Court filing

Government's Objections to the Presentence Report and Sentencing Memorandum re Carl Bradley Johansson

Summary

The Government's objections to the presentence report and sentencing memorandum regarding defendant Carl Bradley Johansson, filed July 29, 2022 as Document 57 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, ED CR No. 5:21-00170-VAP. The memorandum states the presentence report calculated a total offense level of 24 and a Guidelines range of 57-71 months, with the Probation Office recommending 90 months. The government objects that a nine-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(2) and a four-level aggravating role enhancement should apply, and argues the range should be 87-108 months. It recommends a sentence of 120 months, five years of supervised release, a special assessment of $500, and restitution in the listed amounts of $298,562, $667,917 and $286,500. The filing runs 30 pages.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

No. 5:21-cr-00170-JGB · Doc. 57 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 1 of 30 Page ID #:308

1 STEPHANIE S. CHRISTENSEN
Acting United States Attorney
2 SCOTT M. GARRINGER
Assistant United States Attorney
3 Chief, Criminal Division
JOSEPH O. JOHNS (Cal. Bar. No. 144524)
4 MATTHEW W. O’BRIEN (Cal. Bar No. 261568)
Assistant United States Attorneys
5 Environmental and Community Safety Crimes Section
1300 United States Courthouse
6 312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
7 Telephone: (213) 894-4536/8644
Facsimile: (213) 894-0141
8 E-mail: joseph.johns@usdoj.gov
Matthew.O’Brien@usdoj.gov
9
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ED CR No. 5:18-00114(B)-VAP
ED CR No. 5:21-00170-VAP
14 Plaintiff,
GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE
15 v. PRESENTENCE REPORT AND SENTENCING
MEMORANDUM RE DEFENDANT CARL
16 NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES, BRADLEY JOHANSSON
INC.,
17 aka “NDSI,” Hearing Date: August 22, 2022
WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION, INC., Trial Time: 9:00 a.m.
18 dba “Quality Services,” Location: Courtroom of the
CARL BRADLEY JOHANSSON, Hon. Virginia A.
19 aka “Brad Johnson,” Phillips
aka “Carl Johnson,”
20 aka “C. Brad Johanson,”
aka “Keith Golatta,”
21 ENRIQUE GARCIA,
aka “Henry Garcia,” and
22 DONALD CAMERON SPICER,

23 Defendants.

24 And the additional following
case
25

28
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 2 of 30 Page ID #:309

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

2 Plaintiff,

3 v.

4 WESTERN DISTRIBUTION, LLC,
aka “Advanced Distribution
5 Inc.,” and
CARL BRADLEY JOHANSSON,
6 aka “Brad Johnson,”
aka “Carl Johnson,”
7 aka “C. Brad Johanson,”
aka “Jay Johnson,”
8 aka “Keith Golatta,”

9 Defendants.
10

11 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
12 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
13 California, and Assistant United States Attorneys Matthew O’Brien and
14 Joseph Johns, hereby submits its Objections to the Presentence Report
15 and Sentencing Memorandum regarding defendant CARL BRADLEY JOHANSSON
16 in the above-captioned cases.
17 This submission is based upon the attached memorandum of points
18 and authorities, the Declaration of Matthew O’Brien and exhibits
19 thereto (filed under seal concurrently herewith), the Presentence
20 //
21 //
22 //
23

2
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 3 of 30 Page ID #:310

1 Investigation Report disclosed on April 4, 2022, the files and

2 records in these cases, and such further evidence and argument as the

3 Court may permit.

4 Dated: July 29, 2022 Respectfully submitted,

5 STEPHANIE S. CHRISTENSEN
Acting United States Attorney
6
SCOTT M. GARRINGER
7 Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
8

9 /s/
MATTHEW W. O’BRIEN
10 JOSEPH O. JOHNS
Assistant United States Attorneys
11
Attorneys for Plaintiff
12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 4 of 30 Page ID #:311

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 PAGE

3 Contents

4 I. INTRODUCTION...................................................1

5 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.............................................4

6 III. THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIONS.........5

7 A. A Nine-Level Enhancement Should Apply Because the
Offense Resulted in the Substantial Likelihood of
8 Death or Serious Bodily Injury............................5

9 1. The “Offense” Includes JOHANSSON’s Highly
Dangerous Failure to Clean and Purge the Cargo
10 Tanks of Their Hazardous Lading and Fumes............6
11 2. Even if the “Offense” Were Somehow Limited to
Welding Without an “R” Stamp, That Conduct Also
12 Was Highly Dangerous.................................9

13 B. A Four-Level Enhancement Should Apply Because of
JOHANSSON’s Aggravating Role in the PPP Fraud............10
14
C. Additional Objections....................................13
15
1. JOHANSSON’s Purported Jobs and Salaries.............13
16
1. JOHANSSON’s Purported Faith-Based Lack of Assets....14
17
2. The Purported Three Months in Solitary
18 Confinement.........................................15

19 3. The Purported Claustrophobia........................16

20 4. The Purported Master’s Degree in Risk Management....16

21 D. The Government’s Guidelines Calculation..................16

22 IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION....................17

23 A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses.............17

24 B. JOHANSSON’s History and Characteristics..................20

25 1. Additional Victims of JOHANSSON’s Schemes...........21

26 2. Mitigating Factors..................................23

27 C. The Section 3553(a)(2) Factors...........................24

28 D. The Need to Minimize Sentencing Disparities..............25
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 5 of 30 Page ID #:312

1 E. Restitution..............................................25

2 V. CONCLUSION....................................................25

9
10

2
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 6 of 30 Page ID #:313

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I. INTRODUCTION

3 Defendant CARL BRADLEY JOHANSSON (“JOHANSSON”) is a confessed

4 recidivist and fraudster whose welding crimes in this District over

5 the past three decades have killed two of his workers and seriously

6 injured another. (Several other people have been killed and

7 seriously injured as a result of JOHANSSON’s unsafe practices, as

8 discussed below.) In 2000, then-District Court Judge Richard A. Paez

9 imposed a low-end sentence of 16 months on JOHANSSON for, inter alia,
10 ordering a welder to conduct a repair on one of JOHANSSON’s cargo

11 tanks when JOHANSSON’s company lacked the federally required “R”

12 Stamp to conduct such repairs safely. The welder, L.Q., was killed

13 by the explosion caused by the welding because JOHANSSON’s company

14 had failed to purge the cargo tank of its hazardous fumes.

