Motion for Forfeiture of Property Preliminary Order of Forfeiture by USA — USA v. Sheppard (Dkt. 252, S.D. Fla.)

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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 1:22-cr-20290-BB · Doc. 252 · 2024-06-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 22-20290-CR-BLOOM 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
ERIC DEAN SHEPPARD,  
 
 
Defendant. 
________________________________/ 
 
UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE  
 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and the procedures set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 853, as 
incorporated by 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), and Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, 
hereby moves for the entry of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture against Defendant Eric Dean 
Sheppard (the “Defendant”) in the above-captioned matter.  The United States seeks a forfeiture 
money judgment in the amount of $893,575, which represents the amount of proceeds the 
Defendant fraudulently obtained from a scheme to defraud that resulted in three funded Paycheck 
Protection Program (“PPP”) loans and three funded Economic Injury Disaster Loans (“EIDL”).    
The undersigned respectfully submits that the forfeiture money judgement amount can be 
addressed during sentencing scheduled for June 7, 2024.  The requested forfeiture money judgment 
is tied directly to the Court’s determination of actual loss, which has been extensively briefed by 
both the United States and the Defendant, and will be addressed at sentencing.  See Gov’t Resp. to 
Def.’s Obj. to PSI, ECF No. 241; Gov’t Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for New Trial, ECF No. 215; 
Def.’s Mot. for New Trial, ECF No. 205; Def.’s Sentencing Memo. & Obj. to PSI, ECF No. 263.       
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In support of this Motion, the United States provides the following factual and legal bases: 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 23, 2023, a federal grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment charging the 
Defendant in Counts 1–9 with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, among other counts. 
See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 60. The Superseding Indictment also contained forfeiture 
allegations, which alleged that upon conviction of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the Defendant 
shall forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from 
proceeds traceable to such offense, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).  See id. at 9–10.   
On January 12, 2024, after a trial, a jury returned a verdict finding the Defendant guilty of 
on Counts 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, and 14.  See Trial Minute Entries, ECF Nos. 143, 145–46, 149, 154, 156–
61, 163–64, 175–76, 179, 180, & 185; Jury Verdict, ECF No. 1901.  Specifically, the jury found 
the Defendant guilty of executing a wire fraud scheme—spanning from April 2020 through March 
2021—to fraudulently obtain PPP loan and EIDL proceeds from private lenders and the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (“SBA”) when the jury found the Defendant guilty of:  
➢ submitting false and fraudulent Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Form 941s in support 
of Alafaya Trails second-draw PPP loan application with WebBank (Count 5); 
➢ submitting a false and fraudulent PPP second-draw loan application on behalf of 
Alafaya Trails to Northeast Bank (Count 7);  
➢ submitting a false and fraudulent IRS Form 1065 in support of Alafaya Trails’ second-
draw PPP loan application with Northeast Bank (Count 8); and 
 
1There is a scrivener’s error on the Verdict Form incorrectly indicating the Jury came to a verdict 
on January 12, 2023, instead of 2024.   
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➢ submitting a false and fraudulent PPP loan application, IRS Form 1065, and IRS Form 
940 with Cross River Bank on behalf of HM Management (Count 9).   
See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 190; Superseding Indictment 4–7.  The jury also found the Defendant 
guilty of Aggravated Identity Theft in Counts 13 and 14.2 
The United States Probation Office has since conducted a presentence investigation.  The 
Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), which included information on the Defendant’s 
relevant conduct and his financial condition, was filed on May 31, 2024.  See PSI, ECF No. 246.  
On June 3, 2024, the Court, upon Defendant’s motion, acquitted the Defendant of Counts 
13 and 14.  See Omnibus Order on Def.’s Mot. for New Trial & Mot. for Acquittal 25, ECF No. 
251.   
II. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
A. Directly Forfeitable Property 
 
Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to 
the commission of any offense constituting a “specified unlawful activity (as defined in [18 U.S.C. 
1956(c)(7)])” is subject to forfeiture to the United States.  See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).  Wire 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, is a “specified unlawful activity.”  See 18 U.S.C. 
§1956(c)(7)(A) (defining the term “specified unlawful activity” to include any act or activity 
 
2 In Count 13, the Defendant was charged with the use of a falsified IRS Form 1065 tax return 
submitted to Northeast Bank in support of Alafaya Trails’ PPP second-draw loan application, using 
the name, Employer Identification Number (“EIN”), Preparer Tax Identification Number 
(“PTIN”), of N.C.—the Defendant’s accountant; and in Count 14, he was charged with the use of 
a falsified IRS Form 1065 tax return submitted to Cross River Bank in support of HM 
Management’s PPP loan application, using the name, EIN, PTIN, of N.C.  See Jury Verdict; 
Superseding Indictment 8.  
 
