RESPONSE in Opposition as to Carl Delano Torjagbo filed by USA re 281 MOTION to Stay… — USA v. Torjagbo (Dkt. 282)

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U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC · Doc. 282 · 2026-04-03 · Docket on CourtListener

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The United States' response in opposition to the defendant's motion to stay forfeiture in United States v. Carl Delano Torjagbo, Criminal Action No. 1:22-CR-171-MLB-RDC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, filed April 3, 2026 as Document 282. It recounts a ten-count Third Superseding Indictment returned July 1, 2025, a guilty verdict on all counts on July 25, 2025, and a preliminary order of forfeiture entered January 30, 2026 with a personal money judgment of $4,615,080.75. It notes a sentence of 175 months in custody and 5 years of supervised release imposed February 10, 2026 and a notice of appeal filed February 23, 2026. The government argues that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(d) a stay is discretionary and that the defendant has not met his burden on the four factors courts apply.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CARL DELANO TORJAGBO A/K/A 
KARL LUCIUS DELANO 
 
Criminal Action No. 
1:22-CR-171-MLB-RDC 
 
Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for to Stay Forfeiture [281] 
The United States of America, by Theodore S. Hertzberg, United States 
Attorney, and Kelly K. Connors and Nicholas L. Evert, Assistant United States 
Attorneys for the Northern District of Georgia, files this Response in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Motion to Stay Forfeiture (Doc. 281). Defendant’s Motion should 
be denied because he fails to meet his burden to show that a stay is warranted. 
1. Background 
On July 1, 2025, a Grand Jury, sitting in the Northern District of Georgia, 
returned a ten-count Third Superseding Indictment against Carl Torjagbo, 
charging him with bank fraud, wire fraud, concealment money laundering, and 
transactional money laundering. (Doc. 198). These charges stemmed from two 
schemes that resulted in Torjagbo receiving over $12 million in fraud proceeds. 
Specifically, he obtained over $9.5 million from a fraudulent Paycheck Protection 
Program (PPP) loan and over $3 million by filing fraudulent IRS tax returns. The 
Third Superseding Indictment included a forfeiture provision, notifying Torjagbo 
that, upon conviction, the United States would seek to forfeit the following 
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property from him: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY:  
a. Approximately $1,141.89 in funds seized from PNC Bank account 
ending in 9499, held in the name of Kremkov Industries.  
b. Approximately $1,750,018.12 in funds seized from PNC Bank 
account ending in 9849, held in the name of Carl Torjagbo. 
c. 2022 BMW M850xi bearing VIN: WBAGV8C06NCH96608.  
d. 2021 Land Rover Range Rover Velar Sports Utility Vehicle bearing 
VIN: SALYM2FU7MA302651.  
e. 2014 Lamborghini Aventador bearing VIN: 
ZHWUC1ZD3ELA02216.  
REAL PROPERTY:  
f. 5114 Greythorne Lane, Marietta, Cobb County, Georgia 30068, and 
all buildings and appurtenances thereto.  
g. 101 Holt Drive, Acworth, Cherokee County, Georgia 30101, and all 
buildings and appurtenances thereto.  
h. Tract 4 Fiber Drive, Cartersville, Bartow County, Georgia 30120, and 
all buildings and appurtenances thereto. 
(Collectively, the “Subject Property”). The forfeiture provision of the Third 
