Information — United States v. Tracy D. Wade (Dkt. 289, S.D. Fla. No. 0:23-cr-60173)

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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW · Doc. 289 · 2025-08-15 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 23-60173-CR-WILLIAMS/GRAHAM  
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
 
 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRACY D. WADE, 
 
 
 
       Defendant. 
                                    / 
 
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION TO STAY JAIL SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL 
 
Introduction 
The United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby responds in 
opposition to the “Renewed Motion to Stay Jail Sentence Pending Appeal,” filed on behalf of 
Defendant Tracy D. Wade (“Defendant”) on August 1, 2025 (DE 288) (the “Renewed Motion to 
Stay”).  To remain on bond pending appeal, Defendant must establish that his appeal will raise a 
substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.  He has 
again failed to do so.  As the government explained in its prior response on this matter (DE 251 
at 3),1 the Eleventh Circuit defines a “substantial question” as one that is “close” or “very well 
could be decided the other way.”  The Renewed Motion to Stay presents only two legal issues as 
the basis for the requested relief, and neither comes close to meeting this high burden. 
The first issue concerns the Court’s rulings on certain evidentiary objections the defense 
made when Defendant was testifying on cross examination at trial.  Specifically, Defendant 
asserts that the Court should not have permitted the government to cross-examine Defendant about 
 
1 The United States hereby incorporates by reference its Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Stay Jail 
Sentence Pending Appeal, filed on April 12, 2025 (DE 251). 
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other SBA pandemic-relief loan applications associated with Defendant and Wade Funeral Home 
that contained materially false information.  The second issue concerns the Court’s decision not 
to provide the jury with a good-faith defense instruction.  The Court’s rulings on these two issues 
were correct, as explained herein, and will be reviewed on appeal for clear abuse of discretion.  
Under that highly deferential standard, it is extremely unlikely that the Eleventh Circuit will disturb 
either ruling, much less reverse the jury’s guilty verdict on all counts or order a new trial.  Even 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that either ruling constituted a clear abuse of discretion (and 
they certainly did not), the result would not change unless the Eleventh Circuit also found that the 
purported errors were not harmless.  That is simply implausible given the overwhelming evidence 
independently supporting the jury’s guilty verdict on all counts charged.   
For these reasons, among others discussed herein, the Bail Reform Act requires Defendant 
to serve his term of imprisonment during the pendency of his appeal.  Accordingly, the Court 
should deny the Renewed Motion to Stay, and Defendant should surrender as ordered by 2:00 p.m. 
on August 27, 2025 (DE 286). 
Pertinent Procedural History 
On March 12, 2025, the Court sentenced Defendant to a 90-day term of imprisonment for 
his seven felony convictions resulting from the October 2024 jury trial of this case, which were: 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud (Count 1), wire fraud (Counts 2-3), conspiracy to commit 
offenses against the United States (Count 4), and making false statements to the SBA (Counts 6, 
7 and 10).  The judgment directed Defendant to surrender for his sentence by April 14, 2025 (DE 
242 at 2).  On April 9, Defendant filed his initial motion to stay his sentence pending appeal (DE 
247).  As grounds for the request, the motion merely asserted that “[t]here may be legal issues 
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with the conduct of the trial” that appellate counsel had yet to identify (DE 251 at 4-5).  At a 
hearing on April 14, the Court deferred ruling of the motion to stay, granted Defendant’s ore tenus 
motion to extend his surrender date to July 28, 2025 (DE 253), and permitted Defendant to file any 
supplemental motion at least two weeks before the new surrender date.  On July 5, Defendant 
asked the Court to extend Defendant’s surrender by an additional 30 days so appellate counsel 
could obtain transcripts from a pretrial motion hearing.  In an Order entered on July 24, the Court 
directed Defendant to surrender on or before 2:00 p.m. on August 27, 2025, and advised that “[n]o 
further extensions will be granted.” (DE 286).  Defendant filed this Renewed Motion to Stay on 
August 1. 
Pertinent Facts 
The Superseding Indictment alleged that Defendant and his wife, co-Defendant Carolyn 
Wade (who was also convicted at the October 2024 trial) conspired to obtain, and obtained, PPP 
loans (and forgiveness thereof) based on materially false and fraudulent information.  It also 
alleged defendants conspired to make (and made) false statements to the SBA in connection with 
their PPP loans and loan forgiveness. 
In the government’s case in chief, the Court received in evidence, among other things: five 
PPP loan applications (each an SBA Form 2483-C) that all contained materially false information, 
including false income information for fictitious businesses (GXs 116, 117, 157, 158, and 159); 
and two PPP loan forgiveness applications (each an SBA Form 3508S) that all contained materially 
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false information, including that the borrower (Defendant) had complied with all of the PPP rules 
(GXs 118 and 160).2   
Furthermore, in the government’s case in chief, the Court received in evidence dozens of 
records establishing Defendant’s direct involvement in the application and forgiveness processes 
for his and Carolyn Wade’s fraudulent PPP loans.  Defendant’s direct involvement evidenced in 
those records included, but was not limited to, Defendant:  
 receiving 30 one-time codes to log into the website (Womply) hosting his and Carolyn 
Wade’s PPP loan applications; 
 
