Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint Without Prejudice — Tate v. Capital Plus et al. (D. Haw.)

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U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii · No. 1:25-cv-00349-LEK-KJM · Doc. 10 · 2025-10-17 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
DISTRICT OF HAWAII 
  
JIMMY TATE, JALECEYA TATE, 
 
Plaintiffs,  
 
 
vs.  
 
CAPITAL PLUS FINANCIAL, LLC,  
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC,  BENWORTH 
CAPITAL,  HARVEST SMALL BUSINESS 
FINANCIAL, LLC,  MCCOY FEDERAL 
CREDIT UNION,  FOUNTAINHEAD SBF 
LLC,  CENTRAL PACIFIC BANK,  
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION,  NAVY FEDERAL 
CREDIT UNION,  DOES 1-50, 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO BE 
IDENTIFIED IN DISCOVERY; 
 
Defendants. 
CIV. NO. 25-00349 LEK-KJM 
 
 
 
 
 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
 
 
 
On August 14, 2025, pro se Plaintiffs Jimmy Tate and 
Jaleceya Tate (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint for Injunctive 
Relief and Damages (“Complaint”) and an Ex Parte Motion to Waive 
Filing Fees and Surcharges Under Hawai`i Revised Statutes 
Chapter 607. [Dkt. nos. 1, 3.] In light of Plaintiffs’ pro se 
status, the Court liberally construes docket number 3 as an 
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“Application”). See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 
 
 
The Complaint names the following parties as 
defendants: Capital Plus Financial, LLC; Prestamos CDFI, LLC; 
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Benworth Capital; Harvest Small Business Finance, LLC; McCoy 
Federal Credit Union; Fountainhead SBF LLC; Central Pacific 
Bank; JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association; and Navy 
Federal Credit Union (“Defendants”). [Complaint at pg. 2, 
¶¶ III.B.1-10.] Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant 
resides in Hawai`i. See generally id. 
 
 
On September 16, 2025, an entering order was issued 
informing Plaintiffs of the Court’s inclination to dismiss the 
action without prejudice because venue appears improper (“9/16 
EO”). [Dkt. no. 8 at PageID.16.] The Court afforded Plaintiffs 
an opportunity to cure the defect in their claims by filing an 
amended complaint on or before October 7, 2025. The Court 
cautioned Plaintiffs that failure to file an amended complaint 
would result in dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice. 
The Court also reserved ruling on Plaintiffs’ Application and 
directed Plaintiffs to each complete and file a Form AO 240, 
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees & Affidavit. 
[Id.] Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint, and neither 
Plaintiff filed a Form AO 240. Further, Plaintiffs did not 
request an extension of the deadline to do so. 
 
 
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is 
hereby dismissed without prejudice. In light of this ruling, the 
Application is denied as moot. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
 
As discussed in the 9/16 EO: 
 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that they are 
the “victims of a sophisticated identity theft 
and fraud scheme.” [[Complaint] at pg. 2, ¶ 1.] 
Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that several 
individuals – not named as defendants in the 
current action – “used Plaintiffs’ names, 
likenesses, Social Security numbers, and other 
personal information to apply for and obtain 
millions of dollars in [Paycheck Protection 
Program (‘PPP’)] loans.” See id. Plaintiffs 
allege that the named Defendants, i.e., “banks 
and financial institutions, act[ed] as PPP 
lenders and/or facilitators, processed, approved, 
and disbursed these fraudulent loans, despite 
numerous red flags and clear indicia of identity 
theft and fraud.” [Id. at pg. 2, ¶ 2.] Plaintiffs 
claim that “Defendants received substantial fees 
and financial incentives for processing PPP 
loans, creating a conflict of interest and a 
motive to ignore or downplay fraud risks.” [Id. 
at pg. 2, ¶ 6.] 
 
 
According to Plaintiffs, as a result of 
Defendants’ alleged conduct, “Plaintiffs’ credit, 
reputations, and financial standing have been 
irreparably damaged.” [Id. at pg. 2, ¶ 4.] 
Plaintiffs, therefore, seek various forms of 
relief, such as: injunctive relief “enjoining 
Defendants and all persons acting in concert with 
them from further misuse of Plaintiffs’ personal 
data, and from processing or facilitating 
fraudulent loans in Plaintiffs’ names;” [id. at 
pg. 4;] compensatory and punitive damages; and 
any other appropriate relief, [id.]. 
 
