Court filing
Response to Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 — United States v. Harrescia Hopkins
Summary
The United States' response to the defendant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in United States v. Harrescia Hopkins, No. 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, filed June 6, 2024 as Document 60. It asks the court to deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the three ineffective-assistance claims fail both prongs of Strickland v. Washington. The response recounts an indictment on two counts of wire fraud on August 9, 2022, a guilty plea on December 20, 2022, and two Paycheck Protection Program loans of $19,100 each. It states that at sentencing on June 8, 2023 the court found a Total Offense Level of 11, Criminal History Category of I and a range of 8-14 months, and imposed five months of imprisonment, two years of supervised release and restitution of $46,004.04.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
No. 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS · Doc. 60 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 1 of 18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA Criminal Action No.
v. 1:22-CR-284-SEG-CMS
H ARRESCIA H OPKINS
Response to Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
The United States of America, by Ryan K. Buchanan, United States Attorney,
and Garrett L. Bradford, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Georgia, files this Response to Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 46).
Introduction
Defendant Hopkins’ motion to vacate should be denied. Her ineffectiveness
claims falter on both the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland. Her
counsel performed within the range of reasonable competence demanded of him.
Nor can Hopkins establish prejudice as required, especially in light of the
reasonable sentence imposed by the Court. The existing record is sufficient to
reject all of the claims raised here. The Court should therefore deny Hopkins’
habeas motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 2 of 18
Background
1. Offense Conduct
In 2021, while Hopkins was employed as a Correctional Officer at the United
States Penitentiary–Atlanta, the Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector
General began investigating Hopkins based on allegations from multiple sources
that Hopkins was accepting bribes from inmates to smuggle contraband cellular
phones, marijuana, and methamphetamine into USP-Atlanta. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 9, 47-49). During that investigation, the
government discovered Hopkins applied for and received two Paycheck
Protection Program loans of $19,100 each for a business, Hopkins Towing and
Storage, that didn’t exist. (PSR ¶ 9, 19-24; Doc. 19-1 ¶ 12). Further investigation
revealed that Hopkins had submitted false information about that fake business
to a financial institution, including falsified IRS tax documents, to apply for those
loans. (Id.). Hopkins then spent the proceeds of that fraud on personal expenses,
including a Caribbean cruise and other travel, a new Chevrolet Blazer,
landscaping for her house, restaurant meals, and retail goods. (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 12(d);
PSR ¶¶ 21, 23, 26-27).
2. Course of Proceedings
Based on this activity, Hopkins was indicted on two counts of wire fraud on
August 9, 2022. (Doc. 1). Hopkins entered a negotiated guilty plea on December
20, 2022. (Doc. 19-1). Her plea agreement included a written factual basis that
Hopkins signed and agreed constituted the facts underlying her conduct. (Id.
¶ 12). During the plea hearing, the Court engaged in the following exchanges
with Hopkins:
2
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 3 of 18
“Q Ms. Hopkins, has anyone made any promise other than the plea
agreement that induced you to plead guilty? A No.” (Doc. 25 at 16-17).
“Q Other than the plea agreement, has anyone threatened or forced you to
plead guilty or told you that if you do not plead guilty, further charges will be
brought against you or other adverse actions will be taken against you? A
No.” (Id. at 17).
“Q Ms. Hopkins, do you feel that you have had sufficient time to think about
and discuss this matter fully with your lawyer, before entering a plea of guilty
today? A Yes.” (Id. at 18).
“Q Are you satisfied with the representation of your lawyer in this case? A
Yes.” (Id.).
“Q Have you had enough time to talk with your lawyer about this plea offer
and whether or not you should accept it? A Yes.” (Id.).
“Q Have you discussed with your lawyer the charges in the indictment to
which you intend to plead guilty? A Yes.” (Id. at 19).
“Q. Is your guilty plea voluntary and of your own freewill? A Yes.” (Id. at 30).
The Court also engaged in a lengthy exchange confirming that Hopkins
understood that she was waiving her right to appeal except for certain narrow
exceptions. (Id. at 26-27).