15 Upon his release from prison, JOHANSSON got right back in the

16 game. Having learned nothing from Judge Paez’s sentence (except that

17 he should more carefully conceal his crimes), JOHANSSON went back to

18 running corrupt and unsafe trucking companies, but covered up his

19 ownership of those companies. JOHANSSON continued to order his

20 welders to conduct dangerous repairs on cargo tanks that had not been

21 purged of their hazardous fumes. And JOHANSSON continued to refuse

22 to spend the money necessary to obtain the “R” Stamp required for

23 such welding, despite living a lavish lifestyle that was (1) built on

24 the backs of his workers’ life-threatening labor, and (2) enabled by

25 his willful failure to pay any federal income taxes.

26 When another explosion occurred in JOHANSSON’s shop in September

27 2012 as a result of welding on an unpurged tanker, JOHANSSON kept at

28 it. He continued to order his welders to conduct illegal repairs,
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 7 of 30 Page ID #:314

1 continued to ignore their complaints about the dangers, and continued

2 to refuse to buy basic safety equipment.

3 Another explosion inevitably followed, this time with tragic

4 consequences. On May 6, 2014, JOHANSSON ordered his two welders,

5 D.L.V. and S.E., to conduct yet another welding repair without the

6 requisite “R” Stamp and without having purged the tank of the crude

7 oil and fumes inside the tank. The welding caused another violent

8 explosion that killed S.E. and permanently injured D.L.V.

9 Rather than fess up, JOHANSSON covered up his crime by
10 repeatedly lying to investigators about his control of his company,
11 his employment of S.E. and D.L.V., and his role in ordering the fatal
12 repair. When the government ordered JOHANSSON to stop using 37 of
13 his tankers later in 2014 because of safety concerns, JOHANSSON
14 formed a new company to operate the prohibited tankers.
15 The government indicted JOHANSSON for a second time in April
16 2018. Over the government’s objection, JOHANSSON was released on
17 bond and allowed to continue operating his companies. As he prepared
18 for trial in 2019, JOHANSSON started another trucking company as yet

19 another “reincarnated” or “chameleon” carrier, established to trick

20 regulators and insurance companies into thinking he had a clean

21 safety record.

22 When COVID-19 hit Southern California in early 2020, JOHANSSON

23 laid off most of his employees. Then a lifeline emerged: the federal

24 Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), enacted to help businesses keep

25 their employees on payroll during the depths of the public-health

26 crisis. JOHANSSON, now living on a golf course in a gated Newport

27 Beach community, leapt at the opportunity to use taxpayers’ dollars

28 to pay his bills (despite not having paid a penny in federal income

2
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 8 of 30 Page ID #:315

1 taxes for a decade). Using his mother and son as strawmen, JOHANSSON

2 obtained $722,890 in PPP loans for two of his trucking companies in

3 April 2020 by means of fraudulent loan applications. Rather than use

4 the PPP funds to pay his employees as required by law, JOHANSSON

5 spent much of the funds on other debts he had piled up. When the

6 time came to account for the expenditure of the PPP funds in late

7 2020, JOHANSSON – awaiting trial for fraud – cooked up yet another

8 scheme. He transferred 21 employees from the payroll of one of his

9 companies to the payroll of another of his companies, to make it look
10 like he had used PPP funds to pay his laid-off employees, when he had
11 not.
12 When the government informed JOHANSSON’s counsel in late 2020
13 that JOHANSSON was under investigation for committing PPP fraud while
14 on pretrial release, JOHANSSON doubled down. JOHANSSON continued to
15 submit fraudulent PPP documents to his banks in early 2021 and even
16 got a third PPP loan, for $231,527. JOHANSSON’s schemes came to an
17 end (one hopes) when he was indicted in a third federal criminal case
18 in mid-2021 and detained.

19 This Court now has the opportunity to sentence JOHANSSON for his

20 criminal conduct spanning from 2012 to 2021. The Presentence Report

21 (“PSR”) found that JOHANSSON’s Guidelines range is 57-71 months, but

22 the Probation Office recommended an above-Guidelines sentence of 90

23 months due to JOHANSSON’s egregious conduct. As detailed below, the

24 government respectfully disagrees with the PSR’s calculations;

25 JOHANSSON’s Guidelines range should be 87-108 months.

26 The government respectfully recommends a sentence of 120 months.

27 The Guidelines simply do not account for a criminal like JOHANSSON,

28 or the decade-long trail of fraud confronting the Court here. Rarely

3
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 9 of 30 Page ID #:316

1 has the government encountered a criminal with such an unyielding

2 desire to commit fraud at the expense of his employees and taxpayers.

3 A ten-year sentence is necessary to show JOHANSSON and the public

4 that committing fraud, over and over again, and particularly while on

5 pretrial release, will result in a severe punishment.

6 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7 In the interest of brevity, the government respectfully refers

8 the Court to the following summaries of JOHANSSON’s criminal conduct

9 over the past three decades:
10 • The Factual Basis from JOHANSSON’s guilty plea in March 1999 in
11 his first federal criminal case (Dkt. No. 264 at 42-44); 1
12 • The 36-page PSR from JOHANSSON’s first criminal case, dated
13 September 20, 1999 (Exh. C);

14 • The 72-page complaint filed against JOHANSSON in his second
15 federal criminal case on April 5, 2018 (Dkt. No. 1);

16 • The nine-count second superseding indictment filed in JOHANSSON’s
17 second federal case on November 20, 2019 (Dkt. No. 149);

18 • The 48-page complaint filed against JOHANSSON in his third federal
19 criminal case on July 2, 2021 (PPP Dkt. No. 1);

20 • The four-count indictment filed in JOHANSSON’s third federal
21 criminal case on July 21, 2021 (PPP Dkt. No. 14);

22 • The 17-page Factual Basis from JOHANSSON’s consolidated plea
23 agreement, filed on August 12, 2021 (Dkt. No. 264); and

24 • JOHANSSON’s most recent PSR, filed on April 4, 2022 (Dkt. No.
25 306).