Superseding Indictment also sought a personal money judgment against 
Torjagbo.  
Prior to trial, the United States filed a Motion for Interlocutory Sale with 
respect to the real properties located at 5114 Greythorne Lane, 101 Holt Drive, 
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and Tracy 4 Fiber Drive (collectively the “Subject Real Properties”). (Docs. 61, 
95). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for Interlocutory Sale 
on December 9, 2024. Three witnesses testified: the treasurer of the Brookshyre 
Manor Homeowner’s Association (“HOA”), Janet Franchi; Cobb County Police 
Department Detective Adriano Ghisi; and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Special Agent Scott Caruana. 
Franchi, who lived next door to Torjagbo’s home at 5114 Greythorne Lane, 
testified that after Torjagbo’s arrest, his cousin was initially looking after the 
property, but that the cousin stopped looking after the property in early 2023, 
and nobody had been looking after the property since then. (Hearing Transcript, 
Doc. 167, (“Hrg. Tr.”) at 10, 13). In the months that followed, the home started to 
fall into disrepair. (Hrg. Tr. at 13–16). The HOA undertook the maintenance of 
the front of the property. (Hrg. Tr. at 22). As of the hearing, the HOA had spent 
$3,400 maintaining Torjagbo’s home on his behalf, all while he had failed to pay 
his dues to the HOA. (Hrg. Tr. at 11–12, 24). While the HOA had been able to 
prevent the front of the house from falling into decay, it was unable to do so with 
respect to the back of the house. (Hrg. Tr. at 16, 36–37). Photographic evidence 
showed that the pool behind the house was full of murky standing water and 
debris, and the HOA was concerned about what type of safety hazards this 
might present. (Hrg. Tr. at 14–16). In total, as of December 2024, the HOA had 
lost $10,719.93 as a result of Torjagbo’s failure to pay his dues and maintain his 
property. (Hrg. Tr. at 27). 
Detective Ghisi testified that the house at 5114 Greythorne Lane had been 
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targeted for adverse possession by squatters. (Hrg. Tr. at 47–52). Specifically, an 
individual entered the house and (falsely) asserted that he had a claim to the 
house by virtue of having paid taxes on the property. (Hrg. Tr. at 47–50). Even 
after this individual left, at least one other potential squatter was found at the 
house. (Hrg. Tr. at 51).  
Special Agent Caruana testified that, as of early December 2024, there were 
$66,441.28 in unpaid taxes for 5114 Greythorne Lane, $7,937.09 in unpaid taxes 
for 101 Holt Drive, and $3,614.09 in unpaid taxes for Tract 4 Fiber Drive. (Hrg. Tr. 
at 60–66). He also explained that the 101 Holt Drive and Tract 4 Fiber Drive 
properties are parcels of undeveloped land. (Hrg. Tr. at 62, 64). On June 10, 2025, 
the Court denied the Motion for Interlocutory Sale. (Doc. 190). 
A week-long jury trial began on July 21, 2025. (Doc. 218). On July 25, 2025, 
after approximately an hour and fifteen minutes of deliberation, the jury 
returned a verdict finding Torjagbo guilty on all counts.1 (Doc. 228). At the 
conclusion of the trial, Torjagbo waived a jury determination of forfeiture as to 
the Subject Property, consenting to the Court making such determination. 
On January 15, 2026, the United States filed a Motion for Preliminary Order of 
Forfeiture, which described the nexus between the offenses of conviction and the 
Subject Property and sought a forfeiture money judgment. (Doc. 253 at 9–12). On 
 