Following the plea hearing, it came to light that Hopkins was contesting her
termination from her job at the Bureau of Prisons through a proceeding before
the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. (See Doc. 31 at 4). In that proceeding,
she contended that her guilty plea had been coerced. (See id. at 4-5). In light of
this revelation, Hopkins’ sentencing was continued and the Court held two
status conferences at which Hopkins was present while her attorney stated that
Hopkins did not wish to withdraw her guilty plea. (See Doc. 27; Doc. 28; Doc. 31
at 5-6). Subsequently, on May 25, 2023, the Court held a third status conference to
directly question Hopkins about the voluntariness of her plea and whether she
3
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 4 of 18
desired to withdraw her guilty plea. (Doc. 30; Doc. 31). During that hearing, the
Court engaged in the following colloquy with Hopkins:
Q Is there anything that you would like to say on the record in this court
about any allegation that your guilty plea in this case was obtained by
coercion, intimidation, or any other unfair tactic?
A No.
Q Is there anything you would like to say, either on your own, or through
your lawyer, about any factor that unfairly influenced your decision to
plead guilty?
A No.
Q Has anyone made any promise, other than the plea agreement, that
induced you to plead guilty?
A No.
Q Was your plea in this case coerced by the United States Attorney’s
Office?
A No.
Q Was it coerced by anyone?
A No.
Q Was it voluntarily and intelligently made?
A Yes.
Q Other than the plea agreement, has anyone -- let me rephrase that.
Has anyone threatened or forced you to plead guilty?
A No.
Q Has anyone engaged in any kind of intimidation to get you to plead
guilty?
A No.
Q Has anyone told you that if you do not plead guilty, further charges will
be brought against you or other adverse action will be taken against you?
A No.
Q Do you want to withdraw your guilty plea and proceed, instead to a
trial in this case?
A No.
Q Nave you had a sufficient time to discuss the issues that we were
discussing here today with your lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Are you prepared to go forward with sentencing in this case?
4
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 5 of 18
A Yes.
(Doc. 31 at 8-9).
At sentencing on June 8, 2023, the Court calculated Hopkins’ sentencing
Guidelines as outlined in the PSR, with a Total Offense Level of 11, Criminal
History Category of I, and a Custody Guideline Range of 8-14 months. (See PSR
at 20; Sentencing Transcript (“Sent. Trans.”)1 at 28). The Court advised Hopkins
of her right to speak at the hearing, but Hopkins declined to say anything. (Sent.
Trans. at 43-44, 47). The Court applied a two-level downward variance in
anticipation of the Zero-Point Offender amendment to the Guidelines and
sentenced Hopkins to a term of five months of imprisonment to be followed by
two years of supervised release. (Sent. Trans. at 52; Doc. 35). The Court also
imposed restitution in the amount of $46,004.04. (Doc. 35; Doc. 36).
Following sentencing, the Court twice granted Hopkins’ pro se motions to
extend her date to voluntarily surrender to begin serving her custodial sentence.
(Doc. 40; Doc. 43). Hopkins was released from BOP custody on February 9, 2024.
(See https://www.bop.gov/mobile/find_inmate/byname.jsp# (last visited May
28, 2024)).
3. Habeas Claim
On August 14, 2023, Hopkins filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 44). The Court ordered her to
file an amended motion with more details about the relief she was seeking, (Doc.
45), which she did on August 31, 2023, (Doc. 46).
1 The transcript of the sentencing hearing has not been assigned a docket
number yet.
5
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 6 of 18
In her motion, Hopkins appears to make three claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel by her attorney: (1) her attorney failed to make certain arguments to
mitigate her culpability at sentencing, (Doc. 46 at 4 (“My attorney failed to
represent me. . . He didn’t defend the fact that the loans were forgiven. I did not
complete the application myself. I was manipulated. . . .”); (2) she couldn’t file an
appeal because her “attorney ignored [her] for two weeks after sentencing,” (id.
at 4); and (3) she “was told I had no choice but to plead guilty because they
would add charges concerning false allegations made about me . . . ,” (id. at 5).2
As a remedy, Hopkins requests that the Court amend her sentence to instead be
“probation with an expunged record. I would like to be able to seal my record to
continue my journey to be a federal judge. I cannot fix my wrong in custody.”
(Id. at 11-12).
All of her claims are baseless and should fail.
Argument
1. The Defendant Carries a Heavy Burden on His Ineffectiveness Claims,
With Habeas Relief Available in Only the Rarest of Cases.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
has the burden to prove the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984): “(1). . . counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2). . . there is a reasonable probability that, but
2 The government has made a good faith effort to liberally construe and
address all the claims made in Hopkins’ pro se motion. To the extent the Court
determines there are additional issues presented by the motion that need to be
addressed, the government respectfully requests the opportunity to file a
supplemental response.
