Qui Tam Complaint (FCA) — Pietschner v. Kabbage (E.D. Tex.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division · No. 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ · Doc. 1 · 2021-02-05 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
SHERMAN DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
) 
ex rel. PAUL PIETSCHNER 
) 
)  Case No. ____________ 
Plaintiff-Relator, 
)  JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
)  FILED UNDER SEAL 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
) 
KABBAGE, INC.; KATHRYN PETRALIA;   
) 
ROBERT FROHWEIN and SPENCER ROBINSON,) 
) 
Defendants.  
 
 
 
 
) 
COMPLAINT 
1.
Relator Paul Pietschner brings this action on behalf of himself and the
United States of America against defendants Kabbage, Inc.; Kathryn Petralia; 
Robert Frohwein; and Spencer Robinson, for violations of the federal False Claims 
Act (“federal FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. (the “False Claims Act”). 
INTRODUCTION 
2.
Kabbage, Inc. is a fintech company that applied its “fund now, verify later”
model of lending to the federal Paycheck Protection Plan loan program, 
recklessly spreading more than six billion dollars around the country in a matter 
of weeks. In doing so, Kabbage failed to apply even the lax standards that it had 
been applying for its own loan portfolio, ignored even the most basic origination 
criteria, and then bragged about how fast it could originate PPP loans and how 
4:21cv110-SDJ
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 1 of 57 PageID #:  1

-2- 
few people it needed to do so. 
3. 
Kabbage’s boastful press releases were a supposed homage to its data 
analytics platform, which supposedly looked at myriad data points to make 
quick credit decisions. But in fact, more than a year before the PPP program 
Kabbage had already begun lowering its own lending standards, disregarding 
most of these data points.  
4. 
By the time it was qualified as a PPP lender, Kabbage was in a state of 
negative amortization and violating even its own most basic tenets, such as 
requiring a business to exist for a year before receiving Kabbage credit.  
5. 
The “Kabbage Heads,” as Kabbage management styles itself, saw the PPP 
program as a way to salvage their own struggling business through loan 
processing fees. They did this so successfully that after closing out the second 
round of the PPP program, the Kabbage Heads sold the data analytics platform 
to American Express, Inc. in what was called the “Deal of the Year.” 
6. 
Unfortunately, this “deal of the year” was at the expense of the PPP 
program, the CARES Act funds, and ultimately the American taxpayer.  
7. 
As explained below, Relator Paul Pietschner, a legal analyst in Kabbage’s 
Atlanta collections department, saw the decreasing internal controls on lending 
and brought it to the attention of the Kabbage Heads, but to no avail.  
8. 
As the data from PPP loans becomes available, it is easy to see that even 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 2 of 57 PageID #:  2

-3- 
obviously fraudulent loan requests were granted, all because Kabbage failed to 
abide by its duties as a PPP Lender and engage in even basic verification 
procedures. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
9. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a), 
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345. 
10. 
Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 31 U.S.C. § 
3732(a), as one or more of the defendants resides or transacts business in this 
jurisdiction and violations of the False Claims Act described herein occurred in 
this district. 
PARTIES 
11. 
Defendant Kabbage, Inc. is a Delaware fintech corporation originally 
founded to provide working capital advances for online merchants. Kabbage 
offered financial services data and financial technology for small and medium 
sized online sellers from its principal place of business at 730 Peachtree Street 
Suite 350 Atlanta, GA 30308.  
12. 
Between April and August of 2020, Kabbage distributed more than six 
billion dollars in SBA PPP loan funds, earning more than three hundred million 
dollars in loan fees. These loans went to applicants all U.S. states, including 
Texas.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 3 of 57 PageID #:  3

-4- 
13. 
In late 2020, substantially all of Kabbage’s assets were purchased by 
American Express, Inc. (“Amex”). However, Kabbage’s existing loan portfolio 
(including both Kabbage Funding loans and Paycheck Protection Program loans) 
were not part of the Amex acquisition. Such loans taken out prior to October 16, 
2020 continue to be serviced by Defendant Kabbage, Inc. through the new K 
Servicing site. 
14. 
Defendant Kathryn Petralia is a co-founder of Kabbage and currently 
serves as its President. Defendant Petralia lives in Atlanta, Georgia. She received 
a cash retention award of $13,320,000 as part of the sale of Kabbage to Amex. 
15. 
Defendant Robert Frohwein is the second co-founder of Kabbage, who still 
serves as its CEO. Defendant Frohwein lives in Atlanta, Georgia. Like Petralia, he 
received a cash retention award of $13,320,000 as part of the sale of Kabbage to 
Amex. 
16. 
Defendant Spencer Robinson was the Kabbage Head of strategy and as 
such was responsible for the PPP Loan implementation. Defendant Robinson 
lives in Atlanta, Georgia. He received a $2,400,000 cash Retention Award as part 
of the sale of Kabbage to Amex. 
17. 
Relator Paul Pietschner is a former Kabbage legal analyst in the credit 
operations department. Prior to the PPP loan roll out, Relator’s job duties 
included training customer service representatives on legal terms and conditions 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 4 of 57 PageID #:  4

-5- 
of the loan program and how to explain those concepts to customers, and how to 
assess/forward calls requiring escalation.  
18. 
Relator, along with a significant portion of the Kabbage work force, was 
furloughed in March 2020 at the start of the pandemic. After Kabbage was 
qualified as a PPP Lender, Relator was called back to work in June 2020, where 
his job duties put him squarely in the path of the fraud described herein. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
Regulatory Framework and the Fraudulent Conduct 
Overview of the PPP Loan Program Framework 
19. 
Under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES 
Act, Pub. L. 116–136), the SBA received funding and authority to modify its 
existing loan programs and establish a new loan program to assist small 
businesses nationwide that had been or were expected to be adversely impacted 
by the pandemic. Section 1102 of the CARES Act authorized the SBA to 
guarantee 100 percent of certain 7(a) loans under a new program titled the 
‘‘Paycheck Protection Plan.” 
20. 
 At a high level, the PPP Loan Program is designed to work as follows: 
small businesses apply for a loan through an SBA-approved lender, which 
reviews the application and makes eligibility determinations based on 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 5 of 57 PageID #:  5

-6- 
requirements that, in the main, were already well established for issuing loans 
under the SBA 7(a) loan program.  
21. 
One important difference in the PPP loan program, however, is that 
lenders were permitted to rely on borrower certifications to determine eligibility 
and to rely on borrower’s documentation in determining loan amount and 
forgiveness eligibility.  
22. 
Nevertheless, as explained below, eligibility determinations still required 
the lender to undertake basic underwriting procedures and to comply with the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), anti-money laundering (AML) controls, and fraud 
controls. For example, lenders were required to verify the identity of the 
applicant and, in the case of certain businesses, its ultimate beneficial owners. 
Lenders were also required to report fraudulent and suspicious transactions. 
23. 
If the loan is approved, it is funded by the lender. Prior to the end of the 
loan’s term, the business may apply to have the loan forgiven based on having 
spent the money in specific, approved ways such as payroll or mortgage/rent 
payments.  
24. 
If the forgiveness conditions are satisfied, the lender is repaid by the SBA 
through CARES Act funds. If the business’s use of the funds does not qualify it 
for forgiveness, the business pays the loan back to the lender itself. However, if 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 6 of 57 PageID #:  6

-7- 
the business fails to make payments, the Lender can turn to the SBA, who will 
pay the loan back 100%, protecting the Lender. 
SBA Interim Final Rules 
25. 
To manage the PPP Program, the SBA and Treasury have published 
twenty-six Interim Final Rules in the Federal Register as follows: 
IFR  Title 
1 
Letter from the Administrator 
2 
Paycheck Protection Program 
3 
Affiliation Rules 
4 
Additional Eligibility Criteria and Requirements for Certain Pledges of 
Loans for the Paycheck Protection Program 
5 
Promissory Notes, Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility 
6 
Seasonal Employers 
7 
Disbursements 
8 
Requirements – Corporate Groups and Non-Bank and Non-Insured 
Depository Institution Lenders 
9 
Nondiscrimination and Additional Eligibility Criteria 
10 
Extension of Limited Safe Harbor with Respect to Certification 
Concerning Need for PPP Loan Request 
11 
Requirements for Loan Increases for Partnerships or Seasonal Employers 
12 
Eligibility of Certain Electric Cooperatives 
13 
Treatment of Entities with Foreign Affiliates 
14 
Second Extension of Limited Safe Harbor with Respect to Certification 
Concerning Need for PPP Loan and Lender Reporting 
15 
Requirements – Loan Forgiveness 
16 
SBA Loan Review Procedures and Related Borrower and Lender 
Responsibilities 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 7 of 57 PageID #:  7

