Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction — Norris v. Stanley

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
 
JEANNA NORRIS, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. 1:21-cv-756 
-v- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Hon. Paul L. Maloney 
SAMUEL L. STANLEY, JR., ET AL.,  
 
) 
 
 
 
Defendants.  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jeanna Norris’s motion for preliminary 
injunction (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the Michigan 
State University (“MSU”) vaccine mandate policy. This Court previously denied Plaintiff’s 
motion for a temporary restraining order, which sought the same relief (ECF No. 3).  
I. 
A trial court may issue a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
65. A district court has discretion to grant or deny preliminary injunctions. Planet Aid v. City 
of St. Johns, Mich., 782 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir. 2015). A court must consider each of four 
factors: (1) whether the moving party demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the 
merits; (2) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable injury without the order; (3) 
whether the order would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest 
would be served by the order. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless & Service Employees Int’l 
Union v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
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The four factors are not prerequisites that must be established at the outset but are 
interconnected considerations that must be balanced together. Northeast Ohio Coalition, 
467 F.3d at 1009; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 244 
(6th Cir. 2006). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be 
granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly 
demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst, 39 F. App’x 964, 
967 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Smith 
Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 873 n. 13 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Sixth 
Circuit has noted that “[a]lthough the four factors must be balanced, the demonstration of 
some irreparable injury is a sine qua non for issuance of an injunction.” Patio Enclosures, 39 
F. App’x at 967 (citing Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 
(6th Cir. 1982)). 
II. 
A. Factor I: Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim hinges in significant 
measure on the standard of review that this Court must apply given existing appellate 
authority. “If a protected class or fundamental right is involved, [the court] must apply strict 
scrutiny, but where no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated, [the court] must apply 
rational basis review.” Midkiff v. Adams Cty. Reg’l Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 770 (6th Cir. 
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2005). Because this Court finds that no fundamental right is implicated in the present matter, 
the Court must apply a rational basis standard. 
Under rational basis, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the policy in question 
is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Under rational basis review, the 
governmental policy at issue “will be afforded a strong presumption of validity” and must be 
upheld as long as there is a rational relationship between the policy in question and some 
legitimate government purpose. Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). Further, “a plaintiff faces a severe burden 
and must ‘negate all possible rational justifications for the distinction.’” Midkiff, 409 F.3d at 
770 (quoting Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 771 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
Although Plaintiff advocates that strict scrutiny should apply because MSU’s vaccine 
policy violates her fundamental rights to privacy and bodily integrity under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this argument is without merit. Plaintiff is absolutely correct that she possesses 
those rights, but there is no fundamental right to decline a vaccination. See Hanzel v. Arter, 
625 F. Supp. 1259, 1261-63) (explaining that “contraception, abortion, and vaccination” all 
involve bodily autonomy, yet bodily autonomy has not been deemed a “fundamental” right). 
She also does not have a constitutionally protected interest in her job at MSU, which 
Plaintiff’s counsel conceded. The MSU vaccine policy does not force Plaintiff to forgo her 
rights to privacy and bodily autonomy, but if she chooses not to be vaccinated, she does not 
have the right to work at MSU at the same time (see ECF No. 7 at PageID.347-48) (discussing 
that Plaintiff, as an at-will employee, does not have a constitutionally protected property 
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interest in her job). The MSU vaccine policy does not violate any of Plaintiff’s fundamental 
rights. 
Plaintiff attempted to distinguish her case from Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 
11 (1905) but was unsuccessful. She argues that her case is different because Jacobson never 
considered natural immunity, and because the policy in Jacobson was subject to 
bicameralism and presentment to the Massachusetts legislature, while the MSU policy was 
not. First, the asserted factual differences between Jacobson and Plaintiff’s case are not 
relevant. Over the last year and a half, courts have looked to Jacobson to infer that a rational 
basis standard applies to generally applicable vaccine mandates; the facts of the case are 
obviously not going to be identical to every COVID vaccine case that has been or is currently 
being litigated. See, e.g., Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) 
(“Plaintiffs assert that the rational-basis standard used in Jacobson does not offer enough 
protection for their interests and that courts should not be as deferential to the decisions of 
public bodies as Jacobson was, but a court of appeals must apply the law established by the 
Supreme Court.”); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (stating that Jacobson essentially applied a rational basis standard); 
Harris v. Univ. of Mass., Lowell, No. 21-cv-11244-DJC, 2021 WL 3848012 (D. Mass. Aug. 
27, 2021) (applying rational basis to the university’s “generally applicable public health 
measure[]”). This Court must apply the law from the Supreme Court: Jacobson essentially 
applied rational basis review and found that the vaccine mandate was rational in “protect[ing] 
the public health and public safety.” 197 U.S. at 25-26. The Court cannot ignore this binding 
precedent. 
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Similarly unpersuasive is Plaintiff’s unconstitutional conditions argument. See Koontz 
v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 606 (2013) (“[T]he unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively 
withholding benefits from those who exercise them.”). To succeed under this argument, 
Plaintiff would first have to identify an enumerated right that the vaccine policy coerces her 
into giving up. See id. at 604. As stated above, the MSU vaccine mandate does not violate 
any of Plaintiff’s fundamental rights, so this argument cannot succeed. 
Given that rational basis applies to this case, the burden is on Plaintiff to show that 
the MSU vaccine mandate is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
Plaintiff provided evidence in the form of testimony and declarations from an expert witness 
who stated that naturally acquired immunity is just as effective as vaccine immunity (see ECF 
No. 12). She thus argued that it was irrational for MSU to not carve out an exemption in its 
vaccine mandate for individuals like herself who have naturally acquired immunity from a 
previous COVID infection. On the other hand, Defendants presented competing evidence 
from their own expert witness that refuted the effectiveness of naturally acquired immunity 
(see ECF No. 9-1, 17). The Court heard the battle of the experts, and they essentially 
presented that there is ongoing scientific debate about the effectiveness of naturally acquired 
immunity versus vaccine immunity. In creating its vaccine policy, Defendants relied on 
guidance from the CDC, FDA, MDHHS, and other federal and state agencies that have 
extensively studied the COVID-19 vaccine. Put plainly, even if there is vigorous ongoing 
discussion about the effectiveness of natural immunity, it is rational for MSU to rely on 
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present federal and state guidance in creating its vaccine mandate.
1 Thus, Plaintiff has failed 
to show that the MSU vaccine mandate does not meet rational basis. She is unlikely to 
succeed on the merits of her claim.
2 
Finally, the Court notes a recent case out of the Central District of California: Kheriaty 
v. Regents of the University of California, No. 8:21-cv-01367 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021). The 
facts of this case are very similar to the present case. In Kheriaty, a professor at the University 
of California claimed to be naturally immune to COVID-19 due to a COVID infection he 
suffered in 2020, just as Ms. Norris. Id. at 1. He sought an injunction preventing the 
University from enforcing its vaccine mandate against him because he alleged his prior 
infection gave him superior immunity to COVID than vaccinated individuals. Id. In denying 
Mr. Kheriaty’s injunctive relief, the district court applied a rational basis standard under 
Jacobson and found that despite competing studies and evidence on natural immunity, it was 
not irrational for the University to implement a vaccine mandate. Id. at 8. The University 
relied on CDC guidance and clinical trials that supported the effectiveness of the COVID 
 