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constituting an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which includes wire fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1343).  If a defendant is convicted of such violation, the Court “shall order” the forfeiture 
of property as part of the sentence.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (authorizing criminal forfeiture for 
any offense wherever civil forfeiture is authorized).   
 
Criminal forfeiture is governed by the preponderance standard.  See United States v. 
Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003).  Upon finding that property is subject to forfeiture 
by a preponderance, the Court:    
. . . must promptly enter a preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth the amount 
of any money judgment, directing the forfeiture of specific property, and directing 
the forfeiture of any substitute property if the government has met the statutory 
criteria.  The court must enter the order without regard to any third party’s interest 
in the property.  Determining whether a third party has such an interest must be 
deferred until any third party files a claim in an ancillary proceeding under Rule 
32.2(c). 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A).  Where a defendant is convicted of wire fraud—as is the case 
here—the Court is free to consider all conduct involving the same fraud scheme when determining 
a forfeiture amount, so long as the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
property to be forfeited was linked to the conduct.  See United States v. Holland, 722 F. App’x 
919, 928–929 (11th Cir. 2019).   
B. Forfeiture Money Judgments 
A forfeiture order may be sought as a money judgment.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A), 
(2)(A); see also United States v. Padron, 527 F.3d 1156, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “explicitly contemplate the entry of money judgments in 
criminal forfeiture cases”).  The forfeiture money judgment is final as to the defendant “[a]t 
sentencing—or at any time before sentencing if the defendant consents.”  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
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32.2(b)(4)(A).  No ancillary proceeding is required when forfeiture consists solely of a money 
judgment.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1).  As additional property is identified to satisfy the 
forfeiture money judgment, the Court must order the forfeiture of such property.  See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 32.2(e)(1) (“[T]he court may at any time enter an order of forfeiture or amend an existing order 
of forfeiture to include property that . . . is subject to forfeiture under an existing order of forfeiture 
but was located and identified after that order was entered; or . . . is substitute property . . . .”); see 
also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(C). 
The amount of the money judgment should represent the full sum of directly forfeitable 
property, regardless of the defendant’s ability to satisfy the judgment at the time of sentencing.  
See United States v. McKay, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (adopting the majority 
rule); see also United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 143–44 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The fact that a 
defendant is indigent or otherwise lacks adequate assets to satisfy a judgment does not operate to 
frustrate entry of a forfeiture order.”).  The Court determines the amount of the money judgment 
“based on evidence already in the record, including any written plea agreement, and any additional 
evidence or information submitted by the parties and accepted by the court as relevant and 
reliable.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(B).  The Court in imposing a forfeiture money judgment 
may rely on an agent’s reliable hearsay.  See United States v. Stathakis, 2008 WL 413782, at *14 
n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2008).  The defendant’s money judgment amount can be based on a 
reasonable estimate on the amount of property subject to forfeiture.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Peithman, 917 F.3d 635, 651 (8th Cir. 
2019); United States v. Vico, 2016 WL 233407, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2016) (calculation of 
money judgment does not require mathematical exactitude; district court may make a reasonable 
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extrapolation supported by a preponderance of the evidence).  
C. Difference Between Forfeiture and Restitution 
Both forfeiture and restitution are mandatory in criminal cases.  See United States v. 
Brummer, 598 F.3d 1248, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2010) (the word “shall” does not convey discretion 
and the district court was required to order forfeiture of the property in accordance with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32.2); 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (requiring district courts to order restitution in the full 
amount of each victim’s losses).  Although sometimes conflated, forfeiture and restitution serve 
different purposes.  “While restitution seeks to make victims whole by reimbursing them for their 
losses, forfeiture is meant to punish the defendant by transferring his ill-gotten gains to the United 
States Department of Justice.”  United States v. Joseph, 743 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(citing United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007), United States v. Venturella, 
585 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2009), and Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995)).  
Because of this distinction, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that district courts cannot use 
restitution to offset the forfeiture amount ordered, or vice versa.  See United States v. Hernandez, 
803 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2015); Joseph, 743 F.3d at 1354 (“In light of the statutory 
framework governing restitution and forfeiture, we hold that a district court generally has no 
authority to offset a defendant’s restitution obligation by the value of forfeited property held by 
the government, which is consistent with the approach taken by the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits.”); United States v. Bane, 720 F.3d 818, 827 n.8 (11th Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Hoffman-Vaile, 568 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2009); Browne, 505 F.3d at 1281 (finding 
defendant’s disgorgement of illicit profits did not divest the United States of its forfeiture interest 
in the full amount of offense). 
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D. Property Subject to Forfeiture in Instant Criminal Case3 
The Defendant was convicted on four of nine wire fraud counts.4  Those convictions 
necessarily required the jury to find the Defendant guilty as to an essential element of those 
counts—that the Defendant devised the scheme to defraud private lenders and the SBA spanning 
from April 2020 and continuing through March 2021.  See Jury Verdict; Superseding Indictment.  
Between April 2020 and March 2021, the below-listed private lenders and the SBA funded six of 
the Defendant’s requested loans—relying on his fraudulent loan applications and fabricated 
supporting documents—totaling $893,575:  
Date 
Program 
Lender 
Entity 
Amount Funded 
4/15/2020 
PPP 
(1st Draw) 
WebBank 
Alafaya Trails 
$146,587 
7/24/2020 
EIDL 
SBA 
HM Management 
$150,000 
7/24/2020 
EIDL 
SBA 
Alafaya Trails 
$150,000 
10/22/2020 
EIDL 
SBA 
HM Four 
$150,000 
3/11/2021 
PPP 
(2nd Draw) 
Northeast Bank 
Alafaya Trails 
$148,397 
3/12/2021 
PPP 
Cross River Bank 
HM Management 
$148,591 
 