1 Many for the counts Torjagbo was convicted of specifically related to the 
purchases of the Subject Property. Counts 5 through 10 charged defendant with 
money laundering in connection with his purchases of Tract 4 Fiber Drive, 101 
Holt Drive, 5114 Greythorne Lane, the Land Rover, the BMW, and the 
Lamborghini, respectively.  
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January 30, 2026, the Court granted the Motion for Preliminary Order of 
Forfeiture, finding that “[t]he United States ha[d] established the requisite nexus 
between the Subject Property and Counts One through Ten” of the Third 
Superseding Indictment. (Doc. 260 at 4). The Court also imposed a personal 
money judgment against Torjagbo in the amount of $4,615,080.75. (Id. at 5). 
On February 10, 2026, Torjagbo was sentenced to a total of 175 months in 
custody followed by 5 years of supervised release. (Doc. 270). Torjagbo filed his 
Notice of Appeal on February 23, 2026. (Doc. 273). He then filed a motion for a 
stay of forfeiture with the Court of Appeals on March 3, 2026. Because the 
motion should have been filed in the District Court, see Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1), he 
withdrew his motion before the Court of Appeals and filed the instant motion on 
April 2, 2026. (Doc. 281). 
2. Torjagbo has failed to meet his burden to show that a stay is warranted. 
The instant motion should be denied because Torjagbo has failed to show that 
a stay is warranted. The filing of an appeal does not automatically stay a 
forfeiture order.  See United States v. Houghton, 132 Fed. App’x 130, 132 (9th Cir. 
2005).  Instead, a defendant who appeals his conviction and order of forfeiture 
may seek a stay of the forfeiture pending his appeal.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(d).  
“[T]he court may stay the order of forfeiture on terms appropriate to ensure that 
the property remains available pending appellate review.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Thus, a stay is not mandatory but is instead left to the sound discretion of the 
court.  See id.; United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 123 (2d Cir. 2020). 
Courts have generally looked at four factors to determine whether a stay of 
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forfeiture should be granted pending appeal: (1) the likelihood of success on 
appeal; (2) whether the asset(s) will depreciate; (3) the intrinsic value of the 
asset(s) to the defendant; and (4) the expense of maintaining the asset(s). United 
States v. Ngari, 559 F. App’x 259, 272 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fisher, No. 
1:21-CR-231-02-TCB-CMS, 2024 WL 2001596, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2024), report 
& rec. adopted by 2024 WL 2000633 (N.D. Ga. May 6, 2024); United States v. Dong, 
252 F. Supp. 3d 447, 460 (D.S.C. 2017); see also Grote, 961 F.3d at 123 (noting that 
district court applied these factors, but that there are slightly different factors 
courts generally consider for stays outside of the forfeiture context, and finding 
that “[u]nder any such test, … the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying … a stay of the forfeiture order”). The party moving to stay forfeiture 
bears the burden of showing that such a stay is warranted. See Fisher, 2024 WL 
2001596, at *2 (“Rule 32.2(d) is silent about which party bears the burden of 
showing that a stay is warranted. It stands to reason, however, that the party 
seeking a stay … has the burden to show that a stay is warranted.”). Here, in 
light of the factors above, Torjagbo has failed to meet his burden to show that a 
stay is warranted.  
A. Torjagbo fails to show a likelihood of success on appeal. 
Torjagbo vaguely asserts that “there is a likelihood he will prevail on the 
merits of the appeal” because “he had no fraudulent intent to defraud the United 
States Government or Chase Bank” and because “there is no proper nexus 
between the criminal acts alleged and the forfeited property and the property is 
not properly subject to forfeiture.” (Doc. 281 at 2). Of course, the jury and the 
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Court respectively found otherwise, and Torjagbo offers no explanation as to 
why those findings were erroneous. In Fisher, the defendant contended that he 
was likely to succeed on appeal, but “provide[d] no details to support this 
claim[.]” 2024 WL 2001596, at *2. Because of this lack of detail, the Fisher court 
found that this factor did not support granting a stay. Here too, because 
Torjagbo’s motion is entirely devoid of detail as to why he is likely to succeed on 
appeal, this factor weighs against granting a stay.  
B. Many of the assets are depreciating in value and/or expensive to 
maintain. 
Torjagbo makes no showing whatsoever that the Subject Property will not 
depreciate in value over time or be costly to maintain. Nor could he. The Subject 
Real Properties and the three luxury vehicles (the “Subject Vehicles”) are all 
depreciating in value and/or costly to maintain. 