[Id. at PageID.13-14 (some alterations in 9/16 EO).] 
STANDARD 
 
 
“Federal courts can authorize the commencement of any 
suit without prepayment of fees or security by a person who 
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submits an affidavit that demonstrates he is unable to pay.” 
Smallwood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CV. NO. 16-00505 DKW-
KJM, 2016 WL 4974948, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 16, 2016) (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). 
 
The Court subjects each civil action 
commenced pursuant to Section 1915(a) to 
mandatory screening and can order the dismissal 
of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious, 
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, or seeking monetary relief from a 
defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but 
requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in 
forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 
claim);[1] Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 
(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 
limited to prisoners”). 
 
Id. at *3. 
 
 
In addition, the following standards apply in the 
screening analysis: 
 
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, 
the court liberally construes her pleadings. 
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the 
federal courts to liberally construe the 
‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing 
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per 
curiam))). The court also recognizes that 
“[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 
amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se 
litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s 
deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to 
dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of 
 
1 Lopez has been overruled, in part, on other grounds by 
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
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Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th. [sic] 
Cir. 2000). 
 
 
Despite the liberal pro se pleading 
standard, the court may dismiss a complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) on its own motion. See Omar v. 
Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua 
sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal 
may be made without notice where the claimant 
cannot possibly win relief.”); see also Baker v. 
Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (holding that district court may 
dismiss cases sua sponte pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) without notice where plaintiff 
could not prevail on complaint as alleged). . . . 
“Federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute.” United 
States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). The assumption is 
that the district court lacks jurisdiction. See 
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Accordingly, a “party 
invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the 
burden of proving the actual existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 
F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
Flores v. Trump, CIVIL 16-00652 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 125698, at *1 
(D. Hawai`i Jan. 12, 2017) (some alterations in Flores) (some 
citations omitted). 
 
The Court may raise, sua sponte, the issue 
of defective venue, “as long as the parties are 
first given an opportunity to present their views 
on the issue.” See Palmer v. Stephens, CIV. 
NO. 16-00020 DKW/RLP, 2016 WL 347302, at *3 (D. 
Hawai`i Jan. 28, 2016) (some citations omitted) 
(citing Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 
(9th Cir. 1986)). 
 
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A civil action may be brought in one of the 
following: 
 
(1) a judicial district in which any 
defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district 
is located;  
 
(2) a judicial district in which a 
substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 
substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action is situated; or 
 
(3) if there is no district in which an 
action may otherwise be brought as provided 
in this section, any judicial district in 
which any defendant is subject to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to such action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 
 
 
For purposes of venue, a natural person is 
“deemed to reside in the judicial district in 
which that person is domiciled,” and an entity is 
“deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any 
judicial district in which such defendant is 
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with 
respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). The plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that venue is proper. See 
Eliason v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., CIVIL NO. 20-
00257 JAO-WRP, 2020 WL 3965970, at *1 (D. Hawai`i 
July 13, 2020) (citing Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun 
Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 
1979)). 
 
[9/16 EO at PageID.14 (alteration in 9/16 EO).]  
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The Court — after providing Plaintiffs an opportunity 
to present their views on the issue, see Palmer, 2016 WL 347302, 
at *3 — finds that venue is improper in this district. As 
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discussed in the 9/16 EO, the Complaint does not allege any 
basis for venue in Hawai`i. See 9/16 EO at PageID.14-15. First, 
none of the parties are alleged to “reside” in Hawai`i. See 
Complaint at pgs. 1-2, §§ I-II; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). 
Second, Plaintiffs do not allege that: 
any events or omissions giving rise to the claims 
in this action occurred in Hawai`i. Plaintiffs 
claim that “[v]enue is proper in this District 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (b)(3) because a 
substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claims occurred in Honolulu 
County, Hawaii, and Defendants purposefully 
directed their conduct at this forum.” [Complaint 
at pg. 1.] This conclusory statement, however, is 
not supported by the factual allegations related 
to Plaintiffs’ claims, none of which are alleged 
to have occurred in Hawai`i. See Complaint at 
pg. 2, ¶¶ 1-8. 
 