 
3 As previously mentioned, the forfeiture money judgment amount in the Instant Case is tied 
directly to the Court’s determination of actual loss, which appears to be, at least in part, the subject 
matter of the sentencing hearing schedule for June 7, 2023. Therefore, the undersigned respectfully 
submits that there is no need for a separate forfeiture hearing.  
4 Because the factual assertions supporting forfeiture were fully briefed in Government’s Response 
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial [ECF No. 215], and in United States’ Response 
to Defendant’s Objections to the Presentence Investigation Report [ECF No. 241], the United 
States hereby incorporates by reference ECF Nos. 215 and 241 and in this Motion generally 
summarizes the facts supporting the requested forfeiture money judgment.   
 
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Those PPP loan and EIDL applications submitted by the Defendant grossly misrepresented 
the number of people employed by each business, the respective businesses’ revenues and monthly 
payroll expenses, and the type of business the borrowing entities were engaged in, among other 
material misrepresentations. See PSI ¶ 15. In support of the Defendant’s fabricated and 
misrepresented loan applications, the Defendant submitted falsified documents, including IRS and 
Florida Department of Revenue forms.  See id. at ¶¶ 15, 23, 30, 37, 39, 42, 46, 48.  In an effort to 
keep his illusion of legitimacy from unveiling, the Defendant took the fraud scheme a step further 
by flagrantly forging the signatures of others—including his accountant—on various documents 
submitted in support of his PPP loan and EDIL applications.  See id. at ¶¶ 15, 33, 37, 42–43, 48–
49, 53–54, 61. 
i. The Defendant, Through Alafaya Trails, Fraudulently Obtained $444,984 in 
PPP Loan and EIDL Proceeds Between April 2020 and March 2021. 
 