6
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 7 of 18
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy the first prong, the defendant must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In
applying this “highly deferential” test, reviewing courts “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Id. at 689; see also Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375
(11th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing “that petitioner was not entitled to error-free
representation”). “‘Counsel’s competence . . . is presumed and the [defendant]
must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney’s representation was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms[.]” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315,
n.15 (alterations and emphasis in original)(noting that the “presumption of
competence must be disproved by a petitioner”). “Never does the government
acquire the burden to show competence, even when some evidence to the
contrary might be offered by the petitioner.” Id. The standard for evaluating
counsel’s performance is “‘reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.’” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313.
To prove ineffectiveness, a defendant must show that his or her attorney’s
representation “fell outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This standard of
effectiveness applies equally to both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the
trial.” Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1020 (11th Cir. 1995); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686-87.
7
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 8 of 18
When evaluating an attorney’s performance, the court must be highly
deferential. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314. The court “must avoid second-guessing
counsel’s performance.” Id. Instead, the court must “indulge [the] strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and that counsel made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted)(alteration in original). Thus, “counsel cannot
be adjudged incompetent for performing in a particular way in a case, as long as
the approach taken ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). “[B]ecause counsel’s conduct is
presumed reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was
unreasonable, a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have
taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315; see White v.
Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The test has nothing to do with
what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good
lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the
trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.”).
Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, the court “must evaluate the
reasonableness of counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time,”
not with the distortion of hindsight. Id. at 1316. “The reasonableness of a
counsel’s performance is an objective inquiry.” Id. at 1315.
This “strong presumption in favor of competence” places a “heavy” burden
on petitioners alleging ineffective counsel, Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1217
(11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), and “cases in which habeas petitioners can
8
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 9 of 18
properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and
far between,” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).
To satisfy the second Strickland prong and show prejudice, a defendant must
show more than simply that counsel’s conduct might have had “some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
“Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every
error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the
reliability of the result of the proceeding.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Instead,
a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694, 2068. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Prejudice is established
only by showing that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable. Lockart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312.
2. Hopkins’ Guilty Plea Was Voluntary, Not A Product of Coercion
For one of her claims, Hopkins attacks the knowing and voluntary nature of
her guilty plea by claiming that her attorney coerced her guilty plea by telling
her that she had to plead guilty or else she would have additional charges
brought against her. Specifically, she claims, “After I had nothing to give [the
government] for their investigation, I was told I had no choice but to plead guilty
because they would add charges concerning false allegations made about me. . .
9
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 10 of 18
.” (Doc. 46 at 5). However, this claim is directly contradicted by the record and
Hopkins’ own sworn statements in Court.
First, at her plea hearing, after being placed under oath, (Doc. 25 at 3),
Hopkins confirmed that she had not been told that she would face additional
charges if she didn’t plead:
Q Other than the plea agreement, has anyone threatened or forced you to
plead guilty or told you that if you do not plead guilty, further charges
will be brought against you or other adverse actions will be taken against
you?
A No.
(Id. at 17). Hopkins further explained under oath that she had discussed the plea
agreement thoroughly with her attorney, was satisfied with his representation of
her, and was entering the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 16-19, 30).
Second, Hopkins confirmed this at the May 25, 2023, status conference, when
she was again placed under oath, (Doc. 31 at 3), and engaged in the following
exchange with the Court:
Q Has anyone told you that if you do not plead guilty, further charges will
be brought against you or other adverse action will be taken against you?
A No.
(Doc. 31 at 9). Hopkins further denied that there had been any promises or unfair
tactics that induced her plea, that there was any coercion or intimidation, or that
she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea. (Id. at 8-9). Instead, Hopkins confirmed
that she had sufficient time to discuss the issues with her attorney, had
voluntarily entered her plea, and was ready to go forward with sentencing. (Id.).
10
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 11 of 18
Third, at sentencing, Hopkins was again given an opportunity to address the
Court and could have alerted the Court if her attorney had told her that she had
no choice but the plead guilty; instead, she declined to say anything. (Sent. Trans.
at 47).
The Eleventh Circuit has “recognized ‘a strong presumption that the
statements made during [a] colloquy are true.’” Martin v. United States, 703 F.
App’x 866, 871 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187
(11th Cir. 1994)). So has the Supreme Court. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74
(1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.
The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics
is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record
are wholly incredible.”). Hopkins’ unsupported claims, which are directly
contradicted by her own multiple sworn statements, should be denied.
3. Hopkins’ Attorney Was Not Ineffective For Refraining From Making
Frivolous Mitigation Arguments At Sentencing
In another claim, Hopkins appears to second-guess the arguments her
attorney made at sentencing to respond to the issues the government raised.