9/16 EO at PageID.15; see also § 1391(b)(2). Third, there are no 
factual allegations in the Complaint to support Plaintiffs’ 
conclusory allegation that Defendants’ conduct was purposefully 
directed at the State of Hawai`i. See generally Complaint. Thus, 
there is no basis for the Court to conclude that it has personal 
jurisdiction over Defendants in this case. See § 1391(b)(3). 
 
 
In addition, because Plaintiffs assert a claim under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 
Title 18 United States Code Section 1962(c), [Complaint at 
pg. 3,] the Court must consider RICO’s special venue provision. 
See Daniels v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., CIVIL NO. 22-00296 JAO-
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RT, 2022 WL 2658855, at *2 (D. Hawai`i July 8, 2022) (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)). RICO’s special venue provision 
authorizes any civil enforcement action to be 
brought “in the district court of the United 
States for any district in which [a defendant] 
resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his 
affairs.” 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a). “Transacts his 
affairs” requires “business of a substantial and 
continuous character.” King v. Vesco, 342 F. 
Supp. 120, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see also Taal v. 
St. Mary’s Bank, No. 5:19-CV-25, 2019 WL 8349005, 
at *5 (D. Vt. Dec. 10, 2019) (“Section 1965(a) 
‘requires that the affairs transacted in the 
district be substantial.’”) (quoting Corso v. 
Franz, No. 16-CV-2384, 2018 WL 1513639, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018)); Pincione v. D’Alfonso, 
506 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring 
business to “be substantial in character, so that 
there is some amount of business continuity and 
certainly more than a few isolated and peripheral 
contacts with the particular judicial district” 
(citations and quotations omitted)). 
 
Id. (alteration in Daniels). Plaintiffs fail to establish venue 
under RICO’s special venue provision because they do not allege 
that the individual Defendants reside in Hawai`i, nor do they 
allege that Defendants transact their affairs or have agents in 
Hawai`i. See generally Complaint.  
 
 
When the Court determines that a case has been filed 
in an improper venue, the Court must either “dismiss, or if it 
be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any 
district or division in which it could have been brought.” See 
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “A court should examine a plaintiff’s claim 
to determine whether the interests of justice require transfer 
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instead of dismissal.” Rosiere v. United States, CIVIL NO. 16-
00260 HG-RLP, 2016 WL 3408848, at *2 (D. Hawai`i June 1, 2016) 
(citing King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992)).2 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not provide sufficient factual 
allegations to determine which district or division would be a 
proper venue for this action. See generally Complaint. The Court 
thus concludes that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
for Injunctive Relief and Damages, filed August 14, 2025, is 
HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In light of the dismissal, 
Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion to Waive Filing Fees and Surcharges 
Under Hawai`i Revised Statutes Chapter 607, filed August 14, 
2025, is DENIED AS MOOT. 
 
 
Plaintiffs are REMINDED that, if they choose to file a 
new complaint and request to proceed in forma pauperis in this 
district court, each Plaintiff must complete and file Form 
AO 240. Plaintiffs are again CAUTIONED that they cannot act on 
each other’s behalf, unless they are licensed attorneys and 
authorized to practice before this district court. See Local 
 
 
2 In Rosiere, the magistrate judge’s findings and 
recommendation was adopted, as modified on other grounds, by the 
district judge. 2016 WL 3440566 (June 20, 2016). 
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Rule LR81.1(a). For instance, Plaintiff Jimmy Tate cannot sign 
Form AO 240 on behalf of himself and Plaintiff Jaleceya Tate, 
unless he is a licensed attorney who is authorized to practice 
law in this district court. 
 
 
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case on 
November 3, 2025. 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, October 17, 2025. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JIMMY TATE, ET AL. VS. CAPITAL PLUS FINANCIAL, LLC, ET AL; CV 
25-00349 LEK-KJM; ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
Case 1:25-cv-00349-LEK-KJM     Document 10     Filed 10/17/25     Page 10 of 10  PageID.26

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