-8- 
IFR  Title 
17 
Eligibility of Certain Telephone Cooperatives 
18 
Interim Final Rule on Revisions to the First PPP Interim Final Rule 
19 
Additional Revisions to First PPP Interim Final Rule 
20 
Interim Final Rule on Revisions to the Third and Sixth Interim Final 
Rules 
21 
Revisions to Loan Forgiveness Interim Final Rule and SBA Loan Review 
Procedures Interim Final Rule 
22 
Additional Eligibility Revisions to First PPP Interim Final Rule 
23 
Certain Eligible Payroll Costs (Fishing Boat Owners)  
24 
Appeals of SBA Loan Review Decisions Under the PPP 
25 
Treatment of Owners and Forgiveness of Certain Nonpayroll Costs 
26 
Additional Revisions to Loan Forgiveness and Loan Review Procedures 
 
Lender Certifications 
26. 
To qualify as a lender, Kabbage submitted SBA Form 3507, which states in 
Paragraph 3 (“Approval of Guaranty”) that: 
For purposes of making covered loans to an eligible recipient under 
the Paycheck Protection Program, Lender is responsible, to the 
extent set forth in the PPP Loan Program Requirements, for all 
decisions concerning the eligibility (including size) of a borrower for 
a covered loan. Lender may issue a covered loan approved under 
PPP procedures without prior SBA review and approval of the 
processing and underwriting of the loan by executing a PPP 
Authorization. 
27. 
The Lender Agreement further requires, in Paragraph 4 (“Closing and 
Disbursement of Covered Loans”) that Kabbage: 
must ensure that a note and all other Loan Documents (as defined in 
this paragraph) and additional documents are properly executed 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 8 of 57 PageID #:  8

-9- 
and take such other actions necessary to fulfill the requirements of 
the Paycheck Protection Program. SBA is entitled, at any time, to 
examine and obtain copies of all notes, certifications and 
documentation (herein, collectively, called “Loan Documents”), and 
all other records held by Lender which relate to covered loans made 
pursuant to the Paycheck Protection Program. 
28. 
Finally, in Paragraph 10 (“Interpretation of this Agreement”), Kabbage 
certified compliance: “[t]o the best of its knowledge, Lender certifies that it is in 
compliance and will maintain compliance with all applicable requirements of the 
Paycheck Protection Program and PPP Loan Program Requirements.” (¶10(B)); 
see also signature block, stating “[b]y signing below, I hereby certify that I have 
the authority to execute this Agreement for the Lender on whose behalf I am 
signing, and that all representations made are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge.” 
29. 
The “Paycheck Protection Program Lender Application Form – Paycheck 
Protection Program Loan Guaranty” was also submitted electronically and 
required Kabbage to certify as follows: 
On behalf of the Lender, I certify that: 
• The Lender has complied with the applicable lender obligations 
set forth in paragraphs 3.b(i)-(iii) of the Paycheck Protection 
Program Rule. 
• The Lender has obtained and reviewed the required application 
(including documents demonstrating qualifying payroll amounts) of 
the Applicant and will retain copies of such documents in the 
Applicant’s loan file. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 9 of 57 PageID #:  9

-10- 
30. 
IFR No. 1, referenced in the first bullet above and published at 85 F R 
20811, provides in Paragraph 3 (“What do lenders need to know and do?) (B) 
(“What do lenders have to do in terms of loan underwriting?”) as follows: 
Each lender shall: 
i. Confirm receipt of borrower certifications contained in Paycheck 
Protection Program Application form issued by the Administration; 
ii. Confirm receipt of information demonstrating that a borrower 
had employees for whom the borrower paid salaries and payroll 
taxes on or around February 15, 2020; 
iii. Confirm the dollar amount of average monthly payroll costs for 
the preceding calendar year by reviewing the payroll documentation 
submitted with the borrower's application; and 
iv. Follow applicable BSA requirements: 
…. 
II. Entities that are not presently subject to the requirements of the 
BSA, should, prior to engaging in PPP lending activities, including 
making PPP loans to either new or existing customers who are 
eligible borrowers under the PPP, establish an anti-money 
laundering (AML) compliance program equivalent to that of a 
comparable federally regulated institution. Depending upon the 
comparable federally regulated institution, such a program may 
include a customer identification program (CIP), which includes 
identifying and verifying their PPP borrowers' identities (including 
e.g., date of birth, address, and taxpayer identification number), and, 
if that PPP borrower is a company, following any applicable 
beneficial ownership information collection requirements. 
Alternatively, if available, entities may rely on the CIP of a federally 
insured depository institution or federally insured credit union with 
an established CIP as part of its AML program. In either instance, 
entities should also understand the nature and purpose of their PPP 
customer relationships to develop customer risk profiles. Such 
entities will also generally have to identify and report certain 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 10 of 57 PageID #:  10

-11- 
suspicious activity to the U.S. Department of the Treasury's 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). …. 
Each lender's underwriting obligation under the PPP is limited to 
the items above and reviewing the “Paycheck Protection Application 
Form.” Borrowers must submit such documentation as is necessary 
to establish eligibility such as payroll processor records, payroll tax 
filings, or Form 1099-MISC, or income and expenses from a sole 
proprietorship. For borrowers that do not have any such 
documentation, the borrower must provide other supporting 
documentation, such as bank records, sufficient to demonstrate the 
qualifying payroll amount. 
31. 
Thus, in sum, the IFR require lenders to confirm (1) receipt of the required 
borrower certifications; (2) receipt of information sufficient to establish that a 
borrower had employees for whom the borrower paid salaries and payroll taxes 
on or before February 15, 2020; (3) the dollar amount of the average monthly 
payroll costs, based on review of the payroll documentation submitted by the 
borrower.  
32. 
Then, in addition to these certifications, the lender must follow all BSA 
requirements, which may include having a “Customer Identification Program” 
for both individual and entity clients. Existing clients were not required to be re-
verified “unless otherwise indicated by the institution’s risk-based approach to 
BSA compliance,” suggesting that first time customers did, in fact, need to go 
through appropriate verification procedures. 
33. 
Identity verification for partnerships includes establishing information on 
Ultimate Beneficial Ownership (UBO). Specific information on UBO 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 11 of 57 PageID #:  11

-12- 
requirements is found in Final PPP FAQs 25, which provides that for new 
customers, the lender’s collection “of the following information from all natural 
persons with a 20% or greater ownership stake in the applicant business will be 
deemed to satisfy applicable BSA requirements and FinCEN regulations 
governing the collection of beneficial ownership information: owner name, title, 
ownership %, TIN, address, and date of birth. If any ownership interest of 20% or 
greater in the applicant business belongs to a business or other legal entity, 
lenders will need to collect appropriate beneficial ownership information for that 
entity.” 
34. 
Finally, it is important to note that the SBA specifically required that all of 
these obligations must be fulfilled by the lender before the lender submitted the 
loan application to SBA. Final PPP FAQ No. 28, provides as follows: 
Question: Is a lender permitted to submit a PPP loan application to 
SBA through E-Tran before the lender has fulfilled its responsibility 
to review the required borrower documentation and calculation of 
payroll costs? 
Answer: No. Before a lender submits a PPP loan through E-Tran, the 
lender must have collected the information and certifications 
contained in the Borrower Application Form and the lender must 
have fulfilled its obligations set forth in paragraphs 3.b.(i)-(iii) of the 
PPP Interim Final Rule. 
35. 
However, as discussed below and consistent with its own loan practices, 
Kabbage performed only minimal verification until after loans were submitted. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 12 of 57 PageID #:  12

-13- 
Then, after submission, a secondary review was performed, but only on some 
files, and was conducted by largely-untrained third parties.  
36. 
The PPP program required Kabbage to verify customer information at this 
basic level, consistent with its obligations under the BSA/AML procedures, 
before submitting the loan, and Kabbage did not do so.  
37. 
Importantly, both the 100% guarantee of the PPP loans and the payment of 
SBA Lender Fees (discussed further below) are conditioned on the Lender 
meeting each of the foregoing requirements. 
SBA Lender Fees 
38. 
Before the passage of the CARES Act, Lenders were not compensated by 
the SBA for originating SBA 7(a) loans. Under the PPP loan program, however, 
Lenders are compensated for processing PPP loans based on the amount of the 
funded PPP loan.  
39. 
Lender fees for PPP loans were calculated as follows: five percent for loans 
of not more than $350,000; three percent for loans between $350,000 and 
$2,000,000; and one percent for loans of $2,000,000 or greater. 
40. 
These SBA Lender Fees were the incentive for Kabbage Heads to 
reimagine themselves as a PPP Lender.  
41. 
As explained below, in addition to the SBA Lender Fees it generated for its 
own loans, Kabbage also entered into servicing agreements with Cross River 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 13 of 57 PageID #:  13