First, with respect to the Subject Real Properties, there are already thousands 
of dollars of taxes overdue on each of the properties. When the United States 
ultimately sells these properties, it will have to pay these taxes, which will 
diminish the equity in the property available to the United States—and 
ultimately the victims. The available equity will only decrease further as 
additional taxes and penalties accrue on the properties. Additionally, Franchi 
testified that the 5114 Greythorne Lane property has already started to fall into 
disrepair—nobody has been looking after the property on Torjagbo’s behalf since 
early 2023, there is murky standing water and debris in the pool, and the house 
has been targeted for adverse possession by squatters. The house would likely be 
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in an even worse state, were it not for the efforts of the HOA, which has spent 
thousands of dollars (and counting) to prevent the front of the house from 
deteriorating. Torjagbo has offered no evidence that the state of 5114 Greythorne 
Lane has improved since the hearing. If the house continues to decay, the 
amount that the United States will be able to sell it for will decrease even further, 
and the United States will likely have to reimburse the HOA for more and more 
of the expenses it has incurred, which will further diminish the value that can be 
recovered from the house and ultimately be returned to victims. Additionally, 
before the house can be sold, it will likely be necessary to make costly repairs, 
and the price of these repairs will only increase as the condition of the house 
continues to deteriorate.  
As for the Subject Vehicles, which are model years 2014, 2021, and 2022, their 
values are also depreciating as they age. See In re Bishop, 420 B.R. 841, 854 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2009) (recognizing that “cars depreciate very quickly, losing most of 
their value in the first few years after purchase”). Additionally, the United States 
must bear the costs of storing and maintaining the Subject Vehicles. All of this 
means that as more time passes before the Subject Vehicles are sold, there will be 
less and less money available for forfeiture, and ultimately less money available 
to victims.  
C. Torjagbo fails to show that the assets have intrinsic value. 
As to the final factor, Torjagbo conclusively asserts that, if the United States 
sells the Subject Property, he will suffer “irreparable harm … in that not only will 
he lose substantial financial equity in the property, but it will be difficult if not 
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impossible to regain the property after the conclusion of this appeal if the matter 
is not stayed.”(Doc. 281 at 2). This is not enough to meet his burden.  
First, as a factual matter, Torjagbo would not be “losing” the financial equity 
in the Subject Property if forfeiture is not stayed.  Rather, he would be “entitled 
to the proceeds from the sales of [the Subject P]roperty if the Eleventh Circuit 
reverses his conviction on appeal[.]” See Fisher, 2024 WL 2001596, at *4.  
Moreover, Torjagbo’s conclusory assertion that he will suffer “irreparable 
harm” is simply not enough to show that the Subject Property has intrinsic value. 
As the Fisher court explained: 
Courts have been reluctant to find that property has intrinsic value simply 
because it is a home or a parcel of real property. Instead, courts have 
required defendants seeking to stay forfeiture to allege facts showing that 
the property is unique, such as allegations showing that the real property 
had been in the defendant’s family for a long time or had nostalgic value.  
Fisher, 2024 WL 2001596, at *3 (emphasis in original).  
Here, Torjagbo fails to allege any facts that show that any of the Subject 
Property is unique or otherwise of intrinsic value. He purchased all of the Subject 
Real Properties and Subject Vehicles with the proceeds of his frauds between 
April 2021 and April 2022. He was arrested in May 2022, and has been in custody 
ever since. These were not heirlooms that had been in his family for 
generations—they were the fruits of his crimes, which he enjoyed for no more 
than approximately thirteen months. Under these circumstances, the intrinsic 
value factor weighs against a stay.  
 
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3. Conclusion 
Because Torjagbo has failed to meet his burden to show that a stay is 
warranted, the United States respectfully requests that the Motion (Doc. 281) be 
denied. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
THEODORE S. HERTZBERG 
United States Attorney 
/s/KELLY K. CONNORS 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 504787 
Kelly.Connors@usdoj.gov 
/s/NICHOLAS L. EVERT 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 693062 
Nicholas.Evert@usdoj.gov 
600 U.S. Courthouse 
75 Ted Turner Drive S.W. 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
Tel: (404) 581-6000; Fax: (404) 581-6181 
 
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