During the relevant time, WebBank, Northeast Bank, and the SBA funded $444,984 in PPP 
loan and EIDL proceeds on behalf of Alafaya Trails and disbursed the funds to the Defendant. 
WebBank, Northeast Bank, and the SBA relied on the Defendant’s misrepresented loan 
applications and fabricated supporting documents when approving the respective loans, the 
proceeds of which the Defendant obtained as part of the ongoing wire fraud scheme.  
Specifically, Alafaya Trails’ April 15, 2020, PPP loan application with WebBank is an 
example showing the Defendant’s wire fraud scheme was continuous, spanning from April 2020 
to March 2021.  On April 15, 2020, the Defendant submitted a PPP loan application on behalf of 
Alafaya Trails’ to PayPal (a loan processor for WebBank).  PSI ¶ 17.  In the application, the 
Defendant claimed that Alafaya Trails had eighty (80) employees, a monthly payroll of $58,583, 
was engaged in commercial building construction, and  was “doing business as” HM Management, 
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among other material misrepresentations.  See id.; Gov’t Composite Ex. 17 (PayPal Records for 
Alafaya Trails).  The evidence established that was untrue.  Alafaya Trails did not have a single 
employee—a far cry from the eighty employees the Defendant claimed that Alafaya Trails 
employed.  See Gov’t Ex. 13-4 & 13-5 (Certifications of Lack of Record of Form 940 & 941 for 
Alafaya Trails); Gov’t Ex. 16-2 (Fla. Dept. of Rev. No Records for Alafaya Trails); see also Gov’t 
Composite Ex. 19 (PPP Second-Draw Application) (The jury found the Defendant guilty of Count 
5, submission of false & fraudulent IRS Form 941s in support of Alafaya Trails’ second-draw PPP 
loan with PayPal/WebBank.). In fact, the evidence showed that HM Management was the only 
business to ever report employees to the IRS—listing three employees in total.  See PSI ¶¶ 15, 17.  
As a result of the Defendant’s misrepresentations, WebBank approved the loan and disbursed 
$146,587 to a bank account controlled by the Defendant.  Id. at ¶¶ 17–19.   
However, the Defendant’s fraud scheme did not stop with the Alafaya Trails’ fraudulent 
April 15, 2020, PPP loan.  Rather, the Defendant continued the scheme almost a year later when 
he applied to have the loan forgiven in May 2021.  Id. at ¶ 20.  In the Defendant’s loan forgiveness 
application, he claimed that Alafaya Trails’ payroll costs skyrocketed to $488,338.81 between 
May and October 2020.  See id.  In support of his false payroll expenses, the Defendant submitted 
a “PPP Labor Report,” which falsely listed the Defendant and independent contractors as 
employees of Alafaya Trails.  See id.  Based on the Defendant’s fraudulent application and 
supporting documents, PayPal approved the loan forgiveness, and the SBA reimbursed WebBank 
for the PPP loan.  See id.; Gov’t Composite Ex. 18 (Forgiveness Application).   
While the Defendant argues that the SBA’s loan forgiveness renders the PPP loan “not 
fraudulent,” that argument is devoid of logic.  See Def.’s Sentencing Memo & Obj. to PSI 14, n.6, 
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ECF No. 236.  As the evidence at trial showed, the Defendant fabricated the information in both 
the original application and the loan-forgiveness application, including fabricating IRS documents, 
among others, to support the illusion that he was entitled to receive the original PPP loan in the 
first place and its subsequent forgiveness.  Frauds do not cancel each other out.  Regardless of the 
SBA forgiving Alafaya Trails’ April 15, 2020, PPP loan based on lies, the evidence established 
Alafaya Trails’ many fraudulent statements.  See PSI ¶ 20.  The repayment of the PPP loan, if 
anything, simply swaps one victim (the bank) for another—the SBA.   
Likewise, Alafaya Trails’ July 24, 2020, EIDL proceeds also are derived from the 
Defendant’s ongoing fraud scheme.  In that EIDL application, the Defendant claimed Alafaya 
Trails employed only twelve (12) people, among other material misrepresentations.  See id. at ¶24; 
Gov’t Composite Ex. 24.  The Defendant completed the EIDL application, along with EIDL 
applications for three other businesses he owned, using Nationwide Lending Direct’s online portal.  
See PSI ¶ 22.  Again, the evidence showed that Alafaya Trails never employed a single person—
rendering the company’s July 24, 2020, EIDL fraudulent.  Based on the fraudulent application, the 
SBA approved the EIDL loan and disbursed $150,000.  See id. at ¶ 25.   
Moreover, on March 11, 2021, the Defendant applied for a second-draw PPP loan on behalf 
of Alafaya Trails with Northeast Bank.  Id. at ¶ 41.  In the fraudulent PPP loan application, the 
Defendant again misrepresented the number of people employed by Alafaya Trails and the wages 
allegedly paid to these purported employees.  See id. at ¶¶ 41–45.  This time, however, the 
Defendant claimed Alafaya Trails employed nineteen (19) people—down from eighty (80) and, 
coincidently, lowered around the time when SBA directed lenders to prioritize businesses with 
twenty (20) or fewer employees.  See id. ¶¶ at 36, 41.  Despite the decrease in purported employees, 
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the Defendant still claimed Alafaya Trails paid $59,359 in monthly wages—almost the same 
amount the Defendant claimed he paid when the company purportedly employed eighty (80) 
people.  See id. at ¶¶ 17, 36, 41.  As a result of the fraudulent PPP loan application and the 
fabricated—and forged—supporting documents, Northeast Bank funded the PPP loan and 
deposited $148,397 into a bank account controlled by the Defendant.  See id. at ¶ 45. 
The jury found the Defendant guilty, in Superseding Indictment Counts 7, 8, and 13, of 
submitting false and forged documents as part of his scheme to fraudulently obtain PPP loan 
proceeds on behalf of Alafaya Trails.  See Jury Verdict; Superseding Indictment.  Specifically, in 
Counts 7, 8, and 13, the Jury found the Defendant used the name, Employer Identification Number, 
and Preparer Tax Identification Number of his accountant, N.C., on a falsified IRS Form 1065 
submitted in support of the March 11, 2021, fraudulent PPP loan application on behalf of Alafaya 
Trails with Northeast Bank.  See Superseding Indictment 7–8; Jury Verdict.   
ii. The Defendant, Through HM Management, Fraudulently Obtained 
$298,591 in PPP Loan and EIDL Proceeds Between April 2020 and March 
2021. 
 