-14- 
Bank and Customers Bank. These two banks were also paid SBA Lender Fees, a 
portion of which they remitted to Kabbage in exchange for servicing obligations. 
42. 
IFR No. 15 states that a Lender is not eligible for an SBA Lender Fee if the 
borrower himself is determined to be ineligible for the loan. “If SBA conducts a 
loan review and determines that the borrower was ineligible for a PPP loan, the 
lender is not eligible for a processing fee” and previously paid processing fees 
are subject to clawback: ‘[f]or any SBA-reviewed PPP loan, if within one year 
after the loan was disbursed SBA determines that a borrower was ineligible for a 
PPP loan based on the provisions of the CARES Act or applicable rules or 
guidance available at the time of the borrower’s loan application, or the terms of 
the loan application, SBA will seek repayment of the lender processing fee from 
the lender.” 
43. 
Similarly, SBA Lender Fees are subject to clawback if a lender has not 
fulfilled its obligations under PPP regulations. “If a lender fails to satisfy the 
requirements applicable to lenders that are set forth in section III.3.b of the First 
Interim Final Rule or the document collection and retention requirements 
described in the lender application form (SBA Form 2484), SBA will seek 
repayment of the lender processing fee from the lender and may determine that 
the loan is not eligible for a guaranty. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 14 of 57 PageID #:  14

-15- 
44. 
To request payment for SBA Lender Fees, the lender reports to SBA that 
the loan has been fully disbursed, using Form 1502.  
45. 
Upon receipt of Form 1502, SBA confirms that no previous request has 
been made for fees on the same loan, confirms that the disbursed amount on the 
1502 matches the approval amount in E-Tran; calculates the processing fee owed 
based on the finally fully disbursed amount; and submits the fee to the Lender 
using the ACH credit information provided by the Lender. 
Loan Amounts 
46. 
As discussed above, lenders like Kabbage were required to certify that, 
“[t]he Lender has obtained and reviewed the required application (including 
documents demonstrating qualifying payroll amounts) of the Applicant and will 
retain copies of such documents in the Applicant’s loan file.”  
47. 
The amount for which a business was eligible was based on the payroll of 
that business, paying out two-and-a-half months of a company’s payroll. This is 
calculated is based on annual compensation, with a cap for annualized 
compensation of $100,000. 
48. 
Self-employed individuals were eligible for a PPP Loan if (1) they were in 
operation as of February 15, 2020; (2) they were individuals with self-
employment income, such as an independent contractor or a sole proprietorship; 
(3) their principal place of residence was in the United States; and (4) they filed 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 15 of 57 PageID #:  15

-16- 
Form 1040 Schedule C. IFR “Additional Paycheck Protection Program Eligibility 
Criteria and Requirements for Certain Pledges of Loans.” 
49. 
As a result of these calculations, the most that a single employee/sole 
proprietor could receive under the program was $20,833.00, which is an annual 
compensation of $100,000, divided into twelve months, times two and a half 
months. This number reoccurred over and over in the Kabbage loans—many 
times for industries in which the annual compensation more typically was 
$30,000 to $40,000, and where the taxpayer was only able to show that much 
compensation for previous years. 
B. Background and Corporate History of Kabbage, Inc. 
50. 
Kabbage was founded in 2009 by Defendants Petralia and Frohwein, to 
make fast credit decisions for small, online businesses using automated 
processes.  
51. 
Named after a slang term for money, the company set out to build 
“Kabbage culture,” which included offering daily yoga, bootcamp, and lunch, 
along with snacks, a keg, massage chairs, a pool table, and pinball machines. 
Employees were permitted to bring both pets and children to the office and, 
announcing a commitment to transparency, Kabbage Heads set up weekly 
“Town Halls” in which the entire company gathered.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 16 of 57 PageID #:  16

-17- 
52. 
Kabbage’s “Core Values,” as per its website are to “Unconditional 
Commitment, Stay Connected, Care Deeply, Inspire Innovation, Win, and Create 
Holy Shit Moments.” 
53. 
Kabbage’s first and primary product was known as “Kabbage Funding,” 
which uses automated processes to make fast loan decisions for small online 
businesses. The process relies on data points such as business volume, time in 
business, transaction volume, social media activity, and the seller's credit score to 
authorize a total available balance for small online businesses for up to $250,000 
per customer.  
54. 
Each draw by the customer against the available balance was considered a 
separate loan, with either 6-, 12- or 18-month terms.  
55. 
Kabbage loans were not funded by Kabbage, but by Celtic Bank, a 
privately owned industrial bank chartered by the State of Utah, which allowed 
Kabbage to take advantage of Utah’s favorable lender rules. For example, Utah 
banks are not subject to an interest rate ceiling, This made the functional APR for 
Kabbage loans 100% in some cases.  
56. 
However, immediately after each loan was made, Kabbage paid Celtic the 
face value of the note plus a fee for the participation interest in the receivable, 
which Kabbage then securitized to use as collateral for credit facilities.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 17 of 57 PageID #:  17

-18- 
57. 
Kabbage purchased the participation interest from Celtic with funds from 
various credit facilities, then repaid those facilities with the funds received from 
customers. The remainder was Kabbage’s profit. 
58. 
Kabbage began servicing online merchants with Kabbage Funding in 2011 
and from the outside, the company appeared to be a roaring success. It extended 
its automated lending platform to brick and mortar small businesses in February 
2014 and within six years, Kabbage Funding reportedly offered access to over $1 
billion each year in working capital for small businesses. 
59. 
In addition to Kabbage Funding, Kabbage began to diversify as early as 
2015, working to license its loan platform to other organizations such as ING in 
Spain. The same year, it introduced the “Kabbage Card,” a point-of-sale 
purchasing card that was linked to the customer’s Kabbage Funding account 
balance.  
60. 
In August 2015, Kabbage was named the 36th fastest-growing private 
company in America and in October of the same year, completed a Series E 
funding round of $135 million led by Reverence Capital Partners, with Holland’s 
ING, Spain’s Santander, and Canada’s Scotiabank also participating. 
61. 
In 2017, the company raised $250 million from Softbank Group Corp., 
raising its total equity funding to $500 million. It also secured the largest asset-
backed securitizations of small business loans in the online lending industry at 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 18 of 57 PageID #:  18

-19- 
$525 million, and further diversified its debt-funding sources with a $200 million 
revolving credit facility with Credit Suisse. 
62. 
Despite this seeming success, insiders like Relator knew that by late 2017, 
Kabbage faced mounting difficulties.  
63. 
As explained below, even at its best, Kabbage Funding’s business model 
rewarded the underreporting of fraudulent loans. By 2018, Kabbage began 
lowering its own loan standards, allowing even more opportunities for 
fraudsters to obtain funds. The company then began rolling out more “disrupter” 
products under the aegis of “Cash Flow as a Service,” known internally as 
“CFAS.” These CFAS products brought Kabbage under legal and regulatory 
schemes that came with obligations that Kabbage was not merely unprepared 
for, it was actually ignorant of. By early 2020, these issues contributed to a crisis. 
64. 
As further evidence that things were not as rosy as Kabbage’s press 
releases suggest, there were no merit-based pay increases, very limited bonuses, 
and a general hiring freeze for most departments going into 2020. 
i. Underreporting of Fraud 
65. 
As a fintech company—called a “non-bank” by the banking community—
the Kabbage Funding product took full advantage of the fact that it operates 
outside the bounds of many banking and financial regulations. For example, 
Kabbage was only subject to the strict requirements to discover, report, or 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 19 of 57 PageID #:  19

-20- 
mitigate fraud such as are found in the BSA/AML guidelines as a program 
manager for Celtic Bank. 
66. 
Moreover, Kabbage had an incentive to keep fraud metrics low, because 
they were reported both internally and as part of the contractual terms with 
lending facilities and other partner accounts.  
67. 
To keep these fraud metrics low, in Relator’s personal experience, loans 
that should have been classified as fraud were systemically categorized as 
uncollected or uncollectible, and thus considered delinquent but rightly issued.  
68. 
In part due to Kabbage customers' ability to kite loans, these accounts did 
not substantially impact the apparent delinquency rate, and thus the benefit of 
the increased originations due to reduced controls did not create substantial risk. 
69. 
As used here, kiting refers to paying off credit with credit. Specifically, 
Kabbage customers were able to take out another loan from their Kabbage 
available balance in order to pay the amount that was due. This allowed the 
customers to appear current while sliding towards a point of no return, where 
there would not be sufficient funds available to make the next payment. At that 
point funding would be cut off, and the customer would spiral into delinquency. 
70. 
Kiting was easy to do with Kabbage Funding because the amounts were 
relatively small and the credit was revolving. As discussed above, each draw on 
the available balance was treated as an individual loan, each of which would be 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 20 of 57 PageID #:  20