 performing 19 successful logins on Womply’s website (17 to his PPP loan application 
and 2 to Carolyn Wade’s PPP loan application);  
 
 making 30 modifications to the PPP loan applications (13 to his application and 17 to 
Carolyn Wade’s application);  
 
 uploading 4 bank statements and linking a bank account;  
 
 verifying his identity twice;  
 
 electronically signing (via DocuSign) PPP documents in 5 instances, and electronically 
initialing (via DocuSign) PPP documents in 38 instances;  
 
 receiving $20,833 in fraudulent PPP loan proceeds in his personal bank account; and 
  
 writing and depositing checks to fabricate payroll after receipt of the fraudulent PPP 
loan proceeds.   
 
The records in evidence establishing these facts (among others) were summarized in the 
demonstrative exhibit received in evidence as government exhibit 1000.1. 
 
2 Government exhibits 157, 158, and 159 were the virtually identical SBA Forms 2483-C that resulted in Defendant’s 
fraudulent PPP loan in the amount of $20,833 (SBA loan number 6261949003), and government exhibit 160 was the 
SBA Form 3508S that resulted in forgiveness of Defendant’s fraudulent PPP loan.  Government exhibits 116 and 117 
were the virtually identical SBA Forms 2483-C that resulted in Carolyn Wade’s fraudulent PPP loan in the amount of 
$20,833 (SBA loan number 6697269001), and government exhibit 118 was the SBA Form 3508S that resulted in 
forgiveness of Carolyn Wade’s fraudulent PPP loan.   
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In the defense case, Defendant testified on direct and cross examination that both his and 
Carolyn Wade’s PPP loan and loan forgiveness applications contained materially false 
information.  For example, he admitted that there were no businesses named “Tracy Wade” and 
“Carolyn Wade,” and that the gross income amounts represented in their PPP loan applications 
were false (that is, “$112,430” for the fictitious business “Tracy Wade” and “113,560” for the 
fictitious business “Carolyn Wade”) (10/21 Tr. at 126; 10/22 Tr. at 5).  However, Defendant 
denied that, at any point during the PPP loan application or forgiveness process, he knew there 
was any false information in the PPP loan applications, the PPP loan forgiveness, or the supporting 
documents.  Indeed, Defendant testified that he “had no idea any fraudulent activity had taken 
place” before the prosecution was initiated (10/21 Tr. At 118). 
On cross examination, the government sought to impeach Defendant’s testimony that he 
had “no idea” that his and Carolyn Wade’s PPP loans were based on false information by 
demonstrating that he was not credible.  The government did this through several lines of inquiry, 
but the line of inquiry to which Defendant objected—and raises in the Renewed Motion to Stay as 
grounds for remaining on bail pending appeal—concerned other SBA pandemic-relief loan 
applications associated with Defendant and Wade Funeral Home that contained materially false 
information. 
First, the government asked Defendant if he applied for a separate PPP loan for Wade 
Funeral Home (i.e., not the $20,833 loan for the fictious business “Tracy Wade”).  10/22 Tr. at 
33.  At sidebar, the defense objected on the ground that this inquiry related to previously excluded 
404(b) evidence (10/22 Tr. at 34-35), and that it was not relevant (10/22 Tr. at 36).  The Court 
overruled the objection, finding that the government was not offering the testimony as 404(b) 
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evidence since Defendant was now testifying (10/22 Tr. at 36-37), and that the inquiry was relevant 
because the government was “asking [Defendant] about his knowledge of other PPP loans since 
the subject of the examination is PPP loans.” (10/22 Tr. at 37).3  The government proceeded to 
ask Defendant if he was aware of a PPP loan application for Wade Funeral Home submitted on 
May 6, 2021, seeking a PPP loan in the amount of $701,878.  Defendant said he was not aware 
of that.  The government then showed Defendant documents from a PPP loan application for 
Wade Funeral Home (marked only for identification as government exhibits 168, 169, and 170 
and not offered into evidence), which was dated May 6, 2021, and sought a PPP loan of $701,878 
based on representations in the application that Wade Funeral Home had $3,368,990 in payroll 
and 45 employees.  Defendant testified that he had not seen the documents before, and that Wade 
Funeral Home never had $3 million in payroll and 45 employees. 
Second, the government asked Defendant about two applications that Defendant had 
submitted to the SBA for Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDLs) for Wade Funeral Home during 
the COVID-19 pandemic.  One EIDL application represented that Wade Funeral Home had $465 
million in revenue and $175 million in expenses for the 12-month period ending January 31, 2020; 
the other EIDL application represented that Wade Funeral Home had $350 million in revenue and 
$250 million in expenses for the same period.  The defense objected again, arguing that this 
inquiry also related to previously excluded 404(b) evidence, was not relevant, and was confusing 
under Rule 403.  The Court overruled the objection, finding that the government was not offering 
 