1 See, e.g., New CDC Study: Vaccination Offers Higher Protection Than Previous COVID-19 Infection, CDC (Aug. 6, 
2021, 1:00 PM), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/s0806-vaccination-protection.html. The Court also notes the 
letter from U.S. Senator Roger Marshall of Kansas, himself an M.D., and co-signed by fellow Doctors Caucus members 
of the House and Senate, urging the CDC to recognize COVID-19 natural immunity in future guidance policies. The 
letter references studies identifying the efficacy of natural immunity. 
2 Plaintiff makes two alternative arguments for why she is likely to succeed on the merits. First, she argues that MSU did 
not have the power to implement its vaccine mandate in the first place because it is exercising police power in doing so, 
and the Michigan legislature has never delegated such power to MSU. This argument is completely without merit because 
the Michigan Constitution gives MSU’s “governing board[] authority over ‘the absolute management of the University.’” 
Mich. Const. art. 8 § 5. MSU certainly has the power to implement its vaccine policy because the Board of Trustees has 
the broad power to govern the university. Second, Plaintiff argues that the MSU vaccine policy is preempted under the 
federal Emergency Use Authorization (“EUA”) statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3. She argues that the vaccine mandate 
“actually conflicts” with the EUA, and it is thus preempted (ECF No. 4-1 at PageID.210). The basis of Plaintiff’s 
argument is that the EUA requires medical providers to obtain informed consent from individuals receiving an EUA 
vaccination and to provide those individuals the option to accept or refuse administration of that vaccine. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II). MSU’s policy does not preclude Plaintiff from receiving informed consent, nor does it 
prevent her from accepting or refusing administration of the vaccine. Rather, the vaccine is a condition of employment, 
which Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected interest in. There is no preemption issue here.  
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vaccine, which is enough to meet rational basis. Id. at 3. Specifically regarding competing 
evidence on natural immunity versus vaccine immunity, the court stated, “merely drawing 
different conclusions based on consideration of scientific evidence does not render the 
Vaccine Policy arbitrary and irrational.” Id. at 10. Although the Court recognizes that 
Kheriaty is merely persuasive authority, it strengthens the Court’s position that a rational 
basis standard applies to the present matter and that a university policy choice in its vaccine 
mandate is not irrational. 
B. Factor II: Irreparable Harm 
An irreparable harm is an extraordinary harm that cannot be properly compensated 
by money damages. See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Plaintiff’s only contention 
of irreparable harm is that she will be deprived of at least one constitutional right if MSU 
enforces its vaccine mandate against her. First, as stated above, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights 
are not violated by MSU’s vaccine mandate. Second, if Plaintiff was eventually unlawfully 
terminated, she would have proper money damages (see ECF No. 7 at PageID.349-50). 
Plaintiff’s damages would be her lost wages, cost of health insurance coverage, and other 
compensable benefits that she receives from her job. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette 
Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he loss of a job is quintessentially 
reparable by money damages.”). The Court appreciates and does not discredit that if Plaintiff 
was improperly terminated, she would face a great financial burden in waiting for this case to 
be fully litigated and receive these damages. But that is not an irreparable harm. Because 
Plaintiff faces no constitutional violation and she would have proper monetary compensation 
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in the event of a wrongful termination, Plaintiff cannot show that she will face an irreparable 
harm without an injunction. 
C. Factors III & IV: The Equities 
The equities weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. 
If MSU’s vaccine mandate is not enforced, the harm to others and the public could be 
serious, according to health officials. The goal of the mandate is to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19 and keep people safe. Enjoining MSU’s policy would increase risk based on the 
current record. This factor weighs in favor of Defendants. 
D. Balancing the Factors 
All factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, so 
Plaintiff’s motion must be denied. This denial maintains the status quo by keeping the 
existing vaccine mandate in place at MSU, which is the purpose of a preliminary injunction. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (ECF 
No. 4) is DENIED. 
Date:   October 8, 2021   
 
 
 
 
/s/ Paul L. Maloney                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Maloney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
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