However, the arguments she complains were omitted are either contradicted by
the record or inconsequential to the Court’s sentencing decision.
Hopkins first claims, “My attorney failed to represent me. When the
government mentioned problems at my job.” (Doc. 46 at 4). The government
believes this is a complaint that Hopkins’ attorney did not object to the
government giving the Court information about Hopkins smuggling drugs and
other contraband into the prison that initially triggered the investigation. (See
PSR ¶¶ 9, 47-49). However, Hopkins is wrong; her attorney objected to inclusion
11
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 12 of 18
of that information in the PSR, (see PSR ¶ 49), and argued during the sentencing
hearing that those allegations should be stricken from the PSR, (Sent. Trans. at 5).
The Court ultimately denied that objection, (Sent. Trans. at 5-6).
Hopkins next complains that her attorney “didn’t defend the fact that the
[PPP] loans were forgiven.” (Doc. 46 at 4). However, the fact that the loans were
forgiven by the SBA was inconsequential to her sentencing; loan forgiveness was
not a way of discharging criminal liability for loans that had been obtained
through fraud. Her attorney likely knew that, and knew that discussion of
forgiveness was not helpful to his attempts to minimize Hopkins’ criminal
culpability.3
Hopkins complains that her attorney did not try to deflect her personal
responsibility for her crimes: “I did not complete the application myself. I was
manipulated. I’ve been convicted based on the actions of someone else.” (Doc. 46
at 4). The government believes this is a reference to the initial story she told
agents that “she received assistance from a friend of a friend, named Alicia (Last
Name Unknown - LNU),” who filed the PPP applications for Hopkins, and “her
tax preparer, Janetta,” who filed an IRS Schedule C form in 2019 for Hopkins.
(PSR ¶¶ 25, 27). However, Hopkins’ claims are contradicted by her own
statements — in the written factual basis which was part of the plea agreement
3 Indeed, information about forgiveness of her loans would likely have
increased Hopkins’ relative culpability because to obtain forgiveness Hopkins
had to submit applications in which she falsely certified that the funds were used
for allowable business expenses (for a business she admits did not exist). Those
false certifications – one for each loan – could have been the basis for two
additional counts of wire fraud and would have served as two separate,
additional examples of times that Hopkins committed fraud.
12
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 13 of 18
that Hopkins herself signed, she agreed that “Defendant electronically signed
and submitted” the PPP applications and “submitted a false IRS Schedule C form
to support her application.”4 (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 12(a)-(b)). Her attorney cannot be
faulted for failing to make arguments that were not accurate. Moreover, even if
she did have other people submit the forms on her behalf, her attorney likely
wisely recognized that trying to deflect personal responsibility in that manner at
sentencing could easily backfire, resulting in her losing credit for acceptance of
responsibility or the Court increasing her sentence to reflect her apparent
resistance to rehabilitation and need for specific deterrence.
Hopkins similarly complains that “The government lied or assume I bought
cars and went on vacation with the money, no one (my attorney) didn’t correct
them.” (Doc. 46 at 4). Again, her current attempt to deny how she used the
fraudulent loan proceeds is betrayed by her own signed statements. (Doc. 19-1
¶ 12(d) (“The Defendant spent the PPP money on personal expenses including a
Caribbean cruise and other travel, a down payment and other expenses related to
purchasing a new Chevrolet Blazer, landscaping for her house, restaurant meals,
and retail goods. Defendant also transferred some of the money to relatives.”)).
Her denial is also contradicted by uncontested evidence in the case. (PSR ¶¶ 21 &
23 (summarizing a review of charges in Hopkins’ personal checking account
after the loan proceeds were deposited)). Her current denial is also inconsistent
with what she told agents during an interview. (PSR ¶¶ 26-27 (Hopkins admitted
that she spent the funds on travel expenses for vacations, her vehicle, credit card
4 Additionally, agents confirmed that the Schedule C was never filed with the
IRS – not by a tax preparer nor by anyone else. (PSR ¶ 24).
13
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 14 of 18
debt, and landscaping and projects around her home). Further, Hopkins does not
at any point argue that the loan proceeds were spent properly; after all, her
business was never operational. (PSR ¶¶ 24-25; Doc. 19-1 ¶ 12(c)).
