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Home Court filings United States v. Kisha Sutton — S.D. W. Va., No. 2:24-cr-00192 PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by United States of America as to… — United States of Americ…

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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by United States of America as to… — United States of America v. Sutton et al (Dkt. 161)

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
Filed2025-03-31

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia · No. 2:24-cr-00192 · Doc. 161 · 2025-03-31 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The proposed jury instructions of the United States in United States v. Kisha Sutton, et al., Criminal No. 2:24-cr-00192, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, filed March 31, 2025 as Doc. 161 by an Assistant United States Attorney. Instructions No. 1 to No. 5 address Count One of the Superseding Indictment, which charges Kisha Sutton and Shamiese Wright with conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1349 in connection with PPP loan applications and Schedules C. Instructions No. 6 and No. 7 address the aiding and abetting bank fraud counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2, and later instructions define financial institution, mortgage lending business, scheme or artifice, knowingly and willful blindness. The filing closes with Instruction No. 22 on tapes and transcripts and a certificate of service; it is 28 pages.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 
CHARLESTON 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   CRIMINAL NO. 2:24-cr-00192 
 
 
KISHA SUTTON, ET AL. 
 
         
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Comes now the United States of America, by Jonathan T. 
Storage, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of West Virginia, and submits the following proposed jury 
instructions. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
LISA G. JOHNSTON 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
 
By: 
/s/ Jonathan T. Storage  
 
 
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV Bar No. 12279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 Virginia Street, East  
Room 4000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charleston, WV 25301 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone: (304) 345-2200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fax: (304) 347-5705 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email: jonathan.storage@usdoj.gov 
 
  
 
 
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2 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
COUNT ONE: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT BANK FRAUD 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 1349) 
 
NATURE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED 
 
 
Count One of the Superseding Indictment charges defendants 
KISHA SUTTON and SHAMIESE WRIGHT with violating Title 18, United 
States Code, Sections 1344 and 1349, more specifically as follows: 
Count One of the Superseding Indictment charges that 
beginning no later than in or about April 2021, and continuing 
until at least in or about July 2021, at or near Charleston, 
Kanawha County, West Virginia, within the Southern District of 
West Virginia, and elsewhere, defendants KISHA SUTTON, SHAMIESE 
WRIGHT, knowingly and intentionally conspired with each other and 
with other persons both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to 
commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, that is, to 
knowingly execute a scheme and artifice to defraud Financial 
Institutions 1, 2, and 3, and to obtain moneys, funds, credits, 
assets, securities, and other property owned by, and under the 
custody and control of Financial Institutions 1, 2, and 3 by means 
of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises 
made in PPP loan applications and Schedules C. 
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3 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
COUNT ONE: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT BANK FRAUD 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 1349) 
 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
 
First:    that two or more persons agreed to commit bank fraud; 
and 
Second:   that at some time during the conspiracy, the defendants 
had knowledge of the criminal objective of the agreement 
and willfully joined the conspiracy with the intent to 
further its unlawful purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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4 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
ESSENCE OF A CONSPIRACY 
 
The essence of conspiracy is the combination of minds in an 
unlawful purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013). 
 
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5 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CONSPIRACY 
 
 
Upon joining a criminal conspiracy, a defendant's membership 
in the ongoing unlawful scheme continues until he withdraws. 
Because conspiracy is a continuing offense, a defendant who 
has joined a conspiracy continues to violate the law through every 
moment of the conspiracy's existence, and he becomes responsible 
for the acts of his co-conspirators in pursuit of their common 
plot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, at 107 & 111 (2013). 
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6 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
OVERT ACT NOT REQUIRED 
 
 
When an indictment alleges conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 
there is no overt-act requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States v. Chinasa, 789 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 2011), 
aff'd, 489 F. App'x 682 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 
 
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7 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
 
COUNTS TWO THROUGH TEN: AIDING AND ABETTING BANK FRAUD 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2) 
 