27
All references to the docket herein refer to the docket in
1
28 5:18-CR-114(B)-VAP; references to the “PPP Dkt.” refer to the docket
in 5:21-00170-VAP.
4
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 10 of 30 Page ID
#:317

1 III. THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIONS

2 The PSR calculated JOHANSSON’s offense level of 24 as follows:

3 Group 1 (Conspiracy/Welding)
Base Offense Level 8 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2
4 Defendant was convicted under 49 +2 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(7)
5 U.S.C. § 5124
Aggravating Role +4 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)
6 Obstruction of Justice +2 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
Subtotal 16
7 Count Four (Tax Evasion)
Base Offense Level 18 U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.1(a)(1),
8
2T4.1(G)
9 Sophisticated Means +2 U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2)
Subtotal 20
10 Group 2 (PPP Fraud)
Base Offense Level 7 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1)
11 Loss +14 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (H)
12 Sophisticated Means +2 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)
Offense Committed on Pretrial +3 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3
13 Release
Subtotal 26
14
Multiple Count Adjustment +1 U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4
15
Acceptance of Responsibility -3 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
16 TOTAL 24

17
(PSR ¶¶ 90-123.) The government concurs with the PSR’s findings
18
except for the following objections.
19
A. A Nine-Level Enhancement Should Apply Because the Offense
20 Resulted in the Substantial Likelihood of Death or Serious
Bodily Injury
21
The government objects to Paragraph 95(b) of the PSR, in which
22
the Probation Office declined to apply Section 2Q1.2(b)(2)’s nine-
23
level enhancement for an offense resulting in the substantial
24
likelihood of death or serious bodily injury “[a]t this juncture
25
based on available information.” (PSR ¶ 95(b).) The nine-level
26
enhancement applies for two independent reasons. First, the PSR
27
incorrectly framed the offense (for purposes of “Count Group 1:
28

5
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 11 of 30 Page ID
#:318

1 Conspiracy”) as making welding repairs without an “R” Stamp, whereas

2 Count One also expressly charged JOHANNSON with making welding

3 repairs without purging the tankers of their hazardous fumes and

4 lading, an even more dangerous activity. Second, even if the PSR’s

5 narrow construction of the offense as being limited to the welding

6 without an “R” Stamp were correct, that conduct by itself was

7 substantially likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury (as

8 the Honorable André Birotte Jr. found when sentencing JOHANSSON’s

9 long-time Shop Manager, co-defendant Enrique “Henry” Garcia, on April
10 25, 2022).
11 1. The “Offense” Includes JOHANSSON’s Highly Dangerous
Failure to Clean and Purge the Cargo Tanks of Their
12 Hazardous Lading and Fumes

13 a. The Offense of Conviction Expressly Includes
JOHANSSON’s Failure to Clean and Purge the Tanks
14
The “offense of conviction” charged in Count One – to which
15
JOHANSSON pled guilty - includes the failure to purge the cargo tanks
16
of their hazardous lading. The first object of the conspiracy
17
charged in Count One expressly alleges an agreement to violate 49
18
C.F.R. 180.413(a)(2), which requires the purging of hazardous fumes
19
from cargo tanks prior to welding. (See Dkt. No. 149 at 7:10-14.)
20
Likewise, the second object of the conspiracy is to defraud the
21
United States by defeating “the lawful and legitimate functions of
22
the USDOT in investigating and enforcing federal laws and regulations
23
related to ... purging requirements for cargo-tank repair work.”
24
(Dkt. No. 149 at 7:15-20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 8:6-13
25
(alleging JOHANSSON’s failure to purge his cargo tanks); id. at
26
10:16-20 (same); id. at 12:4-8 (same).)
27

6
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 12 of 30 Page ID
#:319

1 Accordingly, contrary to the PSR’s finding, the “offense of

2 conviction” expressly includes JOHANSSON’s practice of ordering

3 welders to weld on tanks that still contained crude oil and vapors.

4 b. The Failure to Purge the Tanks Was Extremely
Dangerous
5
It is extraordinarily dangerous to conduct welding on cargo
6
tanks that have not been cleaned and purged of their crude oil and
7
hazardous fumes. If there were any doubt, one need only look at the
8
trail of explosions at JOHANSSON’s companies:
9
• In 1993, L.Q. was killed in an explosion caused by his welding
10
inside a cargo tank that had not been purged of its fumes (Dkt.
11
No. 294 at 7:17-22; PSR ¶ 22);
12
• A similar explosion occurred in September 2012 when D.L.V. was
13
conducting a welding repair on an MC-306 cargo tank (Dkt. No.
14
294 at 7:23-27; PSR ¶ 23); and
15
• The explosion that killed S.E. and crippled D.L.V. also was
16
caused by a welding repair igniting unpurged fumes emanating
17
from crude-oil residue remaining inside an MC-306 cargo tank
18
(Dkt. No. 294 at 8:8-12; PSR ¶ 24).
19
JOHANSSON admits that he “knew that welding on the shells or
20
components of specification MC 306 cargo tanks was dangerous because
21
the MC 306 cargo tanks were used to haul hazardous materials that
22
could explode if not properly purged prior to conducting welding
23
repairs or modifications.” (Dkt. No. 264 at 26:21-27:2) (emphasis
24
added.) He further admits that he nevertheless directed such welding
25
“even if the cargo tanks had not been emptied of hazardous materials
26
or sufficiently cleaned of residue and purged of vapors, as required
27
by the HMTS and the HMTS regulations.” (Id. at 27:27-28:2.)
28

7
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 13 of 30 Page ID
#:320

1 Even putting aside the highly relevant explosions from 1993 and

2 2012, the welding repair on May 6, 2014 was substantially likely to

3 result in a deadly explosion. Co-defendant Henry Garcia admits that

4 he “directed S.E. and D.L.V. to conduct welding on cargo tanker

5 #678238 even after D.L.V. told defendant [i.e., Garcia] it was not

6 safe to conduct the welding,” because D.L.V. could smell the crude

7 oil that remained inside the tank. (Dkt. No. 294 at 8:4-6 (emphasis

8 added); PSR ¶¶ 40, 41.) As D.L.V. told an investigator in 2014, “I

9 told Henry. Henry Garcia and [J.S., JOHANSSON’s Assistant Shop
10 Manager]. I told them. I remember I told them you cannot do the
11 welding in this tank and they asked me why. This smell is very
12 strong. It’s very strong. The odor is very strong. Well, the boss
13 wants it right away so they ordered the parts and we start cutting.”
14 (Exh. D at 49 [USAO_00027638].) The “boss” was JOHANSSON. (PSR ¶
15 41.) D.L.V. went on to recount how, on previous occasions, Garcia
16 threatened to send D.L.V. home without pay if D.L.V. refused to
17 perform the dangerous welds. (PSR ¶ 40; Exh. D at 52
18 [USAO_00027641].)