The evidence at trial established that HM Management was the only company that 
historically employed between two to three individuals, with tax year 2018 being the last time HM 
Management reported paying any employees.  PSI ¶¶ 15, 23, 30, 37, 39, 42, 46, 48.  Nonetheless, 
as part of a flurry of fraudulent EIDL applications the Defendant filed on July 24, 2020, the 
Defendant claimed that HM Management had fourteen (14) employees, gross revenues of 
$1,540,000, and a cost of goods sold of $850,000.  See id. at ¶ 23.  To obtain the EIDL loan, and 
in support thereof, the Defendant supplied Nationwide with a false and forged 2019 tax return 
listing fake salaries and wages.  See PSI ¶ 23; Gov’t Composite Ex. 62.  IRS and Florida 
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Department of Revenue records refute the claims made in the EIDL application.  See id. at ¶¶ 15, 
23, 30, 37, 39, 42, 46, 48.    
What’s more, the jury found the Defendant guilty of submitting false and forged documents 
to Cross River Bank as part of his scheme to fraudulently obtain PPP loan proceeds on behalf of 
HM Management.  See PSI ¶¶ 46–50; Jury Verdict.  Specifically, the Jury found, in Counts 9 and 
14, that the Defendant used the name, EIN, and PTIN of his accountant, N.C., on a falsified IRS 
Form 1065 submitted in support of HM Management’s March 12, 2021, PPP loan application with 
Cross River Bank.  See Superseding Indictment 7–8; Jury Verdict.  Although the Defendant has 
since been acquitted of Count 14 (Aggravated Identify Theft), the Court found the Defendant’s 
use of his accountant’s means of identification for the IRS forms lent credibility to the fraud.  See 
Omnibus Order on Def’s Mot. for New Trial & Mot. for Acquittal 25.  
As a result of these fraudulent PPP loan and EIDL applications, and the falsified supporting 
documents, Cross River Bank funded a $148,591 PPP loan and the SBA funded a $150,000 EIDL, 
both of which were deposited into bank accounts controlled by the Defendant.  See PSI ¶ 50.   
iii. The Defendant, Through HM Four, Fraudulently Obtained $150,000 in 
EIDL Proceeds Between October 2020 and November 2021. 
 