-21- 
paid back in sequence. Under this system, each time a payment was made, the 
available balance opened up for the amount of that payment. Thus, a customer 
could have sixteen to twenty Kabbage loans, which enabled the customer to take 
out a loan to pay back the loan that was coming due that month. In Relator’s 
experience in collections, this practice was common. 
71. 
In addition, from its founding until around October 2019, Kabbage 
allowed loans to be paid back with credit cards. In fact, Kabbage only stopped 
this practice when it launched Kabbage Payments, which was a merchant 
terminal product that required the company to sign agreements with Visa and 
Mastercard that forbade accepting debt to pay debt. 
72. 
Thus, from the beginning, Kabbage Funding’s lack of regulatory oversight 
enabled and encouraged it to underreport fraud, while its business model 
incentivized it to do so. 
ii. 
Kabbage Reduces Quality Controls 
73. 
As noted above, in 2017, Kabbage raised $250 million from Softbank 
Group Corp., raising its total equity funding to $500 million; secured the largest 
asset-backed securitizations of small business loans in the online lending 
industry at $525 million; and took out a $200 million revolving credit facility with 
Credit Suisse. All of this created heightened expectations for management, the 
Board, and the founders to outperform previous years. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 21 of 57 PageID #:  21

-22- 
74. 
Unfortunately, based on market saturation and other factors, Kabbage was 
seeing a lessening of originations. To try and “juice originations,” the company 
brought in a new Vice President of Underwriting and Fraud Strategy as well as a 
new Chief Risk Officer. Both men came into Kabbage’s risk department from 
Amex.  
75. 
As part of revamping the department, the pair contracted with third-party 
URS Tech Solutions to perform “secondary account reviews.” These reviews 
occurred after the loan had been approved and issued. 
76. 
Bringing in URS was an unpopular decision. The company was slow to 
respond to inquiries from Kabbage employees and had no clear processes. Worst 
of all, URS’s typical turn around was about 72-hours. Given that Kabbage loans 
were often issued within hours, this review was not helpful—72 hours after 
disbursement was more than enough time for a fraudster to claim the funds and 
vanish.  
77. 
In early 2019, another person was brought in to assist the risk department, 
but departed in only about eight months. Then the new VP left in October 2019, 
and the new CRO left shortly thereafter in December 2019. 
78. 
Also in 2019, Kabbage’s senior fraud analyst who had been handling all of 
the fraud analytics, left the firm and was not replaced with anyone capable of 
doing the types of analysis he had been performing. In addition to bringing 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 22 of 57 PageID #:  22

-23- 
fraud analytics to a standstill, Gibson’s absence also meant that banks calling in 
to report suspected fraudulent activity had no clear point of contact.  
79. 
With the risk department in tatters and increasingly understaffed—
Kabbage had not had a Head of fraud with a tenure longer than three months 
since late 2018—the quality of Kabbage loans continued to plummet in 2019 and 
early 2020.  
80. 
Over the course of that time, the hundreds of datapoints that had 
originally been used to vet applicants (and which were still described as being 
part of the process) devolved into essentially a two-part inquiry of “what’s in 
your bank account?” and “what is your FICO score?” 
81. 
There were two reasons that Relator personally witnessed this lessening of 
internal controls. First, he worked in collections with defaulted loans. This 
allowed him to see firsthand that the sensitivity of the underwriting and risk 
controls had been drastically reduced. When the files reached his desk in 
collections, none of the underlying financial data made available to him would 
demonstrate the types of controls that had previously been in place. 
82. 
For example, Relator recalls an account opened by a start-up company that 
had raised $90,000 through a Kickstarter campaign. This alone was a red flag to 
Relator, because Kabbage was not supposed to service start-up companies; the 
company’s own internal controls required an entity to have been in business for 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 23 of 57 PageID #:  23

-24- 
at least a year before it was eligible for Kabbage Funding. Nevertheless, the start-
up deposited its Kickstarter money into a bank account, and on that basis alone 
was approved for a $45,000 Kabbage loan—half the amount of its Kickstarter 
funds. The company took the loan money and defaulted. In fact, it never made a 
single payment. When the file arrived on Relator’s desk in collections, he 
discovered that no analysis had ever been done for ability to repay. 
83. 
The second way Relator witnessed this reduction in controls was through 
his interactions with sales reps. When unfavorable decisions were made (such as 
a loan being declined or an available funding amount being adjusted 
downward), sales reps relied on Relator to help them explain the reasoning to 
disappointed applicants. To communicate with the unhappy would-be 
customers, Relator had to review the decision process that had gone into the 
denial.  
84. 
In late 2019 and early 2020, based on reviewing both the internal 
documentation and the derived customer data, Relator could tell that all 
decisions were based on substantially simpler metrics than what the company 
was reporting that it used. 
85. 
Finally, Relator also specifically recalls that the Kabbage “Returning 
Customer Model,” which was supposed to re-evaluate borrowers based on new 
data, was entirely disabled at some point in 2019. Thus, by 2019, Kabbage was 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 24 of 57 PageID #:  24

-25- 
not reviewing applicants beyond first time qualification, and not particularly 
well at that point, either. 
iii. 
Kabbage’s Ignorance of Regulatory Compliance 
86. 
Kabbage’s forays into other markets than Kabbage Funding demonstrate 
the “leap first, learn later” approach that was to be the hallmark of its PPP loan 
program.  
87. 
For example, in September 2014, Kabbage launched Karrot Personal Loans. 
Relator observed that the company had to jettison the program because it came 
with regulatory and reporting obligations that Kabbage was unaware of prior to 
launch and was completely unprepared to handle. By approximately early 2016, 
collection was also discontinued. 
88. 
In 2019, Kabbage rolled out several new disruptors under the “Cash Flow 
as a Service” (CFAS) banner, including Kabbage Insights, Kabbage Checking, 
and Kabbage Card 2. Unfortunately, none of the new CFAS “products” were 
raising much revenue because they were just attachments to other online lenders. 
For example, Green Dot provided checking, Marquetta provided Kabbage Card 
1, and Kabbage Card 2 was through Metabank.com. 
89. 
Besides not being very profitable, Kabbage entered these markets 
completely unaware of the additional obligations that these new products would 
entail.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 25 of 57 PageID #:  25

-26- 
90. 
For example, until it rolled out checking and payments, Kabbage Funding 
was a loan servicer and thus was not subject to demands to hold or restrain 
funds. Indeed, part of Relator’s job included dealing with requests and orders to 
restrain funds, such as garnishments, which he could dispense with quickly by 
stating that Kabbage was just a loan servicer and thus not subject to such 
demands. However, with the addition of Kabbage Checking and Kabbage 
Payments, this was going to change. 
91. 
Since these requests were normally passed to Relator, and he knew that 
Kabbage would now be subject to these demands, he was concerned about his 
ability to respond. Accordingly, he approached the Kabbage Checking and 
Kabbage Payment teams to ask what the new process would be when Kabbage 
received an order to hold or restrain funds.  
92. 
To his dismay, Relator discovered that the product teams not only had not 
developed such a plan, they had no idea that their new products would incur 
such obligations.  
93. 
Thus, with a hidden fraud rate, coupled with the decimation of the risk 
department and a host of new obligations, Kabbage was already in trouble when 
the pandemic struck.  
94. 
At that time, small businesses—Kabbage’s customer base—were in serious 
trouble, and Kabbage began to shut down. On March 16, 2020, Kabbage 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 26 of 57 PageID #:  26

-27- 
tightened its lending restrictions. By the next day, March 17, call volumes had 
tripled. On March 23, lending was terminated in full internally, with the official 
close of lending on March 29, 2020. 
95. 
This suspension of all lending services for active and new customers came 
without warning, to the dismay of Kabbage customers, who had been counting 
on the lines of credit to see them through the global economic downturn. With 
no more available balance to draw from, Kabbage customers who had been 
kiting their loans were unable to make payment and they began stopping 
payment or reversing payment on automatic payments, which in turn caused 
problems with Kabbage’s issuing bank, Wells Fargo. 
96. 
On March 31, 2020, Kabbage furloughed approximately three-quarters of 
its employees, including Relator, and laid off the entire Bangalore office, which 
among other tasks performed data analytics.  
97. 
On April 30, 2020, those who were still furloughed were laid off as well. 
98. 
During this same period of March and April: 
• Kabbage’s then most recent Head of fraud, Nicole Hill, was 
either dismissed or resigned. Her position was not backfilled.  
• The Kabbage Funding Portfolio hit 40% delinquency and 
stuck above 30% until roughly September—nearly triple the 
normal rate of default. 
• As a result, Kabbage went into negative amortization. In 
essence, Kabbage’s obligations to repay the credit facilities 
(whose funds it used to purchase the receivables for Kabbage 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 27 of 57 PageID #:  27