19 On May 6, 2014, JOHANSSON and Garcia had not even taken the

20 simple step of draining the liquid crude oil from the tank prior to

21 the repair. When investigators opened the cargo tank’s drainage pipe

22 valve underneath the tanker hours after the explosion, crude oil

23 poured out of the pipe. (See Exh. E at USAO_00327246.) The

24 investigators had to shut the valve to keep the remaining crude oil

25 from draining out of the tank and its piping. (See id.) Not only

26 had the tanker not been cleaned and purged of crude-oil residue and

27 fumes before the repair, but JOHANSSON had not even bothered to have

28 the liquid crude oil emptied from the tanker by opening the drainage

8
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 14 of 30 Page ID
#:321

1 pipe valve beforehand. As a result, the explosion was nearly

2 inevitable.

3 JOHANSSON’s failure to have the tanker properly purged on May 6,

4 2014 was not an aberration. The same thing had happened on September

5 25, 2012, in the same location, under nearly identical circumstances.

6 In an interview in February 2019, D.L.V. said the following about the

7 explosion on September 25, 2012:

8 [D.L.V.] said the tank not being purged was the reason for
the explosion. He told “them” a lot of times about the
9 danger. He said it stank of oil and vapors. He said
Enrique Garcia did not want to hear about that. Garcia
10 told him to solder that day even though he told Garcia he
could smell fumes. However, Garcia said they needed the
11 tank and to fix it…
12 [D.L.V.] always told Garcia there was a lot of danger, but
Garcia didn’t want to purge or clean the tanks.
13
(Exh. F at 2 [USAO_00285807].)
14
In sum, the welding repair that JOHANSSON ordered on May 6, 2014
15
was substantially likely to result in the welders’ deaths or serious
16
bodily injuries because (1) JOHANSSON and his co-defendants had
17
failed to clean and purge the tank of its crude oil and flammable
18
fumes; (2) when D.L.V. and others complained about unpurged fumes in
19
the tankers, defendants ordered them to carry out the welding anyway;
20
and (3) as everyone knew, welding on unpurged tankers could result in
21
a deadly explosion.
22
2. Even if the “Offense” Were Somehow Limited to Welding
23 Without an “R” Stamp, That Conduct Also Was Highly
Dangerous
24
In the alternative, even if the Court does not agree that
25
JOHANSSON’s failure to clean and purge tanker #678238 is expressly
26
part of the “offense of conviction” (or relevant conduct under
27
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)), the offense of conviction set forth in Count
28

9
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 15 of 30 Page ID
#:322

1 Two, by itself, was substantially likely to result in death or

2 serious bodily injury. As the Court ruled in February 2020, “welding

3 without an ‘R’ Stamp could cause fatalities,” as JOHANSSON knew

4 because of L.Q.’s death in 1993. (Dkt. No. 222 at 2.) The PSR

5 itself acknowledges that “[w]elding on cargo tanks that haul crude

6 oil and other hazardous materials can be extremely dangerous due to

7 the risk of explosions.” (PSR ¶ 28) (emphasis added.)

8 The government briefed this same argument in its sentencing

9 memorandum for Garcia, which it incorporates by reference herein.
10 (Dkt. No. 304 at 13:17-16:17.) In response, the Probation Office
11 changed its position and agreed that the nine-level enhancement
12 should apply. (See Dkt. No. 319, ¶¶ 39-40; Dkt. No. 320 at 1-2.) At
13 Garcia’s sentencing on April 25, 2022, Judge Birotte agreed with the

14 Probation Office, the government, and Garcia (see Dkt. No. 294 at 9)

15 that the nine-level enhancement applied for Garcia.

16 The argument applies with even more force to JOHANSSON, who had

17 firsthand knowledge of L.Q.’s grisly death. Accordingly, even if the

18 Court were to ignore the failure-to-purge allegations in Count One,

19 the welding without an “R” Stamp was substantially likely to result

20 in death or serious bodily injury. Thus the nine-level enhancement

21 should apply.

22 B. A Four-Level Enhancement Should Apply Because of
JOHANSSON’s Aggravating Role in the PPP Fraud
23
The government objects to Paragraph 113 of the PSR because it
24
states that JOHANSSON had no aggravating role in the PPP fraud.
25
Pursuant to Section 3B1.1(a), a four-level enhancement should apply
26
because JOHANSSON was the organizer and leader of the PPP scheme,
27
which involved at least the following seven participants:
28

10
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 16 of 30 Page ID
#:323

1 1. JOHANSSON counts as one participant. See United States v.

2 Walter-Eze, 869 F.3d 891, 914 (9th Cir. 2017) (the defendant

3 “may be included among the participants in the criminal activity

4 for purposes of section 3B1.1(a)”) (citations omitted).

5 2. Co-defendant Western Distribution (“Western”) counts as well, as

6 the company was indicted and pled guilty for conduct directed by

7 JOHANSSON. (See PPP Dkt. No. 30 at 17-21.) Although corporate

8 entities are not always considered criminal “participants” under

9 Section 3B1.1, here Western was charged and convicted of the
10 same crimes. 2 (Western is not alleged to be JOHANSSON’s alter

11 ego, so there is no concern of “double counting.”)

12 3. For the same reason, Agri-Comm counts as a participant.

13 Although Agri-Comm was not indicted, it was named in the PPP

14 indictment as “Co-conspirator #1” for the criminal acts it

15 carried out at JOHANSSON’s direction. (PSR ¶¶ 69, 73, 75; PPP

16 Dkt. No. 14 at 7:4-19, Overt Acts 1-3, 11, 14, 16-18.)

17 4. C.S.J. (JOHANSSON’s son and Co-conspirator #2 in the PPP

18 indictment) has claimed to the Court under oath that he has been

19 the “sole owner” of Western “since March of 2019.” (Dkt. No.

20 251, ¶ 3.) C.S.J. signed Western’s fraudulent loan forgiveness

21 application as well as Western’s second fraudulent PPP

22 application in his capacity as Western’s owner and expressly

23 vouched for the truth of the statements therein. (See PPP Dkt.

24 No. 1, ¶¶ 70-74, 77.) 3 Both documents were replete with false

25
2 The Guidelines define a “participant” as “a person,” not an
26 “individual.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 n.1. A corporate entity can be a
“person.” See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 18 (“As used in this title, the
27 term ‘organization’ means a person other than an individual.”).
28 3 The PPP complaint refers to C.S.J. as “Co-conspirator #1”; he
is Co-conspirator #2 in the PPP indictment.
11
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 17 of 30 Page ID
#:324

1 statements. (PSR ¶ 77; PPP Dkt. No. 14 at 7:20-8:9, Overt Acts

2 20-22, 25-27; Dkt. No. 264 at 39:15-40:22.) When C.S.J. made

3 these statements, he was aware of the federal investigation and

4 even had retained his own lawyer because of it.

