of shotgun pleading. The
first paragraph under Count 1 prefaces the delineated causes of action with the
following: “For this and all other causes of action, I reallege and incorporate by
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reference the allegations and facts contained in all of the preceding paragraphs as
though set forth fully herein.” (Id. at p. 182). Because this incorporation paragraph
applies to “all other causes of action,” and because it realleges “all of the preceding
paragraphs,” each successive cause of action adopts the allegations of the prior
causes of action, to the point where the last cause of action is a sum of the
Complaint. This gradual “building” of allegations is the defining characteristic of
this category of shotgun pleading, and it is an easy fix. In repleading, the Complaint
should include a paragraph at the beginning of each cause of action that specifies
the relevant incorporated factual allegations by paragraph number, cognizant to
exclude the allegations contained in other causes of action.3
In justifying the length of his Complaint, Plaintiff emphasizes the number of
claims asserted, the number of Defendants involved, the number of actions
challenged, and his status as a pro se party. (Doc. 171, pp. 8–9). But none of these

3
To illustrate, each cause of action may incorporate the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 1–10. Alternatively, Count 1 may incorporate the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 1–10, and Count 2 may incorporate the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 11–20. But, importantly, Count 2 cannot incorporate the allegations contained in
Count 1.

Relatedly, the Report finds that the Complaint falls within the fourth category of shotgun
pleading because Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 14 assert violations by “all Federal Defendants” without
specifying which of them are responsible for what acts or omissions. (Doc. 155, pp. 7–8; see
Doc. 1, pp. 186–89, 194–95). Likewise, Count 23 conclusively states that the HHS, the CDC,
and the President violated the separation of powers doctrine by enacting the ITTR. (Doc. 1,
pp. 201–02). This is technically true—however, this deficiency stems from the
voluminousness of the Complaint and the improper incorporation of all the preceding factual
allegations, described above. The Complaint can certainly assert claims against “all Federal
Defendants” or multiple Defendants, and even a cursory review of the Complaint reveals
sufficient factual detail regarding each individual Defendant to accuse them collectively. Thus,
paring down the pages of the Complaint and properly incorporating relevant factual
allegations into each Count should rectify this error.
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factors exempt Plaintiff from the pleading requirements established by Rules 8 and
10. See Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797–98 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing a pro se
plaintiff’s complaint as a shotgun pleading).
Plaintiff argues that repleader is unnecessary because Defendants have
notice of his claims, as evidenced by their “extensive” responsive filings. (Id. at pp.
6–7, 10–11). But, regardless of Defendants’ prowess in deciphering this mammoth
Complaint, Eleventh Circuit case law holds that shotgun pleadings, by definition,
fail to provide the type of notice contemplated under Rules 8 and 10 and thus
require dismissal. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23.
Plaintiff also asserts that repleader comes at the cost of judicial economy.
(Id. at p. 7–8). Not so. Repleader is essential to the maintenance of judicial
economy because shotgun pleadings “exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s
docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, [] impose unwarranted
expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and
recourse,” delay justice, and frustrate the appellate courts. Cramer v. Florida, 117
F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997).
Finally, Plaintiff avers the Complaint is “comprehensible,” highlighting that
the Report reached “merits decision[s]” on some of his claims. (Id. at pp. 6–7, 11).
But there is a difference between the form of the allegations under Rules 8(a)(2)
and 10(b) and the substance of those allegations under Rule 12(b)(6). Barmapov
v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1331 n.4 (11th Cir. 2021) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). When
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the allegations are “not so impenetrable as to prohibit a close look at the claims
[the plaintiff] attempted to plead,” there is no rule preventing the district court
from evaluating the plausibility of those claims. Id. at 1331 (Tjoflat, J., concurring)
(engaging in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis despite the dismissal of the whole complaint
as a “‘rambling, dizzying array of nearly incomprehensible pleading’”). Likewise,
the district court can—and must—reach discernable jurisdictional questions. See
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A
necessary corollary to the concept that a federal court is powerless to act without
jurisdiction is the equally unremarkable principle that a court should inquire into
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest possible stage in the
proceedings. Indeed, it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire
into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). Tackling
such glaring defects at the outset, when possible, further streamlines the pleading
process. See Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc.,
556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A district court has inherent authority to
manage its own docket ‘so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’” (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). Thus, the
Report properly recommends, and this Court adopts, the dismissal of some Counts
and some parties (discussed below in more detail) that have such patently obvious
Rule 12(b)(6) issues and jurisdictional problems.4

