Reply brief (Petralia motion to dismiss) — United States ex rel. Pietschner v. Petralia, Frohwein & Robinson (E.D. Tex.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · No. 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ · Doc. 92 · 2025-05-09 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
SHERMAN DIVISION  
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
ex rel. PAUL PIETSCHNER,  
 
Plaintiff,  
 
v.  
 
KATHRYN PETRALIA;   
ROBERT FROHWEIN; and   
SPENCER ROBINSON,  
 
Defendants.  
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No.: 4:21-cv-110-SDJ  
  
DEFENDANT KATHRYN PETRALIA’S   
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION TO DISMISS  
THE UNITED STATES’ COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION  
  
 
 
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Table Of Contents 
 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 
I. 
The Complaint Fails To Allege That Ms. Petralia Acted With The Requisite Scienter ......... 2 
II. 
The Complaint Fails To Plead Causation As To Ms. Petralia ................................................ 6 
III. The Complaint Fails to Plead Common Law Claims as to Ms. Petralia................................. 9 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10 
 
 
 
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Table of Authorities 
 
Page(s) 
CASES 
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000) ...........................................5 
Drywall Elements, LLC v. Edward Wolff & Assocs., LLC, 2022 WL 4667997 
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2022) ...................................................................................................2 
Fulcrum Credit Partners LLC v. Strategic Cap. Res., Inc., 2011 WL 13104241 
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011) ..................................................................................................9 
Greene v. DeMoss, 2022 WL 3716201 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) ....................................................4 
Hidden Values, Inc. v. Wade, 2012 WL 1836087 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2012) .................................2 
Silva v. VICI Marketing, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (M.D. Fla. 2019)..........................................9 
Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997) .................................................10 
United States ex rel. Aldridge v. Corp. Mgmt., Inc., 78 F.4th 727 (5th Cir. 2023) ..................... 6-7 
United States ex rel. Frey v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 2563239 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 10, 2023) ..............................................................................................................2 
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2000).....................................7 
United States ex rel. Hueseman v. Pro. Compounding Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 3d 722 (W.D. Tex. 2023) ...........................................................................................8 
United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739 (2023) ......................................... 3-5 
United States v. Americus Mortgage Corp., 2013 WL 4829269 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 
10, 2013) .......................................................................................................................... 4-5 
United States v. Berkeley Heartlab, 225 F. Supp. 3d 487 (D.S.C. 2016) ......................................10 
United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2014) .......................................5 
United States v. Lakeway Regional Medical Center, LLC, 2020 WL 6146571 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2020) ...................................................................................................2 
United States v. Marlin Med. Sols. LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 876 (W.D. Tex. 2022) ..........................6 
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176 
(2016) ...................................................................................................................................4 
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STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..............................................................................................................................4 
False Claims Act .................................................................................................................... passim 
Rule 9(b) ................................................................................................................................ passim 
 
 
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The Court should not allow the government to obscure the pleading defects in its case 
against Kathryn Petralia by lumping her together with other Kabbage executives (and with 
Kabbage itself, a distinct legal entity) and relying on allegations against “Defendants” or 
“Kabbage” generally. The government’s Opposition provides no persuasive response to the 
pleading deficiencies identified in Ms. Petralia’s individual motion to dismiss.1  First, the 
government identifies no allegations demonstrating Ms. Petralia’s subjective knowledge that any 
submission by Kabbage to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) during the Paycheck 
Protection Program (“PPP”) was false or that Ms. Petralia had any role in an alleged “fraudulent 
scheme.”  Without such allegations, the government cannot establish Ms. Petralia’s individual 
scienter under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), as the case law is clear that it may not state a claim 
against individual defendants through group pleading.  Second, although the government seeks to 
establish causation based on Ms. Petralia’s position at Kabbage, such allegations are insufficient 
absent any “affirmative acts” she took in that position to cause the submission of false claims or 
statements to the SBA.  Third, the government has pointed to no allegations that any payments or 
benefits that Ms. Petralia received are directly traceable to funds paid by the United States, as 
required to sustain the common law claims.  For these additional reasons and those in the Joint 
Reply, the Complaint should be dismissed as to Ms. Petralia.  
 