NATURE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED 
 
 
Counts Two of the Superseding Indictment charges defendants 
KISHA SUTTON and SHAMIESE WRIGHT with violating Title 18, United 
States Code, Sections 1344 and 2. Additionally, Counts Three 
through Ten of the Superseding Indictment charge defendant KISHA 
SUTTON violating Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1344 and 
2. 
Count Two of the Superseding Indictment charges that between 
no later than on or about April 19, 2021, and continuing until at 
least on or about May 21, 2021, defendants KISHA SUTTON and 
SHAMIESE WRIGHT, aided and abetted by each other, knowingly 
executed and attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud 
a financial institution. On or about April 19, 2021, defendant 
KISHA SUTTON caused the submission of a PPP loan application and 
a Schedule C to Financial Institution 3 on behalf of defendant 
SHAMIESE 
WRIGHT 
and 
with 
defendant 
SHAMIESE 
WRIGHT's 
authorization. The application and the Schedule C stated that 
defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT was a sole proprietor of a business that 
was established January 1, 2017. The application stated that in 
2020, the business had a gross income of $75,000. As part of the 
application, a 2020 Schedule C was submitted listing gross receipts 
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8 
 
of $75,000 and a net profit of $48,750. In fact, defendant SHAMIESE 
WRIGHT did not have a business in 2020 with those gross receipts 
and profit. Defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT's 2020 tax return listed 
$21,716 in wages and no business income or expenses. Defendant 
SHAMIESE WRIGHT applied for unemployment compensation throughout 
2020 and stated, several times, that she was not self-employed. 
Financial Institution 3 funded defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT's PPP 
loan for $15,625 on or about May 7, 2021. Between on or about May 
7, 2021, and on or about May 21, 2021, Defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT, 
within the Southern District of West Virginia, remitted $3,000 of 
the fraudulent PPP loan proceeds to defendant KISHA SUTTON. 
Defendant SHAMIESE WRIGHT spent the remainder of the PPP loan 
proceeds on personal, ineligible expenses. 
 
 
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9 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
 
COUNTS TWO THROUGH TEN: AIDING AND ABETTING BANK FRAUD 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 & 2) 
 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
 
 
Aiding and abetting a crime possesses the same elements as 
the underlying offense. 
 
 
First:   A person aids and abets a crime when he intends to 
facilitate that offense's commission. 
Second:   A person commits bank fraud when he knowingly executes, 
or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice - 
a. 
to defraud a financial institution; or 
b. 
to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, 
assets, securities, or other property owned by, or 
under the custody or control of, a financial 
institution, by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises. 
 
United States v. Draven, 77 F.4th 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2023); 
Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014); 18 U.S.C. § 
1344. 
 
 
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10 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO PROVING BANK FRAUD 
 
 
Bank fraud may be established under two alternative methods: 
(1) defrauding a financial institution OR (2) obtaining property 
owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial 
institution, 
by 
means 
of 
false 
or 
fraudulent 
pretenses, 
representations, or promises. 
Where a statute defines two or more ways in which an offense 
may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one 
count. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States v. Saintvil, No. 22-10004, 2023 WL 3644976, at *4 
(11th Cir. May 25, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1067, (2024), 
reh'g denied, 144 S. Ct. 2555, (2024). 
 
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11 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
 
 
As used in the Superseding Indictment, the term "financial 
institution" means a mortgage lending business. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 U.S.C. § 20(10). 
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12 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
DEFINITION OF MORTGAGE LENDING BUSINESS 
 
The term "mortgage lending business" means an organization 
which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in 
real estate, including private mortgage companies and any 
subsidiaries of such organizations, and whose activities affect 
interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 U.S.C. § 27. 
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13 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
DEFINITION OF SCHEME OR ARTIFICE 
 
The words “scheme or artifice” include any plan or course 
of action intended to deceive or cheat others. 
A “scheme or artifice to defraud" may be shown by deceptive 
acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid 
suspicion, or avert further inquiry into a material matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases, Eric Wm. 
Ruschky, 2020 Online Edition (pg. 262); United States v. Colton, 
231 F.3d 890, 901 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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14 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
DEFINITION OF DEFRAUD 
 
“To defraud” means wronging one in his property rights by 
dishonest methods or schemes and usually signifies the deprivation 
of something of value by trick, deceit, chicanery, or overreaching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pattern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases, Eric Wm. 
Ruschky, 2020 Online Edition (pg. 262). 
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15 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
SHOWING OF ACTUAL FINANCIAL LOSS OR INTENT TO CAUSE FINANCIAL 
LOSS NOT REQUIRED 
 
The bank fraud statute does not require the government to 
show any ultimate financial loss or a showing of intent to cause 
financial loss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 67 (2016). 
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16 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
“KNOWINGLY” 
 
 
The United States must prove that the defendant acted knowingly 
and with the intent to steal at the time he allegedly took the 
article of mail. 
 
The phrase “knowingly” means the defendant's actions were done 
deliberately and on purpose.  The reason the law requires the United 
States to prove that the defendant stole, took or abstracted the 
articles of mail knowingly is so that the defendant will not be 
convicted of mail theft because he made a mistake, or because he 
did something inadvertently, not realizing what he was doing. 
 
