Order denying 41 Motion to Dismiss as to Casey David Crowther (1) — USA v. Crowther (Dkt. 56, M.D. Fla. No. 2:20-mj-01094, docketed in No. 2:20-cr-00114)

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U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida · No. 2:20-cr-00114-JLB-MRM · Doc. 56 · 2021-01-06 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
FORT MYERS DIVISION 
UNITED STATES,  
 
v.  
 
Case No. 2:20-cr-00114-JLB-MRM 
 
CASEY DAVID CROWTHER 
 
/ 
ORDER 
A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indictment charging 
Defendant Casey David Crowther with two counts of bank fraud, two counts of 
making false statements to FDIC-insured lending institutions, and three counts of 
making illegal monetary transactions connected to his alleged fraud.  (Doc. 32.) 
Mr. Crowther is a business owner who applied for—and received—a federally 
guaranteed loan under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) of the Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 
281 (2020).  The superseding indictment alleges that Mr. Crowder fraudulently 
obtained this loan and used it in ways not authorized by the CARES Act (most 
conspicuously, buying a forty-foot catamaran boat).  Viewing the superseding 
indictment’s allegations in the light most favorable to the Government, the Court 
denies Mr. Crowther’s motion to dismiss and for a bill of particulars.  (Doc. 41.) 
LEGAL STANDARD 
“A party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that 
the court can determine without a trial on the merits.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1).  
“Under [Rule 12(b)] an indictment may be dismissed where there is an infirmity of 
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law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a 
determination of facts that should have been developed at trial.”  United States v. 
Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Critzer, 
951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The sufficiency of a criminal 
indictment is determined from its face.”).  A sufficient indictment: “(1) presents the 
essential elements of the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to 
be defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the 
indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense.”  United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 1071, 1079 (11th Cir. 1998).  The 
factual allegations in an indictment are “viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government.”  Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1354. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Legal Background of the CARES Act and the PPP. 
 