1 As used herein, “Complaint” refers to the Government’s Complaint in Intervention (ECF No. 
40); “Motion” refers Ms. Petralia’s individual Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 65); “Joint Motion” 
refers to Mr. Frohwein, Kathryn Petralia, and Spencer Robinson’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 
joint Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 66); and “Opposition” refers to the Government’s Omnibus 
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 72). 
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ARGUMENT2 
I. 
The Complaint Fails To Allege That Ms. Petralia Acted With The Requisite Scienter 
The Fifth Circuit has unequivocally held that “[g]roup pleading … does not satisfy Rule 
9(b).”  Drywall Elements, LLC v. Edward Wolff & Assocs., LLC, 2022 WL 4667997, at *5 n.10 
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2022).  “When multiple defendants are alleged to have committed fraudulent 
acts, a party claiming fraud ‘must plead with sufficient particularity attribution of the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions to each defendant; the plaintiff is obligated to distinguish among 
those they sue and enlighten each defendant as to his or her part in the alleged fraud.’”  Hidden 
Values, Inc. v. Wade, 2012 WL 1836087, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2012) (emphasis added; citation 
omitted).  Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal.  See, e.g., id. at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2012) 
(dismissing complaint that “lump[ed] together” multiple defendants and referred to them 
“collectively as ‘Counter-Defendants’ and ‘they’ without distinguishing which entity or persons 
committed the various alleged fraudulent conduct”).  
That rule applies without exception to cases under the FCA.  See, e.g. U.S. ex rel. Frey v. 
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 2563239, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2023) (dismissing FCA 
case that ran afoul of “the prohibition on group pleading” by “lumping the four corporate 
Defendants together”).  In U.S. v. Lakeway Regional Medical Center, LLC, the court dismissed 
FCA claims, which rested on “shotgun” or “group” pleading, and rejected the government’s 
“patently incorrect” approach because, among other reasons, “group pleading prevents [a] 
necessary element of a fraud allegation: each Individual Defendant’s mental state with respect to 
 