5 5. L.S. (Co-conspirator #3 in the PPP indictment) had been

6 JOHANSSON’s office manager and “lieutenant” since 1986. 4 On

7 February 22, 2021, as part of JOHANSSON’s criminal effort to

8 have BAC Bank forgive Western’s first PPP loan, she wrote to the

9 bank that Agri-Comm’s 21 employees actually worked for Western,
10 even though she knew that they did not. (PSR ¶ 76; PPP Dkt. No.
11 14, Overt Act 23; PPP Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 75.)
12 6. J.M. had worked at Agri-Comm for 36 years, most recently as

13 “General Manager/President”; in 2021 he said he “report[ed] to

14 Johansson” and nobody else. (Exh. G at 1.) At JOHANSSON’s

15 direction, J.M. filled out Agri-Comm’s PPP application, which

16 fraudulently concealed JOHANSSON’s role at Agri-Comm and

17 concealed that JOHANSSON also managed Western, as J.M. knew.

18 (PSR ¶ 69; Exh. G at 3.) J.M. then followed JOHANSSON’s orders

19 to have Agri-Comm’s 21 drivers switched to Western’s payroll

20 even though J.M. knew they did not work for Western and even

21 though Agri-Comm continued to fund the drivers’ payroll. (Exh.

22 G at 3-4.) J.M. knew this was improper – he and his wife

23 “fought Johansson about doing it,” but ultimately gave in. (Id.

24 at 3.)

27 4L.S. is Co-conspirator #2 in the second superseding indictment
in the second federal criminal case. (See Dkt. No. 149, Overt Act
28 31.) The PPP complaint refers to L.S. as “Co-conspirator #2”; she is
Co-conspirator #3 in the PPP indictment.
12
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 18 of 30 Page ID
#:325

1 7. K.O. (JOHANSSON’s wife) has been abetting JOHANSSON’s schemes

2 for at least a decade. (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 58 & n.2 & n.4; Dkt.

3 No. 1, ¶¶ 51-55 (explaining how K.O. was the sole officer of

4 Trucking Equipment Co., Inc., the phony entity that “owned” the

5 tanker that exploded on May 6, 2014).) As is relevant here, in

6 the fall of 2020 K.O. “set up a separate account with Paychex

7 for them to move the [21 Agri-Comm] drivers to.” (Exh. G at 3.)

8 The sole purpose of the new Paychex subaccount was to facilitate

9 the fraudulent transfer of the 21 employees.
10 Because JOHANSSON organized a PPP scheme involving at least

11 seven criminal participants, the four-level enhancement should apply

12 pursuant to Section 3B1.1(a).

13 C. Additional Objections

14 The government objects to several statements in the PSR that

15 relay what JOHANSSON told the Probation Office. JOHANSSON’s

16 misrepresentations to the Court exemplify his disregard for the

17 truth.

18 1. JOHANSSON’s Purported Jobs and Salaries

19 The PSR relays JOHANSSON’s claims that (1) he worked for W.S. at

20 co-defendant National from 2008 until JOHANSSON “left in 2014,” and

21 (2) JOHANSSON “was employed as general manager at Wholesale” by the

22 “President and owner of the company,” J.C. (PSR ¶¶ 162-163.) The

23 government has repeatedly debunked these claims; dozens of witness

24 statements and hundreds of documents prove that W.S. (JOHANSSON’s old

25 prison cellmate) and J.C. (his tire salesman) were strawmen at

26 National and Wholesale, respectively, whom JOHANSSON used to try to

27 conceal his own control over both companies. (See, e.g., PSR ¶¶ 23,

28 35, 43, 49, 51, 53, 56, 57; Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 73-101, 110-124.)

13
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 19 of 30 Page ID
#:326

1 JOHANSSON seems to have forgotten that in his own plea agreement he

2 admitted that he “controlled and operated” both companies and that

3 J.C. was a “nominee owner.” (Dkt. No. 264 at 24:6-12, 34:13-14.)

4 Likewise, JOHANSSON’s claims about his salaries at both companies are

5 refuted by his admissions in the plea agreement. (Compare PSR ¶¶

6 162, 163, with Dkt. No. 264 at 33:16-34:9; see also PSR ¶ 61 n.5

7 (noting that the IRS’s estimates of JOHANSSON’s income were

8 conservative).) 5

9 1. JOHANSSON’s Purported Faith-Based Lack of Assets
10 The PSR relays JOHANSSON’s claim that – as he has previously

11 represented to the Court - he has no assets (other than a 12-year-old

12 minivan). (PSR ¶¶ 166-170.) JOHANSSON attributes his lack of

13 “material possessions” to his deep religious faith, claiming it would

14 be “immoral” to possess assets. (PSR ¶ 170.) As the Factual Basis

15 to JOHANSSON’s own plea agreement confirms, this is utter nonsense.

16 JOHANSSON has spent at least the past fifteen years hiding his

17 considerable assets from government scrutiny. (See Dkt. No. 264 at

18 32:17-33:10, 34:10-35:22; see also PSR ¶ 58 & n.2.) If JOHANSSON is

19 telling the truth when he says he has no assets in his own name, it

20 is because he has concealed his assets in corporate shells under the

21 purported control of strawmen including his mother, son, wife, tire

22 salesman, and former cellmate. (See, e.g., PSR ¶¶ 58 & n.4, 66, 69.)

23 JOHANNSSON’s professed faith-based parsimoniousness also is

24 difficult to reconcile with (1) the three teams of skilled lawyers

25 that JOHANSSON retained to aggressively defend JOHANSSON and his

27 5 JOHANSSON’s disregard for the Factual Basis in his plea
agreement is nothing new; in January 2015 he told federal
28 investigators that the Factual Basis to his 1999 plea agreement was
“completely false.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 32(d).)
14
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 20 of 30 Page ID
#:327

1 companies prior to the PPP indictment; and (2) the fact that from

2 2012 to 2018 JOHANSSON paid at least $882,697 in rent (often in cash)

3 to live in the mansion pictured below, thanks to income he concealed

4 from the government. (See Dkt. No. 264 at 33:19-20, 34:22-35:4l; see

5 also PSR at 12 n.3 (noting that JOHANSSON used countersurveillance

6 techniques to prevent federal agents from locating his mansion).)