To understand the nature of Mr. Crowther’s motion, it helps to outline the 
statutory framework underlying the CARES Act and the PPP.  Congress created the 
Small Business Administration (“SBA”) through the Small Business Act of 1953, 
Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (1953) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–
57).  The statute’s purpose was to “aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is 
possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free 
competitive enterprise.”  15 U.S.C. § 631(a).  To fulfill this lofty goal, Congress gave 
the SBA “broad powers . . . including that of lending money to small businesses 
whenever they could not get necessary loans on reasonable terms from private 
lenders.”  SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 447 (1960). 
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The SBA’s primary tool for lending money is the “7(a) loan”—named after 
section 7(a) of a 1958 amendment to the 1953 statute.  Pub. L. 85-563, § 7, 72 Stat. 
384 (1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636).  As relevant here, one form that a 7(a) loan 
might take is “[a] guaranteed loan . . . by which [the] SBA guarantees a portion of a 
loan made by a [participating] Lender.”  13 C.F.R. § 120.2(a). 
On March 27, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed 
the CARES Act, which created the PPP within the existing statutory framework for 
7(a) loans.  § 1102, 134 Stat. at 286–94 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)).   
The PPP is “a multi-billion-dollar loan guarantee program.”  All Sorts of 
Servs. of Am., Inc. v. SBA, No. 8:20-cv-1688-TPB, 2020 WL 6270915, at *1 (M.D. 
Fla. July 31, 2020) (citation omitted).  To obtain a PPP loan, borrowers must apply 
to participating private lenders and make several good-faith certifications, 
including that the loan funds “will be used to retain workers and maintain payroll 
or make mortgage payments, lease payments, and utility payments.” 15 U.S.C. § 
636(a)(36)(G)(i).  Upon approval, the private lender executes a promissory note with 
the borrower and disburses the funds.  In other words, it is the lender that 
processes the PPP loan application and, if approved, the lender disburses the funds, 
not the SBA.  Interim Rule on PPP Requirements for Promissory Notes, 
Authorizations, Affiliation, and Eligibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,450, 23,451 (Apr. 28, 
2020).  Up to one hundred percent of a PPP loan is forgivable if the borrower 
satisfies certain conditions.  15 U.S.C.§ 9005(b).  As an incentive for lenders to 
participate, the SBA fully guarantees the loan.  15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2)(F).   
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The CARES Act also provides the SBA with authority to issue regulations 
without going through the notice-and-comment process.  15 U.S.C. § 9012.  To help 
manage the PPP in the face of an evolving pandemic, the SBA has frequently 
exercised this unusual authority.  See In re Parking Mgmt., Inc., 620 B.R. 544, 560 
n.8 (Bankr. D. Md. 2020) (“The complexity of the PPP lies within the many interim 
rules adopted to implement the CARES Act . . . .”).  The first PPP rule promulgated 
by the SBA provides, “If you knowingly use [PPP] funds for unauthorized purposes, 
you will be subject to additional liability such as charges for fraud.”  Interim Rule 
on Implementation of PPP Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,811, 20,814 (Apr. 15, 2020).    
That said, the CARES Act includes no penalties for misuse of PPP funds beyond 
ineligibility for loan forgiveness.  Id. (“If you use PPP funds for unauthorized 
purposes, SBA will direct you to repay those amounts.”). 
Finally, PPP loan forgiveness depends on the borrower spending the loan 
funds within a designated period.  That period was originally eight weeks from the 
origination of the loan, but Congress later extended it to the earlier of twenty-four 
weeks after origination or December 31, 2020.  Paycheck Protection Program 
Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No 116-142, § 3, 134 Stat 641, 641 (2020). 
II. 
The Superseding Indictment Need Not Allege an Underlying 
Violation of the CARES Act. 
To begin with, Mr. Crowther argues that all seven counts of the superseding 
indictment must be dismissed because using PPP funds for purposes unauthorized 
by the CARES Act is not a crime—it simply means that the borrower is ineligible 
for loan forgiveness.  (Doc. 41 at 11–14.)  For support, Mr. Crowther points to a 
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phrase in the CARES Act that lists allowable uses of PPP loans “in addition to the 
allowable uses of a loan made under this subsection”—that is, in addition to other 
allowable uses under section 7(a).  15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(F).  The existence of other 
“allowable uses,” according to Mr. Crowther, means that the superseding 
indictment fails to charge a criminal offense.  (Doc. 41 at 13.)  Mr. Crowther also 
notes that he was arrested before the covered period for spending the PPP funds 
expired and therefore was not given a chance to spend the full amount of his PPP 
loan in a manner consistent with the CARES Act.  (Doc. 41 at 12.) 
In a narrow sense, Mr. Crowther is correct—the CARES Act does not create a 
new crime for misusing PPP funds.  But as the Government points out, Mr. 