-28- 
Funding loans from Celtic Bank) were based on specific 
contractual terms regarding the performance of the 
securitized loans. As Kabbage’s delinquency rates climbed, 
repayment terms accelerated. Most of the funds that Kabbage 
was able to collect were directed to these facilities, as 
Kabbage’s inability to generate new loans, combined with the 
inability of current customers to repay existing loans, created 
an extremely dire situation. 
C. Kabbage Reinvented as a PPP Lender. 
99. 
The PPP loan program offered Kabbage a way out of its crisis. Instead of 
offering its own loans, it determined to use its existing platform to rapidly make 
loan decisions for PPP program.  
100. However, Kabbage had no experience with existing SBA 7(a) loan program 
upon which PPP was based, and made no effort to educate itself.  
101. Nor did Kabbage use the data points that it had used at the start of the 
company to issue the PPP loans—in other words, Kabbage was not treating the 
PPP loan applications with even the same degree of care it had given its own 
loans, which (as explained above) had become steadily more inadequate. 
102. Kabbage opened up to PPP applications and, with at least reckless 
disregard for whether any of the provided information was true, began issuing 
PPP loans like candy.  
103. To make that happen, Kabbage employed contract workers and third 
parties like URS who had no prior experience as fintech originators, let alone 
with SBA loans.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 28 of 57 PageID #:  28

-29- 
104. So rapidly were the loans processed that between April 7, 2020, when the 
program began, and Kabbage’s first statements on May 18, Kabbage claimed to 
have paid out about $3.5 billion in PPP loan funds. 
105. On June 1, 2020, Relator was called back to work (from home).  
106. By July, Kabbage was reporting that it was the country's third-largest PPP 
Lender, approving more than 209,000 small business loans totaling $5.8 billion.  
107. According to its own press release, “[o]ver the three-month period of the 
program, Kabbage approved over 209,000 small businesses for $5.8 billion, 
making it the third-largest PPP lender in the country by application volume. The 
result is the single-largest PPP lending accomplishment by a FinTech company, 
outperforming some of America’s largest banks to ensure the country’s smallest 
businesses received relief.” 
108. Kabbage boasted of its swift conversion to the SBA system, noting that 
“[p]rior to the PPP, Kabbage had never processed a loan for the SBA. In less than 
two weeks, Kabbage entirely restructured its lending platform and developed 
new automated systems to ingest, analyze, verify, and approve PPP 
applications.” The Kabbage report went on to state that: 
• 97% of all SBA-approved applicants were new customers to 
Kabbage. 
• 93% of all applicants had 10 or fewer employees; 62% had one 
employee, and 58% were self-employed. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 29 of 57 PageID #:  29

-30- 
• Kabbage’s total average loan size was $28,100 and 50% of all 
loans were under $13,500. 
• Over 75% of all applications were processed without human 
intervention or manual review. 
• The median time from applying to approval was 4 hours. 
109. Kabbage issued the loans in partnership with Customers Bancorp (Pa.) and 
Cross River Bank (N.J.) to serve small businesses in all 50 U.S. states and 
territories.  
110. Of the loans processed, 55 percent were directly funded through Kabbage, 
with 23 percent funded through Customers Bancorp, and 22 percent funded 
through Cross River Bank. 
111. A complete report of Kabbage’s PPP results was made available in August 
20201 and stated, inter alia, that 67% of its PPP customers were self-employed; 
approximately 69% of its PPP customers had only one employee; and 90% had 
ten or fewer employees. In all, the company bragged that it had posted over 
seven billion dollars in loans but “on average, for every 790 employees at major 
U.S. banks, Kabbage has one” (emphasis supplied). 
112. Kabbage has declined to say how much it earned in SBA Lender Fees from 
these transactions, but outside estimates based on its reporting suggest that 
 
1 https://newsroom.kabbage.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Kabbage-Paycheck-
Protection-Program-PPP-Report.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 30 of 57 PageID #:  30

-31- 
Kabbage earned between $330 million and $340 million in fees on the $7 billion 
in approved loans the company said it processed. 
113. So successful was Kabbage with this “pivot” to the SBA space that on 
August 17, 2020, in what was later named “The Deal of the Year” by Banking 
Dive, Amex announced it had entered into an agreement to “acquire 
substantially all of Kabbage.”  
114. Under the terms of the agreement, Amex acquired Kabbage’s team and its 
full suite of financial technology products, data platform and IP.  
115. However, Kabbage’s existing loans, including PPP loans, remained with 
Kabbage and are being serviced through an online platform known as K 
Servicing. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. 
Relator’s Discovery of and Efforts to Stop the Fraud 
116. Relator resumed working for Kabbage on or about June 1, 2020.  
117. Like the rest of the company, Relator worked from home, with most 
intraoffice communication happening via Slack. Weekly team meetings and 
Town Halls still occurred but were conducted over Webex, using a Slack channel 
for questions. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 31 of 57 PageID #:  31

-32- 
118. Even as Kabbage began to roll out reports extolling its own performance as 
a PPP Lender, Relator and other Kabbage employees became increasingly 
uncomfortable with the way the PPP money was being distributed.  
119. With his role in collections, Relator was attuned to typical Kabbage loan 
processing verifications, as well as the way safeguards had been steadily lowered 
over the past year. But upon returning to work, he found that even the remaining 
verification rules had been largely suspended when it came to PPP Loans.  
120. In addition, verifications were being performed by contractors and URS, 
who received only the barest training. 
121. During the first week Relator was back, he was inundated with requests to 
assist in complying with OIG subpoenas, which sought information on PPP 
borrowers. These requests were going to the also-understaffed legal department, 
which had lost several positions in the furlough and lay off that had not been 
backfilled.  
122. By June 8, a week after his return, Relator was swamped with concerns 
from the customer reps about the PPP loan process.  
123. Relator had a variety of Slack conversations with managers on customer-
facing parts of the credit operations team, including sales, customer service, 
collections, and billing, trying to help the customer reps learn what documents 
would be appropriate verifications, who they could talk to for verification 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 32 of 57 PageID #:  32

-33- 
purposes, how to address issues with applicants, and so on. Notably, this was 
months into the program. 
124. Reports of suspicious activities continued to pile up. Customer service reps 
reported to Relator that there were many instances in which people stated that 
they had been misled into applying for PPP loans by “accountants” (sometimes 
actual accountants, but more often “business consultants,” or in the Spanish-
speaking communities, “notarios”). These borrowers told customer service reps 
that they did not have a business and had not intended to apply for a loan; the 
form had been filled out for them and they had merely been advised that they 
were entitled to “COVID relief money.”  
125. Others called in to report neighbors and relatives who had been paid to 
apply for loans that had been funded, and in one instance, a woman called in to 
beg the Kabbage rep to tell her friend “not to do this fraud.”  
126. To Relator’s frustration, there was no process for following up on these 
calls or reporting them to any regulatory body such as FinCEN. Moreover, with 
only three people assigned to fraud reporting, there was nowhere near adequate 
staff to review the volume of reports. 
127. Another issue was that when deposited into the accounts provided by 
borrowers, loans were being returned by banks under the NACHA Rules 
because they appeared fraudulent on their face.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 33 of 57 PageID #:  33

-34- 
128. Some of these surface-level fraud indicators included PPP loans sent to a 
person who did not own a business and who had opened the account the week 
before; PPP loans sent to a bank that did not service business accounts; and 
attempts to “deposit” PPP loan funds onto a prepaid debit card.  
129. On one memorable Thursday morning, the company opened to find that 
thousands of loans had been returned overnight in what became known 
internally as the “Wednesday Night Massacre.” These thousands of loans had 
been flagged by the SBA as “duplicates.” 
130. As part of the collections department, Relator had a growing concern that 
he and his colleagues would eventually be tasked with collecting loans that had 
been issued without even basic questions being asked, let alone properly 
verified.  
131. The loans seemed destined to go to collections, because, as he and his 
coworkers explicitly discussed, “bogus accounts don’t apply for forgiveness.” 
When the bogus loans defaulted, Relator worried that lack of proper verification 
procedures would mean Kabbage would be unable to invoke the SBA guarantee, 
unable to service the loans, and unable to even identify the borrowers to make 
collection efforts. He was also concerned that ultimately the losses from these 
fraudulent loans would fall on collections’ books, and that his department would 
be required to handle reconciliation with the SBA. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 34 of 57 PageID #:  34