9
10

14 Likewise, between his arrest in the second federal criminal case in

15 2018 and his arrest in the PPP case in 2021, JOHANSSON lived in a

16 2,800-square-foot condominium, valued at more than $2.1 million, on a

17 golf course in a gated Newport Beach community.

18 2. The Purported Three Months in Solitary Confinement

19 The PSR relays JOHANSSON’s claim that “he was in solitary

20 confinement for three months for COVID-19 quarantine.” (PSR ¶ 139;

21 see also id. ¶ 156 (discussing the mental-health toll of “all the

22 solitary confinement”); id. ¶ 154 (“[d]uring solitary confinement,

23 Johansson lost 75 pounds”). This is nonsense. In reality, JOHANSSON

24 was never put in solitary confinement and was subject to the same

25 quarantine rules that many other federal prisoners faced last summer.

26 According to prison officials, JOHANSSON was in three COVID-related

27 quarantines last summer, for a total of approximately 44 days: July

15
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 21 of 30 Page ID
#:328

1 8-25 at the Santa Ana Jail; August 14-20 at the San Bernardino County

2 Jail; and September 2-22 at MDC-LA.

3 3. The Purported Claustrophobia

4 The PSR relays JOHANSSON’s claim that he has suffered from

5 claustrophobia since he was seven years old. (PSR ¶¶ 139, 155.) The

6 government is not aware of any evidence supporting this claim.

7 JOHANSSON’s sister said she “was not aware that Johansson had any

8 traumas or phobias.” (PSR ¶ 155.) Likewise, JOHANSSON’s PSR from

9 1999 does not mention claustrophobia. (See Exh. C, ¶¶ 156-158.)
10 4. The Purported Master’s Degree in Risk Management

11 The PSR relays JOHANSSON’s claim that he “obtained his master’s

12 degree in Risk Management from St. John’s University in Los Angeles”

13 in 1981. (PSR ¶ 159.) While such a degree would be ironic given

14 JOHANSSON’s trail of dead employees (see also Part IV.B.1, infra),

15 the government is not aware of any evidence supporting his claim.

16 The 1999 PSR’s discussion of JOHANSSON’s education mentions no such

17 degree. (See Exh. C, ¶¶ 160-161; see also id. at USAO_00329612

18 (noting that JOHANSSON had 16 years of education).)

19 D. The Government’s Guidelines Calculation

20 Given the objections set forth above, in the government’s view

21 the following Guidelines apply to JOHANSSON.

22 Group 1 (Conspiracy/Welding)
Base Offense Level 8 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2
23 Substantial Likelihood of Death +9 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(2)
24 or Serious Bodily Injury
Defendant was convicted under 49 +2 U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(7)
25 U.S.C. § 5124
Aggravating Role +4 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)
26 Obstruction of Justice +2 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
Subtotal 25
27
(continued)
28

16
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 22 of 30 Page ID
#:329

1 Count Four (Tax Evasion)
Base Offense Level 18 U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.1(a)(1),
2 2T4.1(G)
3 Sophisticated Means +2 U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(b)(2)
Subtotal 20
4 Group 2 (PPP Fraud)
Base Offense Level 7 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1)
5 Loss +14 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)
Sophisticated Means +2 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)
6
Aggravating Role +4 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)
7 Offense Committed on Pretrial +3 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3
Release
8 Subtotal 30
9 Multiple Count Adjustment +1 U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4
10 Acceptance of Responsibility -3 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)
TOTAL 28
11

12 With a criminal history category II and a total offense level of

13 28, JOHANSSON’s Guidelines range is 87-108 months.

14 IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION

15 The government respectfully recommends a sentence of 120 months’

16 imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, a special

17 assessment of $500, and restitution in an amount to be determined.

18 The recommended sentence is reasonable and necessary to

19 accomplish the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United

20 States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), requires the Court to consider

21 the factors identified in Section 3553(a) when imposing a sentence.

22 Among the factors to be considered are the nature and circumstances

23 of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and

24 the need to deter future criminal conduct, promote respect for the

25 law, and provide just punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

26 A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offenses

27 The offenses here span almost a decade and encompass ordering

28 deadly welding, defrauding DOT regulators, evading income taxes,

17
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 23 of 30 Page ID
#:330

1 defrauding banks of relief funds during a pandemic, and multiple

2 cover-ups. The breadth of the offenses is matched by their duration.

3 Putting aside the technical application of the Guidelines and

4 grouping, the most serious crime here is what JOHANSSON did to S.E.

5 and D.L.V. But for JOHANSSON, S.E. would be alive today, his wife

6 would have a husband, his children a father, and his grandchildren a

7 grandfather. (PSR ¶¶ 81, 82; Exhs. A, B.) But for JOHANSSON, D.L.V.

8 would have lived for the past eight years without crippling back pain

9 and other chronic maladies. (PSR ¶¶ 42, 79, 80.) No punishment will
10 undo the human consequences of JOHANSSON’s welding crimes.
11 As discussed above, the May 2014 explosion was not an “accident”

12 in the sense of other workplace tragedies where something terrible

13 happens as a result of a series of different people’s poor decisions

14 and some bad luck. D.L.V. had predicted another explosion, and had

15 complained about the smell of crude oil emanating from tanker #678238

16 on the morning of May 6, 2014. The same thing had happened on

17 September 25, 2012 (JOHANSSON responded to that explosion by

18 concealing it from law enforcement). (See PSR ¶ 38 (noting how

19 JOHANSSON hid the tanker from fire investigators); Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 33-

20 34.) And the same thing happened on September 27, 1993, after (1) a

21 DOT inspector specifically warned JOHANSSON that L.Q. should not be

22 welding on his tankers in December 1992; (2) JOHANSSON lied to the

23 inspector and said he would no longer have L.Q. conduct the welding

24 repairs; and (3) JOHANSSON continued using L.Q. to do the repairs

25 anyway. (See Exh. C ¶¶ 33-36; Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 31; see also Exh. C, ¶¶

26 79-80 (discussing additional warnings that welding companies gave to

27 JOHANSSON about L.Q.’s illegal welding prior to the explosion).)

18
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 24 of 30 Page ID
#:331

1 If the 1993 and 2012 explosions had not happened, JOHANSSON

2 might credibly disclaim knowledge of the dangers associated with what

3 he was ordering his welders to do on a routine basis. The death of

4 L.Q. and JOHANSSON’s subsequent prison sentence put him on notice

5 that he was engaged in an extremely dangerous scheme. The September

6 2012 explosion was another wake-up call, but it did not change

7 JOHANSSON’s mindset whatsoever.

8 From 2012 through 2014, JOHANSSON’s repair shop continued to

9 lack the basic safety precautions to protect D.L.V., S.E., and others
10 from the well-known dangers they faced. (PSR ¶39.) JOHANSSON often
11 chose to not send the tankers to an authorized repair shop for legal
12 welding repairs. Nor did he send the tankers to a “wash rack” to be
13 properly cleaned and purged prior of their crude-oil residue and
14 fumes prior to welding repairs. (See Exh. H at USAO_00038168
15 (Question 24); Exh. I at USAO_00285915.) Nor did JOHANSSON obtain a

16 “sniffer,” an inexpensive device used to detect hazardous fumes

17 inside a tank. Instead, JOHANSSON had his workers attempt to purge

18 the crude-oil residue from inside the tankers with rags attached to

19 broomsticks. (PSR ¶ 39; Exh. H (Question 23).) And when D.L.V.

