Court's Inclination to Dismiss Complaint Without Prejudice — Tate v. Capital Plus et al. (D. Haw.)

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No. 1:25-cv-00349-LEK-KJM · Doc. 8 · 2025-09-12 · Docket on CourtListener

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MINUTE ORDER
CASE NUMBER:
CIVIL NO. 25-00349 LEK-KJM
CASE NAME:
Tate et al. V. Capital Plus Financial, LLC et al.
JUDGE:
Leslie E. Kobayashi
DATE:
09/12/2025
COURT ACTION:  EO: INCLINATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT 
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WITHOUT PREJUDICE
On August 14, 2025, pro se Plaintiffs Jimmy Tate and Jaleceya Tate (“Plaintiffs”) 
filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages (“Complaint”) and an Ex Parte 
Motion to Waive Filing Fees and Surcharges Under Hawai`i Revised Statutes
Chapter 607. [Dkt. nos. 1, 3.] In light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status, the Court liberally 
construes docket number 3 as an application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“Application”). See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
The Complaint named the following parties as defendants: Capital Plus Financial, 
LLC; Prestamos CDFI, LLC; Benworth Capital; Harvest Small Business Finance, LLC; 
McCoy Federal Credit Union; Fountainhead SBF LLC; Central Pacific Bank; JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, National Association; and Navy Federal Credit Union (“Defendants”).
[Complaint at pg. 2.] Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant resides in Hawai`i. See 
generally id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that they are the “victims of a sophisticated identity 
theft and fraud scheme.” [Id. at pg. 2, ¶ 1.] Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that several 
individuals – not named as defendants in the current action – “used Plaintiffs’ names, 
likenesses, Social Security numbers, and other personal information to apply for and 
obtain millions of dollars in [Paycheck Protection Program (‘PPP’)] loans.” See id. 
Plaintiffs allege that the named Defendants, i.e., “banks and financial institutions, act[ed] 
as PPP lenders and/or facilitators, processed, approved, and disbursed these fraudulent 
loans, despite numerous red flags and clear indicia of identity theft and fraud.” [Id. at 
pg. 2, ¶ 2.] Plaintiffs claim that “Defendants received substantial fees and financial 
incentives for processing PPP loans, creating a conflict of interest and a motive to ignore 
or downplay fraud risks.” [Id. at pg. 2, ¶ 6.]
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According to Plaintiffs, as a result of Defendants’ alleged conduct, “Plaintiffs’
credit, reputations, and financial standing have been irreparably damaged.” [Id. at pg. 2,
¶ 4.] Plaintiffs, therefore, seek various forms of relief, such as: injunctive relief “enjoining
Defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from further misuse of Plaintiffs’
personal data, and from processing or facilitating fraudulent loans in Plaintiffs’ names;”
[id. at pg. 4;] compensatory and punitive damages; and any other appropriate relief, [id.].
STANDARD
The Court may raise, sua sponte, the issue of defective venue, “as long as the
parties are first given an opportunity to present their views on the issue.” See Palmer v.
Stephens, CIV. NO. 16-00020 DKW/RLP, 2016 WL 347302, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Jan. 28,
2016) (some citations omitted) (citing Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.
1986)). 
A civil action may be brought in one of the following:
(1)
a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2)
a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3)
if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect
to such action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 
For purposes of venue, a natural person is “deemed to reside in the judicial district
in which that person is domiciled,” and an entity is “deemed to reside, if a defendant, in
any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction
with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). The plaintiff
has the burden of showing that venue is proper. See Eliason v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., CIVIL
NO. 20-00257 JAO-WRP, 2020 WL 3965970, at *1 (D. Hawai`i July 13, 2020) (citing
Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979)).
DISCUSSION
The Court - after reviewing Plaintiffs’ Complaint - is inclined to find that venue is
improper in this district. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that venue is proper.
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See id. Plaintiffs’ Complaint lacks any factual allegations that, if proven, would support a
finding that venue is proper in this district. First, Plaintiffs do not provide any information
in their Complaint concerning the judicial district in which any Defendant resides. There
is also no indication that the Defendants are subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction
with respect to this action. 
Second, Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that any events or omissions giving
rise to the claims in this action occurred in Hawai`i. Plaintiffs claim that “[v]enue is
proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and (b)(3) because a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Honolulu County, Hawaii,
and Defendants purposefully directed their conduct at this forum.” [Complaint at pg. 1.]
This conclusory statement, however, is not supported by the factual allegations related to
Plaintiffs’ claims, none of which are alleged to have occurred in Hawai`i. See Complaint
at pg. 2, ¶¶ 1-8.
Further, Plaintiffs assert a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”), Title 18 United States Code Section 1962(c). [Id. at pg. 3.]
This district court has explained: 
Where, as here, Plaintiff asserts a RICO claim, the Court also
considers RICO’s special venue provision, which authorizes any
civil enforcement action to be brought “in the district court of the
United States for any district in which [a defendant] resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.” 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
“Transacts his affairs” requires “business of a substantial and
continuous character.” King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 124 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); see also Taal v. St. Mary’s Bank, No. 5:19-CV-25, 2019
WL 8349005, at *5 (D. Vt. Dec. 10, 2019) (“Section 1965(a)
‘requires that the affairs transacted in the district be substantial.’”)
(quoting Corso v. Franz, No. 16-CV-2384, 2018 WL 1513639, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018)); Pincione v. D’Alfonso, 506 F. App’x 22,
24 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring business to “be substantial in character,
so that there is some amount of business continuity and certainly
more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts with the particular
judicial district” (citations and quotations omitted)). . . . 
Daniels v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., CIVIL NO. 22-00296 JAO-RT 2022 WL 2658855,
at *2 (D. Hawai`i July 8, 2022) (some alterations in Daniels).
As already discussed, the individual Defendants are not alleged to reside in
Hawai`i, nor do Plaintiffs allege that Defendants transact their affairs or have agents in
Hawai`i. See generally Complaint; see also Daniels, 2022 WL 2658855, at *2. Thus, the
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Court is inclined to find that the allegations of the Complaint fail to demonstrate that this
district is a proper venue for this action.
If a court determines that venue is improper, it “shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which [the case] could
have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Court is inclined to dismiss the action
without prejudice because venue appears to be improper. The Court will provide
Plaintiffs the opportunity to present their views on the issue of venue through the filing of
an amended complaint. See Costlow, 790 F.2d at 1488 . 
If Plaintiffs choose to take the opportunity to amend their claims, they are
ORDERED to file an amended complaint by October 7, 2025. Plaintiffs are
CAUTIONED that if they fail to comply with the October 7, 2025 deadline, the
Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. 
The Court notes that this inclination is not the Court’s final decision in the matter.
Rather, Plaintiffs are encouraged to cite relevant case law and/or plead factual allegations
in their amended complaint – if they choose to file one – to show the Court why its
inclination is mistaken or correct. 
In light of the inclination, the Court reserves ruling on Plaintiffs’ Application.
Further, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ Application appears to be an application to
proceed in forma pauperis in state court. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to mail
Form AO 240, Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees & Affidavit, to
Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs choose to request to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court,
each Plaintiff is DIRECTED to complete and file Form AO 240. Plaintiffs are
CAUTIONED that they cannot act on each other’s behalf, unless they are licensed
attorneys and authorized to practice before the Court. See Local Rule LR81.1(a). For
instance, Plaintiff Jimmy Tate cannot sign Form AO 240 on behalf of himself and
Plaintiff Jaleceya Tate, unless he is a licensed attorney that is authorized to practice in this
district court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Submitted by: Carla Cortez, Courtroom Manager 
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