-35- 
132. Trying to suss out whether the concerns he was hearing were isolated or 
systemic, Relator spoke with an employee in “fraud operations” who was 
charged with investigating—manually—if a loan was reported as suspicious. He 
also spoke with the associate in financial operations, who was the point of 
contact when loans were returned by banks as fraudulent on their face.  
133. Hearing nothing that reassured him—to the contrary, both employees 
were dealing with daily and escalating problems—by the end of the second week 
in June, Relator had decided to escalate the issue by approaching the Head of 
policy, a lobbyist who had been part of the team that had worked to have 
Kabbage approved as a PPP lender.  
134. Relator asked the Policy Head to clarify what the policies and procedures 
for PPP fraud reporting were. He was told that in addition to the usual method 
of sending an email to “legal@kabbage” (which created a ticket in the work flow 
system), he should add a copy to a specific attorney. 
135. He was further told that, because the system was backlogged, he should 
also instruct reps to drop issues into a new, special Slack channel created for the 
fraud operations rep. 
136. Within hours, the fraud operations rep was objecting to the new system in 
most strenuous terms, stating that “just dropping [sic] cases in slack is not 
helpful! I have a backlog of 500 cases! Im [sic] sure a lot of those are ALSO 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 35 of 57 PageID #:  35

-36- 
FRAUD THAT I NEED TO LOOK AT[.] I CANNOT DO ALL OF IT [.] i [sic] am 
also the ONLY PERSON on this team reviewing Payments which by the way, 
ZERO FRAUD RULES [.] ITS [sic] ALL MANUAL.” 
137. Based on this response, Relator reported back to the Policy Head that the 
new system was not working. With apparent frustration, the Policy Head stated 
that the situation was not what he and Spencer Robinson had agreed to, and that 
he would come back with something to address it. However, to Relator’s 
knowledge there was never any programmatic response. 
138. By the third week in June, with no adequate response, Relator encouraged 
the reps to ask about the practices at the upcoming weekly Town Hall, which 
was held via Webex on June 25, 2020.  
139. During that meeting, a sales rep asked something to the effect of, “we seem 
to be having a lot of fraud, what is happening? What are we doing? We don’t 
have a lot of guidance. Please speak on that.”  
140. The question was echoed by several other employees, who shared 
“reactions” on Slack with emojis. 
141. As usual, Petralia and Frohwein tossed the question to the department 
Heads. The Policy Head reiterated the maxim, “if you see something, say 
something,” but provided no direction on where to actually “say something” or 
how to report. Spencer Robinson, Strategy Head, followed that with a statement 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 36 of 57 PageID #:  36

-37- 
about “how our numbers are looking,” and suggested that the fraud rate was 
“between 2 and 12 percent,” a number that no one thought was remotely 
accurate.  
142. There was no other follow up and no other related questions were 
answered. 
B. Kabbage’s Reckless Failure to Perform Its Duties 
143. The following issues in the PPP program at Kabbage were observed by 
Relator directly or brought to his attention by others in the company and verified 
by Relator. 
144. Identity Verification: Kabbage qualified applications and issued loans 
that had the wrong Social Security Number on the loan documents that the 
customer themselves had provided. On three occasions, this was brought to the 
attention of customer service by the affected parties themselves. These 
applications should never have been able to reach that stage without the SSNs at 
least matching one another. 
145. On a limited and short review, Relator identified at least three instances 
where an SSN check was either not performed, or the error was not corrected 
prior to submission and approval by the SBA. At least two of these instances, the 
reps were directed by a lead sales rep to just have the customers sign documents 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 37 of 57 PageID #:  37

-38- 
with known incorrect SSN so that Kabbage could go ahead and send out the 
money. 
146. Business Organization Type Verification: There were often mismatches 
between Business Organization Type and the name of businesses taking out 
loans. For example, customers who included “LLC” or “Inc.” in their business 
names often listed their Business Organization Type as a sole proprietorship 
rather than S-Corp or Single LLC.  
147. Kabbage did not require articles of incorporation or other documents to 
validate the existence of a statutory entity like a corporation or LLC.  
148. Any account that claimed to be a sole proprietorship was evaluated solely 
on the alignment of personal information provided by the applicant. 
Accordingly, applications were approved that did not meet even basic business 
organization type verification. 
149. The reason for this is clear when reviewing the URS PPP Loan Document 
Review Guide for reviewing “Organizational docs,” which states: 
This is easy! If there is anything uploaded under the Request Type: 
Organizational Document [...] or Request Type: Articles of 
Organization, enter y in Column O and move on! There is no need to 
open this document. 
 
150. Business Eligibility Verification: Kabbage determined if businesses were 
in an ineligible industry based solely on the NAICS code selected by the 
applicant in the application.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 38 of 57 PageID #:  38

-39- 
151. However, NAICS code was not treated as a mandatory field for the 
Kabbage application.  
152. There was no routine substantive investigation into either business activity 
or revenue.  
153. On a number of accounts personally reviewed by Relator, Kabbage 
accepted customer-generated invoices with no identifying information and bank 
statements that showed only Social Security Payments and Retirement Annuity 
deposits as proof of operation. 
154. Payroll Data Verification: Kabbage accepted revenue information that 
was entirely unverified, relying solely on unfiled tax documents, i.e., the “form 
fill” versions of tax documents available on the IRS website.  
155. This was accepted even when the information placed applicants in the top 
10% of earners nationwide, despite their businesses having no advertising, no 
documentation of revenue aside from the unsigned, unfiled tax form, and being 
in industries that traditionally carry an average annual salary of $20,000-40,000. 
156. W-3 Issue: For a time, Kabbage also ignored the requirement that if 
customers provided a W-3, and the gross wages paid averaged out to more than 
$100,000 per employee, the Lender was obliged to request a W-2 for each 
employee that is paid more than $100,000.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 39 of 57 PageID #:  39

-40- 
157. Several accounts were processed without this W-2 request, and a number 
of those were found to be fraud after a sales rep’s manual review identified the 
issue. In that instance, the accounts were revealed to be part of a fraud ring that 
had been presenting identical W-3s.  
158. Some of these loans were funded and were not caught by Kabbage’s 
automatic processes for either identify verification and fraud prevention, not to 
mention the general revenue calculation issue presented by the W-3.  
159. This specific W-3 issue was eventually addressed after several fraud rings 
were identified, but it remained unclear whether Kabbage prioritized customer 
input versus supplied documentation, nor was there any guidance on how to 
address a discrepancy. 
160. Directions for reviewing W3s are likewise indicative of the lack of care 
afforded to the review, as shown in the URS PPP Document Review Guide: 
What if I get a .jpeg or handwritten version of the W3? 
Both are good as long as it is in official IRS format. 
What should I do if the company I’m reviewing has multiple W3s? 
Check the companies names of the W3s because it’s most likely the 
case that they are applying through multiple companies. If the W3s 
have different names, highlight the column yellow (no need to 
complete), and list in the comments that there were multiple filings 
in one application. If the W3s have the same company name, add the 
W-3 amounts together. 
What if my W3 has two states with multiple values stacked on top of 
each other in Box 17? 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 40 of 57 PageID #:  40

-41- 
Sum the cumulative total of both boxes and record in the Box 17 
column of your GExcel sheet 
161. Bank verification: Lenders deposit PPP funds into the account designated 
by the borrower. Kabbage implemented no controls to stop customers from 
linking to banks that could not receive deposits, such as Chime, Greendot, 
MetaBank, and prepaid cards. This generated loan returns under the NACHA 
Rules, as explained below. 
162. The National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) has 
established rules that govern the transfer of funds via electronic checks in the 
United States. The NACHA rules require that Originating Depository Financial 
Institutions (ODFI) and Receiving Depository Financial Institutions (RDFI) 
follow guidelines regarding suspicious transactions in order to remain inside 
safe harbor provisions that shield them from liability for profiting from financial 
crimes. These rules set limits on various aspects of electronic instruments and 
provide financial and other penalties for violations. 
163. One obligation of an RDFI is to have procedures in place that 
automatically return funds that are appear fraudulent on their face. With respect 
to PPP loans, some of these surface-level fraud indicators include PPP loans sent 
to a person who does not own a business and who opened the account the week 
before; PPP loans sent to a bank that does not service business accounts; and 
attempts to “deposit” PPP loan funds onto a prepaid debit card.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 41 of 57 PageID #:  41

-42- 
164. It would be difficult to meet the Lender requirements for PPP Loans and 
still fail to notice the very basic discrepancies that would trigger an automated 
loan return from an RDFI.  
165. As with these other matters, this bank verification should have been done 
before submission.  
166. For instance, Relator observed specifically that Chime, Greendot, and 
Metabank accounts did not trigger a check request, but they did trigger a return 
when Kabbage attempted to transmit PPP funds into them, as happened on 
many occasions, 
167. When this return happened, the primary remedy was to link a new 
account rather than perform a more thorough review. 
168. When Relator and others objected, risk team management would argue 
that “we can’t prove that it is fraud” and so said that the company was obliged to 
re-issue the loan.  
169. This was a shocking position to Relator, as it turns the normal course of 
underwriting on its head. Normally, customers must establish who they are so 
that they can receive funds. But for PPP loans, Kabbage was requiring reps to 
issue funds unless there was some concrete proof of fraud.  
170. Relator had several arguments on Slack about issue management in the 
risk department but was unable to change the practice. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 42 of 57 PageID #:  42