20 complained about having to weld on the unpurged tanks, Garcia

21 threatened to send D.L.V. home without pay. (PSR ¶40; Exh. D at 52;

22 Exh. H (Question 25).)

23 The welding crime – by itself – would justify an above-

24 Guidelines sentence. But JOHANSSON expanded his criminal activity

25 after May 2014. Rather than reform his ways after the May 2014

26 explosion (for which he quickly was charged with felonies by the

27 State of California (PSR ¶ 130)), JOHANSSON did everything possible

28 to conceal role in the crime. Perhaps most comically, JOHANSSON went

19
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 25 of 30 Page ID
#:332

1 so far as to hire himself as a temp at his own company to make it

2 look like – in his words - he was merely a “paper pusher.” (PSR ¶

3 45; Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 80, 81.) More seriously, he also lied,

4 repeatedly, to federal investigators, and urged his employees and

5 contractors to do the same. (PSR ¶¶ 43, 44, 46, 47, 85; Dkt. No. 264

6 at 30:15-31:17.) Then JOHANSSON started a new company, Wholesale, so

7 that he could surreptitiously operate 37 tankers that the DOT had

8 banned him and National from operating because they were unsafe.

9 (PSR ¶¶ 48-50; Dkt. No. 264 at 31:18-26.) Wholesale was a
10 paradigmatic reincarnated carrier, created to evade regulators and
11 conceal JOHANSSON’s involvement. (PSR ¶¶ 49, 50; Dkt. No. 264 at
12 31:25-32:6.) Under Wholesale’s name, JOHANSSON had the 37 prohibited
13 tankers make thousands of hauls of hazardous materials across
14 Southern California. (PSR ¶ 52; Dkt. No. 264 at 32:7-10; Exh. J (a
15 chart showing hundreds of violations of the Out-of-Service Order from
16 a sampling of just seven months of records between April 2015 and
17 April 2018).)
18 Even after being indicted again in 2018, JOHANSSON could not

19 abstain from fraud. He set up Western as yet another reincarnated

20 carrier and lied to the DOT repeatedly about Western’s size and lack

21 of connection to Wholesale. (PSR ¶ 66; PPP Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 39, 80-

22 86.) Under indictment for tax fraud, JOHANSSON then fraudulently

23 applied for, obtained, and spent nearly a million dollars in

24 taxpayers’ funds through three PPP loans, including in 2021 after he

25 already knew the government was investigating him for PPP fraud.

26 B. JOHANSSON’s History and Characteristics

27 JOHANSSON’s history and characteristics are aggravating. His

28 criminal history includes a conviction and prison sentence for two of

20
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 26 of 30 Page ID
#:333

1 the same crimes for which he is being sentenced here. After serving

2 that sentence, JOHANSSON went right back to his criminal ways. And

3 after the May 2014 explosion, he persistently lied to law enforcement

4 about his role at National (and Western), and initiated his other

5 criminal schemes regarding the Out-of-Service Order and the PPP

6 fraud.

7 1. Additional Victims of JOHANSSON’s Schemes

8 L.Q., S.E., and D.L.V. were just a few of the many victims of

9 the unsafe business practices at JOHANSSON’s companies. (See, e.g.,
10 Exh. C, ¶¶ 48-77 (detailing JOHANSSON’s widespread practice in the

11 1990s of having his managers falsify drivers’ records to cover up,

12 inter alia, excessive hours and related safety violations).) For

13 example:

14 • On December 11, 2008, Johansson’s driver E.O.V. was hauling one
15 of JOHANSSON’s double-trailers near Tulare, California when he

16 did an illegal U-turn and caused a crash that killed victim G.G.
17 JOHANSSON had lied when he applied for insurance for the truck
18 that E.O.V. was driving (by claiming that it would not be used

19 to haul double-trailers, and by claiming the truck would be used

20 in Minnesota rather than California), thereby causing the

21 insurance company to void the policy and making the insurance

22 policy unavailable to the victim’s next of kin. See Tulare

23 County Superior Court Case # 09-232230; E.D. Cal. Case # 1:10-

24 cv-00475-OWW-MJS. (See also Dkt. No. 1 at 10 n.2.)

25 • On February 6, 2008, JOHANSSON’s driver D.T. seriously injured
26 victim S.R. in a collision in Colorado. The victim sued two of

27 JOHANSSON’s companies, but JOHANSSON refused to have his

28 companies appear in court, leaving the victim to obtain a

21
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 27 of 30 Page ID
#:334

1 default judgment of nearly $2 million. See 1:09-cv-2775-CMA-BNB

2 (D. Col.).

3 • On July 4, 1996, JOHANSSON’s driver M.B. was killed while
4 driving one of JOHANSSON’s trucks near Petaluma. M.B. was an

5 experienced driver who was familiar with the off-ramp where the

6 accident occurred. At the crash scene, the skid marks indicated

7 that only one side of the axle brakes had locked up, indicating

8 a mechanical failure. Two other drivers for JOHANSSON, M.R. and

9 A.D., said that the brakes on the truck that M.B. was driving
10 were faulty. M.R. said he had driven the same truck the day
11 before the deadly accident, and had submitted a complaint that
12 when he applied the brakes, the truck would speed up temporarily
13 before the brakes started to work. M.R. said that the records
14 of his complaint the day before the accident had been destroyed
15 by one of JOHANSSON’s employees. (Exh. K at 2-3; Exh. L.)
16 • On December 2, 1995, JOHANSSON’s driver C.A. flipped JOHANSSON’s
17 tanker on the 101 Freeway over the Ventura River and was killed
18 in the subsequent explosion, during which flames shot hundreds

19 of feet in the air. The accident also caused a significant oil

20 spill, leading to a clean-up of approximately 3,000 tons of gas-

21 soaked soil from the Ventura River’s riverbed. Law enforcement

22 determined that the crash was caused by speeding. According to

23 interviews with C.A.’s colleague A.D.H. in 1996, at the time of

24 the crash C.A. was within one hour of being over his hourly

25 regulatory limit, meaning that if C.A. had not crashed and had

26 finished his haul, he would have been three hours over the

27 regulatory limit. JOHANSSON’s managers threatened A.D.H. and

28 forced him to alter C.A.’s driver logs to cover up the

22
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 28 of 30 Page ID
#:335

1 violation. Another one of JOHANSSON’s drivers, R.T., told law

2 enforcement that C.A. was too inexperienced and should never

3 have been hired by JOHANSSON. (See Exhs. M, N; Exh. C, ¶¶ 68-

4 69) (discussing the same accident).)