There is no requirement that the defendant must know that there 
is a law that makes it a crime to steal mail.  All the defendant 
must do to act knowingly is to act freely, voluntarily, and with 
the deliberate purpose of taking the mail. 
 
In addition to finding that the defendant acted knowingly, in 
order to meet its burden, the United States must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted with the intent to steal 
the article of mail.  That is, you must find that when the defendant 
took the article of mail, he did so with the intention of depriving 
the rightful owner of the rights and benefits of receiving the 
article of mail, or with the intention to benefit himself.  You 
must also find that the defendant did so without the rightful 
recipient's consent. 
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17 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
“WILLFUL BLINDNESS” 
The United States may prove that the defendant acted 
“knowingly” by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise 
have been obvious to him.  No one can avoid responsibility for a 
crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious.  A finding beyond 
reasonable doubt of the intent of the defendant to avoid knowledge 
or enlightenment would permit the jury to infer knowledge.  Stated 
another way, a defendant’s knowledge of a particular fact may be 
inferred from a deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate 
or intentional blindness to the existence of that fact. 
One may not willfully or intentionally remain ignorant of a 
fact material or important to his conduct to escape the 
consequences of criminal law.  If you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was aware of a certain fact but he 
deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact so he 
could deny knowledge if apprehended, then you may treat this 
deliberate avoidance as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you 
find the defendant actually believed this fact not to be true.  A 
showing of negligence, mistake or even foolishness on the part of 
the defendant is not enough to support an inference of knowledge. 
It is, of course, entirely up to you as to whether you find 
any deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the eyes and the 
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18 
 
inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. 
You may not infer that the defendant had knowledge, however, 
from proof of a mistake, negligence, carelessness, or a belief in 
an inaccurate proposition. 
 
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
' 17.09 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 551 
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1072 (1996); United States v. Gordon, 
754 F. App’x. 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (jury could infer defendant 
willfully avoided learning that funds came from illegal activity 
by failing to ask questions of person who supplied the funds, or 
notice obvious red flags raised by the odd nature of transactions) 
(evidence at trial supported both actual knowledge and willful 
blindness; if jury concluded defendant lacked actual knowledge as 
to the nature of the funds, they could conclude he willfully 
avoided learning this fact); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 
854, 859 (4th Cir. 1992) (real estate agent willfully blind to 
client’s use of drug proceeds to purchase house); United States v. 
Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir. 1992) (real estate agent 
willfully blind to client’s use of drug proceeds to purchase 
house); United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(where evidence suggested, “at a minimum,” defendant failed to ask 
questions that might have incriminated him, trial court acted well 
within its discretion in giving willful blindness instruction); 
United States v. Hoffler-Riddick, No. 4:05cr9, 2006 WL 2381859, *5 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2006) (person who has a “strong suspicion” that 
the money a drug dealer is using to conduct a financial transaction 
is drug proceeds is willfully blind if she deliberately avoids 
learning the truth) (“a willful blindness instruction is 
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge 
and deliberate ignorance”); aff’d in part, rev’d in part, & 
remanded by 253 F. App’x. 249 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Sterling, 701 F. App’x. 196 (4th Cir. 2017) (willful blindness 
instruction appropriate where defendant in lottery scam received 
large sums of cash and wire transfers from persons she did not 
know and subsequently transferred most of those funds to co-
conspirators in Jamaica; evidence also showed defendant’s fax 
machine was used in the middle of the night to send documents 
furthering the lottery scam); United States v. Nicholson, 176 F. 
App’x. 386, 400 (4th Cir. 2006) (willful blindness instruction as 
to defendant’s knowledge of the source of the money she used to 
buy a house was appropriate where the money came from defendant’s 
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19 
 
son, who dealt drugs from defendant’s home and had no other visible 
source of income); United States v. Hatcher, 132 F. App’x. 468, 
475 (4th Cir. 2005) (“a willful blindness instruction is 
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge 
and deliberate ignorance”); United States v. Hatcher, 132 F. App’x. 
468, 475 (4th Cir. 2005) (“a willful blindness instruction is 
appropriate even when there is evidence of both actual knowledge 
and deliberate ignorance”); United States v. Matai, 173 F.3d 426 
(4th Cir. 1999) (Table) (willful blindness instruction appropriate 
where there is evidence of deliberate ignorance even though there 
is also evidence of actual knowledge).  
 