Finally, Hopkins claims that “When I decided to sue the BOP is when I was
indicted. I endured sexual, verbal harassment. Left in a hostile work
environment.” (Doc. 46 at 4). The government believes Hopkins is saying that her
attorney should have argued at sentencing that she endured a hostile work
environment while employed at BOP, and that situation should be considered a
mitigating factor under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis. However, even assuming
arguendo that she did have a hostile work environment at BOP—and there is no
evidence of that in the record—that would not be a proper consideration for her
sentencing because it is unrelated to her repeated commission of loan fraud
outside of work. Her attorney was not ineffective for choosing to not make that
baseless and irrelevant argument.
4. Hopkins Was Not Prejudiced By Not Appealing
Hopkins appears to claim that her attorney prevented her from appealing her
sentence: “My attorney ignored me for two weeks after sentencing where I
couldn’t file an appeal due to personal reasons with the person who hired.” (Doc
46 at 4). First, that claim appears to be inaccurate because later in her motion, in
response to the question, “If you did not raise this issue in your direct appeal,
explain why,” Hopkins states that she did not appeal because “My attorney told
me it was pointless.”5 (Doc. 46 at 6). Based on her own admission, her attorney
5 Hopkins certified and signed the motion under penalty of perjury. (Doc. 46
at 12).
14
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 15 of 18
did not ignore her regarding appellate issues and instead advised her that an
appeal would not be successful.
However, even ignoring her own statement and assuming Hopkins is
accurate that her attorney did not communicate with her for two weeks after
sentencing, that complaint does not satisfy the Strickland test. The Supreme Court
has recognized that it is not necessarily unreasonable for an attorney to not
consult with a defendant about whether he or she wants to appeal, especially
following a guilty plea, and doubly so when the guilty plea includes an appeal
waiver. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000). Instead, counsel has a
constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal
only when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would
want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal),
or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he
or she was interested in appealing. Id. Hopkins has not satisfied either prong of
this test to prove that it was unreasonable for her attorney to fail to consult her
about appealing after she pled guilty, received a low sentence, and waived her
right to appeal, and there aren’t any apparent nonfrivolous ground for appeal
(especially given the appeal waiver). Notably, Hopkins does not at any time
claim that she demonstrated to counsel that she was interested in appealing.
Additionally, Hopkins has failed to allege that she was prejudiced by the
purported failure to appeal. The Supreme Court requires a defendant “to
demonstrate that, but for counsel's deficient conduct, he would have appealed.”
Id. at 486. Hopkins does not at any point state that she wanted to appeal and was
15
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 16 of 18
prevented from doing so or identify any specific issues she would have appealed
despite her appeal waiver. Thus, she has failed to show prejudice.
5. Hopkins Is Not Entitled To A Hearing
“A federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only
where the petitioner alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.”
Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1989). A motion filed under § 2255
may be denied without an evidentiary hearing “when ‘the motion and the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.’” Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2255(b)); see Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1990);
Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, Rule 8(a). The existing record in this case
establishes conclusively that Hopkins is not entitled to the requested relief
because the record and her own sworn statements conclusively show that most
of her claims are factually false, and even if her remaining allegations are
assumed, arguendo, as true, no further factual development is required.
Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is required to dispose of her motion. See
Martin v. United States, 703 F. App’x 866, 873 (11th Cir. 2017) (“because the record
here conclusively establishes that [defendant's] performance was not deficient,
an evidentiary hearing was not necessary.”).
16
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 17 of 18
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Hopkins’ motion under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 should
be denied without an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
R YAN K. B UCHANAN
United States Attorney
/s/G ARRETT L. B RADFORD
Assistant United States Attorney
Georgia Bar No. 074374
Garrett.Bradford@usdoj.gov
600 U.S. Courthouse, 75 Ted Turner Drive S.W., Atlanta, GA 30303
(404) 581-6000 fax (404) 581-6181
17
Case 1:22-cr-00284-SEG-CMS Document 60 Filed 06/06/24 Page 18 of 18
Certificate of Service
The United States Attorney’s Office served this document today by filing it using
the Court’s CM / ECF system, which automatically notifies the parties and counsel
of record, and by mailing a copy with sufficient postage to:
Harrescia Hopkins
1509 Conley Way
Conley, GA 30288
June 6, 2024
/s/ G ARRETT L. B RADFORD
G ARRETT L. B RADFORD
Assistant United States Attorney
File and source
- File
- gov.uscourts.gand.306194.60.0.pdf
- Size
- 150,322 bytes
- SHA-256
- 25307702f3755ce69c81e90fa3473093c655e1ebad3ffa47f0997a0e9baf9c50
- Original
- PACER (login required)