3 The government also confirmed for the Court at sidebar that its inquiry related to the same PPP loan application 
referenced in government exhibit 2002 in evidence, which was an email, dated May 6, 2021, with the subject line 
“wade funeral home,” along with an attachment thereto consisting of a printout from “smartbiz” referencing 
application number “6781674” for an “estimated loan amount” of “$701,873” (GX 2002).  (10/22 Tr. at 29). 
 
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the testimony as 404(b) evidence (because Defendant was testifying on cross examination), that it 
was relevant (because, among other things, Defendant had completed the application himself and 
had received the EIDL—all facts that the defense did not contest), and that it was not confusing 
(10/22 Tr. at 45-51).  The government proceeded to show Defendant (but not offer into evidence) 
the EIDL applications (marked for identification as GXs 900 and 906).  Defendant testified that 
he had applied for the EIDLs, but insisted that the two sets of inflated revenue and expenses for 
Wade Funeral Home were “clearly” typographical errors.  (10/22 Tr. at 54).  In its closing 
argument, the government argued that Defendant making two sets of different typos in two 
different EIDL applications was not credible. 
 
At the charging conference held on October 21, the Court stated that it had not yet heard 
any testimony that would raise a good-faith defense and asked, “does anyone anticipate that 
coming up?” (10/21 Tr. at 196).  In response, defense counsel articulated its position that the 
good-faith instruction applied “based upon the trust that Mr. and Mrs. Wade had with the Riveros” 
(10/21 Tr. at 197).  On this basis, the Court found that the good-faith defense had not been raised, 
but the Court stated that the defense could raise the issue again after all of the testimony was 
completed (10/21 Tr. at 197).  Because of the Court’s ruling at that point, the government reserved 
its argument that the good-faith instruction should not be given, other than to state its position 
that—regardless of any additional testimony—the instruction could never apply to the false 
statement counts because that offense does not have an element of intent to defraud (10/21 Tr. at 
197).   
During the continued charging conference held on October 22, the Court asked the defense 
if it had any cases or argument to support its position that the good-faith instruction should be 
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provided.  The defense offered no cases, no argument, and did not object when the Court stated it 
would remove the good-faith defense instruction from the jury instructions (10/22 Tr. at 66-67).     
Argument 
I. 
The challenged evidentiary rulings do not present a substantial question of law 
or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. 
 
The Court’s decision to permit the government to cross-examine Defendant about the PPP 
loan application for Wade Funeral Home and the two EIDL applications for Wade Funeral Home 
were correct evidentiary rulings.  The Eleventh Circuit reviews the district court’s evidentiary 
rulings for clear abuse of discretion.  United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).  “An abuse of discretion arises when the district court’s decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005).   
Moreover, “[t]he district court possesses broad discretion to admit evidence if it has any 
tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue” and “the court’s discretion to exclude evidence under 
Rule 403 is narrowly circumscribed.” United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1361 (11th 
Cir.1989) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 757 (11th 
Cir.1984)).  As such, exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy[,] which 
should be used only sparingly since it permits the trial court to exclude concededly probative 
evidence.’ The balance under the Rule, therefore, should be struck in favor of admissibility.”  Id.  
In reviewing such evidentiary rulings, the Eleventh Circuit “look[s] at the evidence in a light most 
favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial 
impact.”  United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir.1989). 
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Under this framework, it is extremely unlikely that the Eleventh Circuit will find that the 
Court abused its discretion with respect to the evidentiary rulings raised in the Renewed Motion 
to Stay.  Defendant’s knowledge, intent, and credibility were central issues in this case, and 
Defendant had testified on direct examination (and cross examination) that he had “no idea” that 
there was any false information in any of the PPP applications that were in evidence.  The 
government’s inquiry on cross examination regarding the PPP application for Wade Funeral Home 
and the two EIDL applications for Wade Funeral Home—all of which contained materially false 
information—was relevant evidence admissible to impeach Defendant’s credibility, as the Court 
correctly ruled.  Furthermore, the line of inquiry was permissible under Rule 608(b)(1), which 
allows specific instances of a witness’s conduct to be inquired into on cross examination if they 
are probative of the character for untruthfulness of the witness.  Both the Wade Funeral Home 
PPP application and the two EIDL applications for Wade Funeral Home were probative of 
untruthfulness since they each contained materially false income information for Wade Funeral 
Home, the small business Defendant owned and operated. 
Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that these evidentiary rulings could meet 
the threshold of clear abuse of discretion, any error would likely be deemed harmless given the 
overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt.  The Eleventh Circuit “review[s] preserved 
assertions of error—both constitutional and nonconstitutional error—for harmlessness.” United 
States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be 
disregarded.”).  A nonconstitutional error is harmless unless it “resulted in actual prejudice 
because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” 
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United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted).   
As outlined above, and as set forth in detail in the United States’ Response in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Post-Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (DE 207 at 4-11), overwhelming 
evidence supported Defendant’s convictions.  This included, but was not limited to, the 
voluminous documentary evidence establishing Defendant’s direct involvement in his and Carolyn 
Wade’s PPP application and forgiveness processes, including Defendant’s online activity (logins, 
modifications, document uploads, identity verifications, and electronic signatures and initials), 
Defendant’s phony payroll checks, and the credible testimony of cooperating witness Haydee 
Rivero.  On this record, excluding the testimony about other SBA pandemic-relief loans 
associated with Defendant and Wade Funeral Home could not have impacted the jury’s verdict. 
II. 
The Court’s decision not to provide a good-faith jury instruction does not 
present a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an 
order for a new trial. 
 