As previously mentioned, the Defendant’s fraud scheme spanned various businesses 
owned by the Defendant.  Although the Defendant was acquitted of Counts 1, 3, 4, and 11, relating 
to the submission HM Four’s EIDL application, the Defendant’s scheme to defraud included other 
conduct associated with HM Four’s EIDL, which extended from October to November 2020.  The 
evidence at trial showed the Defendant’s conduct included numerous wire transmissions 
containing false information, some of which the Defendant acknowledged when he testified.  For 
instance, one-day after the SBA questioned the validity of certain information the Defendant 
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submitted in support of an EIDL application for HM Six, LLC, he switched his tactic and applied 
for another EIDL on behalf of HM Four, LLC using his wife’s name. See PSI ¶ 29; Gov’t 
Composite Ex. 26.  The Defendant admitted that he pretended to be his wife when applying for 
the EIDL loan—a fraud.  See Tr. 1/9/24 A.M., at 83–84.   
Not only did the Defendant claim to be his wife when applying for the EIDL, but he also 
falsely represented that HM Four had three employees, gross revenues of $950,000, cost of goods 
sold of $250,000, and lost rental income due to Covid-19 pandemic of $450,000.  See PSI ¶ 30. 
And when the SBA requested to see an actual bank statement, the Defendant lied again.  This time, 
on November 16, 2020, the Defendant transferred $60,000 from Alafaya Trails’ bank account to 
HM Four’s account—which account was opened the same day he applied for the EIDL.  See Gov’t 
Exs. 5, 39-11, 39-12, 58-4–58-7.  The Defendant then submitted the bank statement to the SBA on 
November 17, 2020; transferring back $50,000 to Alafaya Trails afterwards.  See Tr. 1/9/24 P.M., 
at 12–13; Gov’t Exs. 39-12, 58-5, 58-7.  The Defendant even admitted that he sent the November 
17, 2020 email to the SBA with the bank statement attached, and that the email contained false 
information about the HM Four account.  See Tr. 1/9/24 P.M. at 13-14; Gov’t Ex. 58-4.  Based on 
the fraudulent application, and falsified supporting documents, the SBA approved and funded a 
$150,000 EIDL for HM Four.   
III. CONCLUSION    
The record in this case shows the Defendant’s repetitive and unrelenting efforts to game 
the system through falsified and forged documents.  Every funded PPP and EIDL loan was 
obtained through the same, continuing wire fraud scheme spanning from April 2020 to March 
2021, and the false and forged documents submitted by the Defendant all constitute relevant 
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conduct of his scheme to defraud.  As previously mentioned, supra page 4, where a defendant is 
convicted of wire fraud—as is the case here—the Court is free to consider all conduct involving 
the same fraud scheme when determining a forfeiture amount, so long as the government proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the property to be forfeited was linked to the conduct—
which the Government has done in the Instant Case.  See Holland, 722 F. App’x at 928–929.   
Therefore, a reasonable estimate of the total value of the proceeds traceable to the offenses 
of conviction is $893,575, which sum may be sought as a forfeiture money judgment pursuant to 
Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See, e.g., Roberts, 660 F.3d at 166; 
Peithman, 917 F.3d at 651; Vico, 2016 WL 233407, at *7 (calculation of money judgment does 
not require mathematical exactitude; district court may make a reasonable extrapolation supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence).  
Accordingly, the Court should issue the attached proposed order, which provides for the 
entry of a forfeiture money judgment against the Defendant; the inclusion of the forfeiture as part 
of the Defendant’s sentence and judgment in this case; and permission to conduct discovery to 
locate assets ordered forfeited.   
In the alternative, if the Court decides a separate forfeiture hearing after sentencing is 
necessary, the Court should issue—at the time of sentencing—a general order of forfeiture against 
the Defendant attached hereto as Exhibit A.  
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), and the procedures set forth in 21 
U.S.C. § 853 and Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States 
respectfully requests the entry of the attached order.  
 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION AND LOCAL RULE 88.9 CERTIFICATION 
Pursuant to Local Rule 88.9, I hereby certify that the undersigned counsel conferred with 
defense counsel via e-mail on June 1, 2024, regarding the Defendant’s position on the relief sought.  
Defense counsel has represented that the Defendant opposes the proposed forfeiture, citing the 
reasons expressed in briefs filed in United States v. Waked, 969 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 72, 211 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2021), and United States v. Javat, No. 20-13310, 2022 
WL 703940 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022). The Defendant also objects to forfeiture as to any of the 
acquitted counts and forfeiture related to any loans already repaid.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
MARKENZY LAPOINTE 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
 
By: 
s/ Mitchell E. Hyman  
 
              
Mitchell Evan Hyman 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Florida Bar No. 125405 
U.S. Attorney’s Office  
99 N.E. 4th Street, 7th Floor 
Miami, Florida 33132-2111 
Telephone: (305) 961-9283 
E-mail: Mitchell.Hyman@usdoj.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB   Document 252   Entered on FLSD Docket 06/03/2024   Page 15 of 15

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