Crowther is not accused of violating the CARES Act.  The superseding indictment 
charges him with multiple counts of bank fraud, making false statements to lending 
institutions, and conducting illegal monetary transactions.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1344, 
1957.  None of these offenses depend on an underlying violation of the CARES Act.  
Indeed, the SBA’s interim regulations acknowledge that PPP fraud may create 
criminal liability under other statutes.  Interim Rule on Implementation of PPP 
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. at 20,814. 
The superseding indictment provides that Mr. Crowther lied to his PPP 
Lender about how he planned to use his loan funds, which the Lender would have 
never disbursed if it knew that Mr. Crowther would spend the money for his own 
personal use.  (Doc. 32 at 5–7.)  In a similar vein, the superseding indictment 
provides that Mr. Crowther used the PPP funds to misrepresent the extent of his 
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assets to a Mortgage Lender, which relied on his misrepresentations to give him a 
mortgage loan.  (Id. at 9–14).  These two misrepresentations and their attendant 
transactions are the core of the superseding indictment.  Stated differently, Mr. 
Crowther’s alleged crime is not that he misspent the PPP funds, but that he 
purportedly lied to both his PPP Lender and his Mortgage Lender. 
These activities may or may not be illegal under the CARES Act, but many 
activities are not per se illegal unless performed in the context of fraud.  Cf. United 
States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 410 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Nominee loans are not 
illegal per se.  They are illegal, however, when the borrower and the bank officer fail 
to state the real borrower and recipient of the funds, thereby obtaining the loans by 
means of false pretenses.”); see also Rodgers v. United States, 767 F. App'x 823, 
825–26 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We cannot say ‘no competent counsel’ would have 
advanced the technically correct argument that Rodgers’s involvement with straw 
buyers . . . without more, was not a federal crime,” but “[t]he government detected 
defense counsel’s strategy and clarified during its closing argument that the buyers’ 
representations about purchasing property that ‘in reality they are buying . . . for 
somebody else’ is illegal because ‘the bank wouldn’t have approved . . . if they knew 
that that individual was a straw buyer.’” (citation omitted)). 
The statutory language Mr. Crowther cites about other “allowable uses of a 
loan made under this subsection” is unconvincing.  15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(F).  This 
language refers to other allowable uses under 7(a) loan programs beyond the PPP.  
Nothing in the superseding indictment suggests that Mr. Crowther received loan 
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proceeds under a different 7(a) loan program, let alone that his expenditures would 
have been proper under that program.  Of course, Mr. Crowther is free to develop 
such an argument during trial if he wishes.  The same is true of Mr. Crowther’s 
argument that he would have spent the equivalent of his PPP loan in ways 
authorized by the CARES Act if he were not arrested before the covered period had 
expired.  Critzer, 951 F.2d at 307; Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1354. 
Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Crowther’s argument. 
III. 
The SBA is Not the “Financial Institution” at Issue for Purposes of 
Count One (Bank Fraud). 
Mr. Crowther next contends that Count One of the superseding indictment 
(bank fraud) must be dismissed because it can be committed only on a “financial 
institution,” which the SBA is not.  (Doc. 41 at 14–16); 18 U.S.C. §§ 20, 1344. 
Viewing the superseding indictment’s factual allegations in the light most 
favorable to the Government, the SBA is not the “financial institution” that Mr. 
Crowther is accused of defrauding.  Instead, the superseding indictment provides 
that “the SBA enabled and provided for loans through banks, credit unions, and 
other lenders.”  (Doc. 32 at 2) (emphasis added).   In turn, Mr. Crowther allegedly 
executed a fraudulent scheme “by submitting a false PPP loan application . . . in 
order to receive a loan from the Lender, a bank insured by the FDIC, which was 
guaranteed by the SBA.”  (Id. at 7) (emphasis added).  Clearly, the relevant 
institution is the PPP Lender that approved and disbursed the loan.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (“[A] lender approved to make loans under this subsection shall 
be deemed to have been delegated authority by the Administrator to make and 
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approve covered loans . . . . ”); see also Interim Rule on SBA Loan Review 
Procedures, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,010, 33,011 (June 1, 2020) (explaining that the SBA 
may review individual loan applications when appropriate, but “[t]he intent of the 
[CARES Act] is that SBA provide relief to America's small businesses expeditiously, 
which is expressed in the Act by giving all lenders delegated authority and 
streamlining the requirements of the regular 7(a) loan program”). 
To be clear, Mr. Crowther’s argument is not frivolous.  Certain allegations in 
the superseding indictment, if read in isolation, might lead one to conclude that the 