-43- 
171. The instruction to pay even when bank accounts were not verifiable led to 
manually adding new bank channels by adding in routing and account number 
and using hastily acquired and sometimes forged documents, such as Direct 
Deposit forms and bank letters. These are not an acceptable verification for 
lending purposes and Kabbage would never have previously accepted them.  
172. If a channel was unable to be verified by Yodlee, many were verified solely 
by Kabbage Deposit Verification via a micro deposit, with no indication of 
ownership or contents of the channel, and no requirement for secondary review 
of the transaction data. 
173. In relying on Kabbage Deposit Verification to link substantially more bank 
channels than it normally would, Kabbage faced substantial issues with bank 
ownership and revenue verification.  
174. Kabbage faced similarly unprecedented numbers of accounts without the 
data it would ordinarily use to validate business and account ownership.  
175. While some disbursals were returned by the bank or recalled successfully 
by Kabbage and other PPP partners, it was clear that Kabbage did deposit funds 
into accounts that were not owned or controlled by an eligible business owner. 
176. This situation became so extreme that on or about July 1, 2020, Kabbage 
customer support was contacted directly by the head of fraud of Lower Michigan 
Credit Union and U.S. Bank regarding the extremely high volume of suspected 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 43 of 57 PageID #:  43

-44- 
fraudulent or otherwise suspicious transactions originating from Kabbage that 
were being stopped by their BSA/AML/CIP rules.  
177. Because there was no one in the risk department to deal with these issues 
after the senior fraud analyst’s departure, this call and others like it came to 
customer service, where it was forwarded to Relator personally. 
178. The URS PPP Document Review Guide provided this instruction with 
respect to bank account verification: 
What if the ID doesn’t match the name of the account owner? 
Put a Y in the Govt ID column and note ID doesn’t match account 
owner in comments 
179. Customer Identification Program: Given that by its own estimates, ninety 
percent or more of Kabbage’s PPP volume was made up of new customers, 
Kabbage was required to have applied a risk-based review, compliant with 
BSA/AML guidelines, of the information they provided. Per FAQ 28, this 
background check should have been completed prior to submission to the SBA. 
180. Instead, as noted above, loans were submitted to the SBA and only then 
did Kabbage perform a secondary review on some of the loan files.  
181. As part of that secondary review, the Kabbage system often would throw 
out a “Manual Identity Verification Flag” or other flag, which indicated that the 
account was suspicious. Only then would Kabbage request a standard package 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 44 of 57 PageID #:  44

-45- 
of Know Your Customer (KYC)/Know Your Business (KYB)/Customer 
Identification Program (CIP) documents as a follow up to SBA approval.  
182. This is a document package that is held by other institutions for every 
applicant either as part of their existing relationship or as a due diligence process 
before opening a new account. 
183. A supervisory rep on the PPP side was asked on Slack how to clear a 
Manual Identity Verification Flag. His response is illuminating, since it shows 
steps that should have been done prior to submission, not post hoc, and not only 
if a Manual Identity Verification Flag was thrown.  
184. Specifically, his response indicated that Kabbage was accepting “null” in 
an account holder name; that reps were only asking for a voided check if there 
was an actual mismatch between account information and application 
information; that skip tracing had not yet been done by this point to identify the 
customer via social security number or some other identification beyond what 
was originally received; that EIN letters were being treated equally with filed tax 
documents; and that outbound voice checks on telephone numbers were being 
done with applicant provided numbers.  
185. Know Your Customer/Know Your Business: As with the Customer 
Identification Program, this is another instance of overall verification that was 
too little, too late.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 45 of 57 PageID #:  45

-46- 
186. During the PPP loan program, if something triggered a check for 
KYC/KYB, Kabbage used Lexis and Clear to verify the business and the 
authorized representative, and to perform Ultimate Beneficial Owner checks. 
187. However, unless applicants volunteered the information, there was 
nothing to trigger a review of who, in fact, owned a business or whether the 
owner was, in fact, involved with the PPP application. 
188. Any business identified as a General Partnership ought to have been 
subject to UBO review automatically, as a General Partnership requires an equal 
division of ownership among two or more individuals.  
189. Relator found no indication that these reviews were required or 
undertaken. Instead, Kabbage relied on the applicant to tell it who owned the 
company.  
190. No effort was made to go beyond the name, and there was no requirement 
that representatives seek documentation (such as from tax forms) to determine 
whether there were multiple owners.  
191. Relator did not see any account for which a UBO Verification was 
performed without either customer input or manual review identifying a 
problem.  
192. Checks for inaccurate, insufficient, or fictitious documentation: Internal 
reports indicate that 75% of applications were fully automated, with no clear 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 46 of 57 PageID #:  46

-47- 
information on what particular criteria were being applied to verify documents 
or to ensure that they logically connect with applicants in meaningful ways.  
193. Relator does know that Kabbage was accepting unfiled taxes and other 
documents that are available to anyone via the IRS website. Such documents 
would appear genuine as they are indeed IRS forms, but they are not reflected in 
bank statements, nor are they helpful in creating a realistic look at a customer’s 
financial state.  
194. There was no system in place to validate an applicant’s income aside from 
reviewing their tax forms through Inscribe, which did not catch most issues since 
the form is downloaded from the IRS website that has not been “altered” but 
instead filled in with patently false or otherwise extremely suspicious 
information, such as identical W3 or other wage and earnings statements. 
195. Internal documentation issues: At the most basic level, internal guidance 
and documentation were extremely sparse.  
196. There was no central repository of policies and procedures, and no way of 
indicating which prior procedures were outdated, nor was there any notification 
when updates were made.  
197. Given that the PPP loan program rules were constantly evolving, this 
created a great deal of confusion and contributed to the difficulty that sales reps 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 47 of 57 PageID #:  47

-48- 
were having in identifying and reporting suspicious activity, as well as 
identifying dubious documents or requests. 
198. What documentation did exist was simply not being followed.  
199. Kabbage did create a document known as the “Overview of Paycheck 
Protection Loan Program BSA/AML Procedures,” but as to Items 2 (use of a 
different geolocation for the business and signing into Kabbage), 3 (requesting 
changes to profile or bank account after qualification), 7 (triangulation of data 
indicates suspicious behavior), 8 (applicant questions need for documentation), 9 
(applicant withdraws application after documents are requested), and 10 
(account review team indicates suspicious facts), Kabbage not only did not have 
meaningful controls or guidance, Relator observed that the company was 
actively doing the opposite in many cases and simply issuing the loan, even if it 
required changing the initial information provided by the borrower. 
200. Similarly, Kabbage’s documentation stated that: 
On a weekly basis, the Account Review team Manager pulls 3 tickets 
from each Account Review team member’s queue for a quality 
control check. The tickets are reviewed against the documented 
process for each ticket type. Sales Force notes are reviewed to 
confirm ticket disposition. 
201. However, for much of the time of the PPP loan process, there simply was 
no “Account Review team Manager.”  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 48 of 57 PageID #:  48

-49- 
202. Even had this review been conducted, on its face it only included the 
Account Review team, and not the three fraud review team members. And even 
if implemented, it would have resulted in a review of only 36 to 42 accounts per 
rep over the course of the PPP program. 
203. Suspicious Activity Monitoring and Reporting: Kabbage did not provide 
even estimated fraud rates for the PPP program. To the extent these metrics are 
obscured, it was impossible to say that fraudulent activity was being tracked and 
monitored.  
204. More specifically, as of June 26, 2020, there had not been uniform guidance 
on reporting suspicious activity aside from escalating a ticket to the account 
review team.  
205. As Kabbage began asking customers with dead-ended applications to 
resubmit, it did not identify accounts that share a device unless one of the 
accounts sharing the device had already been identified as fraud by manual 
review.  
206. To the extent accounts were not identified as suspicious, they were not 
flagged for having matching devices to other applications in their own name or 
in any other name. 
207. Staffing: Finally, Relator believed that lack of staffing was an important 
reason why Kabbage was unable to respond to suspicious activity reports.  
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 49 of 57 PageID #:  49