4 Plaintiff objects to the Court’s dismissal of Counts 3, 7, 8, and 14 as part of the shotgun
pleading. (Doc. 171, pp. 14, 18–19, 22; see Doc. 130). To the extent Counts 7, 8, and 14 allege
violations against “all Federal Defendants,” the Court, as explained supra, dismisses the
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Finally, Plaintiff’s requests for summary judgment on Counts 1, 4, 5, and 6
are moot. (Doc. 171, pp. 12–18; see Docs. 127-1, 130). As of this Order, there is no
operative pleading at this time.5
ii.
Claims Regarding the ITTR: Counts 19, 21, 22, and 23
To possess standing under Article III of the Constitution, “the plaintiff must
have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
As to the first element, concreteness demands a “de facto harm,” but this
“actually exist[ing]” injury “need be only an ‘identifiable trifle,’” and intangible
injuries suffice. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340–41 (2016); Salcedo v.
Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Students
Challenging Regul. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)). “In determining
whether an intangible harm constitutes an injury in fact, . . . it is instructive to

President as a party to these claims. Otherwise, the Court does not address Counts 3, 7, 8, and
14 at this time because they are among the claims that do not present easily perceivable Rule
12(b)(6) or jurisdictional issues. These Counts are subject to the Court’s ruling under the
shotgun pleading doctrine and may be repled in compliance with the directives of this Order.

5
The Report notes that Plaintiff moved for summary judgment before the Federal Defendants
responded to the Complaint and that the Federal Defendants moved for summary judgment
as they responded to the Complaint, and it observes that “[t]he result is much spilled ink on
judgment prior to the pleadings being set.” (Doc. 155, p. 20 n.12). The Court agrees and advises
the parties against a repetition of this odd procedural posture on repleader. See Bey v. Am.
Honda Fin. Servs. Corp., No. 8:17-cv-759, 2017 WL 11017804, at*1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2017)
(stating that the district court may exercise its discretion in managing the filings of summary
judgment motions and citing Wilson v. Farley, 203 F. App’x 239, 250 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that
has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41. Additionally, particularization
means this concrete harm “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way.” Id. at 339 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, as to the second element,
“[s]ome day intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even
any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the
actual or imminent injury that our cases require.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (internal
quotations omitted). These elements are “indispensable part[s] of the plaintiff’s
case,” and therefore the plaintiff must establish it “with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation”:
At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the
claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however,
the plaintiff can no longer rest of such mere allegations, but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts,
which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be
taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if
controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence
adduced at trial.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the Complaint alleges that, on May 31, 2021, Plaintiff scheduled a
roundtrip flight to Germany, departing on June 24, 2021 and arriving back in the
United States on June 30, 2021. (Doc. 1, p. 6). The Complaint further alleges that,
after the incident at the Orlando International Airport on June 2, 2021, Plaintiff
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was “unable to use” his airline ticket to Germany “because of the . . . ITTR.” (Doc.
1, p. 6; see Doc. 184, p. 2). Although the Complaint does not appear to allege that
Plaintiff suffered economic damages as a result, the lost opportunity to go to
Germany, alone, constitutes a concrete, particularized, actual injury in fact. Cf.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (recognizing a liberty right to international
travel subject to regulation within the bounds of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).6

Furthermore, while the Complaint does not allege the existence of any other
pending international trips, the record shows that Plaintiff has rescheduled his
flight to Germany several times over the course of this litigation, and, recently,
Plaintiff notified the Court of his upcoming flight to Germany for December 20,
2021. (Docs. 130, 173, 174, 186). Thus, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff also
possesses a concrete, particularized, imminent injury in fact.7
The Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiff must amend his pleading each
time the CDC amends the ITTR because each amendment moots his claims. (Doc.
172, pp. 18–19). Using the second version of the ITTR, the Federal Defendants

6 “Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom
of movement is basic in our scheme of values. Our nation . . . has thrived on the principle that,
outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he
thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id. at 126 (internal quotations omitted).