SBA is the institution that Mr. Crowther allegedly defrauded.  For example, 
paragraph 11(e) of Count One provides that it was part of Mr. Crowther’s alleged 
scheme to “cause the SBA to approve the PPP application.”  (Doc. 32 at 6.)  But after 
reading the entire superseding indictment (and in the light most favorable to the 
Government), it is clear to the Court that the “financial institution” at issue is the 
PPP Lender.  Accordingly, the Court must reject Mr. Crowther’s argument.   
IV. 
Mr. Crowther’s Intent is a Factual Issue to be Resolved at Trial. 
Moving forward, Mr. Crowther suggests that Count One (bank fraud) and 
Count Two (making a false statement to a lending institution) must be dismissed 
because the superseding indictment does not allege the requisite intent and 
therefore fails to state either offense.  (Doc. 41 at 16–21.)  He reiterates that the 
Government prematurely arrested him before the covered period for spending PPP 
funds expired and, as a result, cannot prove that he “knowingly” committed either 
crime.  In other words, Mr. Crowther’s representations to the PPP Lender were not 
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false because he intended to spend (or did spend) the PPP funds in permissible ways 
before the statutory deadline. 
Intent is normally a question of fact to be resolved at trial.  See Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (“Where intent of the accused is an 
ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be 
submitted to the jury.”).  Mr. Crowther claims both that the superseding indictment 
does not adequately allege intent and that the Government cannot ultimately prove 
it.  But the substance of his argument and the cases he cites focus entirely on the 
latter point—the Government will be unable to prove intent at trial because Mr. 
Crowther was prematurely arrested.  
This is not a reason to dismiss the superseding indictment, which adequately 
alleges that Mr. Crowther knowingly defrauded and made false statements to 
lending institutions.  (Doc. 32 at 6–7); United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1348 
(11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that an indictment is sufficiently specific if it “tracks 
the wording of the statute, as long as the language sets forth the essential elements 
of the crime”); see also United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir. 
2002) (“We have long held that the term ‘knowingly’ means that the act was 
performed voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of a mistake or accident.”). 
Therefore, the Court rejects Mr. Crowther’s argument. 
V. 
Mr. Crowther’s Residual Arguments for Dismissing the Superseding 
Indictment Also Fail. 
Finally, Mr. Crowther alleges that the Counts Three and Four of the 
superseding indictment (money laundering) must be dismissed because, based on 
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his prior arguments: (1) there is no specified unlawful activity as a basis for either 
charge, and (2) any unauthorized expenses would simply revert to being a regular 
loan without the possibility of forgiveness.  (Doc. 41 at 21.)  Because the Court has 
already rejected Mr. Crowther’s previous arguments, it also rejects this one.   
Assuming a specified unlawful activity can be established, Mr. Crowther also 
argues that Count Three still fails to state an offense because one of the alleged 
laundering payments was an allowable expense under what he calls a “Stock 
Redemption Stock Agreement.”  (Id.)  This Agreement obviously lies beyond the four 
corners of the superseding indictment.  If Mr. Crowther wishes to set forth facts to 
establish that his expenses were authorized, he may do so at trial. 
V. 
There is No Need for a Bill of Particulars.  
 
In the alternative, Mr. Crowther moves for a bill of particulars.  (Doc. 41 at 
21–22.)  A bill of particulars is meant “to inform the defendant of the charge against 
him with sufficient precision to allow him to prepare his defense, to minimize 
surprise at trial, and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a later 
prosecution for the same offense.”  United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 837 (11th 
Cir. 1985).  “[A] defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars where the 
information sought has already been provided by other sources, such as the 
indictment and discovery.”  United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 
2017) (citing United States v. Martell, 906 F.2d 555, 558 (11th Cir. 1990)).   
Mr. Crowther requests a bill of particulars because he wants to know “what 
federal regulation [under the CARES Act] the Government is accusing [him] of 
violating.”  (Doc. 41 at 22.)  As already explained, Mr. Crowther’s charges do not 
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require an underlying violation for the CARES Act.  He also repeats his claims that 
he intended to spend the full amount of the PPP loan in ways allowed by the 
CARES Act.  Once again, this is an evidentiary challenge to intent best resolved at 
trial.  Accordingly, Mr. Crowther’s request for a bill of particulars is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Crowther’s motion to dismiss the superseding 
indictment or, in the alternative, motion for bill of particulars (Doc. 41) is DENIED. 
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on January 6, 2021. 
 
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