2 Ms. Petralia incorporates by reference the legal arguments made in Mr. Frohwein’s and Mr. 
Robinson’s individual reply briefs, to the extent they relate to Ms. Petralia.  Ms. Petralia also notes 
that although she raised venue and personal jurisdiction arguments in her individual Motion to 
Dismiss, she responds to them jointly with her co-defendants because the government responded 
to Defendants’ venue and personal jurisdiction arguments together in its Omnibus Opposition. 
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the alleged fraud.”  2020 WL 6146571, *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2020) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also U.S. ex rel. Haight v. RRSA (Com. Div.), LLC, 2020 WL 6163139, at *4 (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 20, 2020) (noting that complaint cannot “lump all defendants together” and must instead 
“segregate the alleged wrongdoing of one from another.”). 
The government makes this precise error in the Complaint.  It improperly lumps all 
Defendants together or imputes Kabbage’s corporate knowledge to Ms. Petralia without making 
particularized allegations.  See Petralia Mot. at 11-15, 18.  The Opposition does not identify any 
allegations specific to Ms. Petralia that support a plausible inference regarding her subjective belief 
that submissions to the SBA during the PPP were false.  It merely cites paragraphs from the 
Complaint that refer to “Defendants” or “Kabbage” collectively, Opp. 38-39, 55-57, 60-63, and 
then argues (in conclusory terms) that “[t]hese allegations do not improperly lump the Defendants’ 
knowledge together nor do they impute Kabbage’s generalized corporate knowledge to Petralia … 
but, instead, relate to her specifically.”  Opp. 62.  Saying that does not make it so.  And the 
government fails to offer anything else.  The Complaint thus fails to plead Ms. Petralia’s 
“knowledge and subjective beliefs” with respect to  the falsity of statements submitted to the 
government—an essential element of FCA liability.  U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 
U.S. 739, 749 (2023).   
The government’s other arguments are unavailing and, if anything, merely attempt to 
distract the Court from the lack of allegations regarding Ms. Petralia’s scienter.  The government 
incorrectly argues that Ms. Petralia asks the Court to “draw[] inferences in [her] favor.”  See Opp. 
50.  This is not true.  Ms. Petralia asks the Court, as it must, to separate the chaff—the 
government’s conclusory, generalized and impermissible “group pleading” allegations—from the 
wheat—the limited allegations specific to Ms. Petralia.   Once separated, the Complaint does not 
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come close to pleading facts sufficient to establish Ms. Petralia’s scienter, as required to meet the 
FCA’s “rigorous” scienter standard.  Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 579 
U.S. 176, 192 (2016). 
The government is in no position to rely on Greene v. DeMoss, 2022 WL 3716201, at *3 
(5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) for the proposition that “identical allegations do not necessarily defeat an 
otherwise sufficient pleading.”  See Opp. 56.  The complaint in Greene did not attempt to leverage 
general allegations against a group of defendants, as the government has here; rather it made 
individualized allegations against each defendant.  Accordingly, the court in Greene concluded 
only that “identical, individual allegations”—not group pleading—were proper.  2022 WL 
3716201, at *3.  Greene provides no help to the government here, given the Complaint’s dearth of 
individual allegations against Ms. Petralia.  Moreover, Greene involved an excessive force claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was not subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 
9(b) as is the case here.  Thus, the government’s repeated reliance on Greene, Opp. 56, 84, is 
therefore doubly misplaced. 
Similarly, the government’s reliance on U.S. v. Americus Mortg. Corp., 2013 WL 4829269 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2013), for the proposition that it may plead scienter “generally” under Rule 
9(b), is unavailing.  See Opp. 57.  The court in Americus concluded that the plaintiff had satisfied 
the requirements of Rule 9(b) because it “identif[ied] [the defendant] by name and explain[ed] his 
role in both companies and in the fraudulent scheme as a whole,” including “identify[ing] the 
falsified certification submitted to [the government] at [the defendant’s] direction.”  2013 WL 
4829269, at *8.  Importantly, Americus pre-dates by a decade the Supreme Court’s holding in 
SuperValu, the landmark case clarifying that “[t]he FCA’s scienter element refers to [a 
defendant’s] knowledge and subjective beliefs.”  598 U.S. at 749 (emphasis added).  Because the 
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court in Americus did not analyze whether the complaint included allegations regarding the 
defendant’s subjective knowledge, it is inapplicable post-SuperValu to the question of whether the 
government has adequately pled scienter as to Ms. Petralia.3  
Rather than respond to Ms. Petralia’s substantive arguments or explain why it cites 
outdated law, the government instead attacks Ms. Petralia for “blam[ing]” her co-defendant.  See 
Opp. 60, 63.  But Ms. Petralia does no such thing.  Ms. Petralia categorially rejects any suggestion 
that she is blaming anyone; in reality, her motion identifies yet another of the government’s 
pleading deficiencies: the absence of any specific allegations in the Complaint with respect to her 
subjective knowledge of misconduct.  
The government’s procedural arguments—that Ms. Petralia improperly attached extrinsic 
exhibits to her motion that the Court may not consider in this posture—are also wrong.4   See Opp. 
60.  To be clear, Ms. Petralia is not asking the Court to evaluate the sufficiency of the Complaint’s 
allegations regarding scienter “as if it were a motion for summary judgment.”  Id.  In evaluating a 
motion to dismiss, courts may consider exhibits that “are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint 
and are central to [its] claim.”  See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 
(5th Cir. 2000).  The exhibits attached to Ms. Petralia’s motion to dismiss are central to the 
government’s claim that Ms. Petralia was aware of the SALT and 100k errors, which the 
government argues is the reason the Court should conclude it has adequately pled scienter.  The 
Complaint cites to no other evidence, but includes only selective portions of these 
communications, leaving out the complete exchanges and Ms. Petralia’s reasonable responses.  
 
3 The government relies on U.S. v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 775 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2014) for a 
similar proposition.  Opp. 56.  That case also pre-dates SuperValu and is therefore inapplicable for 
the proposition that scienter may be pled generally under Rule 9(b). 
4 Exhibit 2 was erroneously referred to as Exhibit 3 in Ms. Petralia’s Motion. 
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Indeed, it is telling that the government argues so vociferously in its Opposition that this Court 
should not consider the full context of those documents.  As Ms. Petralia explained in her motion, 
the exhibits establish, without any inferences needing to be drawn in her favor, that the allegations 
are patently false.  See Petralia Mot. 18-20. 
II. 
The Complaint Fails To Plead Causation As To Ms. Petralia 
The government argues in a conclusory fashion that Ms. Petralia was a “substantial factor 
in causing Kabbage and its Lender Partners to submit false and inflated claims for processing fees 
and inflated claims for loan forgiveness to SBA” and that the submission of the claims was 
“reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence of” her actions.  Opp. 83-84.  That 
theory overextends the FCA causation standard and points to no specific “affirmative acts” by Ms. 
Petralia that allegedly caused submission of false claims.  See U.S. v. Marlin Med. Sols. LLC, 579 
F. Supp. 3d 876, 886 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (FCA requires “‘some sort of affirmative act’ that causes 
or assists the presentation of a false claim”).  The government attributes the actions of Kabbage 
and its lender partners to Ms. Petralia as if she were an omnipotent actor responsible for actions of 
others both within and outside the organization relating to technical details to which she was not 
privy.  That theory is unsupported legally and does not pass muster under Rule 9(b).5  
As Ms. Petralia explained in her motion, Petralia Mot. 11-14, the Complaint does not allege 
that Ms. Petralia took any “affirmative act that cause[ed] or assist[ed] the presentation of a false 
claim.”  U.S. ex rel. Aldridge v. Corp. Mgmt., Inc., 78 F.4th 727, 741 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation 
marks omitted).  In response, the government cites various out-of-circuit cases to argue that, 
because Ms. Petralia supposedly had “unfettered power … to affirmatively stop fraudulent 
 