 
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20 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
EVIDENCE INFERENCES -- DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
 
There are two types of evidence from which you may find the 
truth as to the facts of a case -- direct and circumstantial 
evidence.  Direct evidence is the testimony of one who asserts 
actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness. 
Circumstantial evidence is where one fact or a chain of facts 
gives rise to a reasonable inference of another fact.  If one fact 
or group of facts on the basis of common sense and common 
experience leads you logically and reasonably to infer other facts, 
then this is circumstantial evidence.  Circumstantial evidence is 
no less valid and no less weighty than direct evidence provided 
the inferences drawn are logical and reasonable.  In a criminal 
case where a defendant's state of mind is at issue, where there 
are questions of what the defendant intended or what his purpose 
was, circumstantial evidence is often an important means of proving 
what the state of mind was at the time of the events in question.  
Sometimes it is the only means of proving state of mind. 
While you should consider only the evidence, you are permitted 
to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits 
as you feel are justified in the light of common experience.  In 
other words, you may make deductions and reach conclusions that 
reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts that have 
been established by the evidence. 
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21 
 
The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given 
to either direct or circumstantial evidence.  Nor is a greater 
degree of certainty required of circumstantial evidence than of 
direct evidence.  Do not be concerned about whether evidence is 
“direct evidence” or “circumstantial evidence.”  You should 
consider and weigh all of the evidence that was presented to you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of 
the Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 1.08 (1990); 1A 
O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, ' 
12.04 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Dizdar, 581 F.2d 1031, 1036-
37 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 
 
 
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22 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
 
STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL AND STIPULATIONS 
 
Statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the 
case. When the attorneys on both sides stipulate or agree as to 
the existence of a fact, you may, however, accept the stipulation 
as evidence, and regard that fact as being proven. You are not 
bound by stipulations, however, because the jury alone decides the 
facts and their importance to the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 678 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 
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23 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
 
“ON OR ABOUT” -- PROOF OF 
 
You will note the Indictment charges that the offenses were 
committed “on or about” a certain date. The proof need not 
establish with certainty the exact date of the alleged offenses.  
It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed on a date 
reasonably near the date alleged. 
 
 
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24 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
“AT OR NEAR” -- PROOF OF 
 
You will note the Indictment charges that the offenses were 
committed “at or near” a certain location. The proof need not 
establish with certainty the exact location of the alleged 
offenses. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed at a 
location reasonably near the location alleged. 
 
 
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25 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
“SYMPATHY” 
You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to try 
the issues of fact presented by the allegations of the Indictment 
and the denial made by the not guilty plea of the defendant. This 
must be decided on the evidence that is presented in this case and 
not from anything else. 
You are to perform this duty without bias or prejudice as to 
any party. You are not permitted to be governed by sympathy or 
public opinion. Both the defendant and the public expect that you 
will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the 
case, follow the law as stated by the Court and reach a just 
verdict, regardless of the consequences.  
 
 
 
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26 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
During the course of this trial, the Court took judicial 
notice of the fact that the city of Charleston is located in 
Kanawha County, within the Southern District of West Virginia. We 
know this fact to be true.  
 
Since this is a criminal case, you may, but are not required 
to accept as conclusive, any facts of which the Court has taken 
judicial notice. If you choose to accept, as conclusive, any facts 
which the Court has judicially noted, then such facts may be 
regarded as evidence in the case without further proof, and are to 
be weighed by you along with other evidence in the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
' 12.03 (6th ed. 2008) (modified). 
 
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27 
 
UNITED STATES PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
 
TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS 
 
Recordings of various events and conversations have been 
admitted into evidence. Transcripts of these recordings have been 
prepared. The recording – not the transcript – is the evidence. 
Therefore, the transcript is not in evidence. The transcript is 
only to be used as a guide in following the recording. Your 
understanding of the recording, rather than the transcript, is to 
govern your deliberations.  
If you detect any discrepancy between the recording and the 
transcript, you are to consider as evidence only what you observe 
in the recording. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1A O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
' 11.10 (6th ed. 2008); United States v. Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 
1428 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 
1203 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 243 
(4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bryant, 480 F.2d 785, 791 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
It is hereby certified that the foregoing “PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES” has been electronically filed 
and service has been made on opposing counsel by virtue of such 
electronic filing this 31st day of March, 2025.    
 
 
 
/s/ Jonathan T. Storage  
 
 
JONATHAN T. STORAGE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
WV Bar No. 12279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
300 Virginia Street, East  
Room 4000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charleston, WV 25301 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone: (304) 345-2200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fax: (304) 347-5705 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email: jonathan.storage@usdoj.gov 
 
 
Case 2:24-cr-00192     Document 161     Filed 03/31/25     Page 28 of 28 PageID #: 754

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