7
Notably, since Plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint anyways, he can include allegations
regarding his forthcoming international flights as well as his plan to reschedule this trip until
the disposition of this action. Such allegations, amounting to more than “some day
intentions,” would obviate the need for future notices during the pleading stage of this
litigation. Regardless, the Complaint sufficiently alleges an actual injury in fact, so these
allegations are not required (but would further solidify Plaintiff’s standing).
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posit that it is “materially different” from the original ITTR because: (1) it explicitly
invokes the good cause exception to the APA’s rulemaking procedure, which
“resolves” Plaintiff’s APA claim; (2) it distinguishes between vaccinated and
unvaccinated individuals, allowing vaccinated persons to provide an older COVID-
19 test result; and (3) it “reflects nine additional months of data and experience
dealing with COVID-19, including wider availability of vaccines and the rise of the
Delta variant,” and, therefore, “it would be necessary to produce a new
administrative record.” (Id.).
However, “a superseding statute or regulation moots a case only to the
extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law. To the extent that those
features remain in place, and changes in the law have not so fundamentally altered
the statutory [or regulatory] framework as to render the original controversy a
mere abstraction, the case is not moot.” Naturist Soc., Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d
1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that amended regulations to a park permitting
scheme did not moot a constitutional challenge to that scheme because “the
challenged aspects . . . remain essentially as they were before the amendments”).
This rule makes sense because if the only exception to the mootness doctrine is the
enactment of “the selfsame statute,” “a defendant could moot a case by repealing
the challenged statute [or regulation] and replacing it with one that differs only in
some insignificant respect.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 660–62 (1993) (holding that an amended
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ordinance did not render the case moot because it disadvantaged the plaintiff “in
the same fundamental way”).
First, the Federal Defendants’ offer no authority supporting their dubious
position that an agency’s invocation of the good cause exception automatically
shields its actions from judicial review. See Fla. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 21-14098, 2021 WL 5768796, at *13–14 (11th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021) (evaluating the
Secretary of Health and Human Services’ invocation of the good cause exception
for an interim rule that requires healthcare facilities providing Medicare and
Medicaid to ensure their staff is fully vaccinated against COVID-19 in the context
of a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction); 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(D) (“To the
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law . . .”).
Second, even setting aside the fact that newest edition of the ITTR
eliminated the second edition’s distinction between vaccinated and unvaccinated
individuals, the regulatory scheme still involves the imposition of a COVID-19
testing requirement on international travelers seeking entry into the United States,
“and it still operates in the same allegedly unconstitutional fashion.” Naturist Soc.,
958 F.2d at 1520. It is immaterial whether the new ITTR “differs in certain respects
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from the old one.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at
662.
And because these amendments to the ITTR do not alter the substance of
the mandate, the fact that the CDC predicates each new amendment to the ITTR
on its augmented COVID-19 research is also inapposite. Fundamentally, the CDC’s
motivation for enacting the ITTR and each amendment thereto remain constant:
the goal of eradicating, or least quelling the spread of, COVID-19.
B.
Dismissal With Prejudice

After determining that repleader is necessary, the Report narrows the
number of parties that can be named and claims that can be asserted in the
amended filing. First, the Report recommends that the Court dismiss the DHS, the
TSA, and the DOT, and the claims as to those parties, with prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction, and the Court agrees. (Doc. 155, pp. 8–18). Second, the Report
recommends dismissal of the President with prejudice because “the Complaint
contains no plausible allegations supporting a request for relief against the
President,” emphasizing that several Counts broadly allege that the FTMM and the
ITTR are illegal without mentioning any particular action by the President. (Doc.
155, pp. 14–15; see Doc. 1, pp. 186–89, 194–95, 201–02).8 The Court finds that

8 The Report recognizes that the Complaint requests the Court to vacate the President’s
Executive Order and that some factual allegations reference that Executive Order, asserting
that it “set” the challenged mask mandates and testing requirement “in motion.” (Doc. 155, p.
15; see Doc. 1, pp. 16, 21, 28, 30, 46, 68, 85). However, the Report concludes that the request
for relief has no connection to any of the claims and that the Complaint ultimately focuses on
the agencies’ implementation of the Executive Order rather than the Executive Order itself.
(Doc. 155, p. 15). Nevertheless, the Court finds that the challenge to the Executive Order is
apparent.
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neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor the shotgun pleading doctrine justify dismissal with
prejudice, but it nonetheless agrees with the recommendation on a different basis:
the President’s general immunity from lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against
him in the performance of his official duties. Lastly, the Report recommends
dismissal of the GOAA and LYNX with prejudice on several grounds, but the Court
finds disposition of these claims premature. (Doc. 155, pp. 16–18). The Court
addresses each conclusion below.
i.
Claims Against the DHS, the TSA, and the DOT: Counts 9, 11,
12, and 15