5 The government concedes that it does not allege that Ms. Petralia herself submitted any false 
claims or statements. 
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conduct,” but failed to intervene, this suffices for causation.  See Opp. 85.  Allegations that a 
defendant—even a member of a company’s c-suite—“exercise[d] control over” a company and 
“was involved in all aspects of the business,” without allegations of affirmative acts, are 
insufficient.  Haight, 2020 WL 6163139, at *5; see also U.S. v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., 
2011 WL 6337455, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011) (explaining that CEO’s “direct and indirect 
control” were “not enough for the Court to connect the dots between his ownership and the specific 
conduct involved in the submission of a claim for reimbursement.”). 
Tellingly, the Complaint contains no support for the premise that Ms. Petralia had 
“unfettered power” at Kabbage, nor any allegation that she chose not to exercise such power when 
presented with instances of fraudulent conduct.  The government points to no allegations that Ms. 
Petralia approved, was involved in, or instructed anyone at Kabbage regarding the submission of 
any specific loan applications or other documents to the SBA—because there are none.  See U.S. 
ex. rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring FCA claims, including 
causation, to be pled with specificity).  The government instead relies on conclusory allegations 
about Ms. Petralia’s position and responsibilities at Kabbage and her purported knowledge of 
“systemic errors in Kabbage’s loan processing.”  Opp. 84.  But these are not allegations of any 
“wrongful acts” that caused the submission of fraudulent statements, as the government suggests.  
See id. 
The only Fifth Circuit case the government cites for its contention that causation is 
adequately pled as to Ms. Petralia is Aldridge, but that case is easily distinguishable.  In Aldridge, 
the court concluded that, by executing an agreement and failing to inquire about management fees, 
the defendant had committed an “‘affirmative act’ that facilitated ... false claims.”  78 F.4th  at 
741.  Here, however, the government does not allege that Ms. Petralia herself committed any 
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“affirmative act” akin to executing an agreement.  Rather, the government alleges that, at most, 
Ms. Petralia—in consultation with another Kabbage employee—decided not to take a single 
employee’s suggestion to pause all PPP applications in light of that employee’s general fraud 
concerns.  See Opp. 85 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 266-267).  This is insufficient.  First, the Complaint does 
not allege that Ms. Petralia had “unfettered power” to make that decision, and, moreover, the 
Complaint paragraph cited in the government’s Opposition does not allege that Ms. Petralia 
“brush[ed] off” the employee, as the Opposition suggests.  Id.  Rather, that paragraph alleges that, 
at a company-wide Town Hall meeting, in response to a question by Ms. Petralia, an employee 
explained that “improvements to the system would proceed on ‘parallel paths’ with application 
acceptance.”  Compl. ¶ 267.  In other words, the Complaint alleges that Ms. Petralia deferred to 
others with relevant responsibility to implement necessary improvements in real time—a far cry 
from any “affirmative acts” to cause submission of false claims.   
In sum, there are simply no allegations in the Complaint that tie any “affirmative act” by 
Ms. Petralia to any submission to the SBA of allegedly fraudulent claims or statements.  
Accordingly, the Complaint fails to adequately allege that Ms. Petralia “was (1) a substantial factor 
in inducing providers to submit claims for reimbursement, and (2) if the submission of claims for 
reimbursement was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence of [a] 
defendant[’s] conduct.”  U.S. ex rel. Hueseman v. Pro. Compounding Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 3d 722, 752 (W.D. Tex. 2023) (citation omitted).6   
 
6 Additionally, the opposition provides no response to Ms. Petralia’s arguments that allegations 
related to the conduct of others at Kabbage as intervening actors, further highlighting the tenuous 
connection between Ms. Petralia and Kabbage’s submission of claims and statements to the SBA.  
See Petralia Mot. at 14. 
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III. 
The Complaint Fails to Plead Common Law Claims as to Ms. Petralia 
 