5 JOHANSSON’s trail of victims and creditors explains his decades-

6 long pattern of illegally creating reincarnated carriers to evade

7 plaintiffs, federal regulators, and the IRS. 6 (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 31;

8 Dkt. No. 149 at 6:6-13, 9:3-10; PSR ¶ 173 (listing millions of

9 dollars in liens and judgments against JOHANSSON); PPP Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶
10 40-42 (explaining how JOHANSSON stole the name of another trucking
11 company in 2019 to obtain insurance and a new DOT number).) For
12 example, after his company Atlas Bulk racked up $369,780 in (unpaid)
13 fines in the 1990s for falsifying drivers’ records (PSR ¶ 127) and
14 failed to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in employment taxes
15 (PSR ¶ 54), JOHANSSON shut down Atlas and started a new company, Tech
16 Logistics. (See Dkt. No. 148 at 2 (discussing how JOHANSSON operated
17 Tech Logistics out of the same warehouse as National from 1999-2007);

18 PSR ¶ 34.)

19 2. Mitigating Factors

20 It is difficult to identify any mitigating factors. Typically,

21 the fact that a business owner employed so many employees over the

22 years would be mitigating. That is not the case here, where

23 JOHANSSON subjected his employees to criminal liability, unsafe

24 working conditions, low wages, and immigration-related threats, and

27
6 The 1999 PSR mentions an additional (unrecorded) fatal
28 accident involving one of JOHANSSON’s drivers; the government lacks
details. (Exh. C, ¶¶ 40-41.)
23
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 29 of 30 Page ID
#:336

1 pocketed a six-figure PPP loan rather than re-hiring laid-off

2 employees in the midst of a pandemic.

3 Likewise, typically the fact that a father of four had raised a

4 family would be mitigating. That is not the case here given, for

5 example, that (1) a significant component of JOHANSSON’s crimes was

6 using more than $1 million in untaxed income from National and

7 Wholesale to pay for his family’s mansion and his children’s private

8 school educations; (2) JOHANSSON recruited one of his sons into the

9 PPP fraud; (3) JOHANSSON’s wife was intimately involved in his
10 schemes (see, e.g., PSR ¶ 104 and Part III.B, supra); and (4)
11 JOHANSSON knowingly jeopardized his sister’s home, which she used to

12 secure his release from custody in 2018, by carrying out the PPP

13 fraud while on pretrial release. (See Dkt. No. 35.)

14 The PSR does not identify and charitable, philanthropic, or

15 volunteer activity by JOHANSSON, ever. (See also Exh. O at 2

16 (JOHANSSON’s former colleague relaying JOHANSSON’s statement that

17 “only poor people pay taxes”).) Nor is there any indication that,

18 since his indictment in April 2018, JOHANSSON has done a single thing

19 to contribute to his community or to manifest any remorse. This

20 vacuum sets JOHANSSON apart from many white-collar defendants.

21 The only mitigating factor that the government can identify is

22 JOHANSSON’s age. Given his age, the government is not recommending a

23 prison sentence longer than ten years.

24 C. The Section 3553(a)(2) Factors

25 Pursuant to Section 3553(a)(2), a ten-year sentence would

26 reflect the seriousness of the offenses, promote respect for the law,

27 provide just punishment for the offenses, afford adequate deterrence

28 to criminal conduct, and protect the public from further crimes by

24
Case 5:21-cr-00170-JGB Document 57 Filed 07/29/22 Page 30 of 30 Page ID
#:337

1 JOHANSSON. JOHANSSON can receive any necessary medical care or

2 correctional treatment while in custody.

3 D. The Need to Minimize Sentencing Disparities

4 Section 3553(a)(6) requires the Court to minimize sentencing

5 disparities among similarly situated defendants. The breadth and

6 duration of JOHANSSON’s criminal schemes warrant an above-Guidelines

7 sentence. There is no risk of disparities among similarly situated

8 defendants because there is no defendant who is even remotely

9 comparable to JOHANSSON.
10 On April 25, 2022, Judge Birotte sentenced Garcia to a low-end
11 sentence of 30 months in prison. While Garcia also bears criminal
12 responsibility for the death of S.E. and D.L.V.’s injuries, he did
13 not enrich himself from the welding scheme. Garcia was merely
14 JOHANSSON’s employee, and he was not involved in JOHANSSON’s other
15 schemes. The low-end sentence imposed on Garcia should not impact
16 the sentence imposed on JOHANSSON.
17 E. Restitution
18 Restitution is mandatory. (PSR ¶¶ 78, 84.) JOHANSSON owes

19 restitution to the IRS ($298,562), BAC Bank ($667,917), and Bank of

20 the West ($286,500). (PSR ¶¶ 84, 196-199.) One of the victims of

21 the welding crimes submitted a restitution request as part of

22 Garcia’s sentencing (see Exh. B), but the government currently lacks

23 sufficient information supporting the request. (See Dkt. No. 336.)

24 V. CONCLUSION

25 For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully

26 recommends a 120-month prison sentence, followed by five years of

27 supervised release, a special assessment of $500, and restitution in

28 an amount to be determined.

File and source

File: gov.uscourts.cacd.826563.57.0.pdf
Size: 359,256 bytes
SHA-256: 2867f492d2d5459b5bc9e6c00573e8797a7c168f80e16f5379946473134b260b
Our copy: gov.uscourts.cacd.826563.57.0.pdf
Original: PACER (login required)

Government's Objections to the Presentence Report and Sentencing Memorandum re Carl Bradley Johansson

Summary

Full text

File and source

Related records