49 U.S.C. § 46110 provides:
Except for an order related to a foreign air carrier subject to
disapproval by the President under section 41307 or 41509(f)
of this title,9 a person disclosing a substantial interest in an
order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (or the
Administrator of the [TSA] with respect to security duties and
powers designated to be carried out by the Administrator of
the TSA . . . ) in whole or in part under this part [i.e., Part A],
part B, or subsection (l) or (s) of section 11410 may apply for
review of the order by filing a petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or

9 Title 49 governs transportation, Subtitle VII of Title 49 governs aviation programs, and Part
A of Subtitle VII governs air commerce and safety. Under Part A, § 46110 governs judicial
review, § 41307 governs the President’s review of actions relating to foreign air transportation,
and § 41509 governs the Secretary of Transportation’s authority to suspend, reject, and cancel
tariffs for foreign air transportation. Section 41307 provides: “The Secretary of Transportation
shall submit to the President for review each decision of the Secretary to issue, deny, amend,
modify, suspend, revoke, or transfer a certificate . . . authorizing an air carrier, or a permit . .
. authorizing a foreign air carrier, to provide foreign air transportation.” Section 41509(f)
provides: “The Secretary shall submit to the President an order made under this section
suspending, canceling, or rejecting a price for foreign air transportation, and an order
rescinding the effectiveness of such an order, before publishing the order.”

10 Subtitle I of Title 49 organizes the DOT, and § 114 of Subtitle I organizes the TSA. Among other
things, § 114(l) authorizes the Administrator of the TSA “to issue, rescind, and revise such
regulations as are necessary to carry out the functions of the [TSA]” and establishes emergency
procedures. Section 114(s) requires the DHS and the TSA to implement a National Strategy
for Transportation Security.
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in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in
which the person resides or has its principal place of business.
. . . the court has exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, amend,
modify, or set aside any part of the order . . .

Importantly, “where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of
Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future
jurisdiction is subject to exclusive review of the Court of Appeals.” George
Kabeller, Inc. v. Busey, 999 F.2d 1417, 1420 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted).

Here, Counts 9, 11, and 12 challenge the Security Directives and the
Emergency Amendment issued by the TSA, explicitly, under § 114 and Part A,11 and
Count 15 asserts that the DOT neglected its duties under the ACAA, which falls
within Part A. (Doc. 1, pp. 189–193, 195; see Docs. 125-2, 125-3, 125-4, 125-5, 125-
6). Thus, this Court quite simply lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate these Counts. And
although Count 15 challenges the DOT’s failure to act under Part A—rather than an
action taken under Part A—this claim, at the very least, may affect the Eleventh
Circuit’s future jurisdiction and therefore is subject to its exclusive review.

In his Objection, Plaintiff asserts the TSA exceeded its statutory authority
because the Security Directives and the Emergency Amendment address health
threats rather than security threats and, thus, the Eleventh Circuit does not have
exclusive jurisdiction. (Doc. 171, pp. 19–22; see Doc. 127-1, pp. 15–18; Doc. 130,
pp. 26–28). Plaintiff conflates the substantive question of whether the TSA

11 Specifically, in addition to § 114, the TSA’s regulations either invoke § 44902 (governing air
carriers’ refusal to transport passengers and property), § 44903 (governing air transportation
security), or both. (Docs. 125-3, 125-4, 125-6). Sections 44902 and 44903 fall within Part A.
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exceeded its statutory authority in taking the challenged regulatory actions with
the procedural question of whether the Eleventh Circuit has exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over these claims. This Court simply cannot reach the
substantive question because, as a matter of procedure, only the Eleventh Circuit
has the power to do so.

Plaintiff also states that this Court, at a minimum, has jurisdiction over the
TSA’s Emergency Amendment because it is “an order related to a foreign air
carrier.” (Doc. 171, pp. 21–22). But that exception explicitly covers certain
economic decisions by the Secretary of Transportation under §§ 41307 and
41509(f). And because the Emergency Amendment expressly cites to § 114 and
other sections of Part A, and because the Eleventh Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over orders issued “in or whole or in part” under those statutes, the exception does
not apply. § 46110(a) (emphasis added).