The government argues it has adequately pleaded its common law claims but fails to 
address the central, fatal flaw with its allegations:  It has not alleged any benefit or payments 
received by Ms. Petralia that are directly traceable to funds paid by the United States. 
As to the unjust enrichment claim, the Opposition merely repeats the government’s 
allegations that the SBA paid claims to Kabbage for fraudulently inflated processing fees and 
applications with false certifications.  See Opp. 99-100.  The central argument to support the 
government’s unjust enrichment claim is that “the benefit of the processing fees was conferred on 
Defendants,” id. at 100, but, without more, this allegation fails to meet Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading 
standards.  See Fulcrum Credit Partners LLC v. Strategic Cap. Res., Inc., 2011 WL 13104241, at 
*5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011) (collecting cases dismissing enrichment claims because benefit 
received was too attenuated or indirect).  As explained in Ms. Petralia’s motion, the PPP processing 
fees and any associated benefits to which the government points cannot “clearly be traced” to any 
financial gain received by Ms. Petralia due to her employment at Kabbage (i.e., her executive 
salary, earnings from the sale of Kabbage to American Express, or her retention bonus).  See 
Petralia Mot. 23-24; see also U.S. ex rel. Silva v. VICI Marketing, LLC, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1245, 
1256-1258 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (dismissing unjust enrichment and mistaken payment claims based 
on conclusory allegations that defendant directly benefited and “that the mistakenly-paid funds 
flowed through” defendant). 
The government cites Silva to argue that “[t]he benefit need not flow directly from the 
government to the defendant for the government to allege an unjust enrichment claim.”  Opp. 99 
(citing 361 F. Supp. 3d at 1256).  But Silva in particular underscores the government’s failure to 
plead that Ms. Petralia was someone “to whom the funds flowed,” regardless of whether the funds 
were “directly given” to them.  361 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (emphasis added).  In other words, the 
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government’s unjust enrichment claim against Ms. Petralia cannot survive because the Complaint 
fails to allege that Ms. Petralia is someone to whom those funds—the PPP processing fees—
actually flowed.  Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 972 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (dismissing 
claim for unjust enrichment where plaintiff failed to allege defendants “received the primary and 
direct benefits of the payment of [smokers’] medical expenses” and “the alleged benefit enjoyed 
by Defendants [was] too attenuated and indirect to find support under the theory of unjust 
enrichment”).  Likewise, the government relies on U.S. v. Berkeley Heartlab, Opp. 99-100, but 
there, the government plausibly alleged a direct connection between government payments and the 
defendant where the defendant’s “salary and bonuses were directly tied to [the corporate entity’s] 
profits.”  225 F. Supp. 3d 487, 503 (D.S.C. 2016).  Here, the government merely speculates that 
PPP processing fees increased Kabbage’s sale price. 
The same reasoning applies with respect to the government’s payment by mistake claim, 
as the government again relies on allegations about Defendants’ “operational control over 
Kabbage’s PPP participation,” while ignoring the absence of allegations that any “payments 
flowed through” to Ms. Petralia or that she personally benefitted from the relevant transactions.  
Opp. 101-102; see Petralia Mot. 25.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, in the Joint Reply, and in the opening motions, the 
Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety as to Ms. Petralia. 
 
 
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Dated: May 9, 2025  
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
_  /s/ Melissa R. Smith 
Melissa R. Smith 
Gillam & Smith LLP 
303 South Washington Avenue 
Marshall, TX 75670 
Telephone: (903) 934-8450 
Fax: (903) 934-9257 
melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com 
 
Anjan Sahni (pro hac vice) 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP  
7 World Trade Center, 250 Greenwich Street  
New York, NY 10007  
Telephone: (212) 230-8800 
Fax: (212) 230-8888 
anjan.sahni@wilmerhale.com 
 
Christopher E. Babbitt (pro hac vice) 
Michaela S. Wilkes Klein (pro hac vice) 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP  
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20037  
Telephone: (202) 663-6000  
Fax: (202) 663-6363  
christopher.babbitt@wilmerhale.com 
michaela.wilkesklein@wilmerhale.com 
 
George P. Varghese (pro hac vice) 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 
60 State Street  
Boston, MA 02109 
Telephone: (617) 526-6000 
Fax: (617) 526-5000 
george.varghese@wilmerhale.com 
 
Counsel for Kathryn Petralia 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 9, 2025, I caused the foregoing to be filed electronically with 
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to 
counsel of record.  
 
Dated: May 9, 2025  
 
 
Respectfully Submitted,  
 
_  /s/ Melissa R. Smith 
 
Melissa R. Smith 
 
 
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