-50- 
208. Even though the account volumes being processed dwarfed any other 
three-month period in Kabbage’s history, there were many gaps in the 
organizational structure that had gone unfilled for years, and even more after the 
layoffs at the start of the pandemic.  
209. Although URS continued to perform post hoc reviews, it had no direct line 
of communication to the Kabbage customer-facing teams, nor did it perform 
reviews pre-submission. 
C. 
Specific Loan Examples 
210. Relator discovered these specific loans with issues, which are identified 
herein by their internal identifier, the Kabbage User ID (KUID). 
211. KUID 2311046 – Customer’s allegedly unfiled but prepared tax return 
provides a Routing Number of Liberty Bank situated in Middletown, 
Connecticut. If customer had not filed this form (it says that it is not final and not 
to file it in big letters), then why did the deposit account for the sole proprietor 
business differ so wildly from the place a direct deposit refund should go for a 
sole proprietor? Risk and Sales managers overrode the decision of the agent to 
not accept the documents the customer had submitted as not conforming to BSA 
guidelines. 
212. KUID 2341369 – Customer kept getting fraud flags, and Kabbage kept 
clearing them. Business and personal information were an exact duplicate. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 50 of 57 PageID #:  50

-51- 
Outbound verification done via phone number on file; phone numbers Accurint 
associates with the customer are different. First filed August 2019. File name 
“1099-misc-efile-2019-edited(19).pdf,” which obviously would be the default 
name for a file that was duplicated eighteen prior times and not renamed.  
213. KUID 2398765 – Kabbage accepted an expired driver’s license to verify 
identity. 
214. KUID 2234620 – The applicant offered a New Jersey corporate certificate 
for a California place of business. LLC had not been filed for foreign registration 
in California, the email was from a dead website domain, and the applicant 
provided the business address of which he did not appear to be an owner or 
even an employee. Yet the primary reason this account did not fund was because 
the customer took too long to sign loan documents. 
215. KUID 780155 – The customer was an LLC, which claimed to be a Single 
LLC, then changed to Sole Proprietor when asked for tax documents (even 
though name indicated two owners). The corporation is housed in Alaska, all 
addresses were in Colorado, the customer provided a receipt from the Alaskan 
government for Corporation Franchise Taxes. This loan was disbursed. 
216. KUIDs 2334451 and 2216841 – had exactly the same W-3, for two different 
businesses, $1.5 million in loans were approved between the two of them. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 51 of 57 PageID #:  51

-52- 
217. KUID 2298451 – Customer has 2018 tax return for $35,000 with W-2s, but 
then purportedly made over $100k cutting hair in 2019. 
218. KUID 2321678 – Customer provided information that did not match: 
Accurint showed a different primary address, the secondary address was on the 
list but with an apartment number that was not included in the application. The 
customer’s bank statement matched the tertiary address in Accurint. Kabbage 
performed an outbound verification to what seemed to be the wife’s phone, 
whose primary address in Accurint is also different from the applicant’s. 
219. KUID 2322529, 2320438, 2322745, 2322674, 2345778, 2321982, 2318397, 
2320902 – These KUIDS were sent to Relator from a rep: someone called in and 
was trying to get all of these applications pushed through. They were very 
similar loan amounts, and they were all sole proprietorships with the same 
income amounts on their 1040-Cs, yet they were spread out through the country. 
220. KUID 2313656 – Customer listed as an LLC, provided Partnership Tax 
documents, UBO at 100%. Website is closed. Address was not a retail store, but a 
home. 
221. KUID 1871628 –Articles list two owners and an authorized party. Business 
listed as a Sole Proprietorship. Name includes LLC. Primary place of business 
was not listed on the application. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 52 of 57 PageID #:  52

-53- 
222. KUID 1857607 – Customer was approved for an amount as a sole 
proprietor. Email leads to a financial group and to an LLC.  Customer’s offer 
expired, was resubmitted, upon an issue with the resubmitted loan amount, 
customer’s account was identified as a prohibited industry and an LLC, not a 
sole proprietorship. 
223. KUID 1978610 – Customer had an "SBA Duplicate Tax ID in E-Tran" flag. 
They claimed not yet to have a loan for this Tax ID, although they were 
approved for another business as a sole proprietor with Kabbage already (KUID 
1976436) The Tax ID numbers were not the same and they claim they haven't 
gone anywhere else for a loan. Email address led to a hedge fund.  
224. KUID 1978854 – Customer attempted to change bank account by having 
email address send in a voided check for a new account that needs to be linked. 
This account was specifically cleared by URS Tech Solutions on May 6, 2020. 
225. KUIDS 2310626, 2212457, 2288398, 2224967, 2212040, and 2187966 –
accounts are linked by device ID to confirmed fraud KUID 2355279, which was 
flagged for device velocity. Risk says “Customers Docs Check out” but does not 
clear fraud flags, indicating that the customers’ documents would have been 
accepted if not for the matching device ID for the other fraudulent accounts. 
226. The following KUIDs represent accounts for which the SSN on the 
application and loan documents did not match the actual SSN for the applicants. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 53 of 57 PageID #:  53

-54- 
In these instances, the discrepancy was pointed out by the applicants themselves, 
which shows that there was no systemic review happening. The first three of 
these applications signed SBA loan documents. KUID 2249152 –transposed 
digits; KUID 2413009 – showing husband’s SSN; KUID 2357798 and 2415315 -- 
customer requested all accounts be removed so they could add to 2143750. For 
this last example, the names did not match but the SSN and the DOB did match, 
and the business name included “Inc” but reported business structure was LLC. 
Threatmatrix Device Rules 
227. Numerous fraud rings were discovered on the basis of a single suspicious 
account being reviewed by fraud ops for matching device ID. However, Kabbage 
did not choose to review for device rules unless there was first an outside, 
independent verification of a fraudulent application that originated from that 
device. There are several rings of these with numerous qualified applications, as 
they are voluminous and repetitive, as the connected GUIDs number into the 
hundreds. 
228. For example, these accounts all came from the same device and submitted 
the exact same W-3: E0EEC563-F637-4674-B7E1-E6AFA85B1C3B; F9B48C41-
994C-4C7C-9998-9534349AFC0B; 83EB9C41-E3DB-44D1-8FB3-97250F8A7E56; 
5867D687-030C-4C0F-AD12-31AD1C818C07; 5B764677-B388-4229-B6F4-
674B3D81742D; 66D89702-4663-46E0-BF76-8DE5B6723596; 83F6AC34-D21F-
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 54 of 57 PageID #:  54

-55- 
4AA9-9167-78948E150770; AE1EC42E-E434-45C6-A797-037726254A9C; 
4F2CFE0D-8718-4CC0-98C6-CB25792E12CB; 62A21B6E-C993-422D-A675-
87FE5344A00C; 74EBD668-D119-45F0-90E6-EDA69ABB4F23; D0D1AFC6-C95B-
47DE-A978-D82555517457; 80BC1925-7DF9-45F9-BBE9-FE4AB4090624. 
229. After seeing no changes from his efforts to stop the fraud, Relator became 
increasingly disillusioned.  
230. He spent his final few months at Kabbage trying to “stop the bleeding” 
and assisting with efforts to prepare the Kabbage loans for K Servicing as part of 
the Amex deal, because, by September, almost all of the Kabbage loans had been 
charged off and would be handled entirely by third party collections agencies. 
231. On or about October 15, 2021, Relator was notified that he was terminated 
as part of the Amex transition.  
232. As part of that transaction, Frohwein and Petralia both received a 
$13,320,000 “Retention Award.” Spencer Robinson received a $2,400,000 
Retention Award.  
COUNT I 
VIOLATIONS OF 31 U.S.C. § 3729 – FEDERAL FCA 
 
233. Relator hereby incorporates and realleges all other paragraphs as if fully set 
forth herein. 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 55 of 57 PageID #:  55

-56- 
234. As set forth above, Defendants knowingly presented or caused to be 
presented false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval, in violation of 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
235. As set forth above, Defendants knowingly made, used, or caused to be made 
or used, false records or statements material to false or fraudulent claims, in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
236. Due to Defendants’ conduct, the United States Government has suffered 
substantial monetary damages and is entitled to recover treble damages and a civil 
penalty for each false claim, record, or statement. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
237. Relator is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
 
WHEREFORE, Relator prays for judgment against Defendants: 
(a) awarding the United States treble damages sustained by it for each of 
the false claims; 
(b) awarding the United States a maximum civil penalty for each of the 
false claims and statements; 
(c) awarding Relator the maximum share of the proceeds of this action 
and any alternate remedy or the settlement of any such claim; 
(d) awarding Relator litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and 
Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 56 of 57 PageID #:  56

Case 4:21-cv-00110-SDJ     Document 1     Filed 02/05/21     Page 57 of 57 PageID #:  57

File and source

File

ECF_1_RECAP.pdf

Size

1,239,718 bytes

SHA-256

13e13d18eeec87e5d0669874949e198659b9129d9071128b0170b9082908598a

Our copy

ECF_1_RECAP.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)