As to Count 15, Plaintiff objects that the Report “mislabels [the] DOT’s
[February] 5, 2021[] Notice of Enforcement Policy regarding the FTMM as an
enforcement order issued under the ACAA” and reasons that this Court has
jurisdiction because the DOT only issued a policy “telling the airlines not to enforce
the ACAA” instead of an “order” under § 46110. (Doc. 171, p. 23; see Doc. 130, p.
38) (quotations and emphasis omitted). The difference between the Report’s
discussion of the DOT’s inaction and Plaintiff’s discussion of the DOT’s policy of
inaction seems to be one without distinction: regardless of the semantics used to
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describe the claim, the challenge is to the DOT’s failure to comply with the ACAA,
and therefore the Eleventh Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over Count 15.12
ii.
Claims Against the President: Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, and 23
The Court must also dismiss the President as a party to this action with
prejudice. Generally, this Court “lack[s] ‘jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties.’” Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d
741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017)13 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–
03 (1992)). “Injunctive relief, however, may run against executive officials,” and,
therefore, Plaintiff’s injuries “can be redressed fully by injunctive relief against the
remaining Defendants, and [] the extraordinary remedy of enjoining the President
is not appropriate here.” Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 788; see Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (ruling that President Truman’s executive order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession and operate most of the
nation’s steel mills fell outside the scope of his powers under Article II of the

12 The Report also recommends, in the alternative, that the Court dismiss Count 15’s request for
a writ of mandamus because the Complaint does not demonstrate that the DOT owes a clear,
nondiscretionary duty to Plaintiff or that Plaintiff exhausted all other avenues of relief. (Doc.
155, pp. 12–14). Because the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction for the reasons stated supra, it
does not need to address this recommendation.

13 In Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017), the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
decision because the challenged executive order had expired on its own terms, and it
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot for lack
of a live case or controversy.

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Constitution and affirming the district court’s decision to enjoin the Secretary of
Commerce from carrying out the executive order).14
iii.
Claims Against the GOAA and LYNX: Counts 17 and 18
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute that this Court has original
federal question subject matter jurisdiction over the challenges to the FTMM (and
the ITTR) because it arises under the Constitution and federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). However, Counts 17 and
18 assert the same state law claim, namely, that the GOAA and LYNX, respectively,
violated the Florida Executive Order by complying with the FTMM. (Doc. 1, pp.
196–98). Moreover, the Complaint fails to expressly state a basis for original
subject matter jurisdiction over these Counts, and the parties do not argue any
such grounds. (Doc. 1, pp. 4–5; Doc. 171, pp. 26–27; Doc. 179, pp. 4–6; Doc. 180,
pp. 13–14). Rather, the parties only contest whether the Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.” “The constitutional ‘case or controversy’ standard

14 In light of this case law, the Federal Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff cannot challenge the
Executive Order for lack of standing is perplexing. (Doc. 172, pp. 22–23).
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confers supplemental jurisdiction over all state claims which arise out of a common
nucleus of operative fact with a substantial federal claim.” Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing United Mine Workers
of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). “In determining whether state law
claims satisfy this standard, courts examine ‘whether the claims arise from the
same facts, or involve similar occurrences, witnesses or evidence.’” Cruz v. Winter
Garden Realty, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-1098, 2012 WL 6212909, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
27, 2012) (quoting Hudson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 455 (11th Cir.
1996)). Importantly, district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction in four
circumstances: (1) where “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law”;
(2) where “the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction”; (3) where “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”; or (4) where there are
“exceptional circumstances” or “other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” § 1367(c).
Here, this Court has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Counts 17 and 18 under § 1367(a). These claims arise out of the same operative
nucleus of fact as the FTMM claims because they involve the same series of events:
Plaintiff’s inability to board his flight or ride the bus due to the enforcement of the
FTMM by the TSA, the GOAA, and LYNX. (Doc. 1, pp. 6–20). Consequently, the
resolution of these state law claims will involve the same or similar facts, witnesses,
and evidence as the FTMM claims—indeed, Counts 17 and 18 rely on the legality
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of the FTMM, which will raise significant questions of preemption.15 Thus, the
Court retains jurisdiction for now, with the caveat that it will remain “continuously
mindful” of whether relinquishment of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate
“‘at every stage of the litigation.’” Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labs., Inc., 803
F.3d 518, 537 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
The Report submits that the Court should exercise its discretion to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 17 and 18 under § 1367(c)(1), positing that
these claims raise the following “novel and complex” issues of Florida law: (1)
whether the Florida Executive Order explicitly or implicitly confers a private right
of action; and (2) if a private right of action exists, whether the Complaint states a
claim for relief against the GOAA and LYNX under the Florida Executive Order,
which only applies to enactments by Florida’s political subdivisions. (Doc. 155, p.