The good-faith instruction requires an underlying evidentiary foundation.  See United 
States v. Williams, 728 F.2d 1402, 1404–05 (11th Cir. 1984).  A district court’s refusal to give a 
requested jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 
1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009).  A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a good-faith 
instruction where the defense was otherwise substantially covered by the court’s instruction on 
intent.  United States v. Holzendorf, 576 F. App’x 932, 936 (11th Cir. 2014). 
As explained above, during the charging conference on October 21, the Court stated that it 
had not heard any testimony establishing a good-faith defense and asked the parties if that defense 
was anticipated.  (10/21 Tr. at 196).  The defense stated its “position” was that the good-faith 
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instruction applied “based upon the trust that Mr. and Mrs. Wade had with the Riveros” (10/21 Tr. 
at 197).  The Court did not accept that as a basis for the good-faith instruction, because it was not 
a sufficient basis under Eleventh Circuit caselaw, but the Court stated that it would allow the 
defense to raise the issue again after completion of all the testimony.  The Court also encouraged 
the defense to read the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instructions and what was required for the 
instruction.  (10/21 Tr. at 197).   The next day, after the close of all evidence, the Court told the 
defense that it was “willing to listen if there’s anything new.”  (10/22 Tr. at 66).  The defense did 
not respond.  It offered no cases, no argument, and did not object when the Court stated it would 
remove the good-faith defense instruction from the jury instruction.  (10/22 Tr. at 66-67). 
To the extent that an objection on this issue is preserved for appeal, it was clearly not an 
abuse of discretion for the Court to not provide the good-faith instruction.4  The record did not 
support a basis for the instruction, and with respect to the wire fraud counts, it was also 
substantially covered by the Court’s jury instructions on intent, which stated that the jury could 
not convict Defendant without finding that he acted with intent to defraud and that “to act with 
‘intent to defraud’ means to act knowingly and with the specific intent to use false and fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises to cause loss or injury.  Proving intent to deceive alone, 
without the intent to cause loss or injury, is not sufficient to prove intent to defraud.”  (10/22 Tr. 
at 140-141; DE 186 at 11).  Furthermore, as a matter of law, the good-faith instruction does not 
apply to the charges that did not have the element of intent to defraud.  See United States v. 
Zoriano, 817 F. App’x 817, 821 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Because intent to defraud is not an element of 
 
4 As the defense notes in the Renewed Motion to Stay, it is not clear whether the jury received written instructions 
that included the good-faith defense instruction.  The copy of the instructions filed by the Court on CM/ECF does 
include the good-faith instruction, even though the Court did not read this instruction to the jury.  See DE 186 at 18. 
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the crimes charged in [defendant’s] indictment, good faith is not a complete defense to those 
charges. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give [defendant’s] 
requested good faith instruction because the instruction was not a correct statement of the law.”) 
Accordingly, the Court’s decision not to provide a good-faith jury instruction is not likely 
to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. 
Conclusion 
Defendant has failed to establish that his appeal will raise a substantial question of law or 
fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.  Accordingly, the Bail Reform Act 
requires Defendant to serve his term of imprisonment during the pendency of his appeal.  The 
Court should deny the Renewed Motion to Stay, and Defendant should surrender as ordered by 
2:00 p.m. on August 27, 2025 (DE 286). 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
    
JASON A. REDING QUIÑONES 
  
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
By: /s/ David A. Snider  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David A. Snider 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Court ID No. A5502260 
500 E. Broward Blvd 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 
Tel: (954) 660-5696 
Fax: (954) 356-7336 
Email: david.snider@usdoj.gov 
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