15 Without touching the substance of these preemption questions, the Court notes that,
generally, a case is not removable to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including
the defense of preemption, even if the complaint anticipates this defense and even if the
parties concede that this defense is the only question truly at issue. Catepillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). However, the complete preemption doctrine is an exception to this
general rule that “converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal
claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule” where the preemptive force of a federal
law is “extraordinary.” Id. (internal citations omitted). It is not clear, at this time, whether the
Executive Order and the FTMM completely preempt the Florida Executive Order, but, if so,
Counts 17 and 18 would be considered, from their inception, federal claims arising under
federal law. Id.

In other words, the Court’s ruling on the legitimacy of the FTMM controls the outcome of
Counts 17 and 18. If the FTMM is legal and preempts the Florida Executive Order, then the
GOAA and LYNX may have a defense to the alleged violations of state law. If the FTMM is
illegal and does not preempt the Florida Executive Order, then this Court may decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) because it would no longer have any
claims invoking its original subject matter jurisdiction (it expects to resolve the ITTR claims
at the same time as the FTMM claims).
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17 n.8; see also Doc. 179, pp. 4–5). Alternatively, the Report asserts that the
Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) because: (1) the GOAA
and LYNX are not municipalities or local governments; (2) neither entity enacted
any restriction or enforced any restriction by a municipality or local government
but rather enforced federal regulations; and (3) “even if Plaintiff’s claims were
otherwise cognizable,” he failed to adhere to FLA. STAT. § 768.38, which requires
civil liability claims against governmental entities that “arise[] from or [] relate[s]
to COVID-19” to be pled with particularity and to be accompanied by “an affidavit
signed by a physician actively licensed in this state which attests to the physician’s
belief . . . that the plaintiff’s COVID-19-related damages, injury, or death occurred
as a result of the defendant’s acts or omissions.” (Doc. 155, pp. 17–18). But for the
reasons stated above, the Court does not need to evaluate the novelty, complexity,
or viability of these claims.
Finally, in his Objection, Plaintiff improperly attempts to recharacterize
Counts 17 and 18 as violations of the Florida Constitution, petitions for a writ of
quo warranto, and infringements of FLA. STAT. § 252.38, none of which appear in
the Complaint. (Doc. 171, pp. 26–28; see Doc. 1); see Menzie v. Ann Taylor Retail
Inc., 549 F. App’x 891, 895–96 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that it is “well-settled” in
the Eleventh Circuit that a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint via an opposition
brief). The Court notes that repleader is not an opportunity to add new claims;
rather, it is a chance for Plaintiff to remedy the pleading deficiencies identified
herein. See, e.g., Huff v. Regions Bank, No. 5:13-cv-63, 2013 WL 12091681, at *1–
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2 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2013). The addition of new claims in violation of this Order
will result in the Court striking the Amended Complaint without further notice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1.
Counts 2, 10, 13, 16, and 20 of the Complaint are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with the parties’ Notice of
Agreement (Doc. 126).
2.
The Report (Doc. 155) is ADOPTED and CONFIRMED in part
and made a part of this Order.
3.
Plaintiff’s Objection thereto (Doc. 171) is OVERRULED.
4.
The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. On or
before Monday, January 3, 2022, Plaintiff may file an Amended
Complaint consistent with the directives of this Order. Failure to
timely file an Amended Complaint will result in dismissal of this
action without further notice.
5.
The Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 125) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
a.
Defendants the DHS, the TSA, the DOT, and the President are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to terminate these parties from the file.
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b.
Counts 9, 11, 12, and 15 of the Complaint are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
c.
The Federal Defendants’ requests for summary judgment and
other forms of relief are otherwise DENIED AS MOOT.
6.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment against the Federal
Defendants (Doc. 83) is DENIED AS MOOT.
7.
Defendant GOAA’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) is DENIED.
8.
Defendant LYNX’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 82